"In no case was the court called upon to punish for contempt or perjury, nor was any process issued to enforce the production of books and papers.' By section 11 of the act of June 23, 1874, all claims Verification of Claims. were required to be "verified by oath of the claimant;" and by Rule III. of the court every claim was required to be stated in a petition. Counsel requested the court to place a construction upon this section of the act, when Wells, presiding judge, read the following memorandum: "The court has been asked by counsel to place a construction upon the second sentence embraced in section 11 of the act of Congress approved June 23, 1874, and under which the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims' was created, and thus determine in advance, and before the question is raised in any given case, whether two or more claimants in the same petition may not have their respective claims verified by any one of such claimants named in said petition. Ordinarily it would be impolitic, if not improper, thus to give an opinion in advance and before such question was raised in the trial of a given case; but in this instance, as many of the cases already on the calendar have several claimants, it may not be amiss at once to dispose of the question for the purpose of facilitating the business of this court. It may be argued in favor of permitting one of several claimants to make the oath in behalf of himself and one or more others in any given case, that the object of the verification by oath is merely to get such case before the court, so that proofs and adjudication may be had; that, in fact, the oath of the claimant does not in any case constitute absolute evidence; that the formality of the law in this requirement is, in fact, complied with by the affidavit of one, although the interests of several were involved. "Some degree of latitude might be tolerated if the court was called upon to construe one of its own rules, to which it would undoubtedly have the right to make exceptions; but in this case it is a provision of the law itself, and whether a necessary provision or not is not the province of this court to determine. It may be that Congress intended that each claimant, although joining with others in the same case, should make separate verifications under oath of his particular interest and its value, possibly conceiving that estimates of value might be different as presented by the different claimants, and that no one claimant, although presenting his claim jointly with others, could properly make affidavit other than as to his belief in reference to the loyalty of his associate claimant; but this court is impressed with the belief that it is not its province to determine the reasons that induced any particular action on the part of Congress. We find the law plain in its provision that all claims shall be verified by oath of the claimant;' and we understand that in the use of the word 'claimant' the law refers specifically to each claimant, and that each claimant when associated or joined with others in any given case must verify by his own oath his claim." The following cases are referred to by the clerk of the court in his final report: "In Matthew A. Chadwick . The United States, the petition was filed and verified by Elizabeth L. Chadwick, the wife and attorney of Matthew A. Chadwick, it being averred that the claimant was absent at sea, and was not expected home until November 1875, too late to file a petition. "Petition demurred to, because the claim of the said complainant is not duly verified by the oath of the claimant.' "Demurrer overruled, the court holding that where a party claimant is beyond the limits of the United States, and it is impossible at the time of making the petition to procure his oath, the oath of his authorized attorney is sufficient to make his petition admissible, provided the facts 'Davis's Report. 25. 218 Stats. at L. 245. of such absence and inability to procure such oath are set out in the petition, or in an annexed affidavit.' “Miguel Ignacio v. The United States was a claim for personal effects and wages, brought by William Gordon, jr., as attorney and next friend of the complainant. It did not appear at first whether Ignacio was alive when the claim was filed; subsequently, and after the time allowed for filing petitions had expired, his death was suggested and a motion made to substitute an administrator as complainant. At the trial of the case it appeared that Ignacio had died at a date prior to that on which the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed; no opinion was delivered; but the court apparently sustained the position of the counsel on behalf of the United States that the claim being filed by a person having no standing in court (the next friend of a deceased person having no authority to act) can not be amended by bringing in a new party-claimant after the time for filing claims has expired. But in later cases this decision seems to have been overruled. See William O. Smith, administrator, v. The United States, and several other cases. "In these claims a foreign administrator filed the petition as claimant. The cases came on for trial after the time for filing claims had expired, when the counsel for the United States contended that the complainant had no standing in court. Mr. James Lowndes, counsel for complainant, then asked leave to amend by substituting an administrator appointed by the supreme court of the District of Columbia. "After argument, leave was granted to so amend. “And in Robert Montgomery . The United States, and other cases, leave was asked to amend by substituting the administrator as claimant when the claim had been brought in the name of a person deceased at the time it was filed. "These motions were allowed, the court