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meet with any interruption." Their alarm had been excited, and their suspicion justified by the arrest of a French courier, on his mission to Strasburg, and the seizure of his papers. No written answer was returned to their application; but, between seven and eight in the evening, an officer, with a squadron of hussars, followed by the greater part of the regiment, arrived at Rastadt, and occupied the town and its vicinity. The officer immediately declared in the name of his colonel, that the French legation might travel in perfect safety, and that the period of twenty-four hours was fixed for their departure. From the impulse of the same spirit which determined lord Malmsbury to quit Paris and Lisle, the French ministers resolved to set out immediately. The carriages had been in readiness during the whole day; and, about half an hour after the order for their leaving the town, they departed with their suite.

The Zekler hussars, after taking possession of all the gates of Rastadt, intimated that they had received orders not to allow any person belonging to the congress to enter or leave the town. When reminded that the French ministers were commanded to depart, he replied, that he was not directed to prevent them; and, when application was made for an escort, he answered, that he had no orders to that effect, but that the legation would find no interruption in their rout. At length, between nine and ten o'clock, the plenipotentiaries began their journey; and, as the night was dark, torches were carried before their carriages. But scarcely had a quarter of an hour elapsed, before intelligence arrived that the carriages had been attacked by the Austrian bussars, and the ministers murdered. About a quarter of a mile from the town, the foremost carriage, in which was Jean de Brie and his family, was suddenly attacked by a party in the dress of hussars, who rushed from an adjoining wood, and that autbassador narrowly escaped with his wife. The minister Bonnier, was dragged out of his carriage and cut in pieces. Robert was slaughtered in the presence of his wife, with

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circumstances of peculiar atrocity. senthiel, the secretary of legation, being in the last carriage, had the good fortune to effect his escape through the adjacent gardens, at the commencement of the attack, and reached the house of the minister of Baden, where he remained for some time in a state of delirium. The hussars pillaged the carriages, and stript the ministers and their retinue of their jewels and valuables; but no person was murdered except the two ministers. The papers were carried off, and conveyed to the Austrian commandant.

The report of this outrage excited the astonishment of Europe; and the directory denounced it, in the name of the Freuch nation to all good men, and to the governments of every country, as an atrocity commanded by the cabinet of Vienna, and executed by its troops. The emperor, that he might clear himself and his court from these vile aspersions, instituted a legal inquiry, and charged the diet of the empire to appoint deputies who might assist in the scrutiny. But, after long and patient investigation, no evidence could be produced sufficient to convict any individual, nor has the history of this singular transaction ever been explained. It is probable, however, that the assassins were influenced by no other motives than resentment for the insults and privations which the Austrians had sustained, and that the simple result of private and individual revenge, has been mistaken for the consequence of political intrigue.

All prospect of peace from this time disappeared. The directory, with the view of exposing the emperor to reproach in the eyes of his confederates, and of weakening the coalition, published a state paper, purporting to be a secret article in the treaty of Campo Formio, from which it appeared that he had consented to sacri fice the interests of the German empire to his own personal views by the cession of Mentz, Manheim, and other places, to France, on condition of being gratified, among many valuable possessions, with the bishopric of Saltzburgh.

Active operations, after a short inter

ruption, were renewed with great spirit: The Austrian generals were determined to improve their past successes. A plan was concerted by generals Hotze and Bellegarde for gaining complete possession of the Grison country, where the inhabitants were well affected to the Austrian cause. Hotze was foiled in his attempt on the fort of Luciensteig, by the activity of general Menard, and the slow advance of one of the columns destined to the attack. By this misfortune his partisans were exposed to the revenge of the French general, and several thousands cut off. Being favored, however, by the excellent position which Bellegarde had taken to cover his movement, he returned with his whole force, and, having obtained possession of the fort of Steig, forced his enemy to abandon the Grisons and the adjacent cantons of Switzerland. General Bellegarde then devoted his attention to active operations near the sources of the Adda and the Rhine; and, with the assistance of a body of forces under general Haddick, he constrained general Lecourbe to leave the Austrians in possession of that vast range of mountainous country, called St. Gothard.

