preparation for a better state hereafter. He would not suffer her to sit up with him, saying that perhaps he might be able to sleep; but if any change should happen, he would send for her. Having no sleep in the night, he was taken out of bed and carried into his study, where he slept for some time in his chair: after waking, he desired to be dressed, and then heard Lady Masham read the Psalms, apparently with great attention; until perceiving his end to draw near, he stopped her, and expired a very few minutes after-. wards, about three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th of October, in his 73d year.

The character of Locke stands eminently high morally and intellectually. He had the manners of a gentleman, the morals of a Christian, the profundity of a philosopher, and the practical activity of the man of business. He was master of whatever he studied, but no one assumed less the airs of superiority. He was a faithful servant of truth, which he followed with conscientious integrity wherever it led him. He sought for knowlege wherever it was to be found, and yielded to reason wherever it appeared. His conversation was agreeable to all; and though he could excel in raillery, he managed his humor so well as never to wound the feelings of any one. He was charitable to the poor, and sought opportunities of doing good to deserving objects. If he had any defect, it was the being somewhat passionate; but he had got the better of it by reason, and it was seldom that it did him or any one else any harm. He was an exact observer of his word, and what he promised

was sacred. His greatest amusement was to talk with sensible people; and he possessed all the requisite qualities for keeping up an agreeable and friendly intercourse. His literary industry was very great, as the enumeration of his works will show. His great work on Human Understanding was first published in 1690, nearly at the same time as Newton's Principia; both contributing to render illustrious the era of the Revolution. The Treatise on Civil Government, a Letter on Toleration, first published in Latin, in Holland, and afterwards in English, with the second Letter in Defence of Toleration, were all published in 1690, and a third Letter in 1692; the Treatise on Education, 1690; that concerning raising the value of money and lowering the interest, 1691 ; and Farther Considerations on the same subject, 1695, when he was very much consulted on the measures then in operation for restoring the coin; The Reasonableness of Christianity, 1695; and a first and second Vindication of the same, 1696; and also three elaborate letters in defence of the principles contained in the Essay against the attacks of the bishop of Wor

cester.

The Conduct of the Understanding, one of the most useful and practical of his works, and the Commentaries and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul, close the catalogue of those of his literary labors which have been given to the world.

ESSAY

ON THE

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

SINCE it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, it is worth some labor to make it a subject of inquiry. But though like the eye, it enables us to see other objects, it requires to be set at a distance to be seen itself; and though the inquiry be attended with many difficulties, it cannot fail to be both pleasant and profitable from the assistance it will afford us in our researches on more points than one.

As my purpose is to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowlege, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent, I shall not trouble myself to ascertain in what the essence of the mind consists, or by what motions of our spirits or changes in our bodies we experience sensations or gain ideas, or whether those ideas depend on matter; it will be sufficient to consider what are the discerning faculties of man, and how they are employed; nor shall I consider my time misspent, if it enable us to set down any measures of the certainty

Locke.

A

of our knowlege, or the grounds of those opinions on points, where, judging from the conflict of sentiments, truth has not been, nor is likely to be attained.

To discriminate between opinion and knowlege, and to regulate assent on points of an uncertain nature, it is necessary,

1. To inquire into the origin of our ideas.

2. To show what knowlege we possess by means of those ideas.

3. To consider the grounds and degrees of opinion or faith in matters, of which we have no certain knowlege.

If by such inquiries we can find out the powers of the understanding, the extent to which they reach, and the points where they fail, we shall learn to be cautious in meddling with things beyond our comprehension; and resting content with ignorance, where knowlege is out of our reach, avoid perplexing ourselves with questions about things, of which all are and must be equally ignorant.

But though the understanding be unable to embrace all things, yet we have reason to be thankful, that whatever is essential to our well-being, and conducive to the purposes of a virtuous life here and a happy one hereafter, lies within the reach of the mind. Nor shall we have cause to lament the confined limits of our understanding, if we use it aright in those matters where it may be serviceable; while, on the other hand, we shall be guilty of childish peevishness, if we neglect that which is within the grasp of the mind, merely because there are other things beyond it; and if, instead of employing our mental faculties on objects suited to their power, and of being content with probability where certainty is not attainable, we will disbelieve every thing because we cannot know with certainty all things, we shall act as wisely as he did who would not use his legs, because he had no wings with which to fly.

As soon as we know the powers of our mind, we know what to expect from them, and we shall neither sit still in despair of knowing any thing, nor disclaim what we really do know because there still exist some things not understood. It is well for the sailor to know the length of his line; and though he cannot fathom with it the depths of the ocean, he knows it is long enough to reach the bottom in places, where alone exists any danger of running on shoals. When we can learn all that is needful for the guidance of our opinion and conduct, we need not be troubled if other things escape our knowlege.

This examination of the powers of the mind is the more necessary, as it prevents our thoughts from losing themselves in the vast ocean of being; as if in that boundless extent, there was nothing above, below, or beyond its reach; and as if our thoughts, wandering into depths where they can find no sure footing, and floundering in questions that admit of no resolution, must eventually find their only refuge in confirmed scepticism. But if the horizon, which bounds the enlightened and dark part of things, be once discovered, the mind will either rest quietly in ignorance, undisturbed by what it knows to be unattainable; or be more free to direct itself to inquiries advantageous and satisfactory.

I would premise that the word idea,' which frequently occurs in the following treatise, is used to express whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, and includes whatever is meant by phantasm,' notion,'' species,' or whatever the mind can be employed about in thinking. Taking for granted that such ideas1 are in men's minds, our first inquiry shall be, how they come there.

6

The above use of the word idea' was censured by the bishop of Worcester, who says, 'The world hath been strangely amused with ideas' of late; and we have been told that strange things might be done by the help of ideas;' and yet these ideas