following year the Ministry of Lord North, after an existence of twelve years, came to an end; and such was the revolt from high Toryism, which had landed the country in such disasters, that a Whig Government succeeded it, the Marquis of Rockingham becoming Prime Minister, and Lord Shelburne and Fox becoming Secretaries of State.

This administration was shortlived, but under it the House of Commons brought itself formally to acknowledge the errors it had committed in the treatment of Mr. Wilkes and the Middlesex electors, some thirteen years previously, and did so in the most thorough manner, by ordering that all declarations, orders, and resolutions respecting the election of John Wilkes, and his incapacity to be elected a member to serve in the said Parliament, should be expunged from the Journals of that House "as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom."1

What a commentary on all the arguments of the Ministers and of "the King's friends," which were used when those resolutions were being placed there. What a triumph for the Platform. Several measures were also passed during this Administration which had been distinctly called for by the Platform, and which, therefore, may be regarded as the firstfruits of the Platform in legislation. A measure of economy was introduced by Burke, and carried; part only of the large and comprehensive plan which he had submitted to Parliament two years before, but still something, for it abolished a number of offices usually held by members of Parliament, and effected an annual saving of £70,000.

Such had been the impetus given by the Platform to popular legislation, that two other measures were carried, tending to the improvement of the constitution of Parliament and the diminution of corrupt influence therein. The first was an Act excluding contractors from the House of Commons, and the second was a measure debarring revenue officers-of whom there were from 40,000 to 60,000 in an electoral body of about 300,000-from voting at Parliamentary elections. The disfranchisement of these Government automata, this crew, whose interest it was to vote for any government nominee, and who were absolutely dependent for their situations on the Ministers 1 Parliamentary History, vol. xxii. p. 1411.

of the day, was, as Mr. Lecky says, "by far the most serious blow that had ever been administered to Government influence at elections." 1

But it was in its larger aspects that Parliamentary reform was sighed for and desired; and from this time on, for the next half century, the question was never lost sight of by the Platform. Ministries might rise and fall, great events might make the great heart of the civilised world palpitate with interest or horror, war might follow peace, and peace war, the most vital interests of the country might be imperilled, each and every one of these events, in greater or less degree, would evoke expressions of feeling from the people by means of the Platform, but the reform of Parliament, or rather of the House of Commons, was the one abiding subject which, the instant the temporary excitement was over, was harked back to by the people, and when not treated solely by itself, was tacked on to whatever other subject happened to be forced on the attention of the country. Truly, had some of the leading reformers of the day discerned that here lay the real measure to be striven for; and gradually was the belief burning itself ever deeper into the minds of larger numbers of the people. It is no condemnation of the Platform that many visionary schemes and expedients by way of reform were set afloat, for the true remedy for a great national disease is not all at once to be discovered. The general direction may be ascertained, but the particular road that will lead to it is not always so clear. It was but natural that men's thoughts should turn in this direction. To succeed in obtaining some voice in their own House was the only way to secure the reform of abuses, and the amelioration of the state of the people.

One great writer after another had condemned the existing system.

"To what gross absurdities," wrote Locke, "the following of custom, when reason has left it, may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheep-cote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of lawmakers as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful

1 History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. iv. p. 218.

in riches.

This strangers stand amazed at, and, every one

must confess, needs a remedy."1

The result of the then existing state of Parliamentary representation was that the commons, or people of the country, had not the actual election of the House of Commons. So far from it, the House was, as a body, more frequently opposed to the people than on their side. Burke recognised this clearly. He said: "A House of Commons which in all disputes between the people and the Administration presumes against the people, which punishes their disorders, but refuses even to inquire into their provocations, is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things in the Constitution."

And even so it was-both unnatural and monstrous. And the majority of that House, so far from being elected even by any appreciable portion of the people, was returned either by men who were coerced or bribed into returning certain nominees, or in a very large number of cases by men who practically elected themselves. Burgh,2 in his Political Disquisitions, described this state of things: "A handful of beggars," he wrote, "either tempted by a bribe, or awed by the threats of a man in power, elect or re-elect as many as they are bid. And so the House comes to be filled with the tools of a minister."

