and ten deputies is the nearest proportion to the population of the republic. I therefore, Citizens Representatives, deem it my duty to reduce to eighty the number of members that are to conftitute the Great Council, and to forty the number of those who are to conftitute the Council of Ancients. I have already obferved, that the diforders, the dangers, the evils that attend your republic, originate in the incoherence of the focial organization, in the quarrels that had previously arifen between the two fupreme powers refpecting the extent of their authority, and in the civil difcord that fprung out of those contentions. It is therefore upon the focial organization that a reforming hand is now to be fet to work; it must be recompounded, and receive more folid foundations and jufter proportions: the different authorities in their mutual relations to each other, call for more confiftency, and each in particular for more energy. In the crifis in which you are now placed, it is impoffible to wait for the period fixed for revifing them. Such a delay, during which the reign of anarchy must be prolonged, would prove fatal to liberty. It is therefore indifpenfably neceffary to make several changes in the conftitutional act: the French government pays as much refpect as you can to the fundamental laws of free nations; but the conftitution by which you are directed, is nothing more than a kind of military ordonnance, which the nation has not yet. fanctioned, neither by its immediate acceptation nor by its fuf-> frage for nominating to the different public employments. It. therefore cannot be regarded as a definitive plan of government, but as a preliminary effay, which experience has demonstrated to: be vicious in many particulars. It is but candour to confefs itthe French conftitution, when fquared on the rule of the Cifal-pine, is difproportioned to the extent of that republic; but, while it proves excellent for the great nation, it would overburden and opprefs you-it would be the armour of a man on the body of a child; it crushes, instead of protecting it. The Cifalpine conftitution has created two fupreme powers, which, without fixed rules, or fufficient means, have permitted the, public authority to become vilified and degraded in their hands. The great number of your territorial divifions had multiplied your administrations, your tribunals, and the agents of every kind. All these public officers were to be paid, as if they had to act in a much more extenfive circle: it was by these means that the expenses of the internal adminiftration had fwollen to immense fums, evidently beyond the means of the people. The amount of the money in fpecie which it was neceffary fhould be paid every year in falaries for fo many employments, was loft both Q92 with with refpect to the other branches of the public fervice, and for agriculture, for manufactures, and for commerce; in a word, for every thing that is connected with the national profperity. The tree of liberty must have decayed, fince, in order to nourifh with due abundance one of its branches, its fap was to be exhausted, and every other branch was to wither and dry up. It is now neceffary to return to the genuine principles of political economy. You are witneffes, Citizens Reprefentatives, of the disorders to which these defects every day gave rife. You cannot but recollect the lamentable divifions that have but too frequently broken out between the Councils and the Directory. If their powers had been more diftinctly separated-if their respective tafks had been better regulated, we fhould not have witneffed thefe fcandalous proceedings, and the public administration would not have fo laboured throughout all its departments. While the Councils were thus engaged in thefe contentions, they could give no falutary effect to the laws which the people called upon them to enact, and the Directory neglected executing those that were enacted. Already the internal authorities threw off all fubordination; the fuperintendance of the public finances was delivered over to ignorance or to fraud; the body of citizens fplit into parties, in imitation of their magiftrates; the laws remained without vigour; the republic was nothing more than a mere name; and anarchy, the most horrible anarchy, already ftretched wide its deftructive arms over your country. This deplorable fituation still continues at the moment I am writing. It is of the most urgent neceffity to devife a speedy remedy for the evils, the picture of which I have juft been drawing out. The French government imagines it has difcovered this remedy in propofing to you a conftitution bottomed upon the fame principles, and which admits nearly the fame diftribution of power, but which at the fame time muft prove far more vigorous and du rable. Men of enlightened understandings had pointed out with fuch minute precifion both the defects and the advantages of thofe free conftitutions that of late years have been establifhed, that it was a matter of no difficulty to exclude from this laft political code the imperfections of thofe which ferved as a model to its framers. You will doubtlefs be fenfible, Citizens Legiflators, of the wifdom and the difpofition which obliges every individual, if he would afpire to be a citizen, to pay a certain contribution; for he maintains a part of the expenfes of the ftate before he reaps his fhare of its enjoyments; nor can the maintenance of public order be effected but by thofe who have fome intereft in preferving it. The -The right of citizen, the most precious and the most honourable of all rights, had been lavifhed upon foreigners with a perilous prodigality; but that facility is now checked, and you also will undoubtedly be of opinion, that previous to obtaining fo fignal an advantage in a state that is not one's natal spot, certain pledges ought to be given to the country that adopts; nor can that country acquire thefe pledges and that fecurity but by a feries of actions, and not by a fingle individual act. The enemies of the republic might too easily make an ill ufe of that inconfideratenefs, by cherishing within its bofom, under the pretext of former perfecutions, both traitors and fpies; in fine, foreigners that are really perfecuted in their respective homes, ought to be well fatisfied to meet with an afylum and protection in another country. Lefs frequent elections will be productive of a double advantage that of giving more connexion and confiftency to legiflative plans, and fettling a fyftem of adminiftration that will lefs frequently call away an agricultural people from their useful labours. By beftowing upon the Executive Directory a greater degree of power and confiftency, you will eafily perceive that the motions of the political machine will henceforward be lefs complicated, and confequently more easy, and productive of more immediate advantages. You will not have to apprehend that they give rife to ferious inconveniencies