rule-for abolishing that which existed, and making a & new one-but surely it cannot justify the Speaker or the House in violating the existing rule, or giving a construction to it in direct opposition to its letter and spirit, and to the practice of the House on a former occasion. This argument, if it must be called an argument, proceeds upon the assumption that there are, or may be, members in this House factious enough, or foolish enough, or vile enough, to raise question after question, and to hang one question upon another, for no other purpose than to prevent a decision. If such a temper existed with any number of members, or even any one member, you cannot prevent such a result by your decision. I will prove to you, and in a way which you cannot deny, that, if there be one single member who is wicked and factious enough to pursue such a course, he can prevent you from taking the question, even after the previous question has been ordered; and this, too, only by making motions, which are undoubtedly in order, from day to day until the end of the session. Suppose the previous question ordered: the member gets up and moves that the House adjourn; you must put the question; it is decided against him; he then moves a call of the House, which he has a right to do, as solemnly settled by the House last session; it is decided against him. He then moves to lay the subject on the table, which you have repeatedly admitted this session to be in order; it is decided against him. He then moves again to adjourn, and goes through the same circle of questions ad infinitum. You cannot prevent him as long as the rules remain unchanged, and he remains a member. All the motions I have stated are clearly in order; how long they will be allowed to remain so, God only knows. It is as easy to repeal them by a decision of the Chair as it has been to repeal the right to debate questions of order, or the rule which requires every member to vote unless excused. None of our rules are framed upon the presumption of there being members disposed so grossly to abuse their privi- | leges. And the possibility of such abuse, or the actual fact of abuse, can never justify you in depriving a member of rights secured to him by the existing rules, though you may change the rule or punish the member for shamefully annoying the House under a perverted use of his privileges. Sir, this notion about a few members being able to prevent a decision being a reason in support of the Speaker's decision, is a mere pretext, having no force in sound reasoning, and no foundation in fact, in regard to the particular case to which it was applied. If such a disposition had existed, it could have been gratified in several ways, within the rules of order. That no such means were resorted to, of itself falsifies the gross and wanton imputation made upon those who voted against the Speaker's decision.

I regret that I have felt myself compelled, in vindica. tion of myself from the denunciation to which I have been exposed, to renew this question. I could in no other way sustain my opinions in argument. The making of this motion may be made the ground of new imputations of a factious spirit. They may be made with full as much truth as those already indulged in. This motion, too, will afford an opportunity to those who were misled in the former vote, and are now satisfied of their error, to do homage to truth and reason, and manifest their firmness and independence, and their scorn of party denunciation and partisan dictation.

I have another word to say. Those of us who voted against the decision of the Chair have been charged with doing so for the purpose of keeping open and preventing the settlement of the abolition subject. The falsehood of this imputation is notorious to every man in this House, so far as I am concerned. I have differed with the majority of this House as to the best means of disposing of the questions that have arisen. I believe that the

[H. OF R.

course which has been pursued is a substantial surrender of the rights and security from attack of the Southern country on that subject. The outworks of our defences have been given up to the abolitionists, and the door is left open through which, one day or other, the citadel itself will, I fear, be dangerously assailed. But the majority thought otherwise. I make no imputation upon their motives; time will show whose course was most wise. And as to the particular imputation, that I wished, by voting against the decision of the Chair, to reopen the question, to keep up excitement, it is shown to be wantonly and shamefully gratuitous by the fact that, on the very day when that question was taken, I made two distinct motions for the express purpose of disposing of the subject, and ending it finally on that day. First, I moved to suspend the rules to go on with it when the orders of the day were called; and afterwards, when a gentleman from New York had made a motion which would only have postponed the questions as to these gentlemen who had declined voting for a few days, I asked him to yield me the floor for the purpose of mov ing a postponement until the 1st day of August-in other words, an indefinite postponement.