And Oldfield, in his Entire and Complete History, Political and Personal, of the Boroughs of Great Britain, wrote: "Thus is the legislative part of our Constitution made of some members who represent neither houses nor persons; of others who are the representatives only of single individuals; and of many whose constituents do not exceed ten in number."

The places sending representatives to Parliament had been so judiciously selected by the governing powers in previous reigns, as to exclude the more important centres of wealth, population, and intellectual activity; and as England progressed in wealth and population this evil was becoming ever more and more magnified. It is needless to quote statistics, the facts are notorious, and were self-evident then to all who were beginning to take a deeper interest in the political life of their country.

It was not from the Platform that the first real rousing in1 Locke, Of Civil Government, chap. xiii. 2 Published in 1774, p. 50.

centive to the reform of Parliament came, but, as we have seen, from Lord Chatham, when, in his famous speech in the House of Lords in 1770, he proposed "to infuse a new portion of health into the Constitution.”

Beckford had alluded to the question on the Electoral Platform in 1761, as we may remember, but the real incentive to action came from Lord Chatham.

Parliament, however, turned a deaf ear to the suggestion; would have none of it. Not so the Platform, which hailed it enthusiastically as its own, and which thenceforward gave it its constant unforgetting attention, using every occasion on which Government laid itself open to censure to enforce the moral that no Government could be satisfactory until Parliamentary reform was affected. Unfortunately the different nature of the remedies proposed, the extravagance of some of them, and the injudicious way in which they were argued, prevented them receiving the consideration the subject was entitled to. But unceasingly, and in spite of every obstacle, it was persevered with, and when not being carried rapidly along by recurrent gusts of popular agitation, it was being quietly pushed forward by other influences.

The history of the struggle for Parliamentary reform is usually traced in Parliament, but its real history was outside Parliament.

It was the people outside Parliament who wanted Parliament reformed-not those inside. During the half-century over which the struggle for reform was prolonged, the whole vital force of the demand for reform came from outside. It was the spokesman, the orators of the people outside who kept the demand for it alive-who pressed it on Parliament in season, and, to Parliament men, always, out of season. Now and then the demand was urged in Parliament by some ardent Member of the Liberal Party, but such demand was the result of outside activity, outside pressure. It was by the Platform and not by Parliament that the question was pushed-it was by the Platform and not by Parliament that the victory was finally won.

Stated shortly, the actual grievance felt peculiarly at this time was the perpetual acquiescence of the House of Commons in the dictation of the Ministers of the Crown.

Lord Rockingham, ex-Prime Minister, speaking in 1780,1 had stated it pretty clearly. He said: "It was, early in the present reign, promulged as a Court axiom that the power and influence of the Crown alone was sufficient to support any set of men his Majesty might think proper to call to his Councils. "The fact bore evidence of its truth; for, through the influence of the Crown, majorities had been procured to support any men or any measures which an Administration, thus constituted, thought proper to dictate. This was the origin of all our national misfortunes.

"Combining the measures of the present reign together, he would say, that they presented such a system of corruption, public venality, and despotism, as never before took place in any limited Government."

And Burke also had spoken out, quite unmistakably, about it. "The whole of our grievances," he said, "are owing to the fatal and overgrown influence of the Crown. Formerly the operation of the influence of the Crown only touched the higher orders of the State. It has now insinuated itself into every creek and cranny in the kingdom."

The evil was patent. No intelligent and impartial person could fail to see it, and as to remedy, the only one was equally evident a reform of the House of Commons.

The action of the Convention of Delegates, which had been so much reprobated in 1780-namely, the grafting of Parliamentary reform on the subject of economic reform-produced nevertheless one great result. It kept the question of Parliamentary reform before the public; and on the 7th May 1782 William Pitt, stimulated partly by the action of the persevering remnant of the Convention of the Associated Counties, partly by his own inclinations and ambitions, and, possibly, partly by the vehemently declared opinions of his father, brought the subject forward in Parliament.

Fox, at a later period of his career, gives a more graphic picture of this debate than do the bald records of the Parliamentary history of the day. Fox said: "Towards the end of the war with America, it became extremely unpopular, and the King's Ministers lost the confidence of the nation. In the 1 Parliamentary History, vol. xx. p. 1346 (8th February 1780). 2 Ibid. p. 1297.

3 Ibid. 1797, vol. xxxiii. p. 710.