wishes might bring on an immediate rnpture. He continued in Paris till the end of July 1798. His conferences with Talleyrand produced no result; and he was rebuked by his government, and directed to consider himself as positively recalled.2 As the reports of the envoys were from time to time Measures of Hostility. received, President Adams promptly communicated them to Congress. On the 14th of June 1798 the correspondence with Talleyrand was received, and on the 18th of the month it was communicated to Congress without comment. On the 23d of the preceding March the envoys had been instructed to demand their passports and return to the United States, if, on the receipt of the instructions, persons with full and equal powers should not have been authorized to treat with them. The arrival of Marshall in the United States conveyed the intelligence that the envoys had been compelled to anticipate their instructions. On the 21st of June the President congratulated Congress on Marshall's arrival, and declared, "I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored, as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation." The news of the manner in which the envoys had been treated, and of the character of the proposals with which they had been received, created a feeling of great indignation. Measures to put the country in a condition for war were immediately adopted. On June 13, 1798, before the reception of the correspondence between Talleyrand and the envoys, the President approved an act to suspend commercial intercourse between the United States and France and her dependencies.3 On the 22d of June, acts were passed to increase the naval armament of the United States, and to amend an act of the 28th of May, authorizing the President to raise a provisional army. In quick succession other acts were passed to authorize the arrest and expulsion of aliens; to authorize the defense of merchant vessels of the United States against French depredations;" to protect the commerce and coasts of the United States; to augment the army of the United States; and to enable the President to borrow money. On the 7th of July the President approved an act by which it was declared that, as the treaties between the two countries had been repeatedly violated by France, the just claims of the United States for reparation refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment repelled with indignity; and as there was still being pursued against the United States, under the authority of the French Government, a system of predatory violence, in conflict with the treaties and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation, the United States were "of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties, and of the con Am. State Papers, For. Rel. II. 199. 31 Stats. at L. 565. 4 Id. 558, 569. Id. 570, 577. 6 Id. 572. 7 Id. 574. 8 Id. 604. 9 Id. 607. 2 sular convention," and that these compacts should "not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of the United States." At the next session of Congress the commercial intercourse between the United States and France was further suspended; authority was given to the President to exchange or send away French citizens who had been or might be captured and brought into the United States; * provision was made for augmenting the army; and various other acts were adopted in relation to the hostilities which Congress had authorized. The command in chief of the army was offered to Washington and accepted by him. On the 21st of August 1798 the Attorney-General of the United States advised the Secretary of State that, taking into consideration the acts of the French republic toward the United States, and the legislation adopted by Congress at its preceding session, he was of opinion that there not only existed an actual maritime war between France and the United States, but a maritime war authorized by both nations.3 The storm which the treatment of the envoys raised Talleyrand's Overtures. in America doubtless was more violent than Talleyrand had anticipated; and when he heard of the declaration of President Adams and of the measures adopted by Congress, he sought to restore diplomatic relations. To that end he instructed the French secretary of legation at the Hague to inform Mr. Vans Murray, then minister of the United States at that capital, in the words of President Adams, that "whatever plenipotentiary the Government of the United States might send to France, in order to terminate the existing differences between the two countries, he would undoubtedly be received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent, and powerful nation."4 On receiving this overture President Adams, on the Mission of Ellsworth, 25th of February 1799, nominated to the Senate Chief Davie, and Murray. Justice Ellsworth, Patrick Henry, and Mr. Murray as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the French republic, with full power to discuss and settle all controversies between the two governments. Mr. Henry being unable to accept the position by reason of advancing age, Governor William R. Davie, of North Carolina, was substituted in his place. Instructions. The instructions of these plenipotentiaries were signed by Timothy Pickering, as Secretary of State, and bore date of the 22d of October 1799.5 They required, as the indispensable condition of a new treaty, a stipulation for compensation for "all captures and condemnations" contrary to the law of nations and to the treaty of amity and commerce of 1778, while the latter "remained in force," and especially for such as were "made and pronounced "1. Because the vessel's lading, or any part thereof, consisted of provisions or merchandise coming from England or her possessions. "2. Because the vessels were not provided with the rôles d'équipage prescribed by the laws of France, and which, it has been pretended, were also required by treaty. "3. Because sea letters or other papers were wanting, or said to be wanting, when the property shall have been, or shall be, admitted or proved to be American "4. When the owners, masters, or supercargoes shall have been refused a hearing or placed in situations rendering their presence at the trial impracticable. 5. When the vessels or other property captured shall have been sold, or otherwise disposed of, without a regular trial and condemnation." If a preliminary acknowledgment of these claims should be secured, the envoys were instructed that it would be necessary, for the purpose of examining and adjusting "all the claims" of citizens of the United States, to provide for the appointment of a board of commissioners, who, besides determining claims for captures and condemnations, should also take cognizance of the following claims: I. Of citizens of the United States 1. For merchandise, or other property, seized by the French in their own ports or elsewhere, and not comprehended under the head of captures; and for their vessels arbitrarily and unreasonably detained in French ports." 2. For "sums due * * * ment or its agents." by contracts with the French Govern II. Of citizens of France, for injuries occasioned by "infringements of the treaty of amity and commerce by the United States, or their citizens." III. National claims 1. Of "the United States, as distinguished from those of their citizens, for injuries received from the French republic, or its citizens." 