them. Our knowlege therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But how shall we know when our ideas agree with things themselves? I answer, there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things: these are,

1. Simple ideas; which since the mind can by no means make to itself, must be the effect of things operating on the mind in a natural way; and producing therein those perceptions, which, by the will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating on us; which carry with them all the conformity our state requires, which is to represent things under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus, the idea of whiteness, as it is in the mind, exactly answers that power which is in any body to produce it there. And this conformity between our simple ideas, and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowlege.

2. All our complex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, and not referred to the existence of things as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowlege. For that which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation. Here the ideas themselves are considered as archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are ideas in his own mind, which possibly he never found existing mathematically, that is, precisely true: yet his knowlege is not only certain, but real; because real things are no farther concerned nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind.

It is true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones; it is true also of a triangle wherever it exists: what is true of those figures, that have barely an ideal existence in his mind, will hold true of them also, when they come to have a real existence in matter.

Hence it follows, that moral knowlege is as capable of real certainty as mathematics: for certainty being nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement by the intervention of other ideas; our moral ideas as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate or complete ideas, all the agreement or disagreement we shall find in them, will produce real knowlege as well as in mathematical figures. That which is requisite to make our knowlege certain, is the clearness of our ideas; and that which is required to make it real is, that they answer their archetypes.

But it will here be said, that if moral knowlege be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas, and those be of our own making, what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance? What confusion of virtues and vices, if every man may make what ideas of them he pleases ? I answer, No confusion nor disorder at all, in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them, no more than there would be a change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles; that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which is called ordinarily by another. The change of name will indeed at first disturb him, who knows not what idea it stands for: but as soon as the figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in moral knowLocke.

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lege: let a man have the idea of taking from others, without their consent, what they are justly possessed of, and call this justice if he pleases; he that takes the name here, without the idea put to it, will be mistaken by joining another idea of his own to that name; but strip the idea of that name, or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it injustice.

One thing we are to take notice of, That where God, or any other law-maker, has defined any moral names, there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs: and there it is not safe to apply, or use them otherwise. But in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech, to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country they are used in.

3. But the complex ideas which we refer to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowlege about them may come short of being real: and such are our ideas of substances. These must be taken from something, that does or has existed, and not be made up of ideas arbitrarily put together without any real pattern. Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowlege concerning substances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered to coexist in nature. And our ideas being thus true, though not perhaps very exact copies, are the subjects of real knowlege of them. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they have with others will be knowlege. If those ideas be abstract, it will be general knowlege: but to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Wherever therefore we perceive the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, there is certain knowlege: and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowlege.

CHAPTER V.

Of Truth in General.

Truth, in the proper import of the word, signifies the joining or separating of signs; as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs, is what we call propositions; so that truth properly belongs only to propositions; whereof there are two sorts, mental and verbal, as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, ideas and words.

It is difficult to treat of mental propositions without verbal because in speaking of mental, we must make use of words, and then they become verbal. Again, men commonly, in their thoughts and reasonings, use words instead of ideas; especially if the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas. If we have occasion to form mental propositions about white, black, circle, &c. we can, and often do, frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the names. But when we would consider, or make propositions about the more complex ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, &c. we usually put the name for the idea; because the idea these names stand for, being for the most part confused, imperfect, and undetermined; we reflect on the names themselves, as being more clear, certain, distinct, and readier to occur to our thoughts, than pure ideas; and so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental propositions.

We must then observe two sorts of propositions, that we are capable of making: 1. mental propositions, wherein the ideas in our understandings are put together, or separated by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement; 2. verbal

propositions, which are words put together or separate in affirmative or negative sentences: so that proposition consists in joining or separating signs: and truth consists in putting together, or separating these signs, according as the things they stand for agree or disagree.

Truth, as well as knowlege, may well come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature; which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as it is. Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas, otherwise than it is; and so far as these ideas thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowlege of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

Besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are other sorts of truths: as, 1. moral truth, which is, speaking things according to the persuasion of our own minds; 2. metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their

names.

These considerations of truth either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them.