with the conftitution of the United States to be convinced of the truth of these observations.

Mr. Gerry further stated, that the powers of the envoys, as they conceived, were adequate to the difcuffion and adjustment of all points of real difference between the two nations; that they could alter and amend the treaty, or, if neceffary, form a new one; that the United States were anxiously defirous of removing all caufes of complaint between themfelves and France, and of renewing their former friendship and intercourfe on terms which would be mutually honourable and beneficial to the two nations, but not on any other terms; that as to a loan, we had no powers whatever to make one; that if we were to attempt it, we should deceive himself and the Directory likewife, which as men of ho nour we could not do; but that we could fend.one of our number for instructions on this propofition, if deemed expedient, provided that the other objects of the negotiation could be difcuffed and adjusted; that as he had expreffed a defire to confer with the envoys individually, it was the with of Mr. Gerry that fuch a conference should take place, and their opinions thus be ascertained, which he conceived correfponded with his own in the particulars mentioned. M. Talleyrand, in anfwer, faid, he should be glad to confer with the other envoys individually, but that this matter about the money must be fettled directly, without fending to America; that he would not communicate the arrête for a week k; and that if we could adjust the difficulty refpecting the fpeech, an application would nevertheless go to the United States for a loan. A courier arrived at this moment from Italy, and M. Talleyrand appearing impatient to read the letters, Mr. Gerry took leave of him immediately. He followed to the door, and defired M. Z. to repeat to Mr. Gerry what he, M. Talleyrand, had faid to him. Mr. Gerry then returned to his quarters with M. Z. took down the particulars of this interview as before ftated, fent for Generals Pinckney and Marshall, and read it to them in the presence of M. Z. who confirmed it. Generals Pinckney and Marthall then defired M. Z. to inform M. Talleyrand that they had nothing to add to this conference, and did not wish that the arrête might be delayed on their account.

Anfwer of M, Barras, Prefident of the Executive Directory, to the Speech of Mr. Monroe, on taking leave, to which the Speech of the Prefident of the United States refers.

"Mr. Minifter Plenipotentiary of the

United States of America,

"BY prefenting to-day your letters of recall to the Executive Directory, you give to Europe a very strange spectacle.

"France, rich in her liberty, furrounded by a crowd of victories,

strong

ftrong in the esteem of her allies, will not abase herself by calcu lating the confequences of the condefcenfion of the American government to the fuggeftions of her former tyrants.-Moreover, the French republic hopes, that the fucceffors of Columbus, Ramhiph*, and Penn, always proud of their liberty, will never forget that they owe it to France. They will weigh-in their wisdom the magnanimous benevolence of the French people with the crafty careffes of certain perfidious perfons, who meditate bringing them back to their former flavery. Affure the good American people, Sir, that, like them, we adore liberty; that they will always have our esteem, and that they will find in the French people republican generosity, which knows how to grant peace as it does to caufe its fovereignty to be refpected.

"As to you, Mr. Minifter Plenipotentiary, you have combated for principles, you have known the true interests of your country. Depart with our regret. In you we give up a representative to America, and retain the remembrance of the citizen whofe perfonal qualities did honour to that title."

October 29th. M. X. again called on us. He faid M. Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of fervice to us, and had requefted that one more effort fhould be made to induce us to enable him to be fo. A great deal of the fame converfation which had paffed at our former interviews was repeated. The power and the haughtiness of France was again difplayed to us. We were told, that the deftruction of England was inevitable; and that the wealth and arts of that nation would naturally pass over to America, if that event fhould find us in peace. To this obfervation we replied, that France would probably forbid America to receive them, in like manner as she had forbid Switzerland to permit the refidence in its country of a British minifter. We told him alfo, that we were sensible of the value of peace, and therefore fought it unremittingly, but that it was real peace we fought for, and real peace only which could be defirable.

The fum of his propofition was, that if we would pay, by way of fees (that was his expreffion), the fum of money demanded for private ufe, the Directory would not receive us; but would permit us to remain in Paris as we now were; and we should be received by M. Talleyrand, until one of us could go to America and confult our government on the subject of the loan. These were the circumstances, he faid, under which the minister of Portugal had treated. We afked him if, in the mean time, the Directory would order the American property not yet paffed into the hands of the privateersmen, to be restored. He faid explicitly, that they would not. We asked him, whether they would fufpend further

Probably intended for Raleigh.

depredations

depredations on our commerce? He faid they would not: but. M. Talleyrand obferved, that on this fubject we could not fuftain much additional injury, because the winter season was approaching, when few additional captures would be made. We told him that France had taken violently from America more than fifty millions of dollars, and treated us in every refpect as enemies, in return of the friendship we had manifested for her; that we had come to endeavour to restore harmony to the two nations, and to obtain compenfation for the injuries our countrymen fuftained; and that in lieu of this compenfation, we were told that if we would pay twelve hundred thousand livres, we might be permitted to remain in Paris, which would only give us the benefit of seeing the plays and operas of Paris for the winter, that we might have time to afk from our country to exhaust her resources for France, whofe depredations would be continued. He again stated, that by this procedure we should fufpend a war; and that, perhaps, in five or fix months, power might change hands.

