carry out a vessel. In January following he should certainly have considered her out of time, and would not have underwritten the policy at any premium.

Mr. Pitcairn, an insurancebroker, proved that in November he had done policies on the Isabella at the usual premium. On the 19th of January following he received orders from Devonshire to effect further insurances. At this time he was aware that the ship had sailed on the 21st of October, which circumstance he communicated to the underwriters, who, in consequence, demanded from 25l. to 35l. per cent. premium. He stated the average voyage from Newfoundland to Genoa to be 35 days.

The lord chief justice told the jury, that there did not seem to be any fraud on the part of the plaintiff in concealing the letter, but that made no difference: if the letter were material, the plaintiff could not recover, whether the concealment arose from ill-design or ignorance. It was for them to consider whether the letter were material or not. He then recapitulated the evidence, and the jury gave a verdict for the defendant.

COURT OF CHANCERY, DEC. 23.

Curtis v. Kingdom.-The Attorney General this day moved to dissolve an injunction which had been obtained by the plaintiff, who stated himself to be the author of an Account of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, with a view to the information of emi,

grants, and who complained that the defendant, in a publication on America and the British colonies, had pirated his work.

The learned counsel contended, that as the plaintiff had compiled his work from other authors, it was not to be considered such an original work as the Court would protect, and even supposing it were such, yet that the defendant was as much at liberty to compile from those authors as the plaintiff; and that, in fact, the defendant had compiled from those authors, and had not copied from the plaintiff's work.

Mr. Horne followed on the same side, distinguishing this case from those that had been previously decided, and pointing out the difference between the works themselves. The defendant's work was published at half-a-guinea, and contained the comparative merits of the various points of emigration; while the plaintiff's, published at a less price, contained only information relating to the Cape.

Mr. Pemberton, also for the defendant, contended that the plaintiff's work not having been entered at Stationers'-hall was not protected by the statute; and to show the different nature of the works, he pointed out the opposite conclusions to which the authors had arrived. The plaintiff stated that he sat down to his task with considerable prejudices against the Cape as a point of emigration, but had risen from it with very different impressions. The fendant, on the contrary, having himself entertained some intention of emigrating, after weighing the various climes of all

the

the colonies, had decided, naturally enough, to abide at home.

Mr. Heald, for the plaintiff, first contended, that if works of this kind were to be furnished to the public, authors must avail themselves of the labours of their predecessors. He would ask his learned friends on the other side in what way they would otherwise wish a history of the Cape of Good Hope? That the plaintiff, so far from being a pirate of the works of others, had in his preface fairly stated, that he had freely availed himself of the many interesting pictures of the Cape colony which modern travels supply: that to the superior work of Mr. Barrow in particular, he had been much indebted, nor had he omitted to consult the observations of Vaillant, Lichtenstein and Campbell; or the Journal of the Rev. Mr. Latrobe's Visit to South Africa in 1815 and 1816. Had the plaintiff therefore pirated from preceding authors in the way the defendant had from him, he would have placed those authors in a situation to make a similar application to the Court; but when he fairly told the world that the "superior" work of Mr. Barrow, &c. was to be had, he did not conduct himself like a pirate upon the rights of others, and he submitted that the plaintiff having bestowed his care and industry in selecting what was important to emigrants from various voluminous publications, he thereby became the author of his own work, from which no man had a right to copy; and as to the 2nd point, it was a matter of fact, and it only remained to show that the defendant's work, far from being

