and senate, as it relates to the appointments, but of the power which had been expressly reserved to the States in the appointment of the officers of the militia; a power the more valuable to the States, because, as they had surrendered to the general government the revenues and physical force of the nation, they could only look to the officers of the militia as a security against the possible abuse of the delegated power. The committee find the melancholy fact before them, that military officers, even at this early stage of this republic, have, without the shadow of authority, raised an army of at least 2,500 men, and mustered them into the service of the United States; 230 officers have been appointed, and their rank established, from an Indian brigadiergeneral down to the lowest subaltern of a company. To whom were those officers accountable for their conduct? Not to the president of the United States; for it will be found that it was not considered necessary even to furnish him with a list of their names; and not until the pay rolls were made out and payment demanded, were the persons known to the department of war.

And

in this place it is proper to observe, that general Jackson seemed to consider those officers, of his own creation, competent to discharge all the functions of officers appointed by the authority of the general or state governments; for we find five of them detailed afterwards to sit on a general court-martial, on a trial of life and death. Might not, on the same principles, general Jack

son have tried, condemned, and executed any officer of the Georgia militia, by the sentence of a court-martial, composed of officers created by him and holding their assumed authority by the tenor of his will?

Your committee will dismiss this branch of the subject, by observing, that consistently with the character and genius of our government, no officer, however high or exalted his station, can be justified for an infraction of the constitution. It is an offence against the sovereignty of the nation; this sovereignty being vested in the great body of the people. The constitution is the written expression of their will, and above the control of all the public functionaries combined. And when that instrument has been violated, the people alone have power to grant the indemnity for its infraction; and all that can be said in favour of the officer who transcends his constitu tional powers must be taken, not in justification of the act, but in mitigation of the enormity of the offence committed. With this view of the subject, which they conceive to be a correct one, the committee have in vain sought for an excuse for the commanding general. He has stated in his letter to the secretary of war, assuming the power to judge for the national legislature, that a volunteer force of mounted gunmen would be the least expensive and the most efficient. His duty was, to execute the orders of his superior officers, not to disobey them; to observe and enforce the laws, not to violate them; obedience and subordina

tion are the first and highest duties of a soldier, and no one knew better the truth of, and necessity for observing this maxim, than the officer in question. For the truth of this observation we have his own declaration. In his letter to the Secretary of War of the 20th of January, 1818, he says, "Your letter, enclosing your general order of the 29th ult. has been received; like yourself, I have no other feelings to gratify than those connected with the public good; and it gives me pleasure to find we cocide in those opinions calculated to produce it. Responsibility now rests where it should, on the officer issuing the order; and the principle acknowledged is calculated to insure that subordination so necessary to the harmonious movement of every part of the military machine."

:

It is to be regretted, that an officer who seemed to be so per fectly acquainted with what belonged to the duty of others, should have been so totally regardless of, or unconscious of, his own and while the committee are willing to admit, that the volunteer forces called into service by General Jackson were more efficient and less expensive than the militia, had he confined himself to the usual proportion of officers; this, they conceive, should not be urged as an argument in favour of employing them, or plead in justification of the unlawful act; for if these reasons be considered conclusive, and should be acquiesced in, they will be applied with increased force (fortified by this precedent) in all future wars;

an army of regulars will be contsidered (as they really are) more efficient and less expensive than either the volunteers, if authorized by law, or the militia; and the officer at the head of such army (acting on the principles before stated, and encouraged by the acquiescence of the nation) may dispense with the militia altogether, and increase the regular army to any extent that folly or ambition may suggest; and all this, under the plea of necessity. The committee can scarcely imagine a possible case that may occur in a future war, where the necessity will be less strong than in the present. This war was waged when the United States were at peace with all the world, except this miserable undisciplined banditti of "deluded Indians" and fugitive slaves; their whole strength, when combined, not exceeding 1,000 men, opposed to whom (previous to Gen. Jackson's taking the command) and under Gen. Gaines, were a force of 1,800 regulars and militia, besides the 1,500 friendly Indians, illegally subsidized by the lastmentioned general? What then in this state of the case becomes of the plea of necessity? And if it be admitted in this case to justify or palliate an act of military usurpation, the committee would anxiously inquire where it is to be disallowed or denied? And here the committee, having pledged themselves faithfully to disclose facts and impartially to draw conclusions, beg leave to remark, that the conduct of the commanding general, in raising this volunteer corps, was appro

bated

bated by the War Department, as will appear by the letter of the Secretary, dated the 29th day of January, 1818; and it is but justice to the department to state, that it was not until the officers that had assisted in thus officer. ing and organizing this corps, were examined by the committee, that they were apprized of the illegality of the measure; for there is nothing to be found in Gen. Jackson's letters on this subject to the Secretary of War, of the 12th, 13th and 20th of February, 1818, from which it can be fairly inferred, that he had appointed a single officer: indeed it would seem from a fair interpretation of those letters, that the officers, at least, were of the regular militia of the States, and that the only departure from his orders by the General was, his having called on the subordinate officers of the militia, instead of the Governor of the State of Tennessee, and his preference of mounted men to infantry; and it will also appear from the letters aforesaid, that had the Department of War disapproved of this conduct, and determined to countermand the order of General Jackson in raising this force, no order to that effect could have reached him before he had arrived at the seat of war, and of course the army might have been disbanded in sight of the enemy, and the objects of the campaign thereby jeopardized, and perhaps

defeated.

