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The effect which the Proclamation will have on the public mind is a matter of some uncertainty. In some respects it would, I think, have been better to have issued it when formerly first considered.

There is an impression that Seward has opposed and is opposed to the measure; I have not been without that impression myself, chiefly from his hesitation to commit himself, and perhaps because action was suspended on his suggestion; but in the final discussion he has [as] cordially supported the measure as Chase.

Wednesday, September 24, 1862. Secretary Smith called this morning; said he had just had an interview with Judge Advocate Turner, who related a conversation which had taken place.between himself [Turner] and Colonel Key, one of Halleck's staff. Turner] had expressed to K[ey] his surprise that McClellan had not followed up the victory last week, by pursuing the rebels, and capturing them or cutting them in pieces. That, said Key], is not the policy. Turner asked what then was the policy. Key said it was one of exhaustion, that it would have been impolitic and injudicious to have destroyed the rebel army, for that would have ended the contest without any compromise, and it was the army policy at the right time to compel the opposing forces to adopt a compromise.1

Smith assures me that Turner made to him this communication. It is most extraordinary. yet entirely consistent with current events and what Wilson and others have stated. While I can hardly give credit to the statement, the facts can be reconciled with every action or inaction with wasted energies, fruitless campaigns and barren fights. Smith fully believes it.

As I write, 9 P. M., a band of music

1 Major John J. Key was summarily called upon by the President to account for his language, stingingly rebuked, and forthwith dismissed from the service.

strikes up on the opposite side of the square, a complimentary serenade to the President for the Emancipation Proclamation. The document has been in the main well received, but there is some violent opposition, and the friends of the measure have made this demonstration to show their approval.

CHASE'S FINANCIAL POLICY

Thursday, September 25, 1862. Had some talk to-day with Chase on financial matters. Our drafts on Barings now cost us twenty-nine per cent. I object to this as presenting an untrue statement of naval expenditures, unjust to the Navy Department, as well as unjust in fact. If I draw for $100,000 it ought not to take from the naval appropriation $129,000. No estimates, no appropriations by Congress, embrace the $29,000 brought on by the mistaken Treasury policy of depreciating the currency. I therefore desire the Secretary of the Treasury to place $100,000 in the hands of the Barings to the credit of the Navy Department, less the exchange. This he declines to do, but insists on deducting the difference between money and inconvertible paper, which I claim to be wrong, because in our foreign expenditures, the paper which his financial policy forces upon us at home is worthless abroad. The depreciation is the result of a mistaken financial policy, and illustrates its error and tendency to error.

The departure from a specie standard, and the adoption of an irredeemable paper currency, deranges the finances and is fraught with disastrous consequences. This vitiation of the currency is the be ginning of evil, a fatal mistake — which will be likely to overwhelm Chase and the Administration if he and they remain here long enough.

Had some conversation with Chase relating to the war. He is much discour aged; believes the President is disposed to let matters take their course; deplores this state of things, but can see no relief.

CHASE'S OPINION OF STANTON I asked if the principal source of the difficulty was not in the fact that we actually had not a War Department. Stanton is dissatisfied, and he and those under his influence do not sustain and encourage McClellan, yet he needs to be constantly stimulated, inspired, and pushed forward. It was, I said, apparent to me, and I thought to him, that the Secretary of War, though arrogant and often offensive in language, did not direct army movements; he appears to have something else than army operations in view. The army officers here, or others than he, appear to control military movements. Chase was disturbed by my remarks. Said Stanton had not been sustained, and his department had become demoralized, but he (Chase) should never consent to remain if Stanton left. I told him he misapprehended me. I was not the man to propose the exclusion of Stanton, or any one of our Cabinet associates, but we must look at things as they are, and not fear to discuss them. It was our duty to meet difficulties and try to correct them. It was wrong for him, or any one, to say he would not remain and do his duty if the welfare of the country required a change of policy or a personal change in any one department. If Stanton was militarily unfit, indifferent, dissatisfied, or engaged in petty personal intrigues against a man whom he disliked, to the neglect of the duties with which he was entrusted, or had not the necessary administrative ability, [if he] was from rudeness or any other cause, offensive, we ought not to shut our eyes to the fact.

It is evident that Chase takes pretty much the same views as I do, but has not made up his mind to act on his convictions.

The President has issued a proclamation on martial law - suspension of Habeas Corpus, he terms it- meaning of course a suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus. Of this proclamation I knew nothing until I saw it in

the papers, and am not sorry that I did not. I question the wisdom or utility of a multiplicity of proclamations striking deep on great questions.

Friday, September 26, 1862.

It is now almost a fortnight since the battle near Sharpsburg (Antietam) the rebels have recrossed the Potomac but our army is doing nothing. The President says Halleck told him he should want two days more to make up his mind what to do. Great Heavens! what a General-in-Chief!

Wednesday, October 1, 1862.

Called this morning at the White House, but learned the President had left the city. The porter said he made no mention whither he was going, nor when he would return. I have no doubt he is on a visit to McClellan and the army; none of his Cabinet can have been aware of this journey.

