ance of obligations toward a friendly power, while on the other, the recognition of belligerency involves the rights of blockade, visitation, search, and seizure of contraband articles on the high seas, and abandonment of claims for reparation on account of damages suffered by our citizens from the prevalence of warfare. No intention to circumscribe the means of avoiding the one by imposing as a condition the acceptance of the contingencies of the other can be imputed.

Belligerency is recognized when a political struggle has attained a certain magnitude and affects the interests of the recognizing power; and in the instance of maritime operations, recognition may be compelled, or the vessels of the insurgents, if molesting third parties, may be pursued as pirates. The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408; 3 Whart. Dig. Int. Law, § 381; and authorities cited.

But it belongs to the political department to determine when belligerency shall be recognized, and its action must be accepted according to the terms and intention expressed.

The distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political revolt, between recognition of the existence of war in a material sense and of war in a legal sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the political department has not recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent power engaged in hostility with Spain, but has recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare prevailing before, at the time and since this forefeiture is alleged to have been incurred.

On June 12, 1895, a formal proclamation was issued by the President and countersigned by the Secretary of State, informing the people of the United States that the island of Cuba was "the seat of serious civil disturbances accompanied by armed resistence to the authority of the established government of Spain, a power with which the United States are and desire to remain on terms of peace and amity."

July 27, 1896, a further proclamation was promulgated, and in the annual message of December 7, 1896, the President called attention to the fact that "the insurrection in Cuba still continues with all its perplexities," and gave an extended review of the situation.

We are thus judicially informed of the existence of an actual conflict of arms in resistance of the authority of a government with which the United States are on terms of peace and amity

although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belligerents by the political department has not taken place; and it cannot be doubted that, this being so, the act in question is applicable.

We see no justification for importing into section 5283 words which it does not contain and which would make its operation depend upon the recognition of belligerency; and while the libel might have been drawn with somewhat greater precision, we are of opinion that it should not have been dismissed.

NOTE.-Belligerency has long been recognized as a definite status in international law which confers all the rights of an independent gov. ernment so far as the waging of war is concerned. It is discussed in Rose v. Himeley (1808), 4 Cranch, 241, United States v. Palmer (1818), 3 Wheaton, 610; The Divina Pastora (1819), 4 Ib. 52; United States v. Klintock (1820), 5 Ib. 144; The Santissima Trinidad (1822), 7 Ib. 283, 337; The Prize Cases (1863), 2 Black, 635; Williams v. Bruffy (1877), 96 U. S. 176; Ford v. Surget (1879), 97 U. S. 594; Dow v. Johnson (1880), 100 U. S. 158, 164; United States v. Pacific Railroad (1887), 120 U. S. 227, 233; Underhill v. Hernandez (1897), 168 U. S. 250; Baldy v. Hunter (1898), 171 U. S. 388; Oakes v. United States (1899), 174 U. S. 778; The Amy Warwick (1862), 2 Sprague, 123. See also Moore, Digest, I, 164, and Wheaton (Dana), 34 note 15. This note by Richard Henry Dana is the classic statement of the law of belligerency.

The recognition of the belligerency of an insurgent community not only accords rights to the insurgents but imposes duties and restrictions upon the recognizing state. It may no longer treat the acts of war of the insurgents as acts without political authority and it is under obligation to observe strict neutrality in the contest between the insurgents and the parent state. When the United States accorded to the Confederate States the rights of a belligerent, the two became hostile powers and their inhabitants public enemies, Stovall, Administrator v. United States (1891), 26 Ct. Cl. 226, 240. Hence trade by citizens of the loyal States having no other object than to rescue their property in the South was trading with the enemy and was illegal, Montgomery v. United States (1873), 15 Wallace, 395; Cutner v. United States (1875), 17 Ib. 517; United States v. Lapène (1874), 17 Ib. 601; Dillon v. United States (1870), 5 Ct. Cl. 586. The recognition of belligerency on the part of neutral states is a recognition of a war status only and accords no rights not directly associated with the conduct of the war, Latham v. Clark (1870), 25 Ark. 574; Shortridge v. Mason (1867), 22 Fed. Cases, No. 12812. Although the Confederate States were recognized by President Lincoln as belligerents, it was held that such recognition did not imply any right on their part to establish prize courts for the condemnation of vessels or cargoes belonging to citizens of the loyal States, and the decisions of Confederate prize courts in cases of that kind were dis

regarded, The Lilla (1862), 2 Sprague, 177, 187. If the insurgent or de facto government succeeds in establishing itself, its acts from the beginning of its existence are regarded as those of an independent government, M'Ilvaine v. Coxe (1808), 4 Cranch, 209; United States v. Rice (1819), 4 Wheaton, 246; Underhill v. Hernandez (1897), 168 U. S. 250; Murray v. Vanderbilt (1863), 39 Barbour (N. Y.) 140; State of Yucatan v. Argumedo (1915), 92 N. Y. Misc. 547; Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen (1918), 92 N. J. Law 38.

On the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States see Bancroft, Life of W. H. Seward; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History; Montague Bernard, Historical Account of the Neu trality of Great Britain during the American Civil War; Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy; Hyde, I, 79; Moore, Digest, 184. On the recognition of Cuban belligerency, see Beale, "The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency," Harvard Law Review, IX, 406. The general principles of the recognition of belligerency are discussed in Cobbett, Cases and Opinions, I, 63; Bonfils (Fauchille), sec. 1045; Hyde, I, 77; Moore, Digest, I, 164, 248.