compiled by himself from the works of others, or containing extracts from the plaintiff's work "met with" by accident, and occurring only "here and there," as defendant had alleged, was a verbatim copy of numerous pages of the plaintiff's work on the subject of the Cape. He offered to show 10 pages together of plaintiff's work which had been copied within 3 lines. That the identity which he was prepared to prove between these works reminded him of an occurrence in the early part of his professional life. In an action for pirating a chart, it was shown that a rock had been inserted in the plaintiff's map, which, in point of fact, existed no where else, but which had also been copied in the defendant's. A rock, said his lordship's predecessor, " upon which their case will, I fear, be wrecked." In the present instance he would show that defendant, in a table said to be copied by him from Mr. Barrow, had carefully perpetuated such remarkable typographical errors, as identified it with the plaintiff's work, and with no other. He then in a humorous strain observed, that Mr. Barrow had found in the district of Stellenbosch, 451,695 sheep; but on the plaintiff's arrival at the Cape, an immense slaughter had taken place amongst them, and he found but 51,695, making a difference of no less than 400,000; this he of course duly reported in his book, and it was remarkable, that the defendant on his arrival found not only that no further mortality had taken place, but that to a head there was the exact number of sheep the plain

tiff had stated. Other peculiarities of a similar description were pointed out. In particular the learned counsel observed, that Mr. Barrow had described the Cape under the four principal districts into which it was in his time divided. But the plaintiff had introduced a totally different political division, i. e. into seven districts, under which it was now governed; and in the very order and terms in which the plaintiff had introduced them, the defendant had copied them into his book. Now, though he must admit that the defendant, in writing a history of the Cape, could not do otherwise than insert the seven existing divisions, was it to be imagined that two gentlemen sitting down, even to compilations, upon which each fairly bestowed his time and labour, would arrive at exactly the same mode of describing such divisions in seven distinct instances, and express themselves in exactly the same words?

Mr. Raithby followed on the same side, and was proceeding to insist on a bona fide compilation or abridgment being as much intitled to the protection of the law as a work in other senses original, when his lordship expressing a full concurrence in this argument, the learned gentleman did not press it.

The Attorney General attempted to sustain his former line of observation, by beginning to read from Mr. Barrow and to point out errors of the plaintiff which defendant had corrected, when

The Lord Chancellor terminated the discussion, by observing this case to be somewhat dif

ferent from the application of the original author of a work for his protection. In the absolute sense of the terms, neither of these were original works; both professed to be compilations from other and larger publications. "But if a man profess to give the world a compilation," said his lordship, "let him sit down fairly and compile. He must not copy even from a previous compilation; for his work would then be a piracy of that compilation. this case, the defendant has not merely copied some facts, but many facts with the errors; and not only the facts, but the reasoning of the plaintiff. The injunction cannot, under these circumstances, be dissolved. The plaintiff is perfectly correct in coming here for the protection of his labours, which, both in law and equity, as far as I can see, must be given him.

BOARD OF EXCISE, DEC. 29.

The firm of Messrs. Thompson and Coates, wine and spirit-merchants of Holborn-hill, were charged under the 54th of Geo. III. chap. 8, commonly called the Cape Act, with having mixed a quantity of Port wine with a quantity of Cape wine, against the statute. There is a penalty of 300l. attached to the offence if it is with a fraudulent intention, but this being admitted not to be the case, the penalty was not proceeded for.

This case excited an extraordinary degree of interest amongst the wine trade in general, as the question at issue was as to the

legality

legality of a common practice of mixing wines to improve their flavour. The court was crowded by persons in the trade, who were anxious to hear the decision.

Mr. Fisher, a surveyor in the Excise, proved, that in taking the stock of Messrs. Thompson and Coates, on the 19th of October, he found an excess of eight gallons in a pipe of Cape wine of 98 gallons, which was not accounted for by the permits. On asking Mr. Coates to account for the increase, he stated it to have been caused by the addition of eight gallons of Port wine, in order to improve the Cape wine. The whole of the pipe, 100 gallons, were consequently seized. The stocking officer corroborated this

statement.

