son; it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give place to a proposition, whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.

In all things therefore where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and the principles of knowlege above mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees; nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith, which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason. But,

3. There being many things of which we have but imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowlege at all; these, being beyond the discovery of our faculties, and above reason, when revealed, become the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God; that the bodies of men shall rise and live again, and the like, are purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do.

1. Then, whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above

reason.

2. All propositions, whereof the mind by its natural faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired ideas, are matter of reason; but with this difference, that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth only on probable grounds,-in such, I say, an evident revelation ought to determine our assent even against probability. Because the mind, not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony, which it is satisfied comes from one who can

not err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered.

Thus far the dominion of faith reaches; and that without any violence to reason, which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal Fountain of all knowlege. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor prefer less certainty to the greater. There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and the sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as that of the principles of reason: and therefore, nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to, as a matter of faith, wherein reason has nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our opinions, prejudices, and interests, and hath a right to be received with a full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the landmarks of knowlege: this shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us.

CHAPTER XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

He that would seriously set on the search of truth, ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody who does not profess himself a

lover of truth, and that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this, one may truly say, there are very few lovers of truth for truth's sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth inquiry and I think there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are selfevident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain all that surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth. Whatsoever credit we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself on, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such: which, as it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture from them.

The assuming an authority of dictating to others, and a forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is a constant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our judgments. For how can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others' belief, who has already imposed on his own?

On this occasion I shall consider a third ground of assent, which with some men has the same authority as either faith or reason, I mean enthusiasm; which, laying by reason, would set up revelation without it; whereby in effect it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct.

Immediate revelation being a much easier way for

men to establish their opinions, and regulate their conduct, than the tedious labor of strict reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to it, especially in such of their actions and opinions as they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowlege, and principles of reason. Hence we see that in all ages, men, in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an opinion of greater familiarity with God than is allowed others, have often flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the Deity, and frequent communications from the divine Spirit.

Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly on their fancies, is an illumination from the Spirit of God; and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or direction from Heaven, and must be obeyed. This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, though rising from the conceit of a warmed or overweening brain, works, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either reason or revelation, or both together; men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they receive from themselves. Strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all easily with it, when, got above common sense, and freed from all restraint of reason, and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.

When men are once got into this way of immediate revelation, of illumination without search, and of certainty without proof, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost on them; they are above it: they see the light infused into their understandings, and cannot be mistaken; it is clear and visible there, like the light of bright sunshine, shows itself, and needs no other proof but its own evidence: they feel

the hand of God moving them within, and the impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel.

This is the way of talking of these men: they are sure because they are sure; and their persuasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For when what they say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to. These men have, they say, clear light, and they see; they have an awakened sense, and they feel: this cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. But here let me ask this seeing, is it the perception of the truth of the proposition, or of this, that it is a revelation from God? This feeling, is it a perception of an inclination to do something, or of the Spirit of God moving that inclination? These are two very different perceptions, and must be carefully distinguished. I may perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate revelation from God. Nay, I may perceive I came not by it in a natural way, without perceiving that it is a revelation from God. Because there be spirits, which, without being divinely commissioned, may excite those ideas in me, and make their connexion perceived. So that the knowlege of any proposition coming into my mind, I know not how, is not a perception that it is from God. But however it be called light and seeing; I suppose it iş at most but belief and assurance. For where a proposition is known to be true, revelation is needless. If therefore it be a proposition which they are persuaded, but do not know to be true, it is not seeing but believing. What I see, I know to be so by the evidence of the thing itself: what I believe, I take to be so on the testimony of another: but this testimony I must know to be given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it is God that reveals