After the recal of Jourdan, who was succeeded by Massena, and the disasters of Scherer, the archduke approached with his army, the frontiers of Switzerland, which soon became the chief theatre of Transalpine war. He who knew in what manner to conquer at Stockack, knew also what is perhaps more difficult and more honorable, when to repress the desire of profiting by his victories. He did not immediately endeavor to drive the French army to the other side of the Rhine, but remained with the greater part of his force near the lake of Constance, rightly judging, that if he abandoned that point, and advanced into the Brisgau, his left and rear would be exposed to the incursions of Massena. He sacrificed the trivial glory of driving a vanquished enemy beyond his frontiers, considerations of higher moment, and more worthy of his character. All his thoughts were devoted to the invasion of Switzerland. The French had

converted that country into a kind of strong hold, from which they intended to fall upon Germany. Switzerland was a two-edged sword, which could be employed either against France or the empire. It became necessary to deprive the republicans of so important a possession, to be able in return to menace their own country.. Prince Charles resolved to accomplish that object, and began his preparatious for the enter prise.

The French general had, for six weeks, endeavored to retard the invasion of Swit zerland by hostile movements before Kehl, and on the Mein, and the Necker. He had also carefully entrenched all the weak points of the left bank of the Rhine, from Schaffhausen to Basle, and had fortified the suburb opposite to that town on the other side of the river. The hostile demonstrations in Suabia had induced the archduke to change the concentrated position which he had occupied between Stockack and Schaffhausen; nor did the entrenchments made along the river deter him from passing it. He had determined not to enter Switzerland till the south and the east of that country should have been invaded. That event having now occurred, he lost not a moment in executing an enterprise so long delayed, and which had been expected with the utmost anxiety by every friend of freedom and humanity.

When the Austrians successfully commenced their operations in the country of the Grisons, in the beginning of the month of May, Massena, having reason, to fear that they would soon invade Switzerland on all sides, and foreseeing that, after that event, it would be impossible for him to preserve the semicircle formed by the Rhine, from the source of the Linth to the mouth of the Glat, wished at least to defend its diameter, and more particularly the middle of that diameter. He therefore caused that chain of mountains to be fortified, which lies in front of Zurich, between the Limmat and the Glat, the position which first presents itself at the east of Switzerland. His right, entirely composed of infantry, was posted upon the zurichberg, the most elevated part of the

chain of mountains. Access to it was rendered almost impossible, by a thick wood, by several ranks of abatis and redoubts, and by a formidable artillery, which crowned the circumference of the heights. Between his right and the lake of Zurich, there was no point through which it was possible to penetrate. The town of Zurich also was covered by the position. The left was placed upon the same chain of mountains, and the approaches to it had the same means of defence as the approaches to the right. Between these two wings, the ground sloping gradually, was open and intersected by the roads, from Schaffhausen and Constance, to Zurich. Here Massena placed his cavalry; but, as it might be beaten, and as the two wings would then be separated and irretrievably lost, he linked them together by a chain of strong redoubts, which defended the centre in front, while it was protected by the fire of the two wings. Fearing that the imperialists might endeavor to gain the left flank of his position, and that, after having passed the Glat, they would also pass the Limmat, and thus fall upon his rear, Massena placed a small flanking corps between Regensberg and the Glat, with the design of covering the lower part of the Limmat.

This position was so well selected, that the archduke could make no effectual progress until he had dislodged the French, and this could only be done by attacking them in front, or by turning their flank upon the left bank of the Limmat, an attempt which would have been arduous, tedious, and dangerous. The prince therefore adopted the first expedient, and resolved to attack the zurichberg, which, when once forced, must cause the loss of the position. After having marched his right to Bulach, his centre to Kloten, and his left to Basserstorf, he reconnoitred the French position, and caused their right to be attacked upon the 3rd of June, by his vanguard, which drove them from the villages of Vitikon, Zulicon, and Riespach. These villages were taken and retaken several times during the course of the day. This engagement was but the prelude to