Thus it is that the motives and conduct of members on this floor may be misrepresented and perverted by those who are under no restraint from either truth or decency.* The SPEAKER stated the grounds of his decision to the House, substantially to the following effect:

In giving his decision on a former day, when the same question of construction of the rules, now raised, was first brought to the notice of the House, he had stated a case which might arise, as an illustration of what would be the practical operation of the rules, under a contrary decision from that which he had given. The case supposed, for the purpose of illustration merely, was not ap

*On the question, "Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the House?" those who voted in the affirmative are

Messrs. Anthony, Barton, Bean, Bockee, Boon, Bouldin, Bovee, Briggs, Brown, Buchanan, Burns, W. B. Calhoun, Carr, Casey, Chaney, N. H. Claiborne, Cleveland, Coles, Connor, Craig, Cramer, Cushing, Cushman, Deberry, Dickerson, Doubleday, Dromgoole, Fairfield, Farlin, Fry, P. C. Fuller, William K. Fuller, Galbraith, Gillet, Glascock, Grantland, Haley, Joseph Hall, Hamer, Samuel S. Harrison, Albert G. Harrison, Haynes, Hiester; Howard, Hubley, Huntington, Huntsman, W. Jackson, J. Jackson, Jarvis, J. Johnson, C. Johnson, B. Jones, Judson, Kennon, Kilgore, Kinnard, Klingensmith, Lane, Laporte, J. Lee, Leonard, Logan, Loyall, Lucas, A. Mann, J. Mann, Martin, May, McKeon, McKim, McLene, Miller, Montgomery, Morgan, Muhlenberg, Owens, Page, Parker, Parks, Patterson, Franklin Pierce, D. J. Pearce, Pettigrew, Phelps, John Reynolds, Joseph Reynolds, Ripley, Roane, Schenck, Seymour, W. B. Shepard, Shinn, Sickles, Spangler, Speight, Taylor, Thomas, J. Thomson, Toucey, Turner, Turrill, Vanderpoel, Wagener, Ward, Wardwell, Webster, Weeks108.

Those who voted in the negative are

Messrs. Adams, H. Allen, Ashley, Beale, Bell, Bond, Borden, G. Chambers, J. F. H. Claiborne, Clark, Corwin, Darlington, Denny, Everett, Forester, J. Garland, Granger, Graves, Griffin, Hard, Hardin, Harlan, Hazeltine, Hoar, Howell, Ingersoll, Janes, Jenifer, J. W. Jones, Lawler, Lawrence, L. Lea, Lewis, Lyon, S. Mason, Maury, McKay, McKennan, Mercer, Milligan, Morris, Patton, J. A. Pearce, Phillips, Reed, Rencher, Robertson, Russell, A. H. Shepperd, Slade, Standefer, Steele, Storer, Taliaferro, Waddy Thompson, Underwood, Vinton, E. Whittlesey, L. Williams, S. Williams, Wise-61.

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[MAY 30, 1836.

bers have voted, and half have not, and arrest the decision on the question before it, until it can decide on the case of the member who has not voted? Or if the roll be

[Mr. Adams here asked, if the Speaker was going on to argue that precedent, if he could be permitted to answer?]

The Speaker proceeded to examine the precedent, and to state the proceedings in the case, as they appeared on the journal, to show that the House, without the vote of the member who had asked to be excused, (and though his request to be excused from voting had been refused,) did, notwithstanding, proceed to call the roll through, and pronounce the decision. In that case,

the decision of the House was declared upon a very important question-a question of no less importance than a resolution declaring that one of the members of the House "merited the decided censure of the House;" and yet, if the true construction of the rule be that every member who is present when a vote is taken, must either vote or be excused from voting, before a decision can be had, no decision could have been pronounced in that case. It appeared, further, from the journal, that, after the votes of the members who had given their votes had been declared, and the decision of the House been made on the question before it, on the next day the case of the member who had not voted was the subject of consideration, and resolutions which had been introduced upon the subject were, by a vote of the House, laid on the table, and there the matter ended. He had cited this case (the only one of the kind, he believed, which had ever occurred) for the single purpose of showing that, in the opinion of the House of Representatives of that Congress, it was not necessary for every member present to "give his vote, unless the House, for special reasons, shall excuse him," in order to enable the House to decide the question before it, upon the votes of the majority of the House who did give their votes. It was to establish this point alone that he had referred to this case. The rule is silent as to the time at which the member shall be excused; if he "shall be in the House when the question is put," he "shall give his vote, unless the House, for special reasons, shall excuse him." But the time at which his case shall be considered is left in the discretion of the House. It is competent for the House, if he has committed a violation of the rules of the House, to pass his name, and consider his case subsequently.