The committee will next take notice of the operations of the army in the Floridas, whither they were authorized to pursue the enemy; and connected with VOL. LXI.

this authority, it was enjoined on Gen. Gaines, to whom the first order to this effect was given, that in case the enemy took refuge under a Spanish garrison, not to attack them there, but to report the fact to the Secretary at War; and the observance of this order the committee conceive was equally obligatory on General Jackson, who succeeded to the command; at least it must have clearly evinced the will of the Secretary of War on that point; and how far this injunction was observed, will be found by what followed. It appears that Gen. Jackson advanced into Florida with a force of 1,800 men, composed of regulars, volunteers, and the Georgia militia; and afterwards, on the 1st of April, was joined by Gen. M'Intosh and his brigade of 1,500 Indians, who had been previously organized by Gen. Gaines; opposed to whom, it appears from the report of Captain Young, topographical engineer, and other evidence, the whole forces of the fugitive Seminole Indians and runaway negroes, had they all been embodied, could not have exceeded 900 or 1,000 men, and at no time did half that number present themselves to oppose his march, of course little or no resistance was made.

The Mickasuky towns were first taken and destroyed; the army marched upon St. Mark's, a feeble Spanish garrison, which was surrendered "without firing a gun," and then occupied it as an American post: the Spanish commandant having first by humble entreaties and then by a timid protest, endeavoured to avert the L

measure.

measure. Here Alexander Arbuthnot was found, taken prisoner and put in confinement, for the purpose, as it was stated by General Jackson, "of collecting evidence to establish his guilt;" and here also were taken two Indian chiefs, one of whom pretended to possess the spirit of prophesy; they were hung without trial and with little ceremony.

This being done, and St. Mark's garrisoned by American troops, the army pursued their march eastward to Suwaney river, on which they found a large Indian village, which was consumed, and the Indians and negroes were dispersed ; after which the army returned to St. Mark's, bringing with them Robert C. Ambrister, who had been taken prisoner on their march to Suwaney. During the halt of the army for a few days at St. Mark's, a general court-martial was called, Arbuthnot was arraigned, found guilty, sentenced to suffer death and hung.

Ambrister was tried in like manner, found guilty and sentenced to whipping and confine ment. General Jackson annulled the sentence and ordered him to be shot; and this order was executed.

It appears by the testimony, that the army had arrived at St. Mark's, on their return from Suwaney, on the 25th of April; and on the 26th, general Jackson writes to the secretary of war in the following manner:-" I shall leave this in two or three days for Fort Gadsden, and, after making all necessary arrangements for the security of the po

The

sitions occupied, and detach ing a force to scour the country west of the Appalachicola, I shall proceed direct to Nashville; my presence in this country can be no longer necessary. Indian forces have been divided and scattered; cut off from all communications with those unprincipled agents of foreign nations who have deluded them to their ruin, they have not the power, if the will remains, of annoying our frontier." pears, however, by the conduct of the commanding general, that he had, at this time, looked to different movements; for, at the time he was writing this letter, as will be seen by the testimony of captain Call and surgeon Bronaugh, he had dispatched lieute nant Sands to Mobile, to forward on a train of artillery to a given point, to be ready to be made use of in reducing Pensacola and the fort of Barancas, should that measure be thereafter thought proper; having made these arrangements, the army marched to Fort Gadsden, on the Appalachicola river. There, as stated by general Jackson and confirm. ed by the testimony of colonel Butler, information was received by a private letter, written from a merchant at Pensacola to Mr. Doyle and shown to general Jackson, that a number of Indians had recently visited Pensacola, and were committing depredations on the Spanish inhabitants of that place, and were receiving aid and comfort from the garrison. On the receipt of this intelligence, the resolution seems to have been taken to garrison that place with American troops;

and

and after a march of about 20 days, having met his artillery, general Jackson, with about 1,200 men, the rest having been discharged, appeared before Pensacola, the capital of the province. The place was taken with scarce the show of resistance. The governor had escaped, and taken refuge in the fort of the Barancas; to which place, distant about six miles, the army marched, and the fortress was invested on the 25th of May; and a demand being made for its surrender and refused, the attack on the fortress by land and water commenced, and after the bombardment and cannonading had been kept up for a part of two days, and some lives lost, the fortress was surrendered, the garrison made prisoners of war, and the officers of the government, civil and military, transported to the Havannah, agreeably to the terms of the capitulation; which terms general Jackson, in his letter of 2nd June, 1818, declares." were more favourable than a conquered enemy would have merited."

The civil and military govern ment of Spain thus annulled, general Jackson thought it necessary to abolish the revenue laws of Spain, and establish those of the United States as more favourable to the commerce of the United States; and for this purpose captain Gadsden was appointed collector, and by him, under the authority of general Jackson, that department of the new government was organized. The Spanish authorities being thus put down by the sword, both civil and military, a new government was established for

this newly acquired territory, the powers of which, both civil and military, were vested in military officers. And general Jackson having declared in numerous communications to the department of war that the Seminole war was closed, and the object of the campaign at an end, he returned to his residence at Nashville, state of Tennessee. And here it would have given the committee sincere pleasure to have stated that the history of the campaign had closed; but facts which it becomes now their duty to report, require that history to be continued. On the 7th of August 1818, more than two months after his consummation of the conquest of West, and part of East Florida, he issued an order to general Gaines directing him to take possession of St. Augustine, a strong fortress and the capital of East Florida. A copy of this order is subjoined to this report, and his reasons for this measure are stated at large in the order, and reiterated and enforced by his letter to the secretary at war, dated the 10th of the same month, which reasons, fully and beyond the possibility of doubt, discover the motives of the commanding general in all his movements against Spain..

The tendency of these measures by the commanding general seems to have been to involve the nation in a war without her consent, and for reasons of his own, unconnected with his military functions.

Your committee would be unwilling to attribute improper motives, where those of a different character could be possibly in