resources. Under the pooling system, any improvement which either half of Government can effect, goes into hotchpot, and there is no direct advantage from it, possibly no advantage at all."

It was also pointed out by the Government of India that the Separate Purse with its own separate balances, revenues, power of borrowing and taxation, and having its separate and independent budgets, possessed the following advantages :

Advantages of Separate Purse :-"(1) It would form a tremendous stimulus to the half of the Government concerned, to develop its own resources; (2) it will do away with the temptation which the Joint Purse involves, to meddle with the affairs of the other half of Government; (3) it will do away with the annual wrangle about the allocation of funds between the two halves of the Government. This sort of friction over funds will seriously imperil the harmonious working of the Councillors and the Minísters; (4) a Separate Purse will enable the Finance Department to think out and adopt important schemes of recurring expenditure which have to be spread over a number of years e.g. an increase in the magistracy; an improvement of police, buildings, etc.; (5) it will remove the "official" government from the undue influence and control of the Ministers, by depriving the latter of an opportunity to "meddle with its budget." In short the Government of India disliked the idea that the popular half should in any way control the policy of the bureaucratic half through their handling of the purse strings and tried to avoid it.

(C) By the Indian public opinion as follows:-Its chief exponant, Sir Shankran Nair, declared himself in favour of the Joint Puree and pointed the following drawbacks of Seperate Purse and several advantages of Joint Purse.

Drawbacks of Separate Purse., -(1) It will deprive the Legislative Council of any real voice in the settlement of the Bud

get as a whole, which would frustrate the very object of the Reforms Scheme and reduce its value. The power of purse, or popular influence on finance is most essential for responsible government. (2) This may have certain administrative conveniences, but the fact that the division of Subjects was not made on financial consideration, would make the whole arrangement unjust and inequitable, the transferred departments being mostly spending rather revenue producing departments. (3) It would violate the fundamental principle which every reasonable man or association has to bear in mind: the principle of maximum benefit out of each item of expenditure. A reserved department faight waste its money to meet a demand that should be absolutely useless in comparison to a pressing need of a transferred department.

Advantages of Joint Purse:-(1) It would lead to the co-operation of both the halves of Executive Government and give them opprtunities of sympathetically influencing each other for the good of the whole. (2) The Budget would be elastic according to the financial disposition each year. (3) The fact that the Ministers have agreed with the Councillors on the allotment made for Reserved Subjects or on the Budget as a whole, would go to convince the Legislative Council with regard to the necessity of those allotments and, therefore, minimise the chances of conflict and the use of the Governor's power of certification.

Final decision:-The Joint Committee at last declared themselves in favour of Joint Purse believing that it would not prove unworkable, given reasonable Councillors, reasonable Ministers and reasonable Governor. But to avoid the chance of friction and bickering which might prove disasterous to the whole machanism of dyarchy, they also suggested that certain Rules should be framed for this purpose. ( Vide I. M. 142) The Devolution Rules were, therefore, framed as follows:

Rule 30. Taxation and Borrowing-All proposals for raising taxation or for the borrowing of money on the revenues of a

province shall, in the case of a Governor's province, be considered by the Governor with his Executive Council and Ministers sitting together, but the decision shall thereafter be arrived at by the Governor in Council, or by the Governor and Minister or Ministers, according as the proposal originates with the Governor in Council or the Governor and Ministers.

Rule 31. Allocation of revenue for the administration of Transferred Subjects:--Expenditure for the purpose of the administrafion of both Reserved and Transferred Subjects shall, in the first instance, be a charge on the general revenues and balances, of each province, and the framing of proposals for expenditure in regard to Transferred and Reserved Subjects will be a matter for agreement between that part of the Government which is responsible for the administration of Transferred Subjects and that part of the Government which is responsible for the administration of Reserved Subjects.

Rule 32. Procedure in event of failure to agree-(1) If at the time of the preparation of the Budget the Governor is satisfied that there is no hope of agreement within a reasonable time between the members of his Executive Council on the one hand and Ministers on the other as to the apportionment of funds between reserved and transferred departments respectively, he may, by order in writing, allocate the revenues and balances of the province between Reserved and Transferred Subjects, by specifying the fractional proportions of the revenues and balances which shall be assigned to each class of Subjects. (2) An order of allocation under this rule may be made by the Governor either in accordance with his own discretion, or in accordance with the report of an authority to be appointed by the Governor-General in this behalf on the application of the Governor.

Rule 33. Period of order of allocation-Every such order shall (unless it is sooner revoked) remain in force for a period

to be specified in the order, which shall be not less than the duration of the then existing Legislative Council, and shall not exosed by more than one year the duration thereof: Provided, that the Governor may at any time, if his Executive Council and Ministers so desire, revoke an order of allocation or make such other allocation as has been agreed upon by them: Provided, further, that if the order which it is proposed to revoke was passed in accordance with the report of an authority appointed by the Governor General, the Governor shall obtain the consent of the GovernorGeneral before revoking the same.

Rule 34. Condition of order of allocation-Every order of allocation made under these rules shall provide that, if any increase of revenues accrues during the period of the order on account of the imposition of fresh taxation, that increase, unless the Legislature otherwise directs, shall be allocated in aid of that part of the Government by which the taxation is initiated.

Rule 35. Preparation of budget in default of agreement or order of allocation- If at the time of the preparation of any Budget no agreement or allocation such as is contemplated by these Rules has been arrived at, the Budget shall be prepared on the basis of the aggregate grants respectively provided for Reserved and Transferred Subjects in the Budget of the year about to expire.

Let us summarise now the powers conferred upon the Governor in matters of finance:-He is

(i) to hold budget meetings of the Councillors and Ministers for the allocation of the revenues; (Rule 31)

(ii) to allocate the revenues and balances of the Provinces between the two halves to prevent the administrative machinery from being brought to a standstill, if the meeting ends in a deadlock or there is no possibility of agreement within a reasonable time; (Rule 32)

(iii) to hold joint meetings for the consideration of all proposals for raising taxation or for the borrowing of money on the revenues of a province; (Rule 30)

(iv) to exercise all the special powers conferred on him for the purpose of legislation (pp. 423-24) in the case of Money Bills.

(v) and to obtain independently of the Legislature appropriations which he needs by the use once more of certificate procedure in the case of Reserved Subjects as well as in all cases of grave emergency. It is, therefore, provided by Section 72 D (2) as follows:

(a) The Local Government shall have power, in relation to any such demand to act as if it had been assented to notwithstanding the withholding of such assent or the reduction of the amount therein referred to, if the demand relates to a Reserved Subject, and the Governor certifies that the expenditure provided for by the demand is essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the Subject, and (b) the Governor shall have power in cases of emergency to authorise such expenditure as may be in his opinion necessary for the safety or tranquillity of the province, or for the carrying on of any department; and (c) no proposal for the appropriation of any such revenues or other moneys, for any purpose shall be made except on the recommendation of the Governor communicated to the council.

L. Working of the Provincial Executive

after the Reforms.

Working of Dyarchy.-We have discussed the meaning of Dyarchy, the circumstances that justified its introduction, its advantages, and lastly, its drawbacks. Let us now summarise the facts discussed already to indicate how the two halves had to work in practice or what the relations between them were