ERRATA.

Page 21, †, for "Antigomus," read Antigonus.

Page 22, line 9, for "De Suffern," read De Suffren.

Page 54, line 5, "through the end tube" should read "through

the casing and tube."

It was a fine conception to draw up all the fleets of the world in one grand review for the inspection and criticism of the student and scholar; and it is to be hoped that the author of "Fleets of the World" will be "encouraged," as he says in his preface, "to persevere in his undertaking," now so happily begun. As the history of fleets of war vessels, to which our author exclusively alludes, has much to say in regard to their military movements, we shall begin our examination of these works on the Socratic principle of first defining our terms. The word Tactics is derived from the Greek TAKTIKO-capable of arranging; relating to drawing up; as to arrange or draw up the line of battle. Hence Tactics has been defined as the art of arranging troops, (or ships), for battle, or moving them while in the presence of the enemy. A simpler definition is that of Aeneas Tacticus who calls it "the science of Military Movements." The subject has generally been divided into two branches, grand tactics, or the tactics of battle; and elementary tactics, or the tactics of instruction.

* "Fleet Tactics under steam," by Foxhall A. Parker, Commodore U. S. Navy. D. Van Nostrand, Publisher. "Fleets of the World", by Commodore Foxhall A. Parker. D. Van Nostrand, 23 Murray St. New-York.

NOTE. This paper was read before the issuing of volume II., but was withheld for revision by the author.

The history of naval warfare, of which tactics forms so important a part, may be divided into the three grand periods of oars, sails, and steam.

OAR PERIOD. Beginning with the earliest authentic history we find that among the Greeks and Phoenicians the higher officers, and often the entire personnel of navies, fought on shore as well as at sea. It was natural, therefore, that the tactics of the land army, which was of an earlier growth, should be applied to the sea army as far as the nature of the two elements would admit. To understand, then, the character of the movements of a large fleet of galleys, numbering not infrequently two or three hundred, when preparing for, or actually engaged in, battle, it will be necessary to examine first the elementary formations of the army. In both the Athenian and Spartan armies the tactical unit was the Enomotia of 32 men, ranged in four files, eight deep. The phalanx, therefore, when in line, was eight deep. On a march, the column, the usual order in marching, would then be of "fours," or of "eights according as it broke from either flank to the front, or was marched to the right or left. The line of battle was most commonly of the parallel order. This order naturally suggested itself even to the barbarians and was practised long after war came to be studied as a science. But in the battle of Mantinea, Epaminondas formed his line in the concave order, with the attacking wing strengthened by the double echelon, a combination considered as very powerful to this day. Epaminondas," says Xenophon, "formed of his cavalry a strong wedge-like body." (Hellenics Bk. VII. 5.24.) In another place he compares the formation to the beak of a galley. "Epaminondas led his army like a ship of war with its beak directed against the enemy." To resist the attack of a superior force, the Greeks, copying from the Egyptians, were accustomed to form in a circle, and, placing their shields together, make a strong rampart difficult to penetrate. In the Cyropedia we are told by Xenophon that "the Egyptians formed a circle, so that their arms faced the enemy, and sat down under the shelter of their shields." Against this rampart Cyrus repeatedly hurled his cavalry in vain. In the Retreat of the Ten Thousand, "Xenophon and his party, being much harassed, marched in a circle, so as to hold their shields together as a defence against the missiles; and so with great difficulty crossed the river Caicus." In the Commentaries of Hirtius (African war ch. xv.) it is stated that "the legions being surrounded by the enemy's cavalry were obliged to form themselves in a circle, and fight as if enclosed with barriers."

The same formation was known to medieval times, being mentioned

in the account of a battle fought between the English under the Saxon king Harold and the Northmen under Tostig, A. D. 1066. It is not a little singular, if the digression be permitted, that the circular formation of the ancient Egyptians should have been recently revived in the U. S Army (see School of Battalion, ¶ 535 Upton's Infantry Tactics.) "On the order: Rally by Divisions, the companies close in quick time towards the centre of division, and form a circle to the rear of the line, &c., &c."

