siderations however, do not respect the present subject, which refers merely to the field of battle, on which the Russians have neutralized Buonaparte's Buonaparte's favourite manœuvre. It may be briefly noticed with respect to the progress of future events that the inhabitants of the peninsula, less fortunate in the field, and who at Tudela experienced discomfiture from the effects of that system which has been detailed, have yet shewn, that when a general battle is lost, the advantages of the victory may be in a great degree intercepted. The inveterate and desperate hostility of the Spaniards and Portuguese, so widely diffused through the peasantry of the country, utterly destroyed the boasted system of intercourse and communication, by which the march of one French column was made to correspond with that of all who were acting in the same kingdom. Near as the events and positions were, it is almost impossible that Massena could have known the fall of Badajos, when he broke up from Santarem, or that Soult anticipated the retreat of Massena when he himself fell back into Spain, instead of advancing into Alentejo to make a diversion, and afforded support to the enfant gale,

(the spoiled child,) whom fortune was dropping out of her arms. But the general and inveterate enmity of the peasantry entirely annihilated all the fair system of unity and constant corres-pondence, which in Germany the French armies maintained at any given distance. Couriers, aids-de-camp, orderly men, and disguised spies, were alike the objects of suspicion to the Ordenanza, who, rather than miss securing their letters, would steadily rip up their bowels,-a sad interruption to a regular and friendly correspondence. And thus these two great generals seem to have known little more of each other's motions, than if they had been next-door neighbours in London. The self-devoting patriotism with which the Portuguese destroyed every part of their property, which could afford supply or assistance to the invading army, rendered the genius of the French for the commissariat department equally unavailing, and even les grand moyens themselves proved fruitless in a country where lord Wellington declared that none, even of the lowest description, forgot through any compulsory intercourse with the French, the duty which they owed to their country.

4 x 2

WHE

HEN general Beningzen arrived on the borders of the Vistula with his corps, he fixed his head-quarters [at Pultusk, and sent forward into the environs of Warsaw, Sedmorasky's division. One part remained at Prague, the rest composed of chasseurs, a regiment of huzzars, and some squadrons of cossacks and cavalry, passed the Vistula, and an advanced-guard proceeded to the river Bsura, but on the approach of the enemy, on the the 26th of October, 1806, it retired after some inconsiderable affairs, reached the Vistula, and burnt the bridge of Warsaw.

The enemy having occupied Warsaw, constructed several heavy batteries, which obliged general Sedmorasky to retire behind the Bug, where he took possession at Zsegz and Dembe, whilst the division of Galoun defended the tract between the confluence of the Narew and the Bug, and the Austrian frontier near the village of Areickow. The division of count Ostreman was at Makow; that of Zacheu between Ostrolenka and Pultusk.

General Beningzen proposed to remain on the defensive, until the junction of general Buxhowden's corps with his own was effected.

The enemy having passed the Vistula advanced to the Bug, the passage of which river was long disputed, but finally marshal Ney threw over a bridge near Nowidwoe, at the confluence of the Wkra, the Bug, and the Vistula, but the first detachments which passed were cut off by the Russians,

and general Beningzen, finding that the corps of Buxhowden was delayed, resolved, with his own corps, to attack the enemy at Modlin.

As the French had strongly fortified an height that commanded the left bank of the Wkra near Pomechowe, and as a column, from the badness of the roads, could not arrive at the appointed time, this plan was abandoned, and the position of Nowemiasto, Sochoczyn, and Czarnowo, was occupied for the defence of the Wkra. In the mean time marshal Soult passed the Vistula at Wysogrod, marshal Augereau with his corps between Zakroczn and Utrata, a little below the embouchure of the Bug into the Vistula, and the corps of marshals Ney, Bessieres, and Lasnes passed the Vistula at Thorn.

General Lesloeg having been ordered to retire by general Beningzen, obeyed after several remonstrances, when marshal Ney marched against the corps of Lesloeg, and Lasnes and Augereau upon. Plonsk.. The former joined Davoust and Modlin; the latter appeared before Nowemiasto on the right bank of the river Wkra.

General Beningzen finding that he could not resume the offensive with his single corps, resolved to fall back upon Pultusk, where there was a reserve of the army, his heavy artillery, and favorable ground, to which the enemy could only advance, from the state of the roads, with light guns. The arrival of general Kaminskoy occasioned the dereliction of this project, as the general

imagined that he could force the enemy behind the Wkra, and made his dispositions accordingly; but Buonaparte having arrived on the Wkra on the 23rd, did not give him time to execute his movement, for he ordered his army to attack the Russians on the same evening, and on the 24th, at the three points of Czarnowo, Sochoczyn, and Nowemiasto.

