with taxa imposed by the king in council was assessed and collected. So long as taxation fell upon land only, the liability of the taxpayer was settled by the sheriff, the justice, or the declaration of the tenant in chief1: but personal property, when under Henry II it came to be taxed, required a closer system of assessGrowth of ment. Thus, for the collection of the Saladin Tithe reprerepresenta tion in sentative men of each township were chosen to determine the connection liabilities of the tax-payers, and here we get the beginning of the connection between taxation and representation. Shortly, one may state the whole history of the process which now begins. First, the representatives calculate the amount due from each individual of a tax fixed by the crown; next, they determine the total amount which shall be granted to the crown; finally, they determine not merely the amount which the crown is to receive, but the way in which the crown shall spend it. tion. The Charter. But this is at present far off. The kings of the twelfth century judged and taxed, and commanded their feudal levies in war, and issued edicts declaratory of custom or relating to changes of administration. But the system of administration was largely based on local representation for purposes of taxation and judicial procedure, and so we get a connection of the local and central power, which paved the way for Parliamentary institutions and for the share in the government of the country which was given to all classes by the constitution of Edward I. The Great Charter is partly a declaration of rights, partly a treaty between crown and people: it contains a statement of the legal limits of the power of the crown in two matters of paramount importance. It put on record first the right at any rate of all tenants in chief, personally or by their representatives, to be parties to the grant of any scutage or aid other than the three customary aids; and next the right of every free man to the free course of justice, 'the legal judgment of his peers or the law of the land.' That representation is a condition precedent to taxation, and that the law is the same Stubbs, i. 505. for all freemen1 may be regarded as the cardinal principles of the charter. The Constitution of Edward I. ment: its Edward I gave to our Parliamentary institutions the form which, with many changes in spirit and many more in detail, they still retain. The executive is the Crown in Council, the king acting with the advice of the wise men and magnates of the realm. The representative body, which at first only Parliaassents to taxation and afterwards makes laws, consists of the constituclergy, the baronage, and the commons, the three estates of tion. the realm. The baronage come in response to a summons addressed by writ to each individually; the clergy are included in a like writ addressed to each bishop; the commons are summoned by a writ addressed to the sheriff of each county, commanding the election of two knights for each shire, two citizens for each city, two burgesses for each borough. The machinery of the county court, which had already been used for the choice of persons who should assess the taxation levied by the Crown, is now used for the choice of persons to represent the shire, and for the confirmation of the choice of their representatives by the towns. And these representatives, the choice of whom is notified from the sheriff in the County Court to the Crown, meet in Parliament 'to enact such things as shall of our common council be ordained 2. The Crown in Parliament begins to be distinguishable from the Crown in Council, but it was a long time before the respective functions of legislature and executive were clearly distinguished and defined, and longer still before the two bodies found a means of working in some sort of habitual correspondence. The Commons as a Political Power. There was at first no clear recognition of the right of the Voice of commons to a voice in legislation; the king in council 1 The charter was not for the villein class, and the liberties were granted on a freehold tenure-omnibus liberis hominibus regni nostri, habendas et tenendas, eis et heredibus suis, de nobis et heredibus nostris. the Commons in legislation, 2 Stubbs, Charters, 486. had been wont to declare customs and make administrative changes; he sometimes continued to do so with the concurrence of the Magnates only, and without waiting for the assent of the Commons. Such was the case with the Statute Quia Emptores, passed instantia magnatum. If they wanted new laws the Commons did not frame them, but asked for them; the Crown in Council legislated on petition of the Commons. in adminis- Nor were the Commons always willing to recognise their position as critics if not advisers of the Crown and its Ministers. When their opinion was asked on matters of executive government they were reluctant to give it, lest their advice should lead to expense for which they might be held responsible. tration, But the strength of the Commons lay in this, that when once the Crown had acknowledged its inability to lay taxes on the people without their consent, that consent could only be obtained through their representatives in Parliament; and further, in days when there was no press, nor means of getting at public opinion by organised demonstrations, it was only through the assemblage of the Commons that the king could ascertain the feeling of the country. And though the Commons might be reluctant to express opinions which would compromise them in the matter of taxation, yet a capable king would learn without much difficulty whether the country was with him or not, and a wise king would not act in grave matters unless he knew that the country was at his back. So the Commons became necessary to the Crown: they were also necessary to the Baronage, for the Barons were frequently in an attitude of resistance to the Crown; it was upon them that feudal liabilities lay heaviest, and to have the Commons on their side was important to them. In the great Constitutional struggles of the middle ages, which ended in the acknowledgment by the Crown of the right of Parliament to grant supply, we find the Barons leading and the Commons following their lead. But though money could only be got through the Commons, and information of the state of public feeling could hardly be got elsewhere, yet it was long before they could exercise any substantial influence on the action of the executive, it was some time before they could even acquire a hold upon legislation. The Commons and the Executive. For in their relations to the executive the criticism of the Commons was occasional, their control remote. They could denounce, but they could not denounce in time or complain before the mischief was done. If grants of money had been Independence required at more regular intervals, or could have been appro- of the priated more specifically to the purpose for which they had been executive. asked, the Commons might at any time have stayed the hand of the executive by tightening the purse strings. But the Crown had an hereditary revenue from various sources which satisfied many of the needs of government. If the king wanted more, he asked for and obtained a grant of a tenth or a fifteenth on real or personal property. No means existed of assigning portions of the grant to particular services, or indeed of providing that the king should not spend the entire subsidy on purposes quite different from those for which it was asked. So when their grant was made the virtue had gone out of the Commons, they could exercise no control over policy till money was wanted again. Their efforts to keep a hold Checks devised by on the king's ministers show that they knew their weakness Commons. in this respect. The oath of office and the practice of impeachment were attempts to impose upon the servants of the Crown a sense of duty by fear of more or less remote contingences. The demand sometimes made that the officers of state should be chosen or at any rate nominated in the Commons is a curious anticipation of modern practice1. Only the Commons desired in the middle ages to do directly and formally what in the modern constitution they do indirectly. The mediaeval Parliament wanted to be able to elect for the Crown the minister of its choice. The modern Parliament is 1 Stubbs, ii. 559. content with the power of making it impossible for the Crown to employ others than those whom Parliament favours for the time. The Commons and Legislation. The control which the Commons exercised over legislation was acquired two hundred years sooner than its control over the executive. But it was not acquired without a struggle. The Confirmatio Chartarum (1297) made them necessary parties to taxation; and a statute of 1322 enacted that laws should not be made without their consent. But the consent thus required was of a vague and general sort. When asked for money they could claim that grievances should precede supply but for such grievances as needed legislation for their redress the Commons had to be content with the king's promise Parliamen- that the necessary laws should be made. When Parliament had dispersed, the statute required was drafted and engrossed legislation. in the statute roll, or an ordinance issued to the same effect. tary con trol over : But the Commons had no opportunity of seeing that their wishes were really carried out, or that if carried out they were not rendered liable to be defeated by saving clauses and the reservation of a dispensing power to the Crown. Nevertheless the process of legislation took much less time to acquire its modern aspect than did the connection of the executive and the legislature. It was not till after the Revolution that party government began to grow up, and the relation of ministers to Parliament assumed something of its present form. But by the end of the fifteenth century statutes had assumed the form which they still retain, and as early as the reign of Henry VI the framing of laws was undertaken and conducted by the Houses, and the king had ceased to do more than express a formal acceptance or rejection of the measure submitted to him. The mediaeval Parliament had thus acquired a close and effective control over legislation, while its control over the action of the Crown, or of the ministers of the Crown, remained |