We told him that what we wished to see in France was a temper fincerely friendly to the United States, and really disposed to do us juftice; that if we could perceive this, we might not fo much regard a little money, fuch as he ftated to be ufual, although we fhould hazard ourselves by giving it; but that we faw only evidences of the most extreme hoftility towards us: war was made upon us fo far as France could make it in the prefent ftate of things; and it was not even propofed, that on receiving our money this war fhould ceafe: we had no reason to believe that a poffible benefit could refult from it; and we defired him to say, that we would not give a fhilling, unless American property unjustly captured was previously restored, and further hoftilities fufpended; and that unless this was done, we did not conceive that we could even confult our government concerning a loan that if the Directory would receive us and commence negotiations, and any thing occurred which rendered a confultation of the government neceffary, one of us would return to America for that purpofe. He faid, that without this money we should be obliged to quit Paris; and that we ought to confider the confequences: the property of the Americans would be confifcated, and their veffels in port embargoed. We told him, that unless there was a hope of a reconciliation, thefe evils could not be prevented by us; and the little delay we might obtain would only increase them; that our miffion had induced many of our countrymen to trust their vessels into the ports of France, and that if we remained in Paris, that very circumftance would increase the number; and confequently the injury which our countrymen would fuftain, if France could permit herself fo to violate her own engagements and the laws of nations. He expreffed a wish that M. Y. fhould fee us once more. We told him that a vifit from M. Y. as a private gentleman, VOL. VII.

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would always be agreeable to us; but if he came only with the expectation that we fhould ftipulate advances of money, without previously establishing a folid and permanent reconciliation, he might fave himself the trouble of the application, because it was a fubject we had confidered maturely, and on which we were immoveable. He parted with us, faying, if that was the cafe it would not be worth while for M. Y. to come. In the evening, while General Pinckney and General Marthall were abfent, M. Y. and M. X. called, and were invited by Mr. Gerry to breakfast with us the next morning.

October 30. Immediately after breakfast the fubject was refumed. M. Y. fpoke without interruption for near an hour. He faid that he was defirous of making a last effort to serve us, by propofing fomething which might accommodate the differences between the two nations; that what he was now about to mention. had not by any means the approbation of the Directory; nor could M. Talleyrand undertake farther than to make from us the propofition to the Directory, and ufe his influence for its fuccefs; that last week M. Talleyrand could not have ventured to have of fered fuch propofitions; but that his fituation had been very materially changed by the peace with Emperor. By that peace. he had acquired in an high degree the confidence of the Directory, and now poffeffed great influence with that body; that he was also clofely connected with Buonaparte and the generals of the army in Italy, and was to be confidered as firmly fixed in his poft, at least for five or fix months; that under thefe circumftances he could undertake to offer, in our behalf, propofitions which before this increase of influence he could not have hazarded. M. Y. then called our attention to our own fituation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us. He said that we were the belt judges of our capacity to refift, so far as depended on our own refources, and ought not to deceive ourselves on fo interefting a fubject. The fate of Venice was one which might befal the United States. But he proceeded to observe, it was probable we might rely on forming a league with England. If we had fuch a reliance, it would fail us. The fituation of England was fuch, as to compel Pitt to make peace on the terms of France. A variety of caufes were in operation, which made fuch an effect abfolutely certain. To fay nothing of the oppofition in England to the minifter and to the war, an oppofition which the fears of the nation would increafe; to fay nothing of a war againft England which was preparing in the North; an army of one hundred and fifty thoufand men, under the command of Buonaparte, fpread upon the coaft of France, and aided by all the vaft refources of his genius, would moft probably be enabled to invade England: in which event their government would be overturned; but thould this invasion not be abfolutely effected, yet the alarm it would spread

through

through the nation, the enormous expense it must produce, would infallibly ruin them, if it was to be continued, and would drive them to fave themfelves by a peace; that independent of this, France poffeffed means which would infallibly deftroy their bank, and their whole paper fyftem. He faid he knew very well it was generally conjectured that Buonaparte would leave Italy, and the army which had conquered under him, and which adored him; he affured [us that] nothing could be more unfounded than the conjecture, that Buonaparte had for more than ten days left Italy for Raftadt, to prefide over the congrefs which was formed for adjusting the affairs of the Empire. He faid that Pitt himself was fo confident of the abfolute neceffity of peace, that after the naval victory over the Dutch, he had fignified his readiness to treat on the fame terms he had offered before that action; we could not then rely on the affiftance of England. What, he asked, would be our fituation if peace fhould be made with England before our difference with France would be accommodated? But, he continued, if even England fhould be able to continue the war, and America fhould unite with her, it would not be in our power to injure France. We might, indeed, wound her ally; but, if we did, it would be fo much the worfe for us. After having stated the dangers attending us, if we fhould engage in the war, he proceeded to the advantages we might derive from a neutral fituation; and infifted at large on the wealth which would naturally flow into our country from the destruction of England.

He next proceeded to detail the propofitions, which are in subftance in the paper annexed, marked (A), except that he insisted that we thould engage to ufe our influence with our government for the loan. He ftated exprefsly, that the propofitions were to be confidered as made by us; that M. Talleyrand would not be refponsible for the fuccefs of any one of them; he would only undertake to use his influence with the Directory in fupport of them. The propofition, he said, concerning a fufpenfion of hoftilities on the part of France, was one which proceeded entirely from him felf; M. Talleyrand had not been confulted upon it; and he could not undertake to fay that that gentleman would consent even to lay it before the Directory. The propofition for an advance in the government of France, of as much money as was due from it to our citizens on contract, and as might be determined to be due for veffels improperly captured and condemned, was, he said, indifpenfable; unless we made that, it was unneceffary to make any other; for the others would not be received.

He expatiated on the vaft advantages we fhould derive from delay; it was, he faid, abfolutely to gain our caufe. He returned to the danger of our fituation, and the policy of making with France any accommodation which France would affent to. Perhaps, faid he, you believe that in returning and expofing to

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