Roman Catholics. Jews. Quakers, &c. Atheists. these penalties were not directly taken away until the 29 Vict. c. 19 (1866), which left only the liability to pay £500 for every occasion on which a member sat and voted without taking the oath. The Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1829, provided a single form of oath, acceptable to Roman Catholics and available to them only it further abolished, in all cases, the necessity for the declaration against transubstantiation. The Jews were still excluded by the concluding words of the oath of abjuration. These were held to be an integral part of the oath 1, and thus, though the seat was not vacated, a Jew could not vote except under a ruinous penalty. But in 1858 an Act was passed enabling either House to dispense with the use of the words 'on the true faith of a Christian' by resolution in individual cases: and in 1860 another Act gave power to either House to make a standing order to the same effect. Meantime in 1858 a single form of oath had been prescribed instead of the three oaths of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration, and finally in 1866 the words which caused the difficulty were omitted from the statutory form required. The only difficulty which now existed was in the case of those persons who declined to take an oath, either because they objected on religious grounds to any form of oath, or because they had no such religious belief as would make an oath binding upon them. The first was the case of Quakers, Moravians, and others to whom it was objectionable to take an oath. These were exempted expressly by various statutes, and were permitted to make affirmation in terms prescribed. The second case gave rise to the mass of litigation to which the late Mr. Bradlaugh was a party. Mr. Bradlaugh, at the meeting of Parliament in 1880, demanded to be allowed to affirm instead of taking the oath, alleging that he, having no religious belief, was 'a person for 1 1 Miller, v. Salomons, 7 Exch. 475; 8 Exch. 778. the time being permitted by law to make a solemn affirmation The case of or declaration instead of taking an oath 1.' The House allowed him to make affirmation, and he was sued by an informer for the penalties due from him as having sat and voted without taking the oath. The Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division 2, held that Mr. Bradlaugh was not exempt from the liability to take the oath. The fact that under the Evidence Acts of 1869 and 1870 he would have been enabled to make a promise and declaration to tell the truth, did not bring him into the class of persons indicated in the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, and the Promissory Oaths Act of 1868. These were not persons on whom an oath would have no binding force, but persons who had a conscientious objection to taking an oath. Thus though when the case of Clarke v. Bradlaugh reached the House of Lords it was there held that the statutory penalty was not recoverable by a common informer, Mr. Bradlaugh was held disentitled to make affirmation in lieu of the oath. He then endeavoured to take the oath, but the House resolved that he should not be allowed to do so, and the Queen's Bench Division refused to make a declaration to the effect that he was entitled to do so 3. On the 11th of February, 1884, Mr. Bradlaugh entered the House; came to the table without being called upon by the Speaker; read from a paper in his hand the words of the oath, and having kissed a book which he brought with him, signed the paper and left it on the table. He subsequently voted in a division, and an action was brought against him, this time at the suit of the Crown, for the penalty which he had incurred by so voting. The Court of Appeal, when the matter came before it *, held 131 & 32 Vict. c. 72, s. 14. 2 Clarke v. Bradlaugh, 7 Q. B. D. 38. Mr. Bradlaugh. Affirmation in lieu of oath. Object of disabilities not only that the manner in which Mr. Bradlaugh had taken the oath was insufficient to meet the requirements of the Parliamentary Oaths Act; but that his want of religious belief, if proved to the satisfaction of a jury, made it impossible for him to satisfy the requirements of the Act even if he had taken the oath in due form. On the 13th of January, 1886, Mr. Bradlaugh took the oath among other members elected to the new Parliament. The Speaker refused to intervene, holding that the resolution of the former House of Commons had lapsed with the dissolution in 1885; that the Speaker had no authority to prevent a member from taking the oath: and that he should not permit (as a former Speaker had permitted) a motion to be made restraining a member from taking the oath. The honourable member,' he said, 'takes the oath under whatever risks may attach to him in a court of law.' Mr. Bradlaugh therefore sat and voted subject always to the risk that the law officers of the Crown might proceed against him for penalties incurred and prove to the satisfaction of a jury that having no religious belief he had not taken the oath within the meaning of the Parliamentary Oaths Act. The last stage