The hollow square also was known to the ancients, being particularly mentioned in the account of the disastrous retreat of the Greeks under the unhappy Nicias, after their terrible series of reverses at Syracuse.

From the fact of the shield being carried on the left arm, the right remained uncovered, hence the right was considered the point of danger and consequently the post of honor. This idea prevailed both in the army and in the fleet, the command of the right wing in line being regarded as the highest distinction. Now it will be found that these several tactical formations of the army-the line for the order of battle, the column for facility of movement, the echelon or wedge shape for strength, the circle for defence-constituted in the main the several orders of naval tactics also.

The earliest authentic record of fleet evolutions is given by the "Father of History" himself. About twenty years before the battle of Salamis, or 500 B. C., Dionysius the Phocæan took command of a fleet belonging to the Ionian Greeks. Whereupon "he proceeded every day to make the ships move in column and the rowers to ply their oars and exercise themselves in breaking the line" (Herodotus Bk. VI. 12.) While this is the earliest example furnished by history of the practice of a regular system of tactical movements by a fleet, it fortunately presents at the same time the clearest indications of what those movements were. The passage is valuable also as showing that thus early the breaking of the enemy's line was a cardinal point in the system of naval warfare.

A few cases selected at random from various authors will illustrate the principal fleet formations of the ancients. On the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, the Persian admiral brought his fleet down the coast of Magnesia in "Column of Eights", the Greek phalanx in Column.*

* To avoid encumbering the text, the more striking points of similarity between the ancient and the modern systems of naval tactics will be indicated by foot notes: thus, the "Column of Eights" of the Persian fleet could be formed by signal No. 138 of the U. S. naval signal book, which is based on Fleet Tactics under Steam, by Commodore Parker.

In one of the battles off Artemisium, where the Confederate Greek fleet covered the right flank of Leonidas at Thermopyla, the Persian line-of-battle was in the form of a crescent-the concave order of the army. The Greeks, greatly inferior in numbers, at a signal, brought the sterns of their ships together, turning their prows on every side towards the barbarians so as to form a circle-the circular formation of the army-" after which, at a second signal,* though closely pressed they darted out and fell bravely to work." (Herodotus). On the fall of Thermopylae, Artemisium ceasing to be a strategic point, the Greek fleet passed down the straits of Eubia in column, in inverse order, the left wing leading.

But it is not till we reach the Peloponnesian war that we read of those tactical evolutions which, for rapidity, and precision of execution, command our admiration to this day.

The triremes were the line-of-battle ships of the period. As they were all homogeneous, that is all built on the same lines and propelled by the same means, their arcs of evolution were equal; hence were practicable, with a numerous fleet, movements which, these elements wanting, could only result in endless confusion.

Moreover, the endurance of the rowers and the high rate of speed at which they could propel the light triremes, rendered a certain celerity of movement possible which at this day is diffleult to realize t. When to this it is added that the exercising of the fleet was incessant, it may readily be understood how a master mind, no uncommon thing in that age of high intellectual development, could maneuver a vast fleet as though it were a perfectly adjusted machine.

In a battle off Naupactus (the modern Lepanto), in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, we find the Lacedemonian fleet passing up the straits in "Column of fours," and, at a signal, suddenly swinging into line of battle by "Fours left wheel," ||.

*How these signals, so frequently alluded to by Herodotus and Thucydides, and evidently so efficacious for the maneuvering of a large fleet were made, is fully explained in Potter's American Monthly, April, 1877. Article, Signals and Signalling.

"La grande vitesse que l'on pût obtenir de ces navires, (triremes) victesse qui, d'apres quelques circonstances bien connues, pouvait atteindre deux lieues marine à l'heure." (Onze kilometres-equal to 6.8 statute miles.) Essai sur les navires a rangs de rames des Anciens. Par P. Glotin Ex. Lieut. de Vaisseau. Paris; Arthur Bertrand, 1862.

Signal No. 111. || Signal No 409.