matter in dispute is not of greater value than $2000, exclusive of costs.

Under the judiciary act, the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court extends to a final judgment or decree, in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a state, where is drawn in question the validity of a national treaty and the decision is against its validity. So, where a statute of the United States is drawn in question in the same manner, and the decision is against its validity. So, where an authority exercised under the United States is drawn in question, and the decision is against its validity. See 1 Wheat. 304. 6 Wheat. 264.

But, it is only, where the state court decides against the claim set up under the laws, &c. of the United States, that the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction. 6 Wheat. 598. It is not sufficient that the construction of the statute is drawn in question, and that the decision was against the party, it must appear, that his title depended upon the statute, 12 Wheat. 117. And generally, it seems, under Sect. 25th of the Judiciary act, 1789 ch. 20, the supreme court has no appellate jurisdiction, in a suit where the construction of a statute of the United States, or a commission under them, is drawn in question, unless some right, title, privilege or exemption is set up by the party, under such statute, and the decision is against it. 12 Wheat. 117.

So, where in any such case, the validity of a statute of any state is drawn in question, as being repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the decision is in favor of its validity, it must appear that the right of the party depended on its validity, otherwise the court will have no jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the validity of a statute of any of the states, is drawn in question, on the ground of being repugnant to the constitution, or to the treaties, or the laws of the United States, and the decision in the state court, is in favor of the validity of the law of the state, the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction. So, if the validity of an authority exercised under any state is drawn in question, in like manner, on constitutional ground, and the decision in the state court is in favor of its validity. 1 Wheat. 304. 6 Wheat. 264.

So, where two parties in a state court set up conflicting titles under the same act of congress, and there is a decision against the title of either, the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction. 4 Cranch, 382. 8 Wheat. 312.

But, the judgment in the state court, in any such case must be final. A judgment reversing that of an inferior state court and awarding a venire facias de novo, is not a final judgment. 3 Wheat. 433. 6 Wheat. 448. 12 Wheat. 135.

The appellate jurisdiction in cases brought from the state court, is not limited by value. 8 Wheat. 312.

So the supreme court has jurisdiction, where the parties claim under grants made by different states, though at the time of the first grant, one state was part of the other. 9 Cranch, 292. See 2 Wheat. 369.

But there must be something apparent on the record, to bring the case within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, otherwise a writ of error will not lie to the highest court of law or equity of the state. 2 Wheat. 263.

It is no objection to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, that one of the parties is a state, and the other a citizen of that state. 6 Wheat. 284. And here note, that citizenship in this case means nothing more than residence.

The supreme court has no authority on a writ of error, to declare a law of a state void, on account of its collision with the constitution of that state. 3 Peters. R. 288.

Under the judiciary act all the courts of the United States have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, &c. The qualification seems to be essential; for it is held that the power of the circuit courts to issue a writ of mandamus is confined exclusively to those cases, in which it may be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction. 7 Cranch, 304.

The same act authorizes the issuing writs of mandamus, &c. to any courts appointed, or persons holding office under the authority of the United States. But, this latter authority is held not to be warranted by the constitution. 1 Cranch, 137, 169.

... Where a district court refuses to proceed to judgment, a mandamus lies to compel it. 1 Paine, 453.

If a state court refuses to transfer a cause, under the act of congress, the circuit court may issue a mandamus. 1 Cooke, 160. So, if a collector of a port refuses to grant a clearance, a mandamus lies from the circuit court to compel him. 1 Hall L. Journal, 429.

In general, it seems, the person applying for a mandamus must be without any other remedy, and the officer to whom it is directed, must be one to whom such direction may be legally made. 1 Cranch, 137.

The supreme court has authority to issue a habeas corpus, where a person is imprisoned under the warrant or order of any other court of the United States. 7 Wheat. 38. But, it seems, in general, is restricted to cases, where the prisoner is confined under or by color of authority of the United States; or, is committed for trial by some court of the United States; or, where it is necessary to bring him in to testify. 1 Wash. C. C. Reports, 232.

If a district court should proceed in an admiralty suit, where it had no jurisdiction, a prohibition would lie from the supreme court. 3 Dal. 121.

