ing to apply it in satisfaction of their judg-home after a quarrel, in defendant's absence, unment. Norbeck v. Davis, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 712. - 9. Act June 3, 1887, § 1, providing that "property of every kind owned acquired or earned by a woman before or during her marriage shall belong to her and not to her husband," confers on a married woman an exclusive property in the earnings of her own hands. In re Lewis' Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 35; Appeal of Rhodes, Id. Charges on property. 10. Under Laws 1876, c. 32, providing that no contract or conveyance by a married woman, as surety or guarantor for her husband, nor any undertaking by her for him, or in his behalf, shall be binding on her, a wife's mortgage of an estate in her own right to indemnify the mortgagee against loss on obligations signed by him as surety for her husband, at the latter's request, and for his benefit, is not valid, by estoppel or otherwise. - Parsons v. Rolfe, (N. H.) 27 A. 172. 11. One who presents the note of a married woman against her estate is entitled to payment thereof without any proof of what she did with their proceeds, as the claim can be defeated only by proof that the contract was one prohibited by the married persons' property act of 1887.-In re Spotts' Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 132; Appeal of Beetem, Id. Rights of husband. der the conviction that he desired her to go; that Action against. 18. The plen of coverture is no defense to a cause of action set forth in the common counts, since most of the contracts made by a married woman can be legally enforced. and, consequently, there can be no inference that a particular contract is beyond her competency; but, if such be the case, she must show it by her plea.-Van Syckel v. Woolverton, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 938. 19. In an action on contract against a husband and wife, a contract signed by the husband alone is insufficient to support a judgment against the wife, and it is proper to strike off the judgments as to her.-Murdock v. Wasson, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 944. Actions by husband -Personal injuries to wife. 20. Where a wife cannot recover for personal injuries because guilty of contributory negloss of her services consequent on such injuries. ligence, her husband cannot recover for the -Winner v. Oakland Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1111. Impeachment. 12. Assumpsit by a husband against the wife's executor to recover for expenditures on the wife's property, before her death, will not be sustained in the absence of an express or implied promise; and the law will imply no such promise, though the expenditures were Of witness, see "Witness,” 13. made on expectation of benefits provided for plaintiff under mutual wills between him and his wife.-Holmes v. Waldron, 27 A. 176, 85 Me. 312. 13. The fact that a husband replaces house- See "False Imprisonment." hold property owned by the wife, which had become worn out by use in the family, does not change the title, so as to enable his creditors to Imprisonment. Improvements. apply it in satisfaction of their demands.- Public, see "Municipal Corporations," 22-43. Norbeck v. Davis, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 712. Gifts between. Imputed Negligence. 14. Plaintiff resided, and was for many years See "Negligence," 8. employed, in the suburbs of a city. He was in TION. For arson, see "Arson." House." the habit of giving his earnings to his wife, who deposited them in the city in her name. On a INDICTMENT AND INFORMAcontest as to the ownership of these deposits, after the wife's death, there was evidence that she had stated to various people that plaintiff was not much of a business man, and that, if she did not attend to his business affairs, he would have nothing in a short time, and also that he was too busy to take the money to the bank. There was no evidence that she ever claimed the deposits as her own, and, in a paper left by her at her death, she expressly stated that she saved the money for him. Held, that there was no gift of such funds to the wife.In re Gracie's Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1083; Appeal of Union Trust Co., Id. 15. Where a husband, when out of debt, makes a present of a piano to his wife, the fact that it remained in the house, and that he could by physical force have taken it back, does not show such a control over the article by him as to invalidate the gift in favor of his creditors. -Norbeck v. Davis, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 712. Direct conveyance to wife. 16. A husband may convey property direct ly to his wife. Vought's Ex'rs v. Vought, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 489. Separation and maintenance. 17. In an action by a wife for maintenance on the ground that defendant had abandoned her without justifiable cause, it appeared that all acts of cruelty by her husband except one had been condoned; that as to such one act the evidence was conflicting; that plaintiff left her tice.' For obstructing justice, see "Obstructing Jus- The offenses of burglary and an assault with intent to commit rape are not cognate offenses, which may be joined in different counts of the same indictment.