talent, no one better knows it than himself, but for one in his place he is often wanting in careful discrimination, true wisdom, sound judgment, and discreet statesmanship. The Committee believe he thinks more of the glorification of Seward than the welfare of the country. He wishes the glorification of both, and believes he is the man to accomplish it, but has unwittingly and unwarily begotten and brought upon himself a vast amount of distrust and hostility on the part of Senators, by his endeavors to impress them and others with the belief that he is the administration. It is a mistake, the Senators dislike it. [They] have measured and know him. AN ADMINISTRATIVE CRISIS It was nearly midnight when we left the President; and it could not be otherwise than that all my wakeful moments should be absorbed with a subject, which, time and circumstances considered, was of grave importance to the Administration and the country. A Senatorial combination to dictate to the President in regard to his political family, in the height presenting what the Senators considered objections, were all inappropriate and wrong; that no party or faction should be permitted to dictate to the President in regard to his Cabinet; that it would be of evil example and fraught with incalculable injury to the government and country; that neither the legislative department, nor the Senate branch of it, should be allowed to encroach on the Executive prerogatives and rights; that it devolved on him, and was his duty, to assert and maintain the rights and independence of the Executive; that he ought not, against his own convictions, to yield one iota of the authority entrusted to him, on the demand of either branch of Congress or of both combined, or to any party whatever might be its views and intentions; that Mr. Seward had his infirmities and errors, but they were venial; that he and I differed on many things, as did other members of the Cabinet; that he was sometimes disposed to step beyond his own legitimate bounds, and not duly respect the rights of his associates, but these were matters that of a civil war which threatens the existence of the republic, cannot be permitted to succeed even if the person to whom they object were as obnoxious as they represent, but Seward's foibles are not serious failings. After fully canvassing the subject in all its phases, my mind was clear as to the course which it was my duty to pursue, and what I believed was the President's duty also. My first movement this morning was to call on the President posed he could have breakfasted. Governas soon as I supor Robertson of Kentucky when I went in, but soon left. was with him I informed the President, I had pondered the events of yesterday and last evening, and felt it incumbent on me to advise him not to accept the resignation of Mr. Seward; that if there were objecSeward-the time, manner and circumimaginary, against Mr. stances, the occasion and the method of tions, real or did not call for Senatorial interference. In short, I considered it for the true interest of the country, now as in the future, that this scheme should be defeated - that so believing, I had, at the earliest moment, given him my conclusions. The President was much gratified. [He] said that the whole thing had struck him as it had me, and if carried out as the Senators prescribed, the whole government would cave in. It could not stand. Could not hold water; - the bottom would be out. I added that having expressed my wish that he would not accept Mr. Seward's resignation, I thought it important that Mr. Seward should not press its acceptance, nor did I suppose he would. In this he also concurred, and asked if I had seen Seward. I replied I had not, my first duty was with him, and having ascertained that we agreed, I would now go over and see Seward. He earnestly desired me to do so. WELLES'S MISSION TO SEWARD I went immediately to Seward's house. Stanton was with him. Seward was excited; talking vehemently to Stanton of the course pursued, and the results that must follow if the scheme succeeded; told Stanton he, Stanton, would be the next victim; that there was a call for a meeting at the Cooper Institute this evening. Stanton said he had seen it. I had not. Seward got the Herald, [asked] me to read it, but Stanton seized the paper, as Seward and myself entered into conversation. [Seward] related what the President had already communicated; how Preston King had come to him; how he wrote his resignation at once, and so did Fred,1 &c., &c. In the mean time Stanton rose and remarked he had much to do, and as Governor S[eward] had been over this matter with him he would leave. I then stated my interview with the President, my advice that the President must not accept, nor he press, his resignation. Seward was greatly pleased with my views; said he had but one course before him when the doings of the Senators were communicated, but that if the President and country required of him any duty in this emergency he did not feel at liberty to refuse it. He spoke of his long political experience, dwelt on his own sagacity and his great services; feels deeply this movement, which was wholly unexpected; tries to suppress any exhibition of personal grievance or disappointment, but is painfully wounded, mortified, and chagrined. I told him I should return and report to the President our interview and that he acquiesced in my suggestions. He said he had no objections, but he thought the subject should be disposed of one way or the other at once. He is disappointed, I see, that the President did not promptly refuse to consider his resignation, and dismiss, or refuse to parley with, the committee. 