An injunction may be issued to restrain an officer of a state, from performing an official act, enjoined by an unconstitutional statute of the state. 9 Wheat. 733.

A circuit court cannot enjoin proceedings of a state court, nor vice versa. 4 Cranch, 179. 7 Cranch, 278.

It is no objection to the granting of an injunction, that a party has a sufficient remedy at law. 9 Wheat. 733.

4. Of the respect which ought to be paid to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. If, in a case depending before any court, a legislative act shall conflict with the constitution, it is admitted that the court must exercise its judgment on both, and that the construction must control the act. The court must determine whether a repugnancy does or does not exist, and in making this determination must construe both instruments. 2 Pet. 524.

Mr Justice Johnson in 1 Pet. 614, asks, 'What is the course

of prudence and duty, where cases of difficult distribution as to power and right, present themselves?' and answers, 'It is to yield, rather than encroach. The duty is reciprocal, and will no doubt be met in the spirit of moderation and comity. In the conflicts of power and opinion, inseparable from our very peculiar relations, cases may occur, in which the maintenance of principle, and the administration of justice, according to its innate and inseparable attributes, may require a different course; and when such cases do occur, our courts must do their duty,' &c.

In the establishment of this court, it is evident that the states intended to provide a supreme tribunal, not only for the decision of all cases, arising in the ordinary course, under the laws and constitution of the United States, but those also, where the rights or claims of any of the states, might seem to clash with those of others, or with the laws, constitution, rights, or authority of the general government. In these cases, the jurisdiction of the court is final and conclusive; and, from their decrees, there is no earthly tribunal to which an appeal can be made. And, though it cannot be doubted, but, that from the imperfection of human reason, they must sometimes err in judgment; yet, however important the interests may be, which are affected; however high and powerful the parties in any such case; the decision of this court must. be submitted to and obeyed, even though it should be unjust. This consequence necessarily results from the theory of the government, established by the constitution. For, the decrees of all tribunals of final jurisdiction, are equally liable to the objection, that they may sometimes err. But, as erroneous decisions must be of rare occurrence; and, as it is better that an erroneous decision should sometimes occur, than that parties should have no tribunal to apply to in case of conflicting pretensions, which they are unable to settle by negociation, the consequence of which would be an appeal to force, the supreme court may be considered as the standing arbitrator, agreed upon by the states in the federal constitution, in all the cases alluded to. The decisions of this court must therefore always be regarded as made agreeably to truth and justice; and, though a state may consider a decision wrong, and

its interests in consequence of it injuriously affected, still such state has no right to disregard and disobey, and far less to resist the decision of the court. For, they can have no better ground to resist, than the opinion which they entertain of the justice of their case. But, unless they are to be judges in their own cause, this amounts to nothing, because the other party may have an equally good opinion of his side of the question; and, to prevent the evil, which usually arises from such conflicting claims or pretentions, is the very object sought for in establishing a common tribunal. There is no mutuality in a general submission to arbitration, where one party considers it binding in all cases submitted, whether the decision is for or against him; and the other considers it binding only when the decision is in his own favor.

Still the decisions of the supreme court are not to be considered as conclusive evidence of absolute right, politically speaking. For, there is nothing to prevent any state, which considers itself injured by a decision of the supreme court, from urging the injustice of the decision, as a ground, either for amending the constitution, or, for repealing a law of the United States, so far as either of them may have furnished occasion for an unjust decree.

It may be observed here, that though the question, whether a certain law or other public measure, be constitutional or not, in a government of laws, would appear to be very properly submitted to the highest court in the nation; yet it does not seem quite reasonable or proper, that the decision of so important a question, should in any case depend upon the opinion of a bare majority of the judges. Since, where a law has been enacted, or other public measure adopted, with the joint sanction of the wisdom of both houses of congress, and has also received the President's approbation, to suffer it to depend on the opinion of a bare majority of the judges, to decide whether it is constitutional or not, is to leave it in such case, in the power of the single individual, whose opinion turns the scale, to control the collective voice and wisdom of the whole government. For, it is possible that a law may be enacted unanimously by congress, and be approved of by the President, and, on a question in relation to its constitutionality be