-State v. Fitzsimon, (R. I.) 27 A. 446. INFANCY. See, also, "Guardian and Ward;" "Parent and Age of consent, see "Marriage," 2. 1. Where an infant, for 18 years after conveying land, and 15 years after coming of age, lives near the land, retaining the consideration therefor, with the fullest knowledge of the voidable character of the deed, of the erection of improvements on the land, and of its steady increase in value, without any disaffirmance of his deed, such a delay will be held unreasonable, amounting to a waiver of his right, and equivalent to an express ratification. 2. A court of chancery is bound to set up the statute of limitations in favor of an infant defendant, against its will, even, as against a demand in favor of a mother, unless the case discloses some circumstances which render such plea inequitable.-Alling v. Alling, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 655. Information. See "Indictment and Information." INJUNCTION. Against nuisance, see "Nuisance," 2. Remedy of simple contract creditor, see 1. A court having jurisdiction of the person may issue injunction to prevent trespass on lands in another county.-Jennings Bros. & Co. v. Beale, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 948. 2. Where a corporation has been created by the legislature, and there has been a de facto organization thereof, the court of chancery will take jurisdiction of a suit instituted in the name of the corporation to restrain persons from acting under an invalid organization attempted to be made thereafter by some of the original incorporators, acting without authority. Union Water Co. v. Kean, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 1015. Irreparable injury. Prior construction of deed. 7. Where the only question relative to a deed is whether it confers the right claimed by plaintiff under which he seeks an injunction, its construction need not be determined in proceedings at law, but may be decided by a court of equity.-Jennings Bros. & Co. v. Beale, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 948. Temporary injunction. 8. Where on a preliminary hearing of an application to enjoin defendant from selling or incumbering a patent assigned to him, and claimed by plaintiff under a prior unrecorded assignment, it appears that complainant is entitled to equitable relief as against his assignor, that defendant acknowledged to a person other than complainant that he had notice of complainant's claim, and that defendant, unless enjoined, can sell the patent to as many inif done, would work irreparable damage to comdividuals as he can find as purchasers, which, plainant, a temporary injunction should be granted, though defendant makes affidavit resisting the application, denying that he ever had such notice.-Stanton Manuf'g Co. v. McFarland, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 828. Pleading. 9. Allegations that a threatened suspension of plaintiff from his official position in a Masonic order would work an irreparable injury to his reputation, character, and business, would be published in Masonic circles, and otherwise extensively circulated, injuring his financial credit, and would be an impeachment of his veracity, are not sufficient to authorize an injunction to restrain such suspension. -Mead v. Stirling, 27 A. 591, 62 Conn. 586. In Pari Delicto. INSANITY. 3. A bill alleging exclusive right in plaintiff to the coal in certain lands, that defendant See "Intoxicating Liquors," 8. is taking it out and shipping it away in such quantities that there will soon be none for plaintiff's mills, shows such injury as authorizes an injunction.-Jennings Bros. & Co. v. Beale, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 948. Rights enforced and wrongs prevented. 4. A court of chancery will not enjoin an officer of a beneficial order, who is vested by the constitution of the order with quasi judicial powers, from exercising such powers.-Mead v. Stirling, 27 A. 591, 62 Conn. 586. Inquisition of lunacy Costs and ex 1. In proceedings in lunacy upon a commission in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo, where the alleged lunatic is found to be of sound mind, or the commission is superseded before a guardian is appointed, the prosecutor cannot be allowed his costs and expenses, however meritorious his conduct may have been, there being no fund out of which they can be directed to be paid. In re Farrell, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 813. 5. A bank recovered judgment at law by default on a note made by a wife to the order of her husband, and subsequently the wife obtained an order opening the judgment, with unrestricted leave to plead. She pleaded that 2. Act March 23, 1887, authorizing the she occupied the position of surety on the chancellor to allow the commissioners reasonnote, and was a married woman, and also that able compensation, and the jurors fixed fees it was a contract made with her husband, and "to be paid out of the estate of the person who therefore void at law. The bank then filed a is the subject of the inquisition," does not, in bill in equity for an injunction against set- such case, authorize the charge of the fees of ting up these defenses at law. On the trial jurors and commissioners upon the estate of of the issues thus raised, the defense of sure- the alleged lunatic, if he shall be found to be tyship was not sustained. Held, that the bank of sound mind. In re Farrell, (N. J. Ch.) 27 was in effect compelled to come into equity A. 813. by defendant pleading that the contract was between husband and wife, and that, having established its case there on the merits, defendant should not be permitted to litigate it again in the law courts. Hackettstown Nat. Bank v. Ming, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 920. Against sale under mortgage. Appointment of guardian. 