For fourteen hours count Ostreman, with a part of his division, resisted the corps of Davoust, Lasnes, and the guards, but at length they succeeded in forcing the Wkra, when the count retired upon Nasielsk, without any serious loss, and afterwards to Strzegooin, where the division of Zachen, Barclay de Tolloy, and Sedmorasky having united, the whole marched to Pultusk. During this time prince Gallitzin, with several regiments of cavalry and infantry, had marched to the succor of the post at Nowemiasto, but did not advance farther than Lopaczin, on the river Sonna, when he was attacked by marshal Augereau's corps and a considerable number of cavalry which had passed the river Wkra at Kursomb, not far from Nowemiasto, and by whom he was compelled to retire on the road of Pultusk, but on which he fell in with a part of Zachen's division which was on march to rejoin its corps. Obliged to halt at Golmyn, the prince was there attacked by the corps of Augereau, and the cavalry under Murat, upon the same day on which the combat of Pultusk took place. The troops which had assembled at Strzegooin, (composing 60 battalions and 55 squadrons without including the cossacks,) arrived in the environs of Pultusk on the 24th and 25th of December, and took up a position with the left appuied on the town, and the right thrown forward into a wood, commencing in front of the right between 200 and 300 paces, and extending along the front of the whole line, but towards the centre, retiring about 2000 paces. The right was the strongest part of the position,-there general Barclay de Tolloy commanded, the centre was under the orders of general Zachen-the left was commanded by count Ostreinan—the reserve by general Sedmorasky. General

Bagavont with two regiments of the line and a regiment of chasseurs, composing part of the advanced-guard, was posted 400 paces in front of count Ostreman, and near some houses on an elevation which formed part of the site of the town; the cavalry was placed between 1500 and 2000 paces in front of the line; and in their front some corps of chasseurs were pushed by general Barclay into the forest.

The position between Pultusk and the wood, was apparently one large plain, but was intersected in front with small defiles. Behind, the plain extended deep, but towards the right was divided by the river Narew, and on the left by the forest in part · occupied by general Barclay.

In the evening of the 25th, the corps of Davoust approached and made a reconnoisauce. On the 26th, at ten o'clock in the morning, the enemy consisting of the corps of Davoust and Lasnes, with the French guards, commenced the action by a cannonade from the centre neither brisk nor well maintained, as he had not been enabled to advance his cannon.

Towards mid-day, however, the attack was more vigorous on the left of the position, and the Russian fire of musketry was considerable. The Russian cavalry also had several opportunities to charge, which they did with complete success. The enemy making no impression on the left, notwithstanding repeated efforts, directed some attacks against the center, but there also being foiled he concentrated and threw nearly his whole force upon the right, and, by an overbearing and unexpected weight of fire, obliged the Russians to retire, (but not in any disorder,) upon their successive reserves and artillery. The enemy elated and confident from this retrograde movement, continued, notwithstanding heavy loss, to advance upon the Russian batteries in the wood, some of which being gallantly maintained to cover the retreat, they carried by assault.

General Beningzen however, having re solved on battle, was determined to sustain it, to oppose force to force, and manœuvre to manœuvre; he therefore directed general Barclay to recede, and throwing back the

right of his line, and retiring the cavalry from his front, opened a well-directed fire of artillery from 120 pieces, which so confounded and destroyed the enemy, that they almost immediately gave way; several regiments being sent to the support of general Barclay, he vigorously advanced, and the original ground was altogether recovered, a great number of the enemy killed, and the darkness of night alone preserved the remainder, for they fled in great confusion and consternation, augmented by the attack of the Russians on their right.

When general Kaminskoy had found his position behind the Wkra forced by the enemy, he resolved to retire the Russian army behind the Njemen river, and gave directions accordingly to the corps of Buxhowden and Beningzen, but his orders were given under such circumstances, that general Beningzen considered himself as authorized to use his own discretion, and therefore preferred to give battle at Pultusk, hoping that general Buxhowden or general d'Aurep would support him; by some unfor tunate misapprehension or disagreement, probably originating in the want of acknowledged superior direction and authority, neither of these officers had advanced to his assistance, he therefore thought it more prudent to retire during the night, not withstanding his success, as Soult was on march for Ostrolenka, and as he feared to be surrounded by the whole French ariny, reuniting to revenge its partial disgrace, if he remained on the position of Pultusk; and this determination was indeed almost indispensable, since he had not any provisions in his camp or in the neighbourhood. The French force which had opposed him was so severely beaten, that their flight continued during the night, and they abandoned many guns, Buonaparte's equipage, &c. nor could the cossacks, who patrolled two German miles in front of Pultusk, on the 27th, find even a rear-guard of the enemy. The French did not readvance until the second day, and general Corbineau did not enter Ostrowiec until the 1st of January, 1807. The loss of the Russians was less than 500 men, and the French at the most moderate computation had 8000

killed and wounded, among whom were several generals and distinguished officers. Had Buxhowden or d'Aurep with his division but co-operated, the action at Pultusk might have decided the campaign, for the entire annihilation of the enemy would have then been certain.