The case he had stated on a former occasion, and now repeated, (for the purpose of illustration,) as one that might arise, was this: Suppose the House to be dividing, and the vote taking on the bill, or other propositions before it, and pending the call of the yeas and nays, and before the vote is announced, a member refuses to vote, or declines voting, and asks to be excused; must the House, in such case, suspend the calling of the yeas and nays, stop in the middle of the roll, when half the mem

certained by the votes given, be suspended, until the House can decide on the case of the member who has not voted? If this be the true construction of the rule, it may be that no decision could ever be had on the main question; for on the question to excuse a member from voting, or to take order in his case, if he refuse to vote, debate may arise, and, after discussion, and possibly great delay, the House may proceed to vote by yeas and nays on the question of excusing him from voting, or to coerce him to vote; and whilst the House are dividing, and pending the call of the yeas and nays on this question, and before the result of the vote is announced, a second member may refuse to vote on that question, or decline voting, or ask to be excused. And so, if this construction of the rule be correct, the proceedings of the House must be again suspended, and the decision arrested upon the case of the first member who refused or declined to vote, until the question can be settled in the case of the second member who did not vote on the question of excusing the first; and so upon the question of excusing the second member from voting, a third member may not vote, and ask to be excused, and the proceedings of the House must be again suspended, and the decision on the case of the second member who has not voted be arrested until a question be taken in relation to the third member who has not voted; and thus, upon each successive case of members who may not choose to vote when their names are called, the same thing may occur, and there may be no possibility of ever deciding any question, however important, so long as any one member may decline or refuse to vote, and the business of the House may be thus utterly obstructed and stopped, and this, too, though the votes of the members who may not have voted could not, if given, change the result; as, for example, in the first case in which this question arose on a former day, where the votes given by the members who did vote stood ayes 182, noes 9; and as in the present case, where the votes given on the question now before the House, as ascertained by the Clerk, and communicated to the Speaker, though not formally announced to the House, show that the vote of the member who has not voted, and asks to be excused, cannot, if given, change the result. (The state of the vote, as subsequently announced to the House, was ayes 123, noes 54.) The same difficulty would arise if, in the midst of a division of the House, (by yeas and nays, or otherwise,) the proceedings were arrested, to enable the House to pass a vote of censure, or otherwise punish a member, instead of stopping to take the vote on excusing him. If any one member present declined to vote, and asked to be excused, on the question to censure, or otherwise punish, no decision could be had until the case of him who had declined to vote on the question was settled, and his case, again, could never be settled so long as any one member declined to vote on the question of excusing him. And so, if this be the true construction of the rule, no decision could ever be made on any question, so long as any two members shall alternately decline to vote on each successive question of excusing or coercing each other to vote.

This was the case he had stated by way of illustration, when this question had first arisen. He had stated it for the purpose of showing what would be the practical effect of a decision contrary to that which he had given. He had given it simply as an illustration, and without any intention of imputing improper motives to any member of the House.

And he respectfully submitted whether a construction which may lead to such a result can be the proper con

struction of that rule of the House which declares that every member present shall vote, unless, for sufficient reasons, he shall be excused by the House? The rules of the House were intended to promote and to facilitate, and not to defeat, the transaction of public business; and, in his opinion, such a construction was to be given to them as would attain the end for which they were framed. It was a common occurrence, in taking the vote by yeas and nays, or by dividing the House, for members to remain silent in their seats, and not give their votes; and yet it had been the immemorial usage, and was now the daily practice, to proceed with the vote and pronounce the decision, as ascertained by the count of those who have voted, without making any question in relation to the members who have not voted. The names of those who do not answer are passed silently by. Is the case at all changed by the fact that a member, instead of remaining silent in his seat, and suffering his name to be passed, rises in his place, and informs the House that he is present and has not voted? The member who remains silent, and suffers his name to be passed, has violated the rule as much as he who rises and informs the House that he is present, and has not voted. In the former case, the daily practice is to proceed with the vote and declare the decision; the House takes no cog. nizance of the case. He may have doubts on the question, and not be prepared to vote, or he may have suffi cient reasons, and may not choose to trouble the House with them; and yet he as much violates the rule as the member who informs the House he has not voted.