3. A guardian, committee, or trustee can be appointed for a lunatic only after an adjudication by a jury as to his mental unsoundness.Hamilton v. Traber, (Md.) 27 A. 229. Sale of property for support. 6. Code, art. 66, § 16, provides that no in-der the sale of a lunatic's property for his sup4. A court of chancery has no power to orjunction to stay a sale of mortgaged property shall be granted unless the party praying the port, or to make a change of investment, apart injunction shall on oath allege payment in which require the application for such sale to from that given by Code, art. 16, §§ 96, 98, whole or in part, and that the mortgagee re- be made by a guardian, committee, or trustee fuses to credit the same. Held, that a bill to enjoin such sale, which alleges that the mort- of the lunatic.-Hamilton v. Traber, (Md.) 27 gage has been paid, gives the court jurisdiction, and it may determine, not only that the mortgage debt was unpaid, but that persons named in the mortgage had power to make the sale. Barrick v. Horner, (Md.) 27 A. 1111. A. 229. INSOLVENCY. See, also, "Assignment for Benefit of Creditors;" "Fraudulent Conveyances." Right to appeal from judgment declaring insolvency. 1. Under Rev. St. c. 70, § 12, providing that no appeal lies from the court of insolvency, except such as is provided by the statute, an attaching creditor cannot appeal from the judgment declaring his debtor an insolvent.-In re Hubbard, 27 A. 464, 85 Me. 542; Appeal of Goulding, Id. Remedy for avoiding preference. ask for a continuance on the ground of pending insolvency proceedings, and, failing to answer, a default was entered, the action of the order to allow him to set up his discharge in court in refusing to set aside such default in insolvency, would not be disturbed.-Simmons v. Lander, 27 A. 100, 85 Me. 197. Subjects of. INSPECTION. 2. R. L. § 1860, declares that a conveyance by way of preference, made within four months of petition in insolvency, to a person having reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's present or contemplated insolvency, shall be void, and the property recoverable by the assignee. Section 1883 provides that, if a debtor die after petition in insolvency is filed, the proceedings shall be discontinued, and his estate settled in the probate court, like other estates of Of election, see "Elections and Voters," 3. deceased persons. Section 2162 authorizes an administrator, in case of deficiency of assets, to sue to set aside his intestate's fraudulent con to hogshead hoops only, and does not require Rev. St. c. 41, § 20, in terms applies barrel hoops to be culled and branded, since there is no government standard for that purpose.-Fitch v. Wood, 27 A. 148, 85 Me. 284. Inspectors. Instructions. INSURANCE. veyances. After a debtor was adjudged insol- See "Criminal Law," 11, 12; "Trial," 9-22. vent, but before any further proceedings in insolvency, he died. Orator, who had been his assignee, was appointed administrator. Held, that a mortgage, executed by the debtor, which was not fraudulent in fact, but which was assailed as being within the terms of section 1860, could not be set aside in a suit by orator as administrator. The orator should have sued as assignee in the insolvency proceedings to obtain a declaration of the invalidity of the mortgage.-Bartlett 'v. Walker, (Vt.) 27 A. 496. Lien of assignee for expenses. 3. Orator, assignee in insolvency of a debtor, was, on the latter's death, appointed administrator, and sued to set aside certain mortgages executed by deceased. Held that, the action not being maintainable, he had no lien as against the mortgages on the mortgaged goods for expenses of the insolvency proceedings.-Bartlett v. Walker, (Vt.) 27 A. 496. Allowance of claims-Right of appeal. 4. On objections, in writing, to a claim filed in the insolvency court, the statute requires the court "to admit the claim to be proved," or "disallow the same, in whole or in part," from which decision an appeal is given. Where the insolvency court simply dismissed the objecting creditors' petition "pro forma," there was no decree from which an appeal could be taken, or that would bar new proceedings.-Milliken v. Morey, 27 A. 188, 85 Me. 340. Discharge. 5. Where one purchases a stock of groceries, and carries on a small grocery business for about a year, without keeping during that period any account of the money used for living expenses by himself and wife, or any account of the money received for goods sold for cash, estimated to amount daily to from four to ten dollars, he has not kept such sufficient or proper books as will entitle him to a discharge under the insolvent law, though all his other financial affairs are readily ascertainable from his papers and books.-In re Patten, 27 A. 89, 85 Me. 154. Debts affected. 6. A discharge of a debtor under a state insolvent law does not extinguish a debt to a nonresident creditor, who did not participate in the insolvency proceedings.