House of Commons against the vexatious conduct of the Council that had become a sort of "Debating Society" or "Petty Parli ament. He quoted the opinion of Lawrence Peel, its first VicePresident, that the Council had no jurisdiction in the nature of that of a grand inquest of the nation and that it was not an AngloIndian House of Commons for the redress of grievences, to refuse supplies, and so forth". Sir Charles Wood, therefore, decided to reduce the functions of the Legislative Council.

(d) The attitude of Sir Charles Wood towards the Council. He spoke in the House of Commons in the following manner:

"The Council quite contrary to my intentions has become a sort of debating society or petty parliament. My own view of its duties is expressed in a letter I wrote to Lord Dalhousie in 1853, in which I said:

I expect the non official members of your enlarged Legislative Council to be constantly employed as a Committee of the Council in working at Calcutta, on the revision of laws and regulations.

"It was certainly a great mistake that a body of 12 members should have been established with all forms and functions of Parliment. They have standing orders as numerous as we have; and their effect nas beer, as Lord Canning stated in one of his despaches, to impede business, cause delay and to induce a Council, which ought to be regarded as a boly for doing practical work, to assume the debating functions of a Parliament". ( Kc. II, 10)

(e) His opinions on the question of its reform. He was against the idea of popular representation for the following reasons:

(i) The notion of legislation which is entertained by a native is that of a chief or sovercign, who makes what laws he

pleases. He has little or no idea of any distinction between the executive and legislative functions of Government." (Ibid. 12)

condition of India will constitute such a body in possibly assemble at any

(ii) "Every one who considers the
see that it is utterly impossible to
that country (India). You cannot
one place in India persons who shall be real representatives
of the various classes of the native population of this empire.
To talk of a native representative is, therefore, to talk of
that which is simply and utterly impossible. (Ibid. 13).
(iii) "All experience teaches us that, where a dominant race
rules another, the mildest from of government is despotism",
which is incompatible with a representative legislature.
(Ibid. 14.)

(iv) Publicity of the acts of the Government is dangerous. Thus he was in favour of the recommendations made by Lord Canning. But when he was pressed for a statutory recognitions of the right of the Indians to be admitted at any rate in to the Council as nominated members, he gave a plausible argument that he held the perfect equality before law of all Her Majesty's subjects without distinction of creed or colour, race or birth. He would, therefore, make no special provision for a particular community, native or European. According to him a governing or legislative body was "dangerous" and "mischievons", if it represented a dominant race ruling over an extended native population. (Ibid. 14) Hence to oblitorate the distinction between the conquerers and the conquered, Sir Charles Wood denied representation to the English settlers also. (Ibid.) It may still be doubted if they ever stood in need of it.

Its Provisions. (A. In relation to the Central Executive).

(a) The Executive Council of the Governer-General was to consist of five ordinary members, three of whom were to be appointed by the Secretary of State in Council from among the Civil Servants of ten

years' standing at the time of their appointment; one of the remaining two was to be a barrister or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland of not less than five years' standing, appointed by His Majesty by warrant under Royal Sign Mannual. Power was also retained by H. M. to appoint the Commander-in-Chief as an extra-ordinary member.

(b) When the Governal-General should visit any part of India unaccompanied by his Council, a member was to be appointed by them as Vice-President of the Council with all the powers of the GovernorGenerol except those with respect to legislation.

(0) In the above case the Governor-General in Council could also au. thorise the Governor-General alone to exercise all or any of the powers which could be exercised by the Governor-General in Council, except the power of making laws or regulations.

(d) The Governor-General was empowered to make rules and orders for the more convenient transaction of business in his Council.

(e) The Council could assemble at such place or places as decided by the Governor-Goneral in Council within the territories of British In lia. If it met within the Presidencies of Madras or Bombay, the Governor of that Presidency was to act as an extra-ordinary member of the Council.

(B. In relatim to the Central Legislature.)

