"1. To organize itself in such manner as it may choose. "2. To do within its dominions whatever acts it may think calculated to render it prosperous and strong. "3. To occupy unappropriated territory, and to incorporate new provinces with the free consent of the inhabitants, provided that the rights of another state over any such province are not violated by its incorporation." Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed., 46-47. Wheaton Elements, Part II, Chapters i. and ii. Requirement of "due diligence." * * * A. was indicted under sections 3 and 6 of the act of Congress of May 16, 1884, 24 Stats. at L. 22, "to prevent and punish counterfeiting within the United States of notes, bonds, and other securities of foreign governments," (1) for having in his control and custody a plate for counterfeiting notes of El Banco del Estado de Bolivar, a bank authorized by the laws of the State of Bolivar, United States of Colombia; (2) for having caused and procured the plate to be made, and (3) for causing a note of the bank in question to be falsely made. The statute under which the indictment was found was attacked on constitutional grounds. Held, (1) that by the Constitution of the United States all official intercourse between a State and foreign nations is prevented and exclusive authority for that purpose given to the United States; (2) that the National Government is thus "made responsible to foreign nations for all violations by the United States of their international obligations,” and that for this reason Congress was expressly authorized "to define and punish offenses against the law of nations" (Article I., sec. 8, el. 10); (3) that the law of nations requires every national government to use "due diligence" to prevent the commission within its dominions of a wrong to another nation or its people; (4) that because of this obligation it is the duty of one nation to punish those who within its jurisdiction counterfeit the money of another nation (Vattel, Law of Nations, Phila. ed. 1876, Bk. I., ch. x, pp. 46, 47); (5) that this protection is due to foreign securities, whether national or corporate, which have been put out under the sanction of public authority at home, and especially to bank notes and bank bills issued under the authority of law and forming part of the circulating medium of exchange, or money, of a country; (6) that the statute in question, having been passed for the protection of an international interest and the performance of an international duty, was properly to be considered as an act to define and punish an offense against the law of nations, and that, this being so, no objection could be made to the statute on the ground that it did not expressly declare the offense defined by it to be an offense against the law of nations. United States v. Arjona (1887), 120 U. S. 479. 2. EQUALITY. $ 24. "No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone." Marshall, C. J., The Antelope (1825), 10 Wheat. 66, 122. "Nations,' says Vattel, 'composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.' In other words, all sovereign states, without respect to their relative power, are, in the eye of international law, equal, being endowed with the same natural rights, bound by the same duties, and subject to the same obligations. 'One of the fundamental principles of public law, generally recognized,' says Sir William Scott, 'is the perfect equality and independence of all distinct states.' Relative magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbor, and any advantage seized on that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the peace of mankind, both in their political and private capacities, to preserve inviolate. "A necessary consequence of this equality of sovereign states is the general rule of public law, that whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other.' Vattel, in discussing the sovereignty and independence of states, says that the effect of such a status is to produce, at least externally and among men, a perfect equality of rights between nations in the administration of their affairs and the pursuit of their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct, of which others have no right to form a definite judgment; so that what is permitted in one is also permitted in the other, and they ought to be considered, in human society, as having equal rights. Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed., 1893), I. 116, citing Vattel, Droit des Gens, In matters of ceremonial, certain distinctions are recognized. To "empires, dors. Royal honors do not belong to "duchies, principalities, counties, or to ordinary republics." In matters of ceremonial, the Holy See has precedence of all states. (Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 125–127.) While sovereign states possess in point of law equal fundamental rights, yet individual states, like individual men, exercise power in proportion to their influence, strength, and riches. See, in this relation, Lawrence, Essays on some disputed Questions in Modern International Law, Chap. V., entitled "The Primacy of the Great Powers." 3. PROPERTY. (1) OWNERSHIP AND TRANSFER. "The rights of a state with respect to property consist in the power to acquire territory and certain other kinds of property susceptible of being held by it in absolute ownership by any means not inconsistent with the rights of other states, in being entitled to peaceable possession and enjoyment of that which it has duly obtained, and in the faculty of using its property as it chooses and alienating it at will. 6 "According to a theory which is commonly held, either the term 'property,' when employed to express the rights possessed by a state over the territory occupied by it, must be understood in a different sense from that which is attached to it in speaking of the property of individuals, or else its use is altogether improper. Property, it is said, belongs only to individuals; a state as such is incapable of owning it; and though by putting itself in the position of an individual it may hold property subject to the conditions of municipal law, it has merely in its proper state capacity either what is called an eminent domain' over the property of the members of the community forming it, in virtue of which it has the power of disposing of everything contained within its territory for the general good, or certain supreme rights, covering the same ground, but derived from sovereignty." It can not be denied that the immediate property which is possessed by individuals is to be distinguished for certain purposes from the ultimate property in the territory of the state, and the objects of property accessory to it, which is vested in the state itself. But these purposes are foreign to international relations. The distinction, therefore, though it may be conveniently kept in mind for purposes of classification in dealing with the rules of war, has no further place in international law." Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed. 47-48. As to questions of property, including those of national proprietary rights, and public and private property, see Wheaton, Elements, Part II. §§ 161–163. a “Vattel, Lib. I. Cap. XX. §§ 235, 244; but see also Lib. II. C. VII. § 81; Heffter, § 64; Bluntschli, § 277. Calvo (§§ 208–9) distinguishes between the public and international aspects of the rights of the state with reference to property, and recognizes, as do also De Martens (Précis du Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, § 72) and Riquelme (Elementos de Derecho Publico Internacional, I. 23), the absolute character of the latter relatively to other States." (2) SUCCESSION IN CASE OF UNSUCCESSFUL Revolt. $ 26. The "Certain cotton, the public property of the Confederate States of America, was consigned by the Confederate government to the defendants Prioleau and others, a firm carrying on business at Liverpool, in pursuance of an agreement between the Confederate government and the defendants, whereby the defendants were entitled out of the proceeds of the cotton to recoup themselves certain charges and expenses incurred by them under the provisions of the same agreement. Confederate government having been dissolved, and the Confederate. States having submitted to the authority of the United States government, the latter government filed a bill praying to have the cotton, which had arrived at Liverpool, delivered up to them, and for an injunction and receiver. It appeared by the evidence that the defendants had, under the agreement, a lien upon the cotton to the extent of at least 20,000 7. Upon motion for an injunction and receiver, Held, that the property in question was now the property of the United States government, but that they must take it subject to the obligations entered into respecting it by the de facto Confederate government. "The defendant Prioleau was appointed receiver, with power to sell the cotton; but he was required to give security for its value ultra the 20,000 7., the amount of the defendants' lien." Syllabus, Wood, V. C., United States of America v. Prioleau (July 26, 1865), 35 L. J., Chancery, N. S. 7. While the foregoing case was pending, Mr. Seward, in a note to Sir Frederick Bruce, June 19, 1865, took the ground that "all insurgent or piratical vessels found in ports, harbors, or waters of British dominions" should be considered as "forfeited" to the United States, and ought to be delivered to the United States upon reasonable application." September 7, 1865, orders were issued by the colonial office for the detention of the Confederate cruiser Shenandoah in any British port she might enter. On the 6th of November she arrived at Liverpool, where she was immediately seized by the British authorities. Mr. Adams requested her delivery up, and on the 10th of November she was transferred, by order of the board of admiralty, to the custody of the United States consul, the crew having previously been landed, with their effects. The London Times, November 8, 1865, said: With regard to the Shenandoah herself, we apprehend that little hesitation can be felt. On every principle of law she belongs to that government which has succeeded to all the rights and all the property of the de facto Confederate Government. This doctrine is laid down very clearly by Vice-Chancellor Page Wood in the decision which has been so much criticised of late in America; but in truth it is scarcely more than a rule of common sense. Lord Russell did not affect to override it by the provision in his dispatch for the disarming of Confederate vessels in our ports, but, on the contrary, facilitated the application of it through a resort to the proper civil tribunals. The captain-general of Cuba doubtless acted on the same view when he delivered over the Stonewall to the agents of the United States; nor, indeed, is it easy to imagine on whose behalf any counter claim could be preferred. What may be the technical formalities to be observed in the transfer is a matter of very little importance. Whether we ought to wait for a demand, or to make over the ship unasked, we hold it in trust for the United States to all intents and purposes. While the Confederate ram Stonewall was taken possession of and delivered up to the United States by the captain-general of Cuba, with the approval of the Government at Madrid,' yet, in the case of the steamer Harriet Lane and certain other property of the Confederate Government at Havana, the Spanish Government took the ground that there were questions involved of a judicial nature; and the consul of the United States at Havana was empowered to proceed in the courts." "Upon the suppression of a rebellion, the restored legitimate government is entitled, as of right, to all moneys, goods, and treasure which were public property of the government at the time of the outbreak, such right being in no way affected by the wrongful seizure of the property by the usurping government. "But with respect to property which has been voluntarily contributed to, or acquired by, the insurrectionary government in the exercise of its usurped authority, and has been impressed in its hands with the character of public property, the legitimate government is not, on its restoration, entitled by title paramount, but as successor only (and to that extent recognizing the authority) of the displaced usurping government; and in seeking to recover such property from an agent of the displaced government can only do so to the same extent, and subject to the same rights and obligations, as if that government had not been displaced and was itself proceeding against the agent. "Therefore, a bill by the United States Government, after the suppression of the rebellion, against an agent of the late Confederate Government, for an account of his dealings in respect of the Confederate loan, which he was employed to raise in this country, was dis |