But the result of this affair made a very favorable impression for the character of general Beningzen, and on the Russians. It was the first check that Buonaparte had experienced on the continent, a charm was broken and the French army foresaw that their future combats would be no longer chaces of pleasure. The Russian generals resumed confidence. The stain of Austrelitz was effaced from their escutcheons, and the soldiers recognised themselves as not unworthy of the companions of Suwarrow. It was iù vain that Buonaparte denied the victory. It was in vain that he boasted the trophy of some cannon which the Russians had abandoned in consequence of the state of the roads, on their subsequent march. He could not deceive the army. He was not able even to resume his interrupted operations so as to pursue the offensive until he had possessed himself of what yet remained of Prussia; and thus if he could not render the battle. equivocal in history, diminish the mischievous consequences of its loss. It was in vain that he announced the entire destruction of the Russian army, and his consequent return to Warsaw there to remain till he chose to renew the campaign. His march had been arrested, all his enterprizes discomfited, and he had scarcely proclaimed that had he repelled the Russians eighty leagues, when the same Russians reappeared in the field to assure him with terrible evidence of their existence.

The affair of Golmyn, on the same day, contributed to animate the Russian courage and amour propre. Prince Gallitzin with 15 battalions and 20 squadrons, having found himself obliged to take post there, whilst count Pahlin, with the regiment of hnssars of Somskoy, and general Laptow, with a regiment of chasseurs, effected their retreat upon him, was vigorously attacked by the whole corps of Angereau

and the cavalry under the orders of Murat, but maintained his ground; and, towards, the evening, being reinforced by the division of general Ducturof, and a part of the division of general Tutchikow, he advanced, and drove back from every point the enemy; nevertheless, in consequence of general Kaminskoy's order for a retreat, and the uncertainty of the issue of the combat sustained by general Beningzen, it became necessary for him to retire upon Ostrolenka, which he did in perfect order, and there joined the corps of general Beningzen, who, on the 27th, had marched to Rozan, and on the 28th, to Ostrolenka. From thence he retired to Novogorod, with the united divisions of general Essen and d'Aurep; and general Buxhowden, with his corps, marched to Kolno. The intention was to repass the Narew, but the state of the ice preventing the construction of a bridge, the army was obliged to fall back as far as Tykoczn, to cross the river. The enemy, aware of general Kaminskoy's order for the Russian army to retrograde, and unwilling, after the battle of Pultusk, to readvance it by any active operations, made their disposition of winter-quarters. Marshal Bernadotte went to Elbing, Ney to Güttstadt, Augereau to Thorn, Davoust to Przasnic, Lasnes to Markow, Soult to Pultusk, and Buonaparte with his guards to Warsaw. General Buxhowden, at Tykoczyn, was removed from the army, and general Beningzen received the supreme command. Desirous to profit of his success at Pultusk, and the confidence there acquired by his troops, he determined to continue the plan proposed by general Buxhowden, who had promised the king of Prussia to save Koningsberg, still menaced by the gradual approach of the corps of marshals Ney and Bernadotte.

The army, 70,000 strong, with 500 cannon, having passed the Narew, marched to the Bobra river, and crossed at Gonionetz and Innowa, except the corps of general Sedmorasky, 12,000 strong, which remained at Konionetz. The rout of march was directed upon Bialla, where the headquarters were established on the 15th of

January. On the 16th, they were transferred to Arys; on the 18th, to Rhein, where the divisions of generals Ducturof and Tuchikof, which had been detached, joined general Beningzen's army; and on the 19th, the advanced-guard fell upon several of the detachments of the enemy in their cantonments. From Rhein the troops marched to Heilige Linde, and then to Bischoffstein.

The general being informed that marshal Bernadotte was retiring with precipitation from Elbing, resolved to pursue him, aud on the 24th marched to Arensdorf, and on the 25th to Liebstadt; but on the same day, the advanced-guard under general Markof, commenced an attack on the village of Mohrungen, in which, to the great regret of the army, general d'Aurep was unfortunately killed. During the action, prince Dolgurowckey entered the town by the rear, surprised the enemy's guards, and took the whole baggage of marshal Bernadotte, while the marshal himself with difficulty escaped.

The grand army advanced on the 26th, to Mohrungen, which it reached the next day, from whence he removed, after many skirmishes, to Yankowo, and subsequently retreated upon Wolsdorf. He was supported in his retrograde movements by prince Bagration, Barclay de Tolloy, and Bagavont. Buonaparte conducted the pursuit in person, with the advanced-guard of his army, which, from the woody and intersected nature of the country, sustained considerable loss. The retreat of the Russians was much embarrassed by the peculiar temper of the subordinate officers and of the troops, who were equally unwilling and unaccustomed to retrace their steps in the presence of an enemy, and the severe and inclement night-marches, after the fatigues of the day, combined with the scarcity of food, would have been sufficient to conquer the discipline of better regulated troops. The soldiers were.compelled, as the only relief from famine, to prowl and dig for the buried food of the peasantry; they had no other bed than the snow, no shelter but the heavens, no covering but their rags.