remarking that the filing of the claims in the court on behalf of a veritable individual was a satisfaction of the provisions of the act, the object of which was that the government should have due notice of all claims to be brought against it (see MacLeane, admx., & Taylor vs. the United States), and that owing to the peculiar circumstances of these claims they should not be allowed to perish through a strict adherence to the technical rules of courts of law. The act merely requires that the claim shall be presented. Porter, judge, dissented from this ruling, holding that the parties in whose names the claims were brought being dead at the time they were filed, the petition was a nullity, and could not be amended. In "The court, by the presiding judge, stated its opinion early in its session, that letters of administration or letters testamentary granted in any State of the United States would give authority to sue in this court. the cases of William O. Smith and others, the court denied the right of a foreign administrator to bring suit. "In Abraham Osborn r. The United States, the claimant (former master of the ship Ocmulgee) prayed damages for the personal effects and wages due to the other officers and seamen of the vessel, and their respective interests in the 'catch' in addition to his own claim. He showed no previous authority or subsequent ratification from these officers or seamen, of the names even of some of whom he was ignorant. "The counsel on behalf of the United States demurred to the claim, and, after argument, the petition was dismissed on the ground of the want of authority in the petitioner from the parties for whom he assumed to act." II. THE SECOND COURT. As shown by the Treasury statements of June 30, Balance in the Treasury, 1876, and June 30, 1877, there was paid out to claimants, on the judgments of the first Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, the sum of $9,315,753. On March 31, 1877, the Secre Davis's Report, 12-14. H. Rep 945, 49 Cong. 1 sess. tary of the Treasury, in accordance with the provisions of the fifteenth section of the act of June 23, 1874, canceled the remaining bonds in which the fund was invested, and the balance available for distribution after payment of the judgments of the court remained stationary at $9,703,904.89. In addition to this sum, which belonged to the fund proper, there was carried into the Treasury, as miscellaneous receipts, for coin premiums on bonds sold ($7,500,000) the sum of $344,393.88, and for currency premiums $40,706.19. These sums, added to the balance of the fund, amounted to $10,089,004.96.1 From the beginning of the attempt to adopt legislaContest over the Fund. tion for the distribution of the Geneva award, differences of opinion and of interest existed as to the persons to whom the money should be paid. Before the expiration of the existence of the first court various classes of claimants who were excluded from participation in the fund endeavored, but without success, to have the jurisdiction of the tribunal enlarged so as to include their claims. After the court had ceased to exist, these claimants continued their agitation with a view to have the court reestablished; and a fierce contest was waged between the conflicting interests. Those who sought to participate in the distribution of the fund may be divided into five classes: 1. Persons whose property was destroyed by the Alabama or the Florida, or their tenders, or by the Shenandoah after she left Melbourne-the cruisers for whose depredations Great Britain was held responsible at Geneva, and which were commonly known as the "inculpated cruisers." 2. Persons whose property was destroyed by vessels commonly called the "exculpated cruisers," for whose depredations Great Britain was held not to be responsible. 3. Persons who had paid war premiums by reason of the Confederate cruisers being on the sea. 4. Insurers who took risks on property destroyed by the inculpated cruisers, and who asked to be subrogated to the rights of the insured. 5. Persons who were excluded by the act of 1874 because they "did not, at all times, during the late rebellion, bear true allegiance to the United States. + As has been seen, the act of 1874 proceeded upon the theory of distributing the money so far as practicable among the classes on whose claims the Geneva award appeared to be based; and the jurisdiction of the court was restricted to claims directly resulting from damage caused by the inculpated cruisers. Claimants of the first class above mentioned were therefore satisfied under the act of 1874, except in the few cases in which they did not become aware of the existence of the court until after the time for the filing of claims had expired. Consequently they played but a small part in the contest over the balance of the fund; and the same thing may be said as to the fifth class, who were unable to comply with the requirements of the act of 1874 on the subject of allegiance. The contest lay chiefly between the second, third, and fourth classes, H. Rep. 945, 49 Cong. 1 sess. 2 H. Misc. Doc. 270, 43 Cong. 1 sess. 4 H. Rep. 243, 44 Cong. 1 sess. namely, insurers who claimed the right of subrogation, persons who paid war premiums, and persons who had suffered damage by the acts of the exculpated cruisers.' Contentions of Various The main controversy in Congress prior to the passage of the act of 1874 seems to have been in regard to the extent to which the insurance companies should be permitted to participate in the distribution; and we have seen that the act restricted such participation to the amount by which their losses, in respect of their war risks, may have exceeded the sum of their premiums or other gains in respect of such risks. Claims for war premiums, and for damage resulting from the acts of exculpated