These rules, which are the laws of the House, are to be construed as a whole, and so as to give effect to each one of them. One of the rules of the House, for ex. ample, provides that "a motion to adjourn shall be always in order;" and yet none will maintain that, whilst the House is in the act of dividing, and a question is taken by yeas and nays, it would be in order for a member, when his name is called for his vote, ay or no, to rise in his place, and interrupt or arrest the further vote of the House, by moving that the House adjourn. None will maintain that the motion to adjourn at this stage, though declared by the rule, in absolute and unqualified terms, to be always in order," could be entertained until after the vote of the House on the question on which they are in the act of voting is completed, and the decision pronounced. So another rule of the House dec'ares that "it

shall be in order for the Committee on Enrolled Bills to report at any time;" and yet none will maintain that it would be in order for a member of that committee to rise in the midst of a vote by yeas and nays, and arrest the vote of the House by making a report, which report, if made at that time, must stop the vote of the House until it was disposed of. And so the rule under consideration could not have contemplated that a vote of the House on a division, by yeas and nays, could be arrested until the House could take cognizance of the case of a mem ber refusing to vote, or asking to be excused from voting. The rule provides that he shall give his vote, if he be not excused, but it is silent as to the time when his excuse shall be considered. He was clear that such a question could not be interposed pending a division of the House. From the reason as well as the necessity of the case, he had decided on a former occasion, and now decided, that the vote of the House, on a division by yeas and nays, could not be interrupted or arrested by interposing any other question; but that the vote, when commenced, must proceed, and the decision be had; leaving it at the discretion of the House to settle or take order upon any other question which may incidentally arise, at such time as may suit its pleasure or convenience. The decision he had made on a former occasion, and now made, was conformable to these views, and for the convenience of the House, and was, in his judgment, the only practi

[H. OF R.

cal construction which could be given to the rules, to enable the House, without great embarrassment and delay, to despatch the public business.

He had felt an anxious solicitude to decide the question properly; and at the same time, if possible, to meet the views of the House, and aid himself in forming a correct judgment, he had, before he had given the decision on the question, when it first arose, taken the opinion of several members of the House, of different political parties, all of whom had concurred with him in opinion that the decision which he subsequently gave was the only practical construction which could be given to these rules that would enable the House to accomplish the objects for which they were framed. The House had, when the question was first raised, sustained the decision; but if, on reconsideration, or more full examination, it should now come to a different conclusion, he would take great pleasure in conforming to their will. He felt sensibly the weight of responsibility which devolved on the presiding officer of the House. Difficul ties, growing out of the complexity as well as the vague and uncertain terms in which many of the rules adopted for the government of the House are couched, were constantly arising. New and delicate as well as difficult and very important questions of order were often raised, upon which it was his duty to decide. His opinions were, however, subject to the revision and correction of the House; and if the House differed from him in opinion upon this or any other occasion, they will so declare, and he would most cheerfully yield to their decision, and promptly execute their will.

In the present case he was of opinion that the decision he had made on a former occasion, and now made, was correct, and for the convenience of the House, and he unhesitatingly adhered to it; but if the House thought otherwise, they would sustain the appeal, and he should as unhesitatingly execute their will.

Mr. CALHOUN, of Massachusetts, said he voted the other day to sustain the decision of the Speaker, because he saw no better way to expedite the business of the House; but he wished to state some difficulties in the manner of doing the business of the House which arose from the frequent use of the previous question. The previous question is called, and, upon a decision of the Chair involving a point of order, a gentleman rises to debate; the previous question is construed as applying to the point of order, and the House is compelled to settle the question in a moment, without the slightest consideration or debate. He would appeal to gentlemen if it was possible for them to decide understandingly. How could they bring their minds to a decision? How could they reason to a conclusion? He would ask if they were willing that the decisions they made should stand as precedents on the journal, to be appealed to at succeeding sessions, and forever, as the deliberate decisions of the House? He knew the decision had been made; but was it on good reasons, deliberately examin. ed? He contended that the previous question did not cut off debate upon a question of order, but that the rule applied only to the main question; and he read the rule in the Manual, which says that incidental questions may arise for which no rules can be provided, such as questions of order, which must be decided as they arise. The only question is, how shall they be decided? Shall a conclusion be jumped at, without argument or consid eration?