EARLY ESTIMATE OF DAVID D. PORTER

Relieved Davis and appointed D. D. Porter to the Western Flotilla, which is hereafter to be recognized as a squadron. Porter is but a commander. He has, however, stirring and positive qualities, is fertile in resources, has great energy, excessive and sometimes not overscrupulous ambition, is impressed with and boastful of his own powers, given to exaggeration in relation to himself (a Porter infirmity), is not generous to older living and superior officers whom he is too ready to traduce, but is kind and patronizing to favorites who are juniors, and generally to official inferiors. Is given to cliquism, but brave and daring, like all his family. He has not the conscientious and high moral qualities of Foote to organize the flotilla, and is not considered by some of our best naval men a fortunate officer; has not in his profession, though he may have personally, what the sailors admire," luck." It is a question, with his mixture of good and bad traits,

how he will succeed. His selection will

be unsatisfactory to many, but his field of operation is peculiar, and a young and active officer is required for the duty to which he is assigned. [It] will be an incentive to juniors. If he does well, I shall get no credit; if he fails, I shall be blamed. No thanks in any event will be mine. Davis, whom he succeeds, is more of a scholar than a sailor, has gentlemanly instincts and scholarly acquirements, is an intelligent but not an energetic, driving, fighting officer just [such] as is wanted for rough work on the Mississippi; is kind and affable, but has not the vim, dash, recklessness perhaps is the better word, - of Porter.

Dahlgren, whose ambition is great, will I suppose be hurt that Porter, who is his junior, should be designated for the Mississippi command, and the President will sympathize with D[ahlgren], whom he regards with favor while he has not great admiration or respect for Porter. Dahlgren has asked to be assigned to the special duty of capturing Charleston, but Dupont has had that object in view for more than a year and made it his study. I cannot, though I appreciate Dahlgren, supersede the Admiral in this work.

THE CABINET ON EMANCIPATION

The Emancipation Proclamation has, in its immediate effects, been less exciting than I had apprehended. It has caused but little jubilation on one hand, nor much angry outbreak on the other. The speculations as to the sentiments and opinions of the Cabinet in regard to this measure are ridiculously wild and strange. When it was first brought forward some six or eight weeks ago, all present assented to it. It was pretty fully discussed at two subsequent Cabinet meetings, and the President consulted freely, I presume, with the members individually. He did with me. Mr. Bates desired that deportation, by force if necessary, should go with emancipation. Born and educated among the negroes, having always lived with slaves, he dreaded any step which should be taken to bring about social equality

between the two races. The effect, he said, would be to degrade the whites without elevating the blacks: demoralization, vice, and misery would follow. Mr. Blair, at the second discussion, said that while he was an emancipationist from principle, he had doubts of the expediency of such a movement as was contemplated. Stanton, after expressing himself earnestly in favor of the step proposed, said it was so important a measure that he hoped every member would give his opinion, whatever it might be, on the subject. Two had not spoken, - alluding to Chase and myself.

I then spoke briefly of the strong ex ercise of power involved in the question, the denial of executive authority to do this act. But [I argued] the rebels themselves had invoked war on the subject of slavery, had appealed to arms, and they must abide the consequences. It was an extreme exercise of war powers, and under the circumstances, and in view of the condition of the country and the magnitude of the contest, I was willing to resort to extreme measures and avail ourselves of military necessity, always harsh and questionable. The blow would fall heavy and severe on those loyal men in the slave states who clung to the Union and had most of their property in slaves; but they must abide the results of a conflict which we all deplored. The slaves were now an element of strength to the rebels, were la borers, producers, and army attendants. They were considered as property by the rebels, and, if property, were subject to confiscation; if not property, but persona residing in the insurrectionary region, we should invite them, as well as the whites, to unite with us in putting down the rebellion. I had made known my views to the President, and could say here I gave my approval of the proclamation. Mr. Chase said it was going a step farther than he had proposed, but he was glad of it, and went into a very full argument on the subject. I do not attempt to report it or any portion of it, nor that of others, farther than to define the position of each

when this important question was before us. Something more than a proclamation will be necessary, for this step will band the South together, make opponents of some who now are friends, and unite the border states firmly with the cotton states in resistance to the government.

Thursday, October 2, 1862. Admiral Dupont arrived to-day; looks hale and hearty. He is a skillful and accomplished officer. Has a fine address, is a courtier with perhaps too much finesse and management, resorts too much to extraneous and subordinate influences to accomplish what he might easily attain directly, and, like many naval officers, is given to personal cliques, naval clanship. This evil I have striven to break up, and, with the assistance of secession, which took off some of the worst cases, have thus far been pretty successful.

STANTON'S THREAT TO RESIGN

Friday, October 3, 1862. Chase tells me that Stanton has called on him to say he deemed it his duty to resign, being satisfied he could no longer be useful in the War Department. There are, Chase says, unpaid requisitions on his table at this time to the amount of $45,000,000 from the War Department, and things are in every respect growing worse daily. Perhaps he really believes Stanton, who no more intends resigning than the President or Seward does.