or real dangers to the country; for you know that the legislature is vigilant, and will always check the ufurpations and correct the abufes of power. Nor fhould I find the leaft difficulty in juftifying every article of this conftitution: it is in fome measure the fruit of experience; it is the most perfect and complete condition of your prefent conftitution; it is even the perfection of the Roman conftitution, which might already be confiderably amended in its representative system. By giving, in fine, more energy and confiftency to the different departments of government, it guarantees in a furcr manner equality, liberty, fecurity, thofe rights fo juftly dear to man, and which are at the fame time the bafis and the effential conditions of the focial contract. Swayed by motives thus powerful, I feel, Citizens Legiflators, that I confer the most precious favour on your country by giving it, in the name of the French republic, and by order of the French government, the new conftitution, which I annex to the prefent. This conftitution I offer you, in order that it be immediately fubftituted in the room of the former one: I entreat you to acknowledge it as the fundamental law of the state, and to present an addrefs to the Cifalpine people, announcing to them that you are fully fenfible of its advantages that this is the confti tution that must henceforward be their rule-and that it must be executed and refpected by all the exifting authorities and by every citizen. I alfo tranfmit to you, Citizens Legislators, the new territorial divifion of the Cifalpine republic. This reduction of the number of departments, the neceffity of which was fo long felt, was made without the leaft regard to local interefts, and the fuggeftions or prejudices of individuals. It is neceffary that it be adopted and executed in like manner, in order to prevent the numberless remonftrances and endless difcuffions of thofe interefts and thofe prejudices which are always hoftile to the general good. Three other laws have been prepared-one for the organization of the legiflative Councils, for their internal regulation, and for the form of their deliberations. You wi!! more especially obferve, that it fixes the number of deputies that each department fhall fend to each of the two Councils at the next elections, and the mode in which, the two Councils are to be renewed by the admiffion of a new third. The second law refpects the organization of the adminiftrative bodies. It determines, in a fummary manner, the functions of the departmental adminiftrators, and likewife those of the municipal adminiftrators. It eftablishes the power of the Directory, for the first time to nominate to the places of the adminiftrations, until, in the eighth year, the electoral affemblies fhall renew them by the admiffion of a third. Laftly, the third law has for its object the organization of the tribunals, nor are the circumftances that attend it lefs interefting than the former. You have to organize the juftice of the peace, the civil and the corrective tribunals; the criminal tribunals, and thofe of caffation and of executive juftice. You have to determine which is the authority that fhall choose your public judges and accufers, functions which they are to discharge ill the election of the eighth year. The law which you are to adopt preferibes the mode of thefe nominations in a clear and precife manner; and through the provifions of this law, and of the two preceding ones, your Executive Directory will be enabled to put into immediate activity all the departments of your government, and to make the Cifalpine people experience the happinets of an organization purely republican and conftitu. tional. It is to give you a complete fyftem of legiflation that may make every citizen fenfible of the advantages of this new organization, that I call upon you to choose from among your own body eight commiflioners, upon whom you will impofe the talk of preparing this great work within the prefent month. Such is the intention of the French Executive Directory. It does not even for a moment a moment lofe fight of the interests of your republic; it perfectly recollects that it has given birth to your republic, and that it ought for a length of time to fhield it under its parental protection, but especially during this first year. It would also have ardently withed that you had given to the Cifalpine people the great law, that is, to regenerate all the departments of your financial fyftem; it has enjoined Citizen Faypoult, its commifsary, to transmit to you the provifions of that law; but this citizen has feen with regret that, though he may be able to prepare the principal provifions of it, yet there are fome of them for which he will be obliged to refort to the affistance of the members of your financial commiffion. There is another law which exifting circumftances render neceffary, and which ought to meet with no delay or obstacle in its execution; you will find that it follows the other laws: this law is relative to clubs and journals. The hero to whom the fair portion of Italy which you inhabit owes the recovery of its liberty, warned and inftructed by the calamities of his own country, had the fagacity to foresee that amid a well-natured and generous, but a warm and impaffioned people, political focieties would degenerate into feditious clubs, and the unlimited liberty of the prefs would be fo mifufed and corrupted, as to become an unbridled licentioufnefs, equally fatal to the honour of your fellow-citizens and to the public tranquillity. In order to refcue you from thefe calamities, that extraordinary man had given you two laws; one left it at the difcretion of the legislative body to fhut, as the times might require, the focieties known under the name of conftitutional circles: the other fubmitted to the immediate fuperintendance government all writings that iffued publicly from the prefs. As foon as Buonaparte quitted Lialy, the legislative body repealed these two laws. This was the fignal of your inteftine diffenfions. To the facred love of liberty, which hitherto had animated your orators and periodical writers, fucceeded the war of private paffions, jealoufy, hatred, revenge. The most upright citizens were blackened with calumnies-the pure fpirit of your real patriots was infulted and blown upon by every fpecies of outrage; and it is thus that liberty is made odious, even to thofe by whom it was at firft idolized. Lay hold, Citizens Legislators, of this memorable circumftance, in order to put an end to all thefe exceffes. One of the laws now held out to you furnishes you with the neceffary power lay hold of and imitate the example of the French republic; like you, it has groaned under the defpotifm of licentioufnefs; its beft citizens daily fell victims to the poisoned thafts of calumny; though on the brink of deftruction, it fummoned up fufficient vigour to vindicate itself from that tyranny, and |