Not every petty contest by irresponsible insurgents can be allowed to disturb the normal relations of states, as is inevitably the case when the insurgents are recognized as belligerents. It was long insisted that any body of insurgents who were not recognized as bellig. erents should be treated as criminals. If their operations took place on the high seas they were classed as pirates. The obvious injustice of this was so great that there has come to be acknowledged a status midway between peace and belligerency which is known as insurgency. That the recognition of belligerency did not apply to every minor act of insurrection was apparently admitted in The Nueva Anna and Liebra (1821), 6 Wheaton, 193. The Three Friends is the chief decision dealing with the distinction between belligerency and insurgency. The Neutrality Act of the United States and the British Foreign Enlistment Act, both of which were enacted for the purpose of assuring neutrality in a war between recognized belligerents, have been held to apply to insurgents, Wiborg v. United States (1896), 163 U. S. 632; The Salvador (1870), L. R. 3 P. C. 218. See also The Ambrose Light (1885), 25 Fed. 408 (a scholarly opinion); The Itata (1893), 56 Fed. 505; Moore, Digest, I, 242; II, 1076; George G. Wilson, "Insurgency and International Maritime Law," in Am Jour. Int. Law, I, 46; International Law Situations, 1901, 108; 1902, 57; 1904, 26; 1907, 127; 1912, 9. These discussions at the Naval War College, the first of which was conducted by Professor John Bassett Moore, the others by Professor George G. Wilson, are unusually valuable contributions to a branch of international law which is still in process of formation. The status of the Cuban insurgents in 1895 is discussed in 21 Opinions of the Attorney-General, 267.

CHAPTER III.

THE CONTINUING PERSONALITY OF STATES.

THE SAPPHIRE.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1871.
11 Wallace, 164.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

[There having been a collision between the American ship Sapphire and the French transport Euryale, in the harbor of San Francisco, a libel was filed against the Sapphire in the name of the Emperor Napoleon III, then Emperor of the French, as owner of the Euryale. The decree of the District Court in favor of the libellant was affirmed by the Circuit Court, from which an appeal was taken in July, 1869. In September, 1870, the Emperor Napoleon was deposed. The case was argued before the Supreme Court in February, 1871.]

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

The first question raised is as to the right of the French Emperor to sue in our courts. On this point not the slightest difficulty exists. A foreign sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature against any person here, may prosecute it in our courts. To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling. Such a suit was sustained in behalf of the King of Spain in the third circuit by Justice Washington and Judge Peters in 1810. King of Spain v. Oliver, 2 Washington's Circuit Court, 431. The Constitution expressly extends the judicial power to controversies between a State, or citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects, without reference to the subject-matter of the controversy. Our own government has largely availed itself of the like privilege to bring suits in the English courts in cases growing out of our late civil war. Twelve or more of such suits

are enumerated in the brief of the appellees, brought within the last five years in the English law, chancery, and admiralty courts. There are numerous cases in the English reports in which suits of foreign sovereigns have been sustained, though it is held that a sovereign cannot be forced into court by suit. King of Spain v. Hullett, 1 Dow. & Clarke, 169; S. C., 1 Clarke & Finnelly, 333; S. C., 2 Bligh, N. S., 31; Emperor of Brazil, 6 Adolphus & Ellis, 801; Queen of Portugal, 7 Clarke & Finnelly, 466; King of Spain, 4 Russell, 225; Emperor of Austria, 3 De Gex, Fisher & Jones, 174; King of Greece, 6 Dowling's Practice Cases, 12; S. C., 1 Jurist, 944; United States, Law Reports, 2 Equity Cases, 659; Ditto, Ib. 2 Chancery Appeals, 582; Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 6 Beavan, 1; S. C., 2 House of Lords Cases, 1; De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 169; also 2 Phillimore's International Law, part vi, chap. i; 1 Daniel's Chancery Practice, chap. ii, § ii.

The next question is, whether the suit has become abated by the recent deposition of the Emperor Napoleon. We think it has not. The reigning sovereign represents the national sovereignty, and that sovereignty is continuous and perpetual, residing in the proper successors of the sovereign for the time being. Napoleon was the owner of the Euryale, not as an individual, but as sovereign of France. This is substantially averred in the libel. On his deposition the sovereignty does not change, but merely the person or persons in whom it resides. The foreign state is the true and real owner of its public vessels of war. The reigning Emperor, or National Assembly, or other actual person or party in power, is but the agent and representative of the national sovereignty. A change in such representative works no change in the national sovereignty or its rights. The next successor recognized by our government is competent to carry on a suit already commenced and receive the fruits of it. A deed to or treaty with a sovereign as such inures to his successor in the government of the country. If a substitution of names is necessary or proper it is a formal matter, and can be made by the court under its general power to preserve due symmetry in its forms of proceeding. No allegation has been made that any change in the real and substantial ownership of the Euryale has occurred by the recent devolution. of the sovereign power. The vessel has always belonged and still belongs to the French nation.

If a special case should arise in which it could be shown that