acceptance of the goods. The appearance of the "adjuster" in this case is interesting, for he seems to be a new dramatis persona in business and one destined to play a very large rôle. The term is borrowed from insurance practise, where the adjuster corresponds to the "claim agent" of railroad companies; to the "complaint department" of public utilities and department stores, the "trouble man" in mechanical trades, and the like. The functions of such a department are generally to make good all minor defects, to settle all small claims, to attempt to compromise the larger ones, and sometimes to gather evidence and lay the foundations for an eventual action or defense through attorneys.

Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1890. [44 Minn. 28.]

COLLINS, J.: The complaint in this action is not a model, as is admitted by the attorney who drew it, but it appears therefrom that defendant, a photographer, had been employed to make, and had made and sold to plaintiff, a number of photographic portraits of herself, and that subsequently, without the order or consent of plaintiff, he made and delivered to a detective another of these photographs, who used it in a manner particularly stated in the pleading, and claimed to have been highly improper. In justice to defendant, it is right that we should here remark that it is nowhere averred in the complaint that the occupation of the detective was known to him, or that he knew that the photograph so delivered was to be used in the manner stated in the complaint or in any other improper way. This action was brought to recover damages, and this appeal is from an order overruling a general demurrer to the complaint. A good cause of action was therein stated, for which nominal damages, at least, may be recovered. The object for which the defendant was employed and paid was to make and furnish the plaintiff with a certain number of photographs of herself. To do this a negative was taken upon glass, and from this negative the photographs ordered were printed. An almost unlimited number might also be printed from the negative, but the contract between plaintiff and defendant included, by implication, an agreement that the negative for which plaintiff sat should only be used for the printing of such portraits as she might order or authorize. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345. The complaint shows that there was a breach of this implied contract. Order affirmed.

§223. The Right of Privacy.-This case presents a question that has been widely discussed under the specious caption "the right to privacy." What is really meant is the interest in one's privacy which the law may or may not protect by creating various rights, but which the law has not undertaken to recognize as such. In this case, the interest can be protected quite easily by reading into the photographer's contract a stipulation based on the custom of the trade to the effect that the negative shall not be used except for the purpose of making copies of the customer's picture according to her order. Cf. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. Law Rev., 193.

§224 W. T. SMITH LUMBER CO. v. JERNIGAN,

et al.

Supreme Court of Alabama, 1914. [185 Ala. 125.] DeGRAFFENRIED, J.: . Standing alone and unexplained, we would unhesitatingly say that the words "timber suitable for sawlogs" meant any sort of sawlogs, whether oak, chestnut, hickory, poplar, or ash. This deed was made, however, nearly 20 years ago, and it may be that in the section in which this timber was situated the word "sawlogs" had at that time a well-understood local meaning, and that this local meaning was well understood by the parties when the deed was made and delivered. The written reservation in the deed is but the memorial of the contract, the thing upon which the minds of the parties met, and, of course, the thing which they agreed to was the contract between them. If "sawlogs," then had a restricted meaning and the parties used that word in that restricted meaning, the fact that, since that time, the meaning of that word has been broadened does not broaden the rights of appellant. As an illustration: Many years ago it was the universal custom for cotton to be picked from the fields and placed in baskets. These baskets were used by the laborers to carry the cotton from the field to the cotton house. These baskets were made from a particular character of white oak. The words "basket timber" then had, in the cotton sections of the state, a particular local meaning. They meant white oak suitable for making cotton baskets. If a man then sold to a maker of cotton baskets all his "basket timber" his plain meaning would have been to sell that part of his white oak timber which was suitable for making cotton baskets, and only that timber.

In this case the contention is that, when the reservation in the

deed was made, the word "sawlogs" had, in the section of Alabama in which the lands in question were situated, a local, welldefined meaning, and that these words meant pine trees or logs suitable to be manufactured into lumber. If this is true, we see no reason why appellees have not the right, by evidence, to show it. In making this proof, the construction which the parties themselves have placed upon the contract may be shown.-Kaul, et al. v. Weed, et al., 203 Pa. 586, 53 Atl. 489.

"When the usage of the locality in which the instrument is executed has given certain words therein a peculiar signification," the parties to the instrument will be presumed to have used such words in their peculiar local sense.-17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 12, subd. 3, and authorities there cited.

$225. "Construction" and "Interpretation" Stricto Sensu. -The principle in this case is not unlike that which governs the contract made in a foreign language. In such case translation includes explanation and some law. Here the court takes into consideration not only the peculiarities of a trade and a locality, but also the changes that come about in custom and language with it.

In all of these cases there is no sharp line between simple interpretation and the addition of details based on custom as a kind of undeveloped law. In the following sections we shall confine our attention to interpretation in the stricter sense of the work of the court after all of the evidence is in, when there is no dispute as to the facts of the case or the terms of the contract.

B. INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE COURTS.

$226. Interpretation, a Function of the Courts.-Two distinct processes are frequently spoken of interchangeably as construction or interpretation. The first is that which we have already examined in several connections, namely, the problem of ascertaining all of the terms of a given contract, particularly the implied terms. As business is ordinarily conducted, every contract has its implied terms, which must be filled out by reference to the usages and customs of the particular business, sometimes by reference to statutes which supply us with convenient "standardized contracts" and frequently by reference to facts and

actions which speak louder than, if not so clear as, words. Even the words used must sometimes be "translated" into nontechnical or at least unabridged sentences before we can say that we have all of the terms of a contract before us. When that is accomplished we are ready for the second task, a judicial task, the interpretation of the words of the contract. It is as if we had a written agreement substituted for the aggregate of words and acts that have gone into the making of the contractand the rules of interpretation laid down for written agreements (§§137, 138, supra) apply.

$227. The Sales Act and Contractual Interpretation.-A specific illustration of the application of these rules is found in those parts of the Uniform Sales Act in which an attempt is made to determine when title passes in a contract for the sale of goods on the basis of the agreement of the parties. The cardinal rule is, of course, that intention governs. As a matter of fact, the difficulty that generally arises is due to the fact that the parties do not clearly express their intention.

$227a. Uniform Sales Act, Sections 18 and 19:

18. [Property in Specific Goods Passes When Parties So Intend.] (1) Where there is a contract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.

(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade and the circumstances of the case.

19. [Rules for Ascertaining Intention.] Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer.

Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is imma

'Cf. §199, supra, on the constructive (or term-supplying) as contrasted with the purely interpretative (or term-defining) phase of the Sales Act, Both are involved in the following sections.

terial whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed.

Rule 2. Where there is a contract to sell specific goods and the seller is bound to do something to the goods, for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the property does 'not pass until such thing be done.

Rule 3. (1) When the goods are delivered to the buyer “on sale or return, or on other terms indicating an intention to make a present sale, but to give the buyer an option to return the goods instead of paying the price, the property passes to the buyer on delivery, but he may revest the property in the seller by returning or tendering the goods within the time fixed in the contract, or, if no time has been fixed, within a reasonable time.

(2) When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or on trial or on satisfaction, or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer

(a) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller, or does any act adopting the transaction;

(b) If he does not signify his approval or accceptance to the seller, but retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.

Rule 4. (1) Where there is contract to sell unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller, with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. Such assent may be expressed or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made.

(2) Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell, the seller delivers the goods to the buyer, or to a carrier or other bailee (whether named by the buyer or not) for the purpose of transmission to or holding for the buyer, he is presumed to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract, except in the cases provided for in the next rule and in section 20. This presumption is applicable, although by the terms of the contract, the buyer is to pay the price before receiving the delivery of the goods, and the goods are marked with the words "collect on delivery" or their equivalents.