a general attack. On the next day, (June 4th,) the Austrians advanced in several columns against the zurichberg, and attacked it upon several points at the same time; chiefly, however, upon those of Seebach and Schwammendingen. The approaches to the zurichberg were so formidably entrenched, and the fire of the batteries so commanding, that generals Hotze and Rosemberg, who conducted the attacks, were unable for some time to make any progress, though two columns acting upon their flank, had already penetrated to the foot of the abatis. The Austrians even sustained a slight repulse on the side of Seebach. To that point prince Charles sent successive reinforcements, drawn from his centre, and, anxious to terminate the doubtful and sanguinary conflict, ordered four battalions, conducted by general Wallis, to advance by Schwammendingen, and to assault the zurichberg with fixed bayonets. The Austrian grenadiers marched forward under a dreadful fire, and attacked with so much valor, that they made their way through the abatis, and carried the first line of the entrenchments. But they could advance no further; the redoubts and abatis still before them being rendered impenetrable by the number and fire of the battalions and batteries which lined them. The Austrians, however, did not retire, but kept the French within their entrenchments, and gave time to the other attacking columns, to arrive to their support. Night put an end to a contest which had raged with destructive obstinacy during the whole day. Each party lost, at a moderate computation, in killed alone, 2500 men. The armies passed the night in presence of each other.

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On the 5th, the archduke again reconnoitred the position of the enemy, and resolved to assault it, but delayed the enterprise till the 6th, in consequence of the fatigues his army had sustained. did not, however, take place; for whether the boldness with which the Austrians passed the day at the foot of the zurichberg, had shaken the courage of Massena, or that he did not believe his position to be tenable, he abandoned it with precipitation

on the night of the 5th of June, and retired to the other side of the Limmat. The Austrians took possession of the French entrenchments, in which more than 20 pieces of cannon had been left, and found themselves masters of the town of Zurich, which had been purchased with so much bloodshed, and which might have produced much more had not Massena retreated.

After having evacuated Zurich with a precipitation strikingly contrasted by the vigor, the promptitude, and the enthusiasm of the archduke, Massena assumed a position on the chain of mountains named Albis, which lies between the lake, the Limmat, and the Reuss. Its left reached to the Rhine near Zurzach, and extended to Baden and the Limmat. Its centre was upon the Albis, in front of Zurich, and the right extended to the lake of Zug. The head-quarters were at Bremgarten. This central position was the nearest which Massena could possibly have taken: it was safe and strong, and was the second of the three great defensive positions which Switzerland presents: those of the Limmat, the Reuss, and the Aar.

After the victory of the 4th of June, the archduke was determined to relinquish all active operations in Switzerland. To this determination he was induced by the strength of the French position; the trivial nature of the assistance which he received from the inhabitants; the weak state in which his army had been left by the departure of general Bellegarde for Italy; the expected arrival of 35,000 Russian auxiliaries; and, above all, the secret orders of the cabinet of Vienna. He contented himself, therefore, with passing the interval between the beginning of June and the middle of July, in recruiting his army. At that period the line of the Austrians, setting out from St. Gothard, proceeded along the valley of the Reuss and the lake of Lucerne, crossed the canton of Schwitz, and joined near Rapperschwile, the body of the army which occupied the left bank of the Limmat and the Aar, as far as the Rhine. The head-quarters were still at Kloten. The line of the French army, VOL. I.

beginning at Brieg in the Vallais, crossed the mountains of the Oberland and the Underwald, passed by Stanz, Lucerne, Bremgarten, Mellingen, and Baden, and extended from thence as far as the mouth of the Aar. The head-quarters were established at Lenzburg, to which place they had been removed from Bremgarten.

There was not, at the beginning July, any considerable disparity of force between the opposing generals; and the slight superiority of Massena was more than counterbalanced by the insurrection of the people, occasioned by the severities which the French had exercised. The month of July was distinguished by no action of importance; but the whole of that month and part of August, were devoted by the contending parties to the augmentation of their political and military resources. The French accelerated the levy of the couscripts, composed them into battalions, and formed two new armies. One was destined to act upon the Rhine, and invade Franconia and Suabia: the other, under the name of the army of the Alps, was to cover France on the side of Dauphiny and Provence, to act offensively if occasion should require, in Piedmont, and to cooperate with the army which occupied the Genoese. They marked out a camp near Geneva, to defend the entrance of France by the way of the Vallais and Savoy. They were equally active in concerting defensive measures and offensive plans; and the assiduous and sanguine Bernadotte, then minister at war, did not despair of seeing, before the end of the campaign, the return of victory to the banners of the republican

armies.

On the opposite side they had experi enced unlooked for success; and the extravagance of their hopes and wishes was proportionate. With a force originally designed to act on the defensive, they had made the most brilliant of all campaigns: but, after so many destructive victories, their numbers were insufficient to secure the continuance of splendid success, and it became a question of policy whether to keep all that had been acquired, or to pursue at every risk the career of conquest.

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