(c) In matters of budgets, they were required to prepare them in such a manner that on the one hand there was no deficit and on the other a minimum cash balance was maintained with the Central Government. Each of the items was to be carefully scrutinised by, and required the sanction of the Government of India.

(d) Lastly there was the control exercised by the Central Audit Department. (See the Chapter on "Finance" in Book II1).

(Note.-Thus up to 1919, the Central Government was the keeper of the "Financial Conscience" of the provinces. For the grievances of the provinces in this respect see page 198.) But after the Act of 1919 this control is relaxed in the following

manner:

(i) In matters of expenditure:-In case of expenditure over Transferred Subjects the Provincial Legislature is given the exclusive control, subject to the control of the superior authorities: (i)Of the Governor, who is empowered in case of emergency to increase such expenditure as may be necessary for the safety and tranquillity of the province or for carrying on any Department; (ii) of the Secretary of State, who is authorised (a) to retain control over the expenditure on Transferred Subjects that is likely to affect the prospects or rights of All-India Services which he recruits, and (b) to retain control over the purchase of stores in the United Kingdom. In case of expenditure over Reserved Subjects the Secretary of State in Council can by means of executive orders delegate his powers of control to Provincial Government. But his responsibility to Parliament in this respect is to remain undiminished. He may dispense with his previous sanction in purely provincial matters which are Reserved, if the Government and the Lagislature are in agreement regarding the desirability of incurreng expenditure on them. But his sanction is necessary for irrigation and navigation works, if the project affects the interests of more than one province and when the original estimate exceeds Rs. fifty lacs

or a revised estimate exceeds by fifteen per cent on original estimate sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council. Thus with the diminishing control of the Secretary of State, the Government of India's control also is proportiontely relaxed so far as provincial expenditure is concerned.

(2) In matters of revenue:- Power is confered on Provincial Legislatures to impose taxes for provincial purposes and the previous sanction of the, Government of India is no longer required, provided the tax in question is one contained in a Schedule of Taxes prepared for the purpose. The Provinces are also allowed to negotiate loans either in India or abroad on the security of their revenues and not necessarily borrow money from the Government of India. The system of "Divided Heads," the revenues of which were divided in a certain ratio determined after a good deal of deliberation between the Central and Provincial Governments, is abolished. It had proved to be a source of constant interference of the Government of India, that owned also a share in the revenue of these heads. The provinces were to be given separate and independent sources of revenue. Thus came to an end the system of Financial Settlements that was inspired only by the considerations of administrative convenience and efficiency and which, therefore, had no statutory basis in this sense that neither the Provinces could legally enforce their claim nor could the Government of India be debarred from revising them under extra-ordinary conditions,

(3) In masters of budgets:-The provinces for the first time were authorised to have their separate budgets, not included in the All-India Budget. This financial autonomy, says Horne, has brought with it new liabilities- (i) of the charges for the capital expenditure on irrigation works now provincialised; (ii) of the annual charges incidental to the so called Famine Insurance Fund;

(iii) and of the outstanding provincial loan account which the pro vinces are required to pay off in twelve annual instalments (Ho. 95).. It may also be noted here that the interest on these loans and the provincial contributions are a first charge on the revenues of the Local Government concerned.

(4) Lastly there is instituted a new Audit System more effective and independent. (See Chapter on "Finance" in Book III ).

F. Relations between the Executive and Legislature

after 1919.

Executive not responsible to the Legislature. From the very beginning the irresponsible character of the Executive has been maintained in the Indian Constitution. The Act of 1909 gave certain powers to the Legislature to criticise the Exe-. cutive and propose resolutions but there was even no idea that the Executive should be controlled by it. But the Act of 1919 has slightly modified the position in practice. The constitutional basís of the Central Executive remains for the present unchanged in as much as it is neither constitutionally responsible to the Indian Legislature nor can that body remove it or tie its hands. In strict theory, therefore, the Governor-General in Council continues, even after the Reforms, to be as autocratic as he was before. Nay he is further armed with extra-ordinary power of certification, which is intended to prove as a corrective to any ferocious or un-necessary obstruction on the part of the Legislature. The Joint Report laid down that "the Government of India must remain wholly responsible to Parliament, and saving such responsibility, its authority in essential matters, must remain indisputable, pending experience of the effect of the changes to be introduced in the Provinces (p.. 240). Lord Meston Says:

It is a curious and interesting example of the pyschology of constitution making. Finding themselves threatened with the anomaly of leaving the Central Government in India the only unregenerate link in the administrative chain, the designers of the new scheme were in a somewhat serious quandary. On one side the insufficiency of the old regime beset them as well as the claims of symmetry in the new constitutional edifice. On the other side they had taken their stand on the imperative duty of keeping the central power, the authority to which the country looks for external defence and internal order, free from any of the weaknesses that might accompany the experimental changes in the Provinces, (I. M. 143)

A Compromise- The above is the reason why the purely theoretical position was given up and a compromise was effected in practice by the Reforms of 1919. Of the two steps of democratic constitution, viz., the popular Legislature and a responsible Executive, only the first was adopted but not the second. The object in view was that on one hand the influence of public opinion, howsoever indirect, might not be insignificant, and on the other the democratic legislature with larger financial and deliberative powers should not stop the wheels of the machinery of Government. Hence to counteract against the tendency of the popular Lower, House (the Assembly ), with an elected non-official majority, seeking to paralyse the official executive by means of an incessant use of its powers of interpellation, of moving resolutions and adjournments, of discussing the budget and voting a part of it, and of sanctioning all legislative measures, two steps were taken: firstly, the Council of State was created; it could reject, or amend a law passed by the Assembly. If it could consent to a measure rejected by the latter, the Viceroy's way was smooth. He could certify it as an essential measure for the safety, tranquillity and interest of British India and forthwith it could become an Act. Secondly, the Viceroy was given certain over

ruling powers, specially the extra-ordinary weapon of certification to put a stop to the ferocious opposition at once. These powers

have been made use of on various occasions.

The idea of habituating the Executive to be responsive:- Notwithstanding these weapons in the bands of the Central Executive, it is maintained that the latter is made by the Reforms "responsive, though not responsible to the Indian Legislature”. The arguments of supporters of this view are:-(i) The statutory safeguards may have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; but they will not make things easy for the Executive which looks for its mandate elsewhere than from the powerful legislature (Parliament) to which it is tied, (so far responsibility is concerned), nor will they cultivate the sense of responsibility in a legislature which is always to be over-ruled by the Executive. (I. M. 150) Hence it is said that the Viceroy will be required to satisfy the demand of the Legislature as far as possible and refrain from exercising his special powers, according to the spirit if not the letter of the law, as embodied in the Act of 1919. If this is not done the whole scheme of Reforms would be rendered nugatory. (ii) Again it is suggested that though the Viceroy may have wide discretion and an indefeasible authority on paper, he must avoid a habit of conflict with the Legislature or defiance of public opinion, for such a defiance in the long run would prove nothing less than suicidal. (iii) Thirdly, it is urged that 'no normal government can subsist on a pure negation' To veto the acts of the Legisleture at every stage will slowly and gradually sap the very foundation of it and deprive it of its human and moral basis. From agruments like these, the supporters of this view have also begun to conclude that the actions. of the Government of India have become "indicative if not reflective of the popular view-point."

The critics on the other hand maintain that the authoritative statement of Lord Selborne's Committee,-"that this power of the Governor-General in Council is real, and that it is meant to be