The general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain; and such as we have no knowlege of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For names of substantial beings, as well as others, having settled significations affixed to them, may with great truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their definitions make them fit to be so joined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may with the same clearness be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths; and all this without any knowlege of the nature of reality of things existing without us. Thus he that has learnt the following words, with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them, viz. substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without any knowlege at all of what the soul really is. And of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity, and some part of natural philosophy; and after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out.

3. The worst sort of trifling is, to use words loosely and uncertainly, which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowlege we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occasions this, is, that men may find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy, under the obscurity or perplexedness of their terms; to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom does in many men much contribute.

To conclude, barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks.

1. All propositions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other, but itself; when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name; or that these two names signify the same idea.

2. All propositions, wherein a part of the complex idea, which any term stands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal: and thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive terms called genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal. When by these two rules we examine the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books; we shall perhaps find, that a greater part of them than is usually suspected, are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs.

CHAPTER IX.

Of our Knowlege of Existence.

Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things, which, being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, give us no knowlege of existence at all. We proceed now to inquire concerning our knowlege of the existence of things, and how we come by it.

I say then, that we have the knowlege of our own existence, by intuition; of the existence of God, by demonstration; and of other things, by sensation.

As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. I think, I reason; I feel pleasure and pain :-can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence?

If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a perception of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowlege of our own existence; and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being, and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty.

CHAPTER X.

Of our Knowlege of the Existence of a God.

Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without a witness, since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us: nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, yet it requires thought and attention: and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it, from some part of our intuitive knowlege; or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To show therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, being certain, that there is a God; and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted knowlege we have of our own existence.

I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear

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perception of his own being: he knows certainly that he exists, and that he is something.

In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If therefore we know there is some real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning, must be produced by something else.

Next, it is evident, that what has its being from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being from another too: all the powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same source. This eternal source then of all being must be also the source and original of all power; and so this eternal being must be also the most powerful.

Again, man finds in himself perception and knowlege: we are certain then that there is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, or else there has been a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, There was a time when that eternal being had no knowlege; I reply, that then it is impossible there should have ever been any knowlege. It being as impossible that things wholly void of knowlege, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is that of a triangle should make itself three angles, bigger than two right ones.

Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowlege of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and knowing being, which, whether any one will call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this idea, duly considered, will be deduced all those other attributes we ought to ascribe to this eternal being.

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowlege of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say, we know, I mean, there is such a knowlege within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.

It being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that something has existed from eternity; let us next see what kind of thing that must be. There are but two sorts of beings in the world, that man knows or conceives: 1. such as are purely material, without sense or perception, as the clippings of our beards, and paring of our nails; 2. sensible perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be. These two sorts we shall hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings: which to our present purpose are better than material and immaterial.

If then there must be something eternal, it is very obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative being; because it is as impossible to conceive that every bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, we shall find it in itself unable to produce any thing. Let us suppose its parts firmly at rest together if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, or produce any thing? Matter then by its own strength. cannot produce, in itself, so much as motion. motion it has, must also be from eternity, or else added to matter by some other being, more powerful than matter. But let us suppose motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and motion could never

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