-Downes v. Fisher, (Md.) 27 A. 121. 7. Rev. St. c. 82, $ 54, as amended by Laws 1887, c. 111, declares that "all actions for debt provable in insolvency, when it appears that the defendant therein has filed his petition in insolvency before or after the commencement of the suit, shall be continued until the insolvency proceedings are closed." Held, that where an insolvent debtor neglected to Benevolent societies doing insurance business, The contract. 1. A policy declared explicitly that it should be void if the assured had at the time any: other policy on the premises. To a count pleadinsurer knew, when it issued its policy, of the ing this stipulation, plaintiff replied that the existence of an antecedent insurance. Held bad, as an attempt to alter the written contract by parol.-Bennett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 641. Validity of assignment. 2 A life policy provided that the money to become due on it should be payable to C. or legal representative, or such person as assured might appoint by writing on notice to the insurer; and that the policy should not be assigned unless notice and copy of assignment be given assured. Held that, the policy having been assigned by writing, signed by assured and the beneficiary, in consideration of an agreehe should outlive his expectancy, otherwise to ment to pay a certain amount to the assured if the beneficiary, and notice and copy of the assignment having been received by the insurer without objection, there was a valid assignment and substitution, so that the original beneficiary had no interest in the policy which would entitle her to sue thereon.-Bowen v National Life Ass'n, (Conn.) 27 A. 1059. Application. 3. To the question in an application for insurance, "What proportion of the value of the property will remain uninsured after this policy is issued?" the applicant stated that "The building alone cost $13,000." Held, that the answer is not proven to be untrue, so as to invalidate the policy, by the mere fact that the building was only worth $6,000 at the date of insurance. -Myers v. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 39. 4. The soliciting agent of an insurance company is not made the agent of the insured by inserting in the policy a stipulation to that effect, so as to render the insured chargeable with errors of such agent in preparing the ap(Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 39. plication. Myers v. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co., Conditions of policy. 5. A condition in a fire insurance policy that it shall be void "if the interest of the insured be not truly stated therein, or if the interest of the insured be other than the unconditional and sole ownership," precludes a recov ery where the title to the insured property is in the insured and his wife jointly, in the absence of any proof of fraud or mistake as to the insertion of the condition in the policy. Schroedel v. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1077. 6. An advertisement and sale of insured property under a power contained in a mortgage is not a violation of a condition that the policy shall be void if the insured property is sold under a deed of trust, or any change is made in the title or possession of the property, since it is necessary for the sale under the power to be reported to court, and the same proceedings had as if the property had been sold by a trustee under a decree, and since, till such proceedings are had, the title of the assuch proceedings are had, the title of the assured has not come to an end. 25 A. 989, affirmed. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, (Md.) 27 A. 314. 7. An advertisement and sale of insured 7. An advertisement and sale of insured property under a power contained in a mortgage is not a violation of a policy of insurance which provides that it shall be void on the entry of a decree of foreclosure of the insured property, since, though the foreclosure sale be regarded as equivalent to a decree of sale by a court of equity, such decree does not pass title until ratified by the court. 25 A. 989, affirmed. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, (Md:) 27 A. 314. Notice and proofs of loss. 8. The stipulation of an accident policy, that failure to notify the company of an injury for 10 days after it is received shall bar all claim under the policy, is valid.-Heywood v. Maine Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 27 A. 154, 85 Me. 289. 9. Under the requirement of a life policy that proof of the death of assured satisfactory to the insurer be given, a sufficient proof cannot be impaired by a false statement therein as to the person entitled to the insurance. Bowen v. National Life Ass'n, (Conn.) 27 A. 1059. Arbitration and award-Validity of appraisement. 10. By the terms of an agreement, an umpire was authorized to act, in appraising a loss by fire, only in case of disagreement between the appraisers, and only on matters of difference. The appraisers, together, examined the damaged goods, and then one proposed to the other to appraise the loss at 50 per cent. of the amount insured, and the latter refused. After that, the appraiser who made the proposition prevented, in bad faith, any further meeting of the appraisers. Held, that the other appraiser and the umpire had authority to make a valid appraisement.