1 Frederick W. Seward. When I returned to the White House, Chase and Stanton were in the Presi dent's office, but he was absent. A few words were interchanged on the great topic in hand. I was very emphatic in my opposition to the acceptance of Seward's resignation. Neither gave me a direct answer, nor did either express an opinion on the subject, though I think both wished to be understood as ac quiescing. LINCOLN CUTS THE KNOT When the President came in, which was in a few moments, his first address was to me, asking if I " had seen the man." I replied that I had, and that he assented to my views. He then turned to Chase and said, "I sent for you, for this matter is giving me great trouble." Chase said he had been painfully affected by the meeting last evening, which was a total surprise to him, and, after some not very explicit remarks as to how he was affected, informed the President he had prepared his resignation of the office of Secretary of the Treasury. - "Where is it?" said the President quickly, his eye lighting up in a moment. "I brought it with me," said Chase, taking the paper from his pocket, "I wrote it this morning." "Let me have it," said the President, reaching his long arm and fingers towards Chase, who held on, seemingly reluctant to part with the letter, which was sealed, and which he apparently hesitated to surrender. Something farther he wished to say, but the President was eager and did not per ceive it, but took and hastily opened the letter. "This," said he, looking at me with a triumphal laugh, "cuts the Gordian knot." An air of satisfaction spread over his countenance, such as I have not seen for some time. "I can dispose of this subject now without difficulty," he added, as he turned on his chair. "I see my way clear." Chase sat by Stanton, fronting the fire, the President beside the fire, his face towards them, Stanton nearest him. I was on the sofa near the east window. While the President was reading the note, which was brief, Chase turned round and looked towards me a little perplexed. He would, I think, have been better satisfied I could this interview with the President have been without the presence of others, or at least if I was away. The President was so delighted that he saw not how others were affected. "Mr. President," said Stanton with solemnity, "I informed you day before yesterday that I was ready to tender you my resignation. I wish you, sir, to consider my resignation at this time in your possession." "You may go to the Department," said the President, "I don't want yours. This [holding out Chase's letter] is all I want. This relieves me. My way is clear. The trouble is ended. I will detain neither of you longer." We all rose to leave, but Stanton lingered and held back as we reached the door. Chase and myself came down stairs together. He was moody and taciturn. Some one stopped him on the lower stairs and I passed on, but C[hase] was not a minute behind me, and before I reached the Department Stanton came staving along. respond with mine, and the approval of F. P. Blair and Preston King gives me assurance that I am right. ["The untrained diplomatist of Illinois," say Nicolay and Hay, " had thus met and conjured away with unsurpassed courage and skill one of the severest crises that ever threatened the integrity of the administration. . . . By his bold and original expedient of confronting the Senators with the Cabinet, and having them discuss their mutual misunderstandings under his own eye, he cleared up many dangerous misconceptions. . . . By placing Mr. Chase in such an attitude that his resignation became necessary to his own sense of dignity, he made himself absolute master of the situation; by treating the resignation and the return to the Cabinet of both ministers as one and the same transaction, he saved for the nation the invaluable services of both, and preserved his own position of entire impartiality between the two wings of the Union party."] Preston King called at my house this evening and gave me particulars of what had been said and done at the caucuses of the Republican Senators, of the surprise he felt when he found the hostility so universal against Seward, and [that] some of the Cabinet (as well as some of the calmest and most considerate Senators were the most decided; stated the course pursued by himself, which was frank, friendly, and manly. He was greatly pleased with my course, of which he had been informed by Seward and the President in part, and I gave him some facts which they did not. Blair tells me that his father's1 views cor1 Frank Preston Blair, editor and politician, father of F. P. Blair, afterwards Senator from Missouri, and of Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General. DID STANTON SHARE IN THE INTRIGUE Montgomery Blair 2 is confident that Stanton has been instrumental in getting up this movement against Seward, to screen himself and turn attention from the War Department. There may be something in this surmise of Blair; but I am inclined to think that Chase, Stanton and Caleb Smith have each, but without concert, participated, if not directly, by expressions of discontent to their senatorial intimates. Chase and Smith, I know, are a good deal dissatisfied with Seward, and they have not hesitated to make known their feelings in some quarters, though I apprehend not to the President. With Stanton I have little intimacy. He came into the Cabinet under Seward's wing, and he knows it; but Stanton is, by nature, an intriguer, courts favor, is not faithful in his friendships, is given to se 2 Blair and Stanton were declared enemies before they joined Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. cret underhand combinations. His obligations to Seward are great, but would not deter him from raising a breeze against Seward to favor himself. Chase and Seward entered the Cabinet as rivals, and in cold courtesy have so continued. There was an effort by Seward's friends to exclude Chase from the Treasury (the President did not yield to it), but it is obvious that Seward's more pleasant nature and consummate skill have enabled him to get to windward of Chase in administrative management, and the latter, who has but little tact, feels it. Transactions take place of a general character, not unfrequently, of which Chase and others are not advised until they are made public; often the fact reaches them through the papers. Seward has not exhibited strategy in this, [though] it may have afforded him a temporary triumph as regarded Chase. He doubtless flatters himself that it strengthens a belief, which he desires should prevail, that he is the power behind the throne greater than the throne itself," that he is the real executive. The result of all this has been the alienation of a portion of his old friends. without getting new ones, and finally in this appointment of a committee which asks his removal. The objections urged are, I notice, the points