Mr. Coates appeared in behalf of the firm, and said he stood there to answer the charge made against the firm-the first in their lives. It was a question in which their character, which had hitherto stood pre-eminent, was concerned; and as it was but natural to suppose that their prosperity would procure them many enemies, the account of the seizure had now the full progress of a lie throughout the trade, and from the mere seizure of a pipe of wine, it had increased to the discovery of a contraband connexion, and an immense seizure, to which a penalty of 20,000l. was attached, which had afforded consolation to those envious of their prosperity. He should first contend that the officer acted illegally in seizing more than the excess of eight gallons; secondly, that to mix Port wine with Cape red wine was not contrary either to the

letter or the intention of the act of parliament; and, thirdly, that they had done nothing inconsistent with the revenue, which was neither in fact nor intention in

jured. On the contrary, he should show that the revenue was in reality benefitted. There were only two laws in force against the mixture of wines, namely, the 12th of Charles II. c. 25, and the 54th Geo. III. as to the seizure of the whole of the pipe. He referred to the 27th clause of the last-mentioned act, to prove that the officer had no right to seize more than eight gallons, the words of the act being, "that the quantity seized should be equal to the quantity found in excess;" and he contended, that there were not the slightest grounds for supposing that the act authorized the whole to be seized. He had, when asked by the officer to account for the excess, openly and candidly given him the truth, which if he had had any improper motives, he would have withheld, and which it would have been impossible to have discovered, had he not told it. He complain ed that the admission, which had been made in honour and good spirit to the officer, should. be converted to their disadvantage. To prove that the act for which they were charged was not contrary to the letter and spirit of the act of parliament, he contended that at the time the act was made for the commutation of the duties on Cape wine from 7s. 6d. per gallon to 2s. 6d. the legislature had in contemplation the frauds which might be committed, by mixing the Cape wine, which paid the duty of 2s. 6d. per

gallon,

gallon, with those which retained the standard duty of 7s. 6d. and thereby defrauding the revenue. The legislature had never in contemplation that any one would mix that which paid the greater duty with that which paid the less, as in the present instance, or it would have been mentioned. The act merely said, that" if any person should mix or mingle Cape wine with Port or other foreign wines." Now had the converse been intended, it would have been stated, as it was in the act of Charles II., for those who made acts of parliament were never sparing of words. The illegality was in mixing Cape wine with Port, or any other, which was not the case in the present instance, for the Port wine was mixed with the Cape. This was not a mere play upon terms, but a solid objection; as, for instance, in a domestic recipe it was said, "Mix a tea-spoonful of sulphuric acid with a pint of water," but it would be absurd to say, "Mix a pint of water with a tea-spoonful of acid;" or, to say "Mix a tea-spoonful of milk with a cup of tea," was proper, but to say, "Mix or mingle a cup of tea with a spoonful of milk," was manifestly contrary to common sense. As to the practice not being injurious to the revenue, but on the contrary, he would not waste the time of the Court, as it was selfevident. He might have been mistaken in the construction of the acts. If he had erred, it was not from intention. If the Court should pronounce the practice illegal, he for one was ready to abandon it. It was the daily practice of the most respectable

wine-merchants in the trade to mix Port wine with Cape, in order to improve the barren flavour of the Cape, and to make it keep longer. The question as to the legality of the practice was therefore of the highest importance to the trade, with whom, if he were guilty, he shared the guilt in common.

The Court asked Mr. Fisher, the surveyor, whether he believed it

to be a common practice; to which he replied in the affirmative, and said that one had been convicted, and another trial was pending for the same offence.

Mr. Coates continued, and said he felt, as every other practical man felt, the utter impossibility of adhering to the letter of the Excise-laws, which the legislature seemed to have contemplated, in giving such extensive powers of mitigation to the Court.

Mr. Mayo said the legislature had only contemplated a departure from the Excise-laws, by enacting excessive penalties.

The Court said, Mr. Coates ought not to have made such a declaration there; he might if he pleased, with others, have reserved it for his closet. The Court could only be governed by the letter of the Excise-laws.

Mr. Coates asked the surveyor whether there was not a corresponding decrease in a pipe of port wine at the time of the increase in the Cape which was seized. The fact was admitted.

Mr. Mayo, the solicitor to the Excise, contended that the Court could only be governed by the letter of the Act, which was, he said, against the defendant. He answered at some length the arguments