-Doying v. Broadway Ins. Co., (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 927; Same v. Citizens' Ins. Co., Id. 929. 11. Where an appraisement of damages is offered to prove the loss by fire, in an action on a policy of insurance, an objection to it, that it was not made as required by the policy, is rightly overruled, when it appears that, by an agreement made after the fire, the parties superseded the appraisement clause of the policy.-Doying v. Broadway Ins. Co., (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 927; Same v. Citizens' Ins. Co., Id. 929. Payment of loss. 12. The face of a policy, while insuring the property to the amount of $700 against loss or damage by fire, expressly limited such insurance to an amount "not exceeding in any case, or under any circumstances, the sum aforesaid, nor more than two-thirds of the actual destructible value of the buildings at the time the loss may happen." The same provision was contained in a condition annexed, as also in a by-law of the company, both of which were referred to, and became a part of the contract. Held, that plaintiff could not recover more than two-thirds of the actual value of the building destroyed, though another condition annexed provided that, "in settling a loss, the damage is to be paid in full, not exceeding in any case, or under any circumstances, the whole amount insured, and is. to be estimated according to the fair value of the property at the time of the fire." The term "damage" might properly be construed as referring, not to the amount of loss. sustained, but rather to the recompense due from the company.-Blinn v. Dresden Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 A. 263, 85 Me. 389. Who entitled to proceeds. 13. In an action between two claimants of money due on account of a loss by fire, it appeared that, in consideration of $20,000, plaintiff conveyed the insured premises to defendant, and took back a lease for one year, at a rental of $1; that defendant gave plaintiff an option to repurchase at the end of the year for $20,000 and stipulated interest; that, at the end of the term, plaintiff paid the interest, and the arrangement was renewed for another year; and that the latter remained in possession all the time, and had the premises insured pursuant to the contract, for defendant's benefit. After the fire, which occurred during the second year, plaintiff paid the $20,000 and interest, and the latter reconveyed the premises. Held that, at the time of the fire, defendant held only the legal title in fee, subject to the equitable interest in plaintiff, and that, on the exercise of the latter's option to repurchase, its interest related back to the beginning of the transaction, and entitled it to the insurance money.-People's St. Ry. Co. v. Spencer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 113. Necessary evidence to show noncompliance with conditions. 14. In an action on a mutual fire insurance policy, defendant alleged that an assessment against plaintiff was due when the loss occurred. The policy provided for the payment of any loss if the insured complied with the "conditions of the constitution and by-laws," and for payment of all "legal assessments." The by-laws were not attached to the policy, nor put in evidence. Held that, it not appearing that failure to pay assessments when due forfeited the policy, nor what were legal assessments, a judgment for plaintiff was proper.-Haverstick v. Penn Tp. Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 245. Mutual fire companies. 15. The levy and collection of an assessment by a mutual fire, insurance company on the premium note of a member after the forfeiture of his policy, and knowledge of such forfeiture by the company, does not constitute a waiver thereof, where such assessment is made to pay losses occurring prior thereto.-Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hull, (Md.) 27 A. 169. 16. The fact that such assessment realized more than enough to pay such losses is insufficient evidence of an intention to waive such forfeiture, where it appears that, from the beginning of the investigation of the loss under such member's policy, the company denied all liability, because of such forfeiture.-Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hull, (Md.) 27 A. 169. Mutual benefit insurance. 17 Where the by-laws of a mutual benefit society require each member to pay a fee of one dollar, after having been a member one year, for the beneficiaries of the next member who shall die, and make a similar payment at each death, such fee is due from a member one year after he joins, though no member may have died during such year.-Menard v. Society of St. Jean Baptiste, 27 A. 1115, 63 Conn. 172. 18. Where a member was 16 months in arrears for the nonpayment of a death benefit fee, and the society did not strike his name from the list of members, or take any steps to enforce payment of such fee, but received from him monthly dues and fines during such 16 months, the society waived the forfeiture of his membership for such nonpayment.-Menard | place searched, and is liable to seizure under v. Society of St. Jean Baptiste, 27 A. 1115, 63 Gen. Laws. c. 255, § 1, cl. 4.-Collins v. Noyes, Conn. 172. (N. H.) 27 A. 225. INTEREST. Running of interest. 