Mr. Justice White delivered a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, dissented. Dooley v. United States (Dec. 2, 1901), 183 U. S. 151. Discussions of the ques tions involved in the insular cases may be found in the following publications: The Status of our New Territories, by Prof. C. C. Langdell, Harvard Law Rev. (Jan., 1899), XII. 365; The Constitutional Questions incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, by the Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, id. 393; The Constitution and New Territory, by Prof. J. W. Burgess, Political Science Quarterly (Sept., 1900), XV. 381; The Law and Policy of Annexation, by Carman F. Randolph (Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London, 1901); The Insular Cases, by the Hon. Chas. E. Littlefield, before the Am. Bar Assoc., Aug. 22, 1901; The Supreme Court and the Insular Cases, by Prof. L. S. Rowe, Annals of the Am. Academy of Polit. and Social Science, Sept., 1901; The Supreme Court and the Insular Cases, by the Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, Yale Review, Aug., 1901; The Insular Cases, by Carman F. Randolph, Columbia Law Review (Nov., 1901), I. 436; The Porto Rico Tariffs of 1899–1900, by Edward B. Whitney, Yale Law Journal, May, 1900; The Insular Decisions of December, 1901, by Edward B. Whitney, Columbia Law Review, Feb., 1902, p. 79; Two Treaties of Paris and the Supreme Court, by Sidney Webster (New York, Harpers, 1901, pp. 133); Practical Legal Difficulties incident to the Transfer of Sovereignty, by Frederic R. Coudert, jr., being an address delivered before the Academy of Political Science at Columbia University, May 27, 1902. Division of territory. By the treaty between the United States and the Sultan of Muscat, then sovereign of Zanzibar, which was concluded Sept. 21, 1833, and which was accepted, ratified, and confirmed by the Sultan of Zanzibar Oct. 20, 1879, it was provided that vessels of the United States entering any port within the Sultan's dominions should pay no more than five per cent duties on the cargo landed. landed. Under this stipulation it was the custom to import into the island of Zanzibar all goods intended for the Sultan's East African dominions, and after paying the duty there to transship them to the various coast ports, the island being used merely as a base of distribution. Dec. 22, 1890, the German consul at Zanzibar notified the consul of the United States that from Jan. 1, 1891, the duty of five per cent would be collected by his Government on the coast now known as the German East African coast, which the Sultan had then recently sold to Germany. At that time the American house of Ropes, Emmerton & Co. held in the city of Zanzibar goods valued at $44,746, imported for the coast in question, and on which they had paid to the Zanzibar customs the stipulated duty. No arrangement was made between the German Government and the Sultan of Zanzibar as to goods so situated. The Government of the United States took the ground that, under the circumstances, the American merchants were entitled either to have the merchandise, on which the duty had been paid, admitted free of duty into the coast, for which it was actually imported, or else to receive a drawback from the Sultan to the amount of the duties paid; and an application was made to the German Government for relief from the exaction of the additional duty. The German Government refused to entertain the claim. The Government of the United States continued to press it, maintaining that it involved "a substantial hardship calling for that equitable treatment which the Foreign Office admits the case should receive." It was not deemed necessary, said the United States, to consider the question whether, by the payment of the duty, the goods themselves were invested with a right of free transportation into any part of what were then the Sultan's dominions. The duty was in fact paid on the goods for sale on the coast; by the entry of the goods at Zanzibar, they were in reality imported into the coast; but, the government of the coast having changed, a new entry was demanded and a second payment of duty exacted, simply because the government had changed. To the contention of the Foreign Office that notice should have been taken of the negotiations for the sale of the Sultan's dominions, it was answered that the importers could not reasonably be required to incur inconvenience and loss merely because negotiations were on foot of which they could not foresee either the result or the time of termination; that it seemed to be the more just and reasonable view that they had a right to continue to conduct their business according to methods which had all along been pursued and which had the sanction of law and treaty; and that the notice of Dec. 22, 1890, while it might be considered as an admission that they were entitled to be advised that they would be required to meet changes in the course of their business, was so short that it constituted rather a notification that they would be subjected to loss than an opportunity to avoid it. Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, Feb. 27, 1891, MS. Inst. Germany, XVIII. 417; Mr. Adee, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, May 20, 1891, id. 520. The German Government appears to have adhered to its position. 4. ON PRIVATE LAW. "All the laws which were in force in Florida while a province of Spain, those excepted which were political in their character, which concerned the relations between the people and their sovereign, remained in force until altered by the Government of the United States. Congress recognized this principle by using the words 'laws of the Territory now in force therein. No laws could then have been in force but those enacted by the Spanish Government." Marshall, C. J., American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 542. In the case of the Island of Grenada, reported under the title of Campbell v. Hall, 20 St. Tr. 239, 322; Cowp. 204, 208, it was declared by Lord Mansfield that "a country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in right of his Crown, and therefore necessarily subject to the legislative power of the Parliament of Great Britain." It was also declared that the "laws of a conquered country continue until they are altered by the conqueror." The latter position was approved by Lord Ellenborough in Picton's case, 30 St. Tr. 944. (See Dana's Wheaton, note 169.) See, also, Craw. v. Ramsey, Vaughan 274; Cross r. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Airhart . Massieu, 98 U. S. 491; Magoon's Reports, 526. In cases of conquest, among civilized countries, having established laws of property, the rule is that laws, usages, and municipal regulations in force at the time of the conquest remain in force until changed by the new sovereign. United States v. Power's Heirs, 11 Howard, 570; United States v. Heirs of Rillieux, 14 id. 189; Leitensdorfer r. Webb, 20 id. 176, affirming Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N. M. 34. An adjudication as to title to certain lands in Louisiana, made by a Spanish tribunal in that territory after its cession to the United States, but before actual possession had been surrendered, the territory being de facto in the possession of Spain and subject to Spanish laws, was held valid as the adjudication of a competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case. Keene v. McDonough, 8 Peters, 308. By the law of nations the rights and property of the inhabitants are protected, even in the case of a conquered country, and held sacred and inviolable when it is ceded by treaty, with or without any stipulation to such effect; and the laws, whether in writing or evidenced by the usage and customs of the conquered or ceded country, continue in force till altered by the new sovereign. Strother . Lucas, 12 Peters, 410. Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana before its cession, and affecting titles to lands there, must be judicially noticed by the court. Their existence is not matter of fact to be tried by a jury. United States v. Turner, 11 Howard, 663; S. P., United States v. Chaves (1895), 159 U. S. 452. The general principle that when political jurisdiction and legislative power over a territory are transferred from one sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the territory continue in force until abrogated by the new sovereign, is applicable as to territory owned by the United States, the exclusive jurisdiction of which is ceded to them by a State in a manner not provided for by the Constitution, to so much thereof as is not used by the United States for its forts, buildings, and other needful purposes. Chicago and Pac. Railway Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, holding that a law of Kansas, requiring railways not enclosed by lawful fences to pay damages for animals killed or wounded by their engines or cars, without regard to the question of negligence, remained in force in the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation after the State had ceded exclusive jurisdiction over it. Article 44 of the alien law in force in Cuba, under which the consul of the country to which an intestate alien belonged had the right to administer upon his estate, continued in force after Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty over the island. Griggs, At.-Gen., April 26, 1900, 23 Op. 93; For. Rel. 1901, 226. A claim having been made by an English firm by reason of the refusal of the municipal authorities of Manila to carry out an alleged contract for supplying certain fire apparatus to the city, it was stated that implied provision had been made by the military government of the Philippines for the protection of the rights of the claimants under the alleged contract "by the continuance of the established laws under which the contract was made, if at all, and by the establishment of competent courts whose decree will be enforced by the executive department." Mr. Root, Sec. of War, to Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, Dec. 6, 1900, Magoon's 5. ON PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS. $96. "No principle of international law can be more clearly established than this: That the rights and the obligations of a nation in regard to other States are independent of its internal revolutions of government. It extends even to the case of conquest. The conqueror who reduces a nation to his subjection receives it subject to all its engagements and duties toward others, the fulfillment of which then becomes his own duty. However frequent the instances of departure from this principle may be in point of fact, it can not with any color of reason be contested on the ground of right." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, chargé d'affaires to The Netherlands, "In the event of a state being divided into two or more independent sovereignties, the obligations which had accrued to the whole before the division are ratably binding on the different parts; for, as Story says, the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested rights of property.' And so, e contrario, where several separate states are incorporated into one sovereignty, the rights and obligations that belonged to each before the union are binding upon the new state; but, as General Halleck points out, of course the rule must be modified to suit the nature of the union formed and the character of the act of incorporation in each particular case." Abdy's Kent (1878), 96, citing Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 52, note 20. The opinion of the United States heretofore has been that as the foreign obligations of Peru, incurred in good faith before the war, rested upon and were secured by the products of her guano deposits, Chile was under a moral obligation not to appropriate that security without recognizing the lien existing thereon. This opinion was frankly made known to Chile, and our belief was expressed that no arrangement would be made between the two countries by which the ability of Peru to meet her honest engagements toward foreigners would be impaired by the direct act of Chile. This Government went so far as to announce that it could not be a party as mediator or directly lend its sanction to any arrangement which should impair the power of Peru to pay those debts. "This attitude was taken, not because any appreciable portion of the bonded debt is known to be held by citizens of the United States, nor because of any purpose to officiously guarantee the eventual rights of alien bondholders, but from an intimate conviction that any settlement would be fraught with embarrassment or even peril to both Chile and Peru, which by its terms did not provide for the payment of the honest debt of Peru. "The same considerations which led this Government to refrain from taking an active initiative in compelling a peace, would lead it to refrain likewise from active opposition to an engagement already signed. "Without knowing the text of the treaty provisions concerning the foreign debt of Peru, it is not easy to particularize an instruction to you. You will, however, abstain from any protest to the Chilean Minister at Lima against the pending ratification of the treaty by Chile. You will likewise abstain from any formulated protest to the provisional government of General Iglesias against such ratification by the coming Assembly. That Assembly is convened for the purpose, as is believed, of permitting a free expression of the will of the Peruvian nation, and it would be contrary to the declared policy of this Government to seek to influence its action in the direction of any determinate solution. "At the same time, it would be the part of frankness not to withhold from such influential Peruvians as may converse with you on the state of their country the firm conviction that in order to render the treaty satisfactory and peace permanent, provision should be made for the payment of the honest indebtedness of Peru. If, as it is supposed, the treaty lately signed commits Chile to a partial recognition of the existing lien by a payment on account, it remains for Peru to make some equally distinct and efficacious provision for meeting the remainder." Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, min. to Peru, Dec. 29, 1883, See, also, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Roustan, French min., |