velle et nolle."-Ad Gal., iii. Original sin is not guilt, but inherited disorder. From this disorder springs the necessity of prevenient grace. In order to salvation grace and freedom .must co-operate: "Quamvis enim propria voluntate ad Deum revertamus, tamen nisi ille nos traxerit et cupiditatem nostram suo roboraverit praesidio, salvi esse non poterimus."-In Jerem, i, 3. Predestination is conditioned on foreknowledge of man's free conduct.

We now come to the first noteworthy dissent from the catholic orthodox view of the relations of grace and freedom. Augustinianism is an innovation of the fifth century. But for more than half of his lifetime Augustine himself (ob. 430) held the orthodox catholic synergistic view. In 387 (at the age of 33) he held that it is by our free act of faith that we are cleansed from sin: "Peccatores credere jubentur, ut a peccatis credendo purgentur." A moral act of the will constitutes the reason why God justifies the one and not the other: "Praecedit aliquid in peccatoribus, quo, quamais nondum sint justificati, digni efficiantur justificatione." A divine call (vocatio) turns man's attention to his need of salvation; but this vocatio becomes effectual only through the mediation of the will.

In his work on the will (A. D. 390) Augustine teaches thus: Despite all the weakness of the sinner, he has got the ability to pray, to ask, to strive. God opens to those who knock. Man is honored with the ability to seek rightly after salvation: "Tantum illi praestitit dignitatis, ut in ejus etiam potestate poneret, si vellet ad beatitudinem tendere." In commenting on Romans he says: "It is nowhere said that God believes all things Our faith, therefore, is our own." "God gives his Spirit to one who he foreknows will believe."

in us.

About the time of his episcopal consecration (396) Augustine (at the age of 42) is thrown out of accord with catholic doctrine by the reaction of his opposition to Pelagianism. In combating undue freedomism he is led to extinguish moral freedom altogether. Two other factors helped to drive him to this extreme; namely, the remnants of his previous Manicheism and a physical conception of the action of grace. These influences were seen in his tractate, Ad Simplicianum. He here abandons the ethical character of the vocatio which God sends to sinners. The vocatio is now not. the occasion of our

:

faith, but the efficient cause of it, (" vocatio est effectrix bonae voluntatis.") This physical conception of grace landed Augustine necessarily in the non-catholic, unorthodox view of a particularistic predestination. If the vocatio is per se effective of faith, and if the mass of men do not have faith, then, of course, the vocatio is given only to particular individuals—the elect.

Pelagius, ignoring the deep significance of the fall, had taught not only that our freedom enables us to initiate a holy life, (" possibilitas bonae actionis a Deo creatore insita,") but also that all the grace we need consists in simple instruction. Augustine .did not correct this by holding that the downward force of universal depravity needs to be counteracted—and is counteracted -by an equally universal prevenient grace, (a grace which is only by accommodation termed grace at all, inasmuch as it is called for by the mere justice of God,) so that by this prevenient owed grace all men are now in fact able to co-work with the calling Spirit, and thus inaugurate holy lives; but he went to the opposite error, denied that the counteraction of depravity is a debt of divine justice, and held that this counteraction, wherever wrought, gives to us not only the ability to initiate a holy life, but also actually produces that life. Thus Augustinianism and Pelagianism are simply two equal heresies, each equally distant from the catholic doctrine, and each containing that half of the whole truth which the other suppressed. The true half of Pelagianism is its defense of the moral autonomy of man; its false half is its suppression of grace. It is a monergism of The true half of Augustinianism is its emphasizing the necessity of grace; its false half is its suppressing the moral autonomy of man. It is a monergism of God. The catholic view rejects the two errors and embraces the two truths. The catholic doctrine is not monergism but synergism. Neither God nor man, grace nor freedom, is to be suppressed; but grace and freedom co-operate.

The error of Pelagius tends to an insipid deism, that of Augustine to pantheism.

Another error which Augustine introduced into theology was that of a double, namely, a secret and revealed, will in God, the one not always harmonizing with the other. It came about thus: The Gospel is full of invitations to all men to come to God. But the grace of coming to God is not given to all.

Hence the expressed will of God is not identical with his real will. Some are called effectually: these God intended to save. Some are not so called: these God intended not to save. This monstrous dualistic self-contradiction in God the catholic orthodox Church has constantly condemned and rejected.

Anti-catholic consequences of Augustinianism are: 1. The damnation of unbaptized infants. They are damned in virtue of the imputation of Adam's guilt to all of his descendants. See Shedd, ii, 88. But this damnation is of a mitigated character: "Potest recte dici, parvulos sine baptismo de corpore exeuntes in damnatione omnium mitissima futuros." "Quis dubitaverit parvulos non baptizatos, qui solum habent originale peccatum, nec ullis propriis aggravantur, in damnatione omnium levissima futuros." See Schaff, ii, 836. 2. Another consequence is the damnation of the whole mass of the Gentile world. Even the virtues of a Socrates or a Lucretia are but masked sins, splendida vitia, and they can only serve to mitigate their damnation-" ut mitius puniantur."