Mr. C. then read the rule which says that, on appeals upon questions of order, “no member shall speak more than once, unless by leave of the House." This (said Mr. C.) is equivalent to a direct declaration that a member may speak once, and that each member is so entitled to speak. This is another rule which must be transgressed, if the House maintains the decision of the

Chair upon the point referred to; and he would say, if the House adhered to this rule, then, on an appeal upon a question of order, be it when it may, or what it may, debate must be permitted. The only questions of order not always debatable were such as arose upon questions of decorum, and Mr. C. read a part of the 21st rule: "If any member, in speaking or otherwise, transgress the rules of the House, the Speaker shall, or any member may, call to order; in which case, the member so called to order shall immediately sit down, unless permitted to explain; and the House shall, if appealed to, decide on the case, but without debate." Here the distinction was in regard to decorum and debate. The rule came under that head, and related only to the order and courtesies of decorum and debate, as regulated by the rules of the House. Upon all other questions of order, every one may debate; and he would ask if free. dom of thought and of speech was to be cut off upon important decisions of the Speaker, merely because the previous question was depending? There was no more perfect tyranny than would exist under such a construction of the rules. It was tyranny of the worst kind, if he could be compelled to vote without an opportunity to think, and thus to form an opinion. He did vote to sustain the Speaker's decision in the instance last week, which was similar to the present, because he saw no more convenient mode of settling the matter before the House. It is not usual for members to ask to be excused from voting, especially without being excused at once. The only precedent to the contrary was the distinguished one of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS.] By the rule, every man is compelled to vote one way or the other, unless for special reasons he is excused; but he is not compelled to violate his conscience. No man can suppose that a member should be forced to vote when, according to his convictions, he ought not to vote either way; and if he says he cannot conscientiously vote, then is he to be excused. Such a course, thus open and manly, is entitled to peculiar favor, when contrasted with one which is not unfrequent-the retiring outside the bar of the House, or sitting in one's seat without answering at all. In the former case, the mere asking to be excused constitutes, in my apprehension, the special reason contemplated in the rule. No gentle. man surely would rise in his place and decline voting, in the presence of the House and of the country, unless the reasons operating upon his mind were of the most imposing and controlling character. If, however, a member declares that he will not vote; if he throws defiance at the House, he is to be met with its rules, and dealt with as the House may deem proper.

Mr. C. then alluded to the obnoxious attacks upon members of the House, made in the Government paper by the official printer of the House, and which had been commented upon by the member from Virginia [Mr. PATTON] with so much spirit and intelligence. He said this was not the first instance in which members had been arraigned for acting according to their convictions of duty. A number of gentlemen the other day were arraigned, because they dissented from a decision of the Speaker, as factious, as opposed to the rules of the House, and opposed to order here and every where. His name was not among them, but he looked with shuddering upon that attack upon the character of the members, and upon the freedom of action in the House. He alluded to this attack, because it appeared in the organ of the executive Government; and this was what gave it importance. He would ask, if it was to be allowed that members of the House, for performing conscientiously and independently their duty here, were to be hung up by an officer of the House, paid by its treasurer, as factious disorganizers, and that the charge was to be conveyed all over the country, and to all other

[MAY 30, 1836.

He

countries with which we have intercourse? The members were required by every sense of duty to act upon their own judgment, however much they might differ in opinion with the Speaker; and the publisher of this atrocious assault upon the members ought to be reprimanded. He is an officer of the House, and should come under its control in such respects as this. spoke as a citizen of the country, not as a member of a party; upon such a subject he belonged to no party; he spoke for the dignity, and character, and purity of the House, and he would not allow such an outrage to pass over in silence. When the time shall have arrived when the members of the House are to be denounced by their official organ, for thinking freely, and acting according to their judgment, let them know it. If the time has not arrived, let them reprimand the offender who has perpetrated the outrage. He would say again that he spoke as an independent man, free from party prejudices; and he called upon the House to stop this annoyance, which would continue and increase unless the House applied the proper remedy.