in the history of this test of the political or religious creed of persons elected to serve in the House, was reached in 1888, when the Oaths Act, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 46, was passed. By this Act it is provided that in all places and for all purposes where an oath is or shall be required by law an affirmation may be made. The affirmation is made in the following form: 'I, A. B., do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm,' the words of the oath required by law are then proceeded with. It should be noticed that all the express disabilities created politicalnot by the form of oath have been imposed for political purposes, religious. and so far as they were directed, as they mainly were directed, at Roman Catholics, their object was to exclude from Parliament persons who were disloyal to the reigning sovereign, because they desired to see a Roman Catholic on the throne, or because they recognised, behind the throne, the supreme authority of the Pope. The words which excluded Jews were not introduced for that purpose, nor would it seem that the question of the quality of religious belief apart from its political significance was ever raised before the case of Mr. Bradlaugh. It does not appear that non-conformists were ever disqualified as such, except in so far as their religious convictions prevented them from taking any form of oath. The Acts exempting Quakers and others who were in this way of thinking were designed to put Quakers on a footing with all other dissenters in England'.' dence. Residence is another of the extinct grounds of disqualifica- (b) Resition for residence in their constituencies was required of the knights and burgesses who represented shires and towns by 1 Henry V, c. 1. This requirement had fallen out of use as early as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but the Act of Henry V was not repealed till 1774. I. A property qualification was created by 9 Anne, c. 5, consist- (c) Property. ing of an estate in land which, in the case of a knight of the shire, must be worth £600 a year, in the case of a burgess £300 a year; and this qualification had to be affirmed upon oath, and later by declaration made by the candidate upon the request of two electors, or of a rival candidate, at any time before the day fixed in the writ of summons for the meeting of Parliament. This Act was modified by some subsequent statutes, but all the provisions relating to the qualification were repealed in 18582. fession An Act of 1372 provides that no man of the law following (d) Probusiness in the King's Court, nor any sheriff for the time of the law. that he is a sheriff, be returned nor accepted knight of the shire.' This statute was not repealed until 1871 3, though its provisions had long been forgotten. But apart from the disqualifications which I have described 1 Hansard, 3rd series, vol. xv. p. 639. 2 21 & 22 Vict. c. 26. 3 34 & 35 Vict. c. 116. Resignation of a seat impossible. The use of official dis ability. as avoiding an election, a member once elected can only cease to represent his constituency by reason of his death, or of the dissolution of Parliament. A seat cannot be resigned, nor can a man who has once formally taken his seat for one constituency throw it up and contest another. Either a disqualification must be incurred, or the House must declare the seat vacant; and, as we have seen, the House has not shown itself very willing to declare a seat vacant on the ground of physical incapacity, or personal unwillingness to serve. The disability attaching to office is thus of great practical convenience. Certain old offices of nominal value in the gift of the Treasury are now granted, as of course1, to members who wish to resign their seats in order to be quit of Parliamentary duties or to contest another constituency. These offices are the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, of the manors of East Hendred, Northstead, or Hempholme, and the escheatorship of Munster. The office is resigned as soon as it has operated to vacate the seat and sever the tie between the member and his constituents. It is curious to note that a good many years elapsed after the passing of the Act of Anne, before it was discovered that the acceptance of one of these small offices was a means of getting quit of a seat which a member desired to resign. The earliest use of a Stewardship of a royal manor as a means of vacating a seat was in 1740. In that year Sir Watkin Wynn accepted the Stewardship of the king's lordship and manor of Bromhild and Gale in the county of Denbigh in order to vacate his seat for the county. In 1742 the Stewardship of the manor of Otford in Kent was used for the same purpose. In 1751 the Chiltern Hundreds first appears, in 1752 the manor of Berkhamstead. Since then the Chiltern Hundreds and the other royal manors specified above have been most commonly used for the purpose required. 1 In the eighteenth century they were refused in the interest of the Government, and presumably might be refused now if demanded for a discreditable purpose, as to avoid expulsion. |