mencement of 1871, for the usual speech-making and letter-writing that usher in the meeting of Parliament. We had our foreign questions also. The public mind was excited at the commencement of the year, by the story of the Prussian seizure of our vessels at Duclair', and there were not wanting newspapers, as well as individuals, to do all in their power to magnify it into an immediate cause of quarrel, and to set it down to the deliberate and diabolical machinations of Prince Bismarck, (to anticipate his new honours by a few weeks). Unluckily, or luckily, for these alarmists, the German Chancellor proved himself at once perfectly reasonable upon the subject. In a message sent without delay to Lord Granville, he wrote, "You are authorized to say to Lord Granville that we sincerely regret that our troops, in order to avert immediate danger, were obliged to seize ships belonging to British subjects. We admit their claim to indemnification, and shall pay to the owners the value of the ships according to equitable estimation, without keeping them waiting for the decision of the question who is finally to indemnify them. Should it be proved that excesses have been committed which were not justified by the necessity of defence, we should regret it still more, and call the guilty persons to account." A rumour that the German demands on France would include the cession of Pondicherry, which excited English society for the moment more perhaps than any thing else during the war, was also contradicted as soon as spread. More important foreign questions we had at this time to deal with, in the shape of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and the famous Russian note upon that head which had caused so much excitement, and also in the well-worn Alabama claims, which had grown to be a weariness and vexation of spirit to public and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, and would seem to survive in America only as a useful expedient to be employed when an Irish vote was to be bidden for. To settle the Black Sea question, a Conference met in London early in the year; to dispose of the Alabama claims, a treaty was subsequently agreed upon and drawn up at Washington, of which further mention will be made in its place. Both these negotiations resulted in a settlement which was greeted with general satisfaction, and must therefore be accepted by the annalist as satisfactory. But it must be open to him to wonder in what light such settlement would have appeared to our fathers, in days, when other, though it may be very mistaken, views were taken of national credit and national honour. There would seem to be some strange inconsistency in the disposition which willingly, and even gratefully, accepts such arrangements as these, and quarrels beforehand over such trifling and unavoidable incidents as the seizure at Duclair.

The Conference was invited with a view to deliberate on, and, if possible, to come to a friendly agreement in respect of, certain complaints made by Russia as to the bearing of the Treaty of 1856

1 An Account of this occurrence will be found in our "Chronicle."

upon her national position. It will be remembered that, at the close of the Crimean War, which was certainly provoked by Russian ambition, that gigantic Northern Power was put under a restraint by the other great Powers of Europe, necessarily partaking of a penal character. Russia had broken the peace of Europe by crossing the Pruth, in the same violent fashion as Napoleon III. disturbed the public tranquillity of the European system by declaring war against Prussia. The Emperor Nicholas did so with a view to the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of Turkey in Europe. A strong warlike fleet issued from the supposed impregnable port and arsenal of Sebastopol, and, taking the fleet of Turkey at a disadvantage, practically destroyed it. When the war arising out of these events was brought to an issue adverse to the designs of Russia, it was both natural and fitting that the Power which for a merely selfish end had defied the strength of the other Powers of Europe should be placed under conditions intended so far to restrict its natural rights as to prevent the possibility of a like irruption in future.

On the fall of Sebastopol, and the conclusion of a treaty with Sweden, by which the Allies would have been able to carry the war into Finland, Austria renewed the offer of her good offices, and four points for which the Allies were contending were again presented in a more detailed form. The third point-that "the Treaty of July 13, 1841 (known as the Treaty of the Straits), should be revised by the high contracting parties in the interest of the European balance of power, and with a view to a limitation of the Russian power in the Black Sea"-now took the shape of an agreement that the Black Sea should be neutralized, that its waters should be open to the merchant marine of all nations, but not to any ships of war; that there should be no military arsenals on its banks; and that Russia and Turkey should mutually engage to maintain in the Black Sea only a specified number of light vessels for the service of the coasts. Before this was submitted to Russia, it had been warmly discussed by the Western Powers. A proposal by France to lower the terms provoked an indignant remonstrance from England, Lord Palmerston declaring that, sooner than accept inadequate terms, England and Turkey would carry on the war alone. England insisted that the engagement as to the Black Sea must be embodied in the general treaty with the Powers, and must not be modified without their assent. These views carried the day, and on January 5, 1856, Count Nesselrode accepted the bases of the negotiation.

These preliminaries being settled, the Congress of Paris opened on February 25, and on March 4 the third point came up for consideration. It was agreed that the Black Sea should be neutralized, and that its waters and ports, while thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, should be " formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts or of any other Power, with the exceptions stipulated in the present Treaty." The paragraph as to the prohibition of military

arsenals was also adopted. Lord Clarendon pointed out that the maintenance of an arsenal of the first class at Nicolaieff, though not on the shores of the Black Sea, would justify public opinion in "attributing to Russia intentions which she cannot entertain." Upon this the first plenipotentiary of Russia replied "that the Emperor, his august master, on acceding with sincerity to the propositions of peace, firmly resolved strictly to carry out all the engagements resulting from them; . . . that in order at once to provide for his engagements and for the requirements of the naval service, the Emperor intends only to authorize the construction at Nicolaieff of the vessels of war mentioned in the bases of the negotiation." Further, Count Orloff agreed to the insertion of his declaration in the Protocol, adding that, to prove his sincerity, the Emperor requested a free passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for the two ships of the line which alone were then at Nicolaieff, and which would have to proceed to the Baltic as soon as peace was concluded.

Thus, the Black Sea, which washes the southern coasts of Russia, was neutralized, and no ships of war beyond the number of six, and these of a small size, were permitted to appear in the waters of the Euxine.

