COBB, J.: "A libel is a false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, or writing, or pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of an individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Civil Code, $3832. A publication coming within this definition is actionable without an averment of special damage. But a publication which has the effect merely of disparaging a tradesman's goods is not actionable without an allegation of special damage. Boynton v. Shaw Stocking Co. (Mass.), 15 N. E. 507; Boynton v. Remington, 3 Allen, 397; Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co. (Mass.) 59 Am. Rep. 83. The controlling question, therefore, to be determined in such a case as the one now under consideration is whether the publication has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person against whom it is directed and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or whether its effect is simply to disparage goods which he is offering for sale. It is possible that a publication may have both of these effects. Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., supra. And whenever a publication is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would make it libelous and the other not, it is for the jury to say whether the words are in fact libelous. Beazley v. Reid, 68 Ga. 380; Colvard v. Black, 110 Ga. 646. The plaintiff can not by innuendo draw from a writing a conclusion not justified by the language used; but it is competent for the plaintiff to explain in this way an ambiguous publication, to point out the intention of the author, and to show wherein the effect of the language was to injure his reputation. Park v. Insurance Co., 51 Ga. 510. And the rule is that a publication must be construed in the light of all the attending circumstances, the cause and occasion of the publication, and all other extraneous matters which will tend to explain the allusion or point out the person in question. Colvard v. Black, 110 Ga. 647. Words harmless in themselves may become libelous when the circumstances under which they are published are such as to convey a covert meaning to the reader reflecting injuriously upon the reputation of the person to whom they refer. These circumstances, as well as the existence of a motive for using the words in a covert sense, should be considered in determining whether they are libelous, when applied to the person to whom they expressly refer or to whom they must have been intended to refer. The publication under consideration in the present case was manifestly in disparagement of the shoes which the plaintiff was offering for sale, but it was more than this. When all the circumstances as detailed in the petition are taken into view, a jury would be authorized to say that the author intended, and would be so understood by

those familiar with the circumstances, to reflect upon the reputation of the plaintiff and expose him to public hatred and contempt. A construction of the words in the light of these circumstances, which would make the publication charge, in effect, that the plaintiff was a cheat and was endeavoring to palm off on the public damaged goods for perfect goods, and that, too, imperfect goods which contained merely latent defects, would be neither forced nor strained.

That the publication was intended to refer to the plaintiff cannot, in view of the allegations of the petition, admit of doubt. If one reading the publication knew that it referred to the plaintiff, knew that he was selling Queen Quality shoes at a reduced price, the inference was irresistible that he was selling damaged goods, and when this is coupled with the further fact that the plaintiff had advertised that his goods were perfect and undamaged, the conclusion is well warranted that the author of the publication intended to charge that the plaintiff's advertisement was false, and that in inserting the advertisement he was guilty of a deliberate falsehood and intended thereby to cheat and defraud the ladies of Macon who were likely to become his customers. Such a publication, in our opinion, exceeded the bounds of legitimate competition. It is right and proper for tradesmen to puff their own goods to the disparagement of those of others, but they must not allow their zeal to betray them into an attack upon the personal reputation of their competitors for honesty and integrity. It is not always easy to draw the line between what would be considered legitimate competition and a libelous publication, but the writing complained of in this case was, in our judgment, susceptible of the construction which the plaintiff put upon it. The case of Behre v. National Cash Register Company, 100 Ga. 213, is closely in point. There the publication charged simply that the plaintiff was no longer connected with the National Cash Register Company, and that any contracts made by him for the company would be void. The court held that these words were susceptible of the construction which the plaintiff put upon them, to the effect that he was endeavoring to represent a company which he had no authority to represent, and was in this manner endeavoring to defraud and cheat the public. There was no allegation of special damage in that case, and the decision was put distinctly on the ground that the publication, construed in the light of the innuendoes laid in the petition, constituted a libel, for which an action for general damages would lie. The defendant in error relied upon the cases of Boynton v. Shaw Stocking Company, and Boynton v. Remington, both of which are eited above. In each of those cases

the publication complained of was held to be merely in disparagement of the plaintiff's goods, and not a libel upon his reputation. It is to be admitted that these decisions are very closely in point. There are, of course, some points of difference between the publications in those cases and the one now under consideration, but these differences are perhaps immaterial. Notwithstanding the very high respect which we entertain for the distinguished court which rendered those decisions, we are unwilling to allow them to influence us to make a decision which in our judgment would be unsound.