(a) The Geveruor General was to nominate, for purppses of legislation not less than six and not more than twelve "additional" members to hold office for 2 years; of these not less than one half were to be nonofficials. The Lt. Governor of a province was also to be an additional member of the Council, if it met for legislative purpose in his province. (b) The Governor-General was empowored to summon and adjourn meetings of the council or authorise the Vioe-President to do the same in his absence.

(c) Its functions were strictly limited to legislation. No business was to be transacted at any meeting except the consideration and enactment of legislave measures, nor any motion to be entertained except a motion for leave to introduce a Bill or having reference to a Bill actually introduced.

(d) No measure could be introduced without the previous sanction of the Governor-General affecting;

() The publis Dobt or publle revenues of India.

(ii) Religious rights or usagos of any class.

(iii) The discipline or maintainance of Army or Navy.

(iv) Relations with foreign princes or states.

(e) The Governor-General was empowered to assent to a measure passed by the Legislative Council, or withhold his assent from it, or reserve the Bill for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon. A law assented to by the Governor-General could be disallowed by the Crown acting through the Secretary of State.

(f) The Governor General with his legislative Council was empowered to make laws for:

(i) all persons, natives and foreigners,

(ii) for all courts of justices,

(ii) for all places and things within the territories of British India, (iv) and for all servants of the Government of India within the dominians of princes and states in alliance with H. M.

(C. In relation to the legislative power of the Executive.)

(a) The Governor-General was authorised to make ordinances having the force of law for not more than six months from their promulgation, in case of urgent necessity. They could be disallowed earlier by H. M. through the Secretary of State in Council or superseded by some law or regularion passed by the Legislative Council.

() No rule, law or regulation made prior to the passing of this Act, by the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council, or by any other authority (Governor, Governor in Council, or Lt. Governor ) in respect of any non-Regulation Province shall be deemed invalid only by reasons of tho same not having been made in conformity with the Acts respecting the constitution and powers of the Council of India, or of the Governor-General or respecting the powers of such Governors, or Governors in Council or Lt. Governors. [Thus the rules made in this respect in the past were validated, but this power of summary legislation by executive order was taken away for the future. It was reɛtored in 1870.]

(D-In relation to Provincial Executive)

(a) To make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business in their Councils. [(Same as (d) of (A).]

(b) Regulations made before 1861 by Governors, Governors in Council or Lt. Governor, in respect Of non-Regulation Provinces were not to be invalid by reason of not having been made in conformity with the provisions of the previous Acts. [See (b) of (C).]

(E. In relation to Provincial Legislature.)

(a) The Governors of the Presidencies cf Madras and Bombay were empowered to appoint in addition to the members of their Executive Councils (termed "ordinary" members), "additional" members, the Advocate-General of the Presidency and some other persons, not less than four and not more than eight, for legislative purposes.

(b) No less than one haif of the persons so nominated were to be always non-official.

(c) Functions to be the same as noted in (c) of (B).

(d) A law passed by any of these Legislative Councils required the assent in the first instance of the Governor, and then of the GovernarGeneral; it could be disallowel by H. M. through the Secretary of State in Council. Should the Govornor-General refuse to give his assent, he would communicate his reasons for the same to the Governor.

(e) These Legislative councils were allowed to make laws for the peace and good government of their respective Presidencies. But it was not lawful for them to make regulations, without the previous . sanction of the Governor-General:-

(i) Affecting the public Debt of India or the Customs Duties, or any other tax imposed by the authority of the Government of India.

(ii) Regulating any of the current coin or the issue of any bills, notes, or other paper currency.

(iii) Regulating the conveyance of letters by the Post Office or messages by the electric telegraph within the Presidency.

(iv) Altering in any way the Penal Code of India established by Act of the Governor-General in Council No. 42 of 1860.

(v) Affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of Her Majesty's subjects in India.

(vi) Affecting the discipline or maintainance of any part of Her Majesty's Military and Naval Forces.