No doubt, this was a humiliation to Russia. All other Powers were free to have what navy they pleased within their own waters. For fourteen years Russia was made an exception, and, until recently, had quietly submitted to the restraint imposed upon her. She took advantage, however, of the supposed annihilation of the French power by the capitulation of Metz to announce her intention no longer to abide by the Treaty of 1856, so far as it related to the neutralization of the Black Sea, and henceforth to treat the provisions of it which had that end in view as of no force. Europe was struck with astonishment at the effrontery of this declaration. There was no indisposition any where to reconsider the stipulations of the treaty in the interest of Russia, nor to relieve her from the pressure of such of them as were penal in their nature, on the understanding that all the parties to the treaty should be properly invoked to give their consent to that release. But Earl Granville, on the part of this country, led the way in protesting against the assumed right of any one signatory to set aside at his own will an international agreement made between several Powers, and dealt with the announcement of Russia as of no effect.

In assuming a right to abolish her own treaty engagements, there can be no doubt that Russia counted upon some general understanding she had arrived at with Prussia, that the latter Power would assist her in effecting her wishes. She deprived herself, however, of the benefit which it might have given her, by her own impatient and premature action. Count Bismarck, no less than the leading statesmen of other European Powers, was taken by surprise. Prussia had enough upon her hands to task all her energies to the utmost, without precipitating another war, in which

she would have been held bound to take part. Count Bismarck, therefore, counselled Russia to be patient and moderate, and proposed the convening of a Conference as the likeliest means of achieving without offence, and with the full concurrence of all the signatory Powers, the object upon which she had set her heart. Finding herself alone as to the method she had adopted for gaining her ends, she listened to reason, and consented to ask as a boon what she had previously declared her intention of taking as a right. Invitations were thereupon issued by Earl Granville to the other signatory Powers, all of which consented to attend, on the full understanding that they should enter the Conference wholly unpledged.

Some delay arose in the assembling of the Conference in consequence of the anomalous position of France. The provisional nature of the existing Government had not, it is true, prevented France from being represented at this gathering of Plenipotentiaries, inasmuch as a formal invitation was sent to the Government of Defence, and accepted by that Government: but M. Jules Favre, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom his colleagues requested to appear for France on the occasion, felt himself unable to quit the side of General Trochu at the moment when Paris was undergoing actual bombardment. No one could blame him for the reluctance he expressed to quit the spot on which the primary duties and responsibilities of his office called for his continued presence. Hence the adjournment of the Conference, at first without any attempt to enter upon the business for which it was convened. The French Ministry at first demanded that the question of the war and the position of France should be brought before the Conference. To this Lord Granville was unable to assent. Dreading the delay, which, in the best of cases, must ensue in the despatch of a Plenipotentiary from France, he suggested the appointment of M. Tissot, the Chargé d'Affaires in London. All the other Powers had appointed as their Plenipotentiaries their representatives at the English Court. A most unpleasant delay, and the lamentable absence of a representative of France from a great European Council would have been spared had Lord Granville's advice been accepted. On the 18th of December, 1870, Lord Granville received a formal intimation that a French Plenipotentiary would present himself at the Conference. On the 23rd the official invitations were sent out from the Foreign Office, among others to M. Tissot as the substitute for the French Plenipotentiary. The day of meeting was fixed for the 3rd of January, 1871.

The French Plenipotentiary chosen was M. Jules Favre, and M. de Chaudordy, in announcing his name to the English Government, begged that it would obtain a pass out of Paris for M. Favre from the Prussian head-quarters, and that the Prussians should communicate for this purpose with the besieged city. Lord Granville replied that the Prussians had determined to send no more flags of truce, in consequence of some recent alleged acts of treachery on the

part of the French, and that the application for a safe conduct must come from M. Favre. A weary game of cross purposes followed. Count Bismarck was not very obliging, and M. Favre was irritated and wayward. It finally became clear that M. Favre did not mean to attend, and Lord Granville on the 6th of January recapitulated in a despatch to Lord Lyons the efforts he had made to secure the presence of a French representative at the Conference. As the best means of supplying this void Lord Granville affirmed that, whatever the decision of the Conference, it should be ultimately left open for the adhesion of France, and that before and after each sitting the course of business should be communicated to the French Chargé d'Affaires.

The Conference was postponed to the 17th of January, in the hope of obtaining the presence of M. Favre. Lord Granville was desirous to postpone the meeting longer, but the Austrian and Turkish Ministers deprecated delay. At the first sitting only the general question of international law was debated, and all the Powers represented signed a note expressly repudiating the right of any single Power to retreat from a Treaty without the previous consent of its co-signataries, or a majority of them. The discussion of the Treaty was adjourned to the 26th, by which time it was hoped M. Favre might arrive. But the emergency at Paris had now become so terrible that M. Favre no longer desired to leave the city, and the result was that the other European Powers were compelled to meet and discuss the Eastern Question without the assent or co-operation of France.

The correspondence which led to the Conference was laid before Parliament soon after its meeting. It was on the 9th of November that Baron Brunnow communicated to Lord Granville a Circular Note, sent at nearly the same time to the other Powers who signed and guaranteed the Treaty of Paris, and also a despatch addressing its arguments more particularly to the English Government. The purpose of the Note was to declare that the Czar felt himself no longer bound by the provisions of the Treaty of Paris signed by himself and the Sultan, and that he withdrew from the joint Convention appended to the Treaty, which prescribes the size and number of war vessels to be maintained by the two Powers within the Straits. It is worth while to cite Article XIV. of the Treaty itself:

"Their Majesties the Emperor of all the Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the force and the number of light vessels necessary for the service of their coasts which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty."

Prince Gortschakoff's Circular, dated "Tsarskoé-Sélo, October 19-31, 1870," distinctly intimated the intention of the Czar to violate the last-cited clause. It began by insisting that recent