Mr. LANE said as the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. PATTON] had no difficulty in voting on the question to suspend the rules, and as he merely desired to bring up the same question which was decided the other day, it could not be productive of any good to continue the discussion upon the appeal; he therefore moved that it be laid on the table.

Mr. ADAMS appealed to the gentleman to withdraw his motion, as, from reasons personal to himself, he de sired to make a few remarks upon the appeal.

Mr. LANE declined withdrawing his motion. Mr. WILLIAMS, of North Carolina, asked for the yeas and nays; which were ordered, and the Clerk pro

ceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JENIFER, of Maryland, having declined to vote on the motion to lay Mr. PATTON's appeal from the decision of the Speaker on the table, he moved to be excused, and the Speaker decided that his motion to be excused should be postponed until after he announced the vote of the House on the appeal of Mr. PATTON; and that the vote of the House on a question could be declared before the members declining or refusing to vote were either excused from voting, or the penalty for refusing or declining to vote was enforced by the

House. From this decision

Mr. WISE appealed, and proceeded to remark that be, with others, had been denounced by the official paper as a factious spirit, and had been denominated an "anarch," for refusing, on a former occasion, to vote on the resolutions reported by the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. PINCKNEY,] and for voting against the decision of the Speaker then made, to postpone the excuses of members refusing or declining to vote until after the vote of the House was declared by the Chair. He said he felt bound to vindicate himself and his friends from the charge of a factious spirit extending to anarchy. He had been denounced as an "anarch" in an opprobrious sense; but in the literal meaning of the word, applied properly to the occasion of his vote, he claimed the honor of having been an "anarch," and gloried in pleading guilty to the charge. What is the meaning of

anarch" It must mean, literally, one who denied the power of the Government, in the case referred to: one who said and voted that the General Government was "without power to affirm or deny any proposition in relation to slavery in the States, and one who denied the power of Congress to govern slave property any where." In that sense, he was an "anarch," and in no factious spirit he refused to vote on the resolutions of the select committee on slavery. He respectfully sent his reasons to the Speaker, at the time he refused, in writing. He thought that if one Congress might deny its power over

slavery in the States, a subsequent Congress, not bound by the acts of this House, might affirm the power which we now deny; and he refused, peremptorily and positively refused, to vote on questions which Congress itself had no power to vote upon, either to affirm or to deny. He could not, consistently, do otherwise than positively refuse to vote, and did not ask to be excused, because, in his comprehension, the petition to be excused admitted the right in the House to compel him to vote upon a proposition which the House itself had no power to entertain. He conscientiously entertained these opinions, and, as courteously as his sense of duty to the constitution and his constituents permitted, he expressed them by his refusal to vote, and by his written reasons for so doing.

[Here Mr. HAMER, of Ohio, called Mr. WISE to order. The Speaker deciding Mr. W. to be in order, be proceeded to say]

That, in another sense, he was an "anarch." He was against a Government of corruption! This was his high offence; he was opposed to the "powers that be" creating those which are to be, and the perpetuation of a spoils-party Government. He desired, in the revolutionary sense, to be without such a Government as the infamous Globe is now laboring to entail upon the country.

The decision of the Chair was obviously, to his mind, erroneous. The constitution and the 28th rule of the House settled the question. The first declares" that a majority of each [House] shall constitute a quorum to do business," and "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member." The latter declares, "every member who shall be in the House when the question is put, shall give his vote, unless the House, for special reasons, shall excuse him.” He put the question, then, whether the House can be said to have voted until "every member in the House shall have given his vote, or shall have been, for special reasons, "excused. If the House has not voted, how can any vote of the House-House in its technical sense, as understood by the constitution-the House composed of "every member in it when the question is put"-be declared? He contended that no decision had yet been made on the resolutions of the slavery committee, because the House had not voted on them, for the reason that every member present had not voted, and many had refused to vote. If a member sat silent, he ordinarily, without a call of yeas and nays, or a count, gave a tacit vote. If a count was called, or the yeas and nays, and he sat silent, if not reported for failing to vote, he was usually considered absent, though in the eye of the Clerk.