1. Where a contract for the support of a minor child continues for several years before a demand of payment, plaintiff is not entitled to have interest computed from the close of each month, but the rule of annual rests applies.-Yerteau v. Bacon's Estate, (Vt.) 27 A. 198. Rate. 2. When a note was due one day after date, and interest was thereafter paid at the rate of 4 per cent., it will be presumed that the parties agreed on this rate, rather than the legal rate of 6 per cent. In re Gilmor's Estate, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 845; Appeal of McClelland, Id. Interstate Commerce. Regulation, see "Constitutional Law," 9; "Intoxicating Liquors." 1. Sale of liquor in original packages, see "Oleo margarine." INTOXICATING LIQUORS. Search and seizure, see, also, "Trespass," 6. Interstate commerce-Sale in original package. 1. Beer imported into the state by a resident of the state can be lawfully sold in original packages, though the sale of beer is prohibited by the laws of the state. Leisy v. Hardin, 10 S. Ct. 681, 135 U. S. 100, applied. Yerteau v. Bacon's Estate, (Vt.) 27 A. 198. Criminal prosecution-Evidence. 6. Under Rev. St. c. 27, § 40 et seq.. providing for libel and seizure of liquors unlawfully kept or deposited and intended for sale within the state in violation of law, and section 59, declaring that no offense under the chapter is barred by less than six years after comn.ission, it is error to charge that if liquors libeled were within six years deposited and kept in that place, with the intent to sell them unlawfully, they then became, and always remained, contraband. The present condition and present intent of the owner are the questions-State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 27 A. 178, 85 Me. 304. Evidence of illegal sales Burden of proof. 7. In an action under R. L. § 3833, for damages for a husband's death by intoxication on liquors unlawfully sold him by defendant, testimony that the party, in which were witon a call for beer, that what witness drank ness and deceased, drank what was furnished in a room containing a bar with bottles and was ale, that the liquor was sold as a beverage glasses, goes to show an illegal sale; the possession of a license being matter of defense.McQuade v. Hatch, (Vt.) 27 A. 136. Recovery of money paid On illegal sale. 8. Where the statute provides that money paid by plaintiff to a liquor dealer for beer sold in violation of the liquor law may be recovered back as money received and held to the plaintiff's use, the rule that plaintiff, having purchased the beer for illegal sale, cannot have the aid of the law in matters growing out of the transaction, does not apply.-Yerteau v. Bacon's Estate, (Vt.) 27 A. 198. See "Parties." Joinder. Of counts, see "Indictment and Information." Joint Debtor. 2. A witness had testified that he had charge of the place complained of as a nuisance, for more than a month; that when he made his contract of service, he had some talk with respondent, and was by him referred to his brother, who, respondent said, was interested therein Held, that he was properly allowed to testify that at the same time respondent Release of, see "Release and Discharge," 1. said that he had several cases of whisky of a certain brand, in square bottles, which he was going to put on sale at said place, and that thereafter respondent's father brought there whisky answering the description. State v. McGill, (Vt.) 27 Ä. 429. Keeping with intent to sell--Res judicata. 3. Under R. L. § 3836, a place where liquor is unlawfully sold, furnished, or given away is a common nuisance. Held, on trial of an indictment under R. L. § 3802, for keeping liquor with intent to sell, furnish, or give away, the record of a conviction under section 3836 for keeping a nuisance is not conclusive of an intent to unlawfully sell.-State v. McGill, (Vt.) 27 A. 430. Searches and seizures. 4. Rev. St. c. 27, § 43, empowers a magistrate to issue a warrant to search a dwelling house occupied as such, if he is satisfied by evidence presented, and so alleged in the warrant, that intoxicating liouor is kept in such house or its appurtenances, intended for illegal sale in the state. Held, that a warrant premising that "satisfactory evidence being presented that intoxicating liquors are kept in said house and its appurtenances," etc., is defective, as not stating that the magistrate was satisfied. Such defect is jurisdictional, and makes the process absolutely void.-State v. Whalen, 27 A. 348, 85 Me. 469; Same v. Lothrop, Id. 5. A beer faucet is adapted for the illegal keeping or sale of intoxicating liquors in the JUDGE. See, also, "Justices of the Peace." The district court act provides that, if the judge be sick or unavoidably absent, court may be held by one of the common pleas judges, to be designated by the disabled judge, and approved by the circuit justice. In a case brought to the supreme court on certiorari from a district court, it appeared that the case was tried by a common pleas judge to whose jurisdiction no objection was made. The record did not show whether he was empowered to act or not. Held, that his designation not being for any particular case would form no part of the record in this case, and the presumption of regularity would prevail. Craig v. Somers, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 639. JUDGMENT. Appealable, see "Appeal," 2-4. Res judicata, see "Intoxicating Liquors," 3. |