I remarked that the disagreement between the Secretary of War and the generals in command must inevitably work disastrously, that I had for some time foreseen this, and the declaration of Stanton did not surprise me. He could scarcely do otherwise. He could not get along if these differences continued, but sooner or later he, or the generals, or the whole must go. My remarks were, I saw, not expected nor acceptable. Chase said if Stanton went, he would go. It was due to Stanton and to ourselves that we should stand by him, and if one goes out, all had better go- certainly he would.

This I told him was not my view. If it were best for the country that all should go, then certainly all ought to leave without hesitation or delay; but it did not follow because one must leave for any cause that all should. That I did not admire combination among officials, preferred individuality, and did not think it advisable that we should all make an action dependent on the movements or difficulties of the Secretary of War, who like all of us had embarrassments and might not, himself, be exempt from error. There were many things in the Administration which he and I wished were different. He desired me to think the matter over. Said, with much feeling, things were serious, that he could not stand it, that the army was crushing him and would crush the country. Says the President takes counsel of none but army officers in army matters, though the Treasury and Navy ought to be informed of the particulars of every movement. This is Stanton's complaint infused into Chase, and has some foundation, though it is but part of the evil. This demonstration of Stanton's is for effect, and will fail.

Governor Andrew of Massachusetts called upon me this morning, and we had a frank, free, and full interchange of views. He is impatient under the dilatory military operations and the growing ascendancy of the army in civil affairs. Our views did not materially differ on the points discussed, though he has been impressed by Stanton who dislikes many army officers.

DAHLGREN'S AMBITIONS

[Since April, 1861, Commodore Dahlgren had been in command of the Washington Navy Yard. He had recently been appointed Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, a branch of the service in which he was deservedly rated at the head of his profession in America, but he was now much dissatisfied at not receiving the grade of rear-admiral. The following February he actually received this promotion, and ultimately realized his ambition of succeeding Dupont as com

mander of the fleet attacking Charleston.]

Dahlgren is grieved with my action in his case. He desires, beyond almost any one, the high honors of his profession, and has his appetite stimulated by the partiality of the President, who does not hesitate to say to him and to me, that he will give him the highest grade if I will send him a letter to that effect, or a letter of appointment. Title irregularly obtained cannot add to Dahlgren's reputation, yet he cannot be reasoned with. He has [as] yet rendered no service afloat during the war, has not been under fire, and is not on the direct road for professional advancement. The army practice of favoritism and political partyism cannot be permitted in the Navy. Its effect will be more demoralizing than that of the military, for it is bad enough. I am compelled therefore, to stand between the President and Dahlgren's promotion, in order to maintain the service in proper condition. Dahlgren has the sagacity and professional intelligence to know I am right, and to appreciate my action though adverse to himself. He therefore now seeks service afloat. Wants an opportunity to acquire rank and distinction, but that opportunity must be a matter of favor. His last request was to be permitted to capture Charleston. This would give him éclat. I told him I could not rob Dupont of that honor, but that if he wished I would give him an opportunity to participate, and understood from him it would be acceptable. I therefore tendered him an iron-clad, and the place of Ordnance Officer; he retaining his position at the head of the Bureau with leave of absence as a volunteer to fight.

My proposition has not been received in the manner I expected. He thinks the tender of a single ship to an officer who has had a navy yard, and is now in the Bureau, derogatory, yet wishing active service as the means of promotion, intimates he will accept and resign from the Bureau. This I can't countenance or per

mit. It would not meet the views of the President, would do wrong to the service, and great wrong to the country, for him to leave the Ordnance Bureau where he is proficient and can be most useful. His specialty is in that branch of the service, he knows his own value there at this time, and for him to leave it now would be detrimental to the object he desires to attain. He is not conscious of it, but he has Dahlgren more than the service in view. Were he to be present at the capture of Charleston as a volunteer who had temporarily left the Bureau for that special service, it would redound to his credit, and make him at least second to Dupont in the glory of the achievement.

[On October 8, Buell, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, defeated the Confederates under Bragg at Perryville, Kentucky, but was soon after superseded by General Rosecrans.]

Tuesday, October 10, 1862. Some vague and indefinite tidings of a victory by Buell in Kentucky in a two days' fight at Perryville. We hear also of the capture of batteries on the St. John's, in Florida, but have no particulars.

A telegram from Delano, at New Bedford, tells me that the pirate or rebel steamer 290,1 built in Great Britain and manned by British seamen, fresh from England, has captured and burnt five whaling vessels off the Western Islands. The State Department will, I suppose, submit to this evidence that England is an underhand auxiliary to the rebels, be passive on the subject, and the Navy Department will receive as usual torrents of abuse.

STUART'S RAID

[The dissatisfaction of the administration with the inactivity of McClellan was greatly intensified by the news that the Confederate cavalry, riding ninety miles in twenty-four hours, had made a complete circle of the Federal Army, rejoining Lee's forces without loss.]

1 The Alabama.

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