2. Of France, for injuries occasioned by infringements of the treaty of amity and commerce. "If, however," said the instructions, "the French Government should desire to waive its national claims, you may do the like on the part of the United States. Doubtless the claims of the latter would exceed those of the former; but, to avoid multiplying subjects of dispute, and because national claims may probably be less definite that those of individuals, and consequently more difficult to adjust, national claims may, on both sides, be relinquished." Minute directions were given as to matters of commerce and navigation, and in conclusion the envoys were instructed that the following points were "to be considered as ultimated:" 1. That a board of commissioners be established to hear and determine the claims of citizens of the United States arising from the causes previously specified, and that France be bound to pay the sums awarded. 2. That the treaties of 1778 and the consular convention of 1788 be not revived in whole or in part, but that all the engagements to which the United States were to become parties be specified in a new treaty. 3. That no guaranty of any part of the French dominions be stipulated, nor any engagement made in the nature of an alliance. 4. That no aid or loan be promised in any form whatever. 5. That no engagement be made inconsistent with the obligations of any prior treaty, and that, if cogent reasons should appear for renewing in substance the seventeenth and twenty-second articles of the treaty of amity and commerce of 1778, it must be done with the explicit declaration that they should not be construed so as to derogate from the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth articles of the Jay Treaty. 6. That no powers be granted to consuls or others incompatible with the complete sovereignty of the United States in matters of policy, commerce, and government. 7. That the duration of the proposed treaty be limited to twelve years from the exchange of ratifications. Bonaparte as First Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie sailed from Newport, Rhode Island, on the 3d of November 1799, agreeing to touch at Lisbon before making any port in France. When, on the 27th of November, they arrived at the Portuguese capital, news had just been received there of the revolution at Paris of the 18th Brumarie (10th November), by which the Directory was overthrown. They reached Paris on the 2d of March 1800, the day after the arrival of Mr. Murray from The Hague. They found Bonaparte reigning as first consul. He promptly granted the envoys an audience, and appointed MM. Joseph Bonaparte, Fleurieu, and Roederer as plenipotentiaries to negotiate with them.1 Negotiations. The commencement of the negotiations was delayed by the indisposition of Joseph Bonaparte. On the 2d of April, however, the plenipotentiaries met and exchanged their powers; but as those of the French plenipotentiaries were not considered by their American colleagues sufficiently full and explicit, the French Government furnished its representatives with new ones.' This preliminary adjusted, the American plenipotentiaries proposed first "to ascertain and discharge the equitable claims of the citizens of either nation upon the other, whether founded on contract, treaty, or law of nations," and then to take up questions of commercial intercourse. The French plenipotentiaries expressed the opinion that "the first object should be to determine the rules, and the mode of procedure, for the valuation of those injuries for which the two nations, respectively, may have demands against each other, whether these demands are founded on national injuries or individual claims;" and that the "second object" was "to insure the execution of the treaties of friendship and commerce, now existing between the two nations, and the accomplishment of those views of reciprocal advantage which first dictated them." Difference as to the The American plenipotentiaries, while suggesting the expediency of a mutual relinquishment of national claims, intimated that the discussion of such claims might conveniently follow the arrangement of the individual claims; and, in accordance with this view, they presented on the 17th of April a draft of articles for the adjustment of the claims of individuals. In this draft it was provided that, in determining questions of capture or condemnation, the commissioners should "decide the claims in question according Am. State Papers, For. Rel. II, 307–311. 2 Id. 312-314. 5627-VOL. 5—3 THE ARMY LIBRARY WASHINGTON, D. C. to the original merits of the several cases, and to justice, equity, and the law of nations; and in all cases of complaint existing prior to the 7th of July 1798, according to the treaties and consular convention then existing between France and the United States." The French plenipotentiaries on the 6th of May replied that the proposal of their American colleagues had "a tendency to remove the obstacles" which lay in the way of the accomplishment of what both nations desired, and that they would have seized the present moment to develop their views respecting the "various interpretations" which had been "given to the treaties," had they "not been struck with an interpretation of which they can conceive neither the cause nor the object, and which therefore seems to require explanation." "The ministers plenipotentiary of France are not aware," they declared, "of any reason which can authorize a distinction between the time prior to the 7th of July 1798 and the time subsequent to that date, in order to apply the stipulations of the treaties to the damages which have arisen during the first period, and only the principles of the laws of nations to those which have occurred during the second." The American plenipotentiaries answered that the distinction was based on the fact that it was not till after the treaty of amity and commerce of February 1778 had been violated to a great extent on the part of the French republic, nor till after explanations and an amicable adjustment sought by the United States had been refused, that they did on the 7th of July 1798 by a solemn public act, declare that they were free and exonerated from the treaties and consular convention which had been entered into between them and France."3 The issue thus made as to the treaties was the subject French Propositions. of numerous fruitless conferences. At length on the 26th of August the French plenipotentiaries formally defined the position of their government thus: 1. That it could not admit that the treaties had been annulled, either by the single act of abrogation on the part of the United States, or by "the misunderstanding" which had for some time existed between the two countries, but which had "not constituted a state of war, at least on the part of France." On this basis France was ready "to stipulate a full and entire recognition of the treaties, and a reciprocal promise of indemnities for the damages resulting, on the part of either, from their infraction." But 2. If the American plenipotentiaries were unable to recognize the validity of the treaties, France would acquiesce in their nullity, with the understanding that the act of the United States, by which their abrogation was declared, was "an unequivocal provocation to war;" that the "hostile acts" by which the provocation was followed "were nothing less than war;" and that the new treaty between the two countries should be "preceded by a treaty of peace." "If," said the French plenipotentiaries in conclusion, "the correctness of these observations is admitted, it would seem that the two governments ought to be occupied no longer with their 1 Am. State Papers, For. Rel. II. 317. 2 Id. 319. 3 Id. 320. |