But when he refused to vote, and actually announced his presence by refusal, the rule says he shall vote. Vote upon what? A question decided, or a question pending? The Chair says, by its decision, he shall vote upon a question decided. What is the consequence? Suppose a bill passes the House by a majority of one, three members refusing to vote. After a vote of the majority of one is declared and announced as the decision of the House, you compel the three refusing members to vote. They vote against the bill or resolution: the act has passed, then, with a majority of two against it in the House! Ay, but would gentlemen tell him that it is not the vote which was postponed, but the excuse? They could not thus reason, because the rule said it was the vote which shall be given; and if the refusing mem ber cannot vote after the decision declared, you cannot punish him for not voting after decision. When a member refuses to vote, he has three alternatives presented; he may ask to be excused for a special reason; he may offer no excuse, and incur the penalty; or, rather than VOL. XII.-257

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incur the penalty, if his excuse be not received, or he offers none, he may purge himself of the " disorderly behaviour" by voting. But, according to the Speaker's decision, he must be excused or punished, and he cannot vote when the rule says he shall vote or be excused. He asked what the reason of the decision was? Solely, the reason of inconvenience. In the first place, he said, the inconvenience of the rule proved the existence of the rule; and no "argumentum ab inconveniente" could destroy the rule itself. The remedy for inconvenience was to abolish or to modify the rule. But did the reason of inconvenience exist? True, to some extent, whenever a member refused, there would be delay; but the House, or a majority, could at once, by aid of the previous question, soon despatch the question of excuse, or pardon, or punishment; and that was the easiest and most convenient mode of despatching every difficulty or inconvenience in the case. Ilere was an illustration of the truth of this position. According to the Speaker's decision, the majority is in the power of the minority; which, if it be given to that factious spirit of which it is accused, can delay the decision of the House ad infinitum by repeated refusals to vote and repeated appeals from the Speaker's decisions! He said, in fact, that such decisions were well calculated to arouse a spirit of just and indignant resistance in the minds and conduct of those who were oppressed by their tyranny. He had, in the conscientious discharge of his duty, and with the sincerest regard to the highest supremacy of the rules of order, refused to vote, and no power on earth could have forced his tongue to vote away all protection of slaveholding interests. No! He defied the arm of civil power of the Sergeant-at-arms of the House, and all the terrors of the standing army of a military despotism, if it should be attempted, to make his tongue speak traitorously to his constituents; he would, without courting, have suffered and exulted in martyrdom! He had been denounced as a factious spirit, as every man was likely to be, by the minions of power, who had the independence and patriotism to resist their tyranny, expose their abuses, and denounce their prostitution. He was glad that he had at last the companionship of his worthy and truly honorable colleague, [Mr. PATTON.] The Globe had classed the forty-six factious spirits into two classes--Harrison men and abolitionists, and White men and nullifiers. It was obvious here were four, instead of two denominations of persons; but the Globe made out denominations to suit its slanders. He would remark there were Harrison men who were not abolitionists, and many abolitionists who were not Harrison or White men; and there were nullifiers who were White men--no nullifiers were abolitionists; and White men who were not nullifiers-and no White men or nullifiers were abolitionists. He should not condescend to notice the Globe, but the majority here seem to make it their mouth-piece; the freedom of debate lies prostrate under the "previous question," and the Globe speaks "by authority" for that high power before which all the dignity and freedom of this House have been, long ago, made to bow low-low in the dust!

Mr. WILLIAMS, of Kentucky, spoke in opposition to the decision of the Chair, and condemned the unwarrantable classification of his name in the article in the Globe. He noticed this because the fact of the editors of the Globe being the printers of the House gave that paper an authority it was not otherwise entitled to. On the subject of the presidency, no man living knew his preference; but he indignantly repelled the charge made against him in the Globe of being an anarchist and revolutionist. He should, when the time arrived, vote for whom he pleased, and should not suffer himself to be driven from what he considered right, by the abuse and slang of a newspaper. He had done nothing during the