During the lifetime of Augustine the potency of his personality made a profound impression in favor of his system. Soon after his death, however, the orthodox consciousness discarded more or less positively the uncatholic notions which he had taught. The predominant drift of catholic theology after Augustine assumed a mediate position between Augustine and Pelagius, sometimes inclining rather toward the one, and then toward the other.

Predestinarian writers are fond of stigmatizing this tendency as semi-Pelagian. It would be equally correct, however, to call it semi-Augustinian. And neither term can justly be regarded as a stigma. The fact is, the post-Augustinian orthodoxy is simply the catholic synergism which had been catholic from the beginning.

Among those who reasserted the Greek anthropology against Augustine was Cassian, (ob. 440.) Said Cassian: Man's depravity is not an extinction of all desire for the good. Man is conscious of his moral bondage, and he can and should seek after 'salvation-"velle sanari, quaerere medicum." The seeds of all holiness are sown by God in the souls of all men; but without the help of grace we cannot develop them: "Dubitari non potest, inesse quidem omnia animae naturaliter virtutum semina

beneficio Creatoris inserta, sed nisi haec opitulatione Dei fuerint excitata, ad incrementum perfectionis non poterunt pervenire." So taught Cassian. His neglect to refer very emphatically to universal prevenient grace as counteractive of depravity has given pretext for accusing him with leaning toward Pelagianism. But in fact he taught in the same way as Chrysostom and the Gregories..

Cassian was warmly opposed by Prosper, (ob. cir. 455,) who endeavored to induce Pope Cœlestin to condemn Cassian. But the papal brief was quite unsatisfactory. It entirely omitted Augustine's irresistible grace.

Much less Augustinian than Prosper was the author (perhaps Pope Leo the Great) of the work De Vocatione Gentium. This work teaches thus: There is no particularistic predestination; God wills the salvation of all; grace is universal, but not dynamic (violenta) in action; human freedom has some co-operative influence in conversion. These views are insisted on without giving up some of the harsh features of Augustine.

Faustus of Rhegium (ob. cir. 493) stood between Cassian and Leo. He taught the universality of grace, the co-operation of freedom with grace, and the possibility of Gentile salvation— "lege naturae, quam Deus in omnium cordibus scriprit in spe adventus Christi." "The efficaciousness of grace," said Faustus, "depends upon the free-will of man."

The provincial synod of Orange, A. D. 529, gave its sanction to a very mild Augustinianism. It decreed as follows: "Grace is not merely bestowed when we pray for it, but grace itself causes us to pray for it; the disposition to believe is effected by grace; the free-will, weakened in Adam, can only be restored through the grace of baptism; when man sins, he does his own will; when he does good he executes the will of God, yet voluntarily; through the grace of God all may save their souls; none are predestinated to sin; without prevenient grace none can love God."

These articles of Orange, though so mildly expressed, are intended to antagonize the orthodox synergism of the Eastern Church, and of the whole Church before Augustine. Their fatal unorthodox point is the dynamic character of grace: prevenient grace is the cause of faith.

It was but a momentary victory. The milder views of Cas

sian and Faustus-the same as those of Chrysostom-maintained their position, and were, in fact, the faith of the subsequent centuries. Let us now follow the course of catholic thought down to the next Augustinian disturbance in the Gottschalk controversy of the ninth century.

Under the influence of Faustus the innovations of Augustine had been condemned at two provincial synods—at Arles, in 472, and at Lyons, in 475. In the wake of these synods followed a succession of able theologians-Arnobius, Gennadius, Ennodius, Vincent of Lerinum-who maintained the orthodox synergism of the earlier Church.

The most prominent name in the following century is Gregory the Great, ob. 604. His system is partially Augustinian, but it contains elements which imply synergism. Among his positions are these: The good which we do is a joint product of grace and of the freed will: "Bonum quod agimus et Dei est, et nostrum: Dei, per praevenientem gratiam; nostrum, per obsequentem liberam voluntatem." Grace can be lost. There is no absolute decree. Grace is prevenient and also subsequent. Prevenient grace operates, but also co-operates. Subsequent grace helps us to succeed-"ne inaniter velimus, sed possimus implese." Wesleyan synergism is but a repetition of these sentiments.

In the path of Gregory followed Isidore of Seville, ob. 636. He holds thus: Prevenient grace makes the new life. possible. "Before the gift of grace there is in man a free-will, but not a will efficient to good." But Isidore's system is not self-consistent.

How little the Latin Church held to the Augustinian innovations upon the old orthodoxy is evident from the suddenness with which the fatalistic predestinarian views of Gottschalk disappeared after his death. Gottschalk (ob. 868) taught as follows: There is a twofold predestination: "Gemina est praedestinatio, sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem." Christ did not die for all. Baptism washes out depravity; but only the elect among the baptized will really be saved. The fall of man did not come about by man's free-will, but was a part of God's absolute decree, by which the whole drama of history was arranged beforehand.

These views of Gottschalk raised a storm of opposition. FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXXII.—2