on which Chase is most sensitive. For two or three months Stanton has evinced a growing indifference to Seward, with whom he was, at first, intimate, and to whom he was much devoted. I have observed that, as he became alienated towards Seward, his friendship for Chase increased. My differences with Seward I have endeavored to settle with him on the day and time of their occurrence. They have not been many, but they have been troublesome and annoying because they were meddlesome and disturbing. He gets behind me, tampers with my subordinates, and interferes injuriously and ignorantly in naval matters, not so much from wrong purpose, but as a busybody by nature. I have not made these matters subject of complaint outside, and think it partly the result of usage and practice at Albany. Tuesday, December 23, 1862. It was announced yesterday morning that the President had requested Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase to withdraw their resignations and resume their duties. This took the public by surprise. Chase's resignation was scarcely known, and his friends, particularly those in the late movement, were a little disgusted when they found that he and Seward were in the same category. Seward's influence has often been anything but salutary. Not that he was evil inclined, but he is meddlesome, fussy, has no fixed principles or policy. Chase has chafed under Seward's management, yet has tried to conceal any exhibition of irritated feelings. Seward, assuming to be helmsman, has, while affecting and believing in his own superiority, tried to be patronizing to all, especially soothing and conciliating to Chase, who sees and is annoyed by it. The President feels that he is under obligations to each, and that both are serviceable. He is friendly to both; he is fond of Seward, who is affable; he respects Chase, who is clumsy. Seward comforts him; Chase, he deems a necessity. On important questions Blair is as potent with the President as either, and sometimes I think equal to both. With some egotism, Blair has great good sense, a better knowledge and estimate of military men than either or both the others, and I think is possessed of more solid, reliable administrative ability. All the members were at the Cabinet meeting to-day. Seward was feeling very happy, Chase was pale, said he was ill -had been for weeks. The subject principally discussed was the proposed division of Virginia and the creation of a new state to be called Western Virginia. Chase is strongly for it, Blair and Bates against it, the latter, however, declining to discuss it or give his reasons except in writing. Stanton is with Chase. Seward does not show his hand. My impressions are, under the existing state of things, decidedly adverse. It is a disturbance that might be avoided at this time, and has constitutional difficulties. Friday, December 26, 1862. Some talk in Cabinet of Thayer's scheme of emigration to Florida. Blair read his opinion of the proposition for making a new state of Western Virginia. His views correspond with mine, but are abler and more elaborately stated. Mr. Bates read a portion of his opinion on the constitutional point, which appeared to me decisive and conclusive. The President has called for opinions from each of his Cabinet. I had the first rough draft of mine in my pocket, though not entirely copied. Chase said his was completed, but he had not brought it with him. Seward said he was wholly unprepared. Stanton assured the President he would be ready with his in season. The President said it would answer his purpose if the opinions of each were handed in on or before Tuesday. Monday, December 29, 1862. We had yesterday a telegram that the British pirate craft Alabama captured the Ariel, one of the Aspinwall steamers, on her passage from New York to Aspinwall, off the coast of Cuba. Abuse of the Navy Department will follow. The six members of the Cabinet (Smith1 absent) to-day handed in their respective opinions on the question of dividing the Old Commonwealth of Virginia, and carving out and admitting a new state. As Stanton and myself returned from the Cabinet meeting to the Departments, he expressed surprise that I should oppose division, for he thought it politic and wise to plant a free state south of the Ohio. I thought our duties were constitutional, not experimental, that we should observe and preserve the 1 Caleb B. Smith had just retired from the Department of the Interior. His successor, John P. Usher, was not appointed till later. landmarks, and that mere expediency should not override constitutional obligations. This action was not predicated on the consent of the people of Virginia, legitimately expressed; was arbitrary and without proper authority; was such a departure from and undermining of our system that I could not approve it, and feared it was the beginning of the end. As regarded a free state south of the Ohio, I told him the probabilities were that pretty much all of them would be free by Tuesday when the Proclamation emancipating slaves would be published. THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION ["It will be remembered," say Nicolay and Hay, "that when the President proposed emancipation on the 22nd of July, and again when he announced emancipation on the 22nd of September, he informed his Cabinet that he had decided the main matter for himself, and asked their advice only upon subordinate parts. In now looking up the matter for the third and final review, there was neither doubt nor hesitation in regard to the actual policy and act about to be consummated. But there were several minor questions upon which he wished the advice of his Cabinet."] At the meeting to-day, the President read the draft of his Emancipation Proclamation, invited criticism, and finally directed that copies should be furnished to each. It is a good and well-prepared paper, but I suggested that a part of the sentence marked in pencil be omitted. Chase advises that fractional parts of states ought not to be exempted. In this I think he is right, and so stated. Practically there would be difficulty in freeing parts of states, and not freeing others, a clashing between central and local authorities. Wednesday, December 31, 1862. We had an early and special Cabinet meeting convened by 10 A. M. The sub |