cruisers, were wholly excluded. The insurance companies maintained that the moneys paid under the Geneva award constituted essentially a trust fund, not indeed of a legal but of an equitable character, to be devoted to the reimbursement of those on whose claims the award was based. As nothing was allowed on account of the exculpated cruisers, they maintained that claims growing out of the acts of such cruisers must necessarily be excluded. On the same ground they contended that claims for war premiums could not be admitted. But there were other interests whose advocates argued that the claims at Geneva and the wrongs on which they were based were national; that all who had suffered loss by reason of the presence of the Confederate cruisers on the sea were entitled to compensation, and that such losers comprised not merely those who lost by the inculpated cruisers, but also all those who lost by other cruisers for which the United States had sought to hold Great Britain liable. For the war premium claimants in particular it was argued that by paying such premiums they enabled the insurance companies to carry on their business, and preserved others from loss; that they thus kept American vessels on the seas, where they were subject to Confederate depredations, and that in this way the Geneva award itself owed its existence to them. When it was suggested that the merchants and others who paid war premiums indemnified themselves by increasing the price of their goods and by obtaining war profits, the answer was made that the war-premium men had to prosecute their business in competition with merchants and ship owners of other countries. Against the doctrine of subrogation which the insurance companies sought to maintain, the argument was made that the Alabama claims were founded on the omission of a duty which England owed not to any person or corporation, but to the government itself, and that the doctrine of subrogation therefore could not apply.3 Act of June 5, 1882. In the session of Congress of 1881-82 the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, Mr. Edmunds, reported a bill to the Senate to pay the losses by the exculpated cruisers only, excluding both the insurance companies and the war-premium men. Meanwhile a bill was reported from the Committee H. Rep. 307, 47 Cong. 1 sess. Congressional Record, vol. 13, part 5, p. 4154. 3 H. Rep. 628, 43 Cong. 1 sess.; H. Rep. 243, 44 Cong. 1 sess.; H. Rep. 663, 45 Cong. 2 sess. Congressional Record, vol. 13, part 5, p. 4185. Constitution of the New 2 on the Judiciary of the House, which provided for the payment of the exculpated-cruiser and war-premium claimants, excluding the insurance companies. This bill passed the House and was sent to the Senate, where an attempt was made to substitute for it a bill reviving the act of 1874, except as to its restriction upon the claims of the insurance companies. When this attempt failed an effort was made to substitute the bill reported by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee for the payment of the exculpated cruisers only. It was also proposed to refer the matter to the Court of Claims for an opinion upon the merits of the various classes of claims, and it was also suggested that any remainder of the fund, after payment of the claims embraced in the Geneva award, should be returned to Great Britain. None of these propositions was received with favor, and the bill was passed as it came from the House without amendment." The bill became a law by the approval of the President on June 5, 1882. By this act, which was entitled "An act for reestablishing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, and for the distribution of the unappropriated moneys of the Geneva award," the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, as created by chapter 459 of the laws of the Forty-third Congress," was "reestablished in the manner and with the obligations, duties, and powers imposed and conferred by said chapter, except as changed or modified by this act." The number of judges was reduced from five to three, and the title of the "presiding judge” was changed to "presiding justice.” The agreement of two of the three judges was made necessary to decide any question arising before the court. The existence of the new court was limited to two years from the date of its organization; and it was provided that all claims submitted to it should be verified by or in behalf of the claimants and filed with the clerk of the court within six months from its organization, on penalty of being held to be waived and barred if they were not so filed. As to the jurisdiction of the court, apart from that Jurisdiction of the Court. which it derived from the revival of the act of 1874, it was provided that the new court should receive and examine claims and enter judgment for the amount allowed in two classes of cases, which were as follows: 1. The first class embraced "claims directly resulting from damage done on the high seas by Confederate cruisers during the late rebellion, including vessels and cargoes attacked on the high seas, although the loss or damage occurred within four miles of the shore," but excluding the claims which had been proved under the act of 1874. This class, it is obvious, embraced claims resulting from damage done by the exculpated cruisers. 2. The second class embraced "claims for the payment of premiums for war risks, whether paid to corporations, agents, or individuals, after the sailing of any Confederate cruiser." 1 H. Rep. 307, 47 Cong. 1 sess., February 8, 1882. 2 Congressional Record, vol. 13, part 5, pp. 4156-4157. 3 Congressional Record, vol. 13, part 5. pp. 4157, 4160, 4162, 4185. * Congressional Record, vol. 13, pp. 3812, 3819, 3839, 3856, 3882, 3892, 4153, 4162, 4178, 4188. 5 Act of June 23, 1874. |