§47. Justification in Cases Involving Interference With Trade or Calling.-Note in 3 Va. L. Rev. 385. "The right to carry on a lawful business or to exercise a legitimate calling without unlawful interference is universally recognized. Modern developments of the law sustain the proposition that intentional interference with another's business or occupation is actionable if no justification is established.' The theory of justification in such cases consists in compromise between conflicting rights by estimating in the light of public policy and social advantage the limits within which the rights of one person may be restricted in order to allow another to exercise an opposing interest. It is plain from its indefinite nature that no statement of what constitutes justification applicable to all cases may accurately be proposed. In general to justify an intentional injury to a lawful trade it must appear that the act complained of was otherwise lawful, that the means employed were not illegal, and that the object sought tended to the advancement and interest

1Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N. HI. 345, 74 Atl. 595, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966; Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 Atl. 962; Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 South. 346. But see Pollock, Torts, 8th ed. p. 346.

In 28 Law Quart. Rev. 67, it is said: "The theory of justification consists in a proper adjustment and compromise between the two competing rights that are equally protected in law. It has been already observed that the enjoyment by a particular individual of the right of freedom, as to how he should bestow his capital and labor, is not absolute, but qualified by the existence of equal rights in the other members, to such an extent, as to be made compatible with an equally free enjoyment of these rights by the rest of the community. In fact, every case of justification reduces itself to the question, how far the rights of an individual can be so circumscribed in accordance with a general law of freedom, as to leave an equal scope for the free enjoyment of competing rights of his fellow men."

of the doer. actionable.

Interference with contract relations in general is

It is necessary that the wrong-doer have knowledge of the existence of the contract and that he causes its breach in bad faith. Justification for such acts may be shown by setting up an equal or superior right in the person causing the breach." A third person is not liable for inducing another to terminate a contract of partnership which was terminable at will."

The chief source of justification in adjusting injuries to business or calling is in the right of competition. Business competition carried on in a lawful manner is a complete defense to whatever injuries are accomplished by lawfully pursuing a competing business.' So in the absence of unlawful means and where no breach of contract is procured it is justifiable for a competitor to induce the customers of another to transfer their trade to him. This right to compete is not limited by the damage done and fair competition lawfully conducted may completely drive a rival out of business with no liability attaching to the successful competitor."

However, the competition must be genuine and not pretended. It has been held in a few cases which have considered the question that a simulated competition carried on with the express purpose of injuring another's business is actionable if injury results. It is not necessary that every particular transaction in trade be conducted for the profit of the trader provided that his business in general assumes the aspect of real competition."

10

Hutton v. Watters (Tenn.), 179 S. W. 134 (principal case). 'Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. American Window Glass Co., 202 Mass. 471. 'See note 7, infra. See also Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603.

McGuire v. Gerstley, 204 U. S. 489.

'Lewis v. Hine Hodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 46 South. 685; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 598.

Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553.

Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, supra; Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271, 38 N. E. 292, 25 L. R. A. 674.

19Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 131 Am. St. Rep. 446, 16 Ann. Cas. 807; Boggs v. Duncan-Sebell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N. W. 482, L. R. A. 1915B, 1196. See Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 623, 132 N. W. 371, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263.

"Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, supra; Lough v. Outerbridge, supra.

Another form of competition which is advanced as matter of justification is that involved in labor controversies. The American decisions have not allowed labor competition the high place which competition in trade or commerce has been conceded." In boycotts carried on by labor unions the means, though otherwise lawful, create an intense form of coercion which renders them actionable and the methods used and the continuance of boycotts may be enjoined in the proper cases." The fact that the boycott was conducted for the benefit and advancement of the union will not avail to justify it."

It is clear that the adjustment of the wages or the reduction. of the hours of labor or any other change for the benefit of the employees attempted by a peaceable strike will not render the employees or the union which they represent liable to the employer even if he is injured." Difficulty arises when the effect of a strike is to cause damage to persons other than the employers. Difference of opinion prevails in the courts on the question of the liability of labor unions when they institute strikes to procure the discharge of non-union men or as it is commonly called-to secure the closed shop.

The most widely held view seems to be that such strikes or similar transactions with employers, though conducted in a lawful manner, create a right of action against the union or union agents when the non-union men are deprived of their employment. It is considered that the benefit or advancement of the union by such acts does not create in its members a self-interest which is sufficient to justify the injury to the non-union men who are deprived of their occupation. The reason advanced by the courts upholding the opposite view is that such strikes tend to unify and strengthen the organization of labor, thereby creating

12See 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, p. 361.

Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421, 42 L. R. A. 407.

"See Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135, 143. 15 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local Union, No. 131, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788; Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 South. 590.

1Berry v. Donovan, supra; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505; Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316.