instruction, in an action for malicious prosecu- | and the mayor signed the resolution, under the tion, that there was no probable cause for such impression that the salary of the counsel was prosecution, is error.-Steimling v. Bower, (Pa. not included. Held, that a writ of mandamus Sup.) 27 A. 299. would not issue to compel the mayor to sign a warrant for the counsel's salary, where the mayor answered that two years previous the counsel had been paid a large sum in excess of his salary due at that time, as well as in excess tains.-O'Hara v. Fagan, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. of that due now, which sum counsel still re1089. MALPRACTICE. Contributory negligence. In an action against a homeopathic physician for malpractice, evidence having been given by witnesses as to how the case should have been treated, but also how the allopathic school would treat it, defendant having requested a charge on the subject, the court should have instructed that the jury were not to consider the relative merits of the two schools, but that, so far as defendant was to be judged by either, it was by the tenets and practices of his own school.-Force v. Gregory, 27 A. 1116, 63 Conn. 167. MANDAMUS. Parties defendant. 7. In a mandamus proceeding to compel the mayor and board of aldermen to meet in joint session with the common council to elect city officers, as required by law, it is unnecessary that the writ issue against the latter body, who have not refused to so meet, but have always been desirous so to do. - Littlefield v. Newell. 27 A. 110, 85 Me. 246. S. In such proceeding it is better practice to join as parties defendant the minority of the recusant body who have been willing to com110. 85 Me. 246. City as party, see "Municipal Corporations," 46. ply with the law.-Littlefield v. Newell, 27 A. Jurisdiction. MARINE INSURANCE. 1. Each house, under Const. art. 4, § 6, is owner impliedly warrants her seaworthiness at To municipal boards and officers. 2. A peremptory mandamus will issue to compel the payment of state and county taxes by a city where it has collected sufficient money for the purpose.-Shields v. City of Paterson, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 803; Same v. Grear, Id. 807. 3. Where it is made the duty of the two branches of the city government, "the board of mayor and aldermen" and the "common council," to meet in joint convention at a certain date to elect city officers, mandamus will lie, at the petition of a committee of one branch consenting to so meet, to compel such action by the other. Littlefield v. Newell, 27 A. 110, 85 Me. 246. 4. A private relator cannot obtain a mandamus to compel a committee to construct a particular sewer, as directed by ordinance to do, when it appears that the council has refused to make any appropriation therefor, and opposes the granting of the writ.-Congregation of Mission of St. Vincent de Paul v. Street & Sewer Committee, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 799. Controlling action of board of al dermen. 5. Under Pub. Laws, c. 474, § 16, cl. 2, of March 27, 1885, incorporating the city of Pawtucket, and providing that, in case of a failure to elect any officer under the provisions of the act, the board of aldermen shall order the city clerk to issue his warrant for another election to fill the vacancy, the action of the board in that regard is not reviewable on petition for mandamus unless there has been an abuse of discretion.-State v. City of Pawtucket, (R. I.) 27 A. 449. Claims allowed by city through mistake. 6. A city council passed a resolution to pay the salaries of the city officers, including that of counsel of the commissioners of adjustment, Recovery back of 2. Where a vessel is unseaworthy at the inception of the voyage for which insured, the insurance does not attach, and the premium paid may be recovered as money paid without consideration.-Dodge v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 27 A. 105, 85 Me. 215. MARRIAGE. See, also, "Divorce;" "Dower;" "Husband and Validity. 1 Where a first marriage is void, owing to the fact that one of the parties had a spouse living at the time of its celebration, the validity of a second marriage is not impaired thereby, though there has been no decree annulling it.-Dare v. Dare, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 654. Age of consent. 2. R. L. (Act 1839) § 2349, provides for the annulment of a marriage when either party had not at the time of the marriage attained "the age of legal consent." No. 63, the age under which a female was held By Acts 1886, incapable of consenting to unlawful carnal knowledge was raised to 14 years. the period of disability to contract marriage Held, that was governed by the common law, and was not affected by the act of 1886.-Fisher v. Bernard, (Vt.) 27 A. 316. Proof. 3. The fact of marriage may be proven by the oral evidence of one who was present at the ceremony.-McQuade v. Hatch, (Vt.) 27 A. 136. 4. In a suit to annul a marriage on the ground that, at the time of its celebration, defendant had a wife living, an admission of such previous marriage in the answer is sufficient to establish it, when corroborated by the production of evidence of a certified copy of tics, and of the record of a suit commenced by the record thereof in the bureau of vital statisdefendant against the person alleged to have been the other party to the previous marriage, to annul it.-Dare v. Dare, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 654. MASTER AND SERVANT. Invention by employe, see "Patents for Inventions," 1. Discharge of servant. 1. An employe under a contract of employment at a certain amount per week, payable weekly, the employment to continue for a year, having been discharged, and his wages paid him up to the time of his discharge, has only a right of action for damages for breach of the contract, and cannot maintain an action for wages as such, on the ground that he was ready and willing to perform the services.Olmstead v. Bach, (Md.) 27 A. 501. Wages. 2. In an action for wages it is error to charge without qualification that plaintiff's drunkenness while off duty would not be such misconduct as would prevent a recovery, since such misconduct might incapacitate for work. Ulrich v. Hower, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 243. 3. It is error to charge in regard to miscon duct of one employed as a teamster that reckless driving and using the team for other people's work will not prevent the recovery of wages, unless such conduct is "general, or frequent or habitual."- Ulrich v. Hower, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 243. Negligence of master. 4. There was evidence that deceased lived a mile away from the works; that he often came early, and used his time in oiling and getting ready his machine. He was killed by a boiler explosion from 10 to 25 minutes before working hours. Held, that the court, having charged that the employer owed no duty to one that came at an unreasonable hour and sat around, was right in leaving the jury to decide whether deceased was killed in the line of his duty-Walbert v. Trexler, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 65. 5. Deceased's post of work was in an open shed behind the engine house, and he had just entered the latter, a little before working hours. when the boiler exploded. There was evidence that he kept in the engine house the oil and whetstone with which he used to sharpen his tools before beginning work. Held, that the court might properly allow the jury to infer that he was going to get the oil and whetstone. and so was reasonably within the scope of his employment.-Walbert v. Trexler, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 65. 6. In an action for death by wrongful act, where deceased was working in a dangerous place, in defendant's employ, the court properly charged as to the law of negligence, and added that defendant should act as any prudent man would if he was doing the work himself both as employer and employe. Held no error.-Morrisey v. Hughes, (Vt.) 27 A. 205. Warning employe. 7. A railroad company is not negligent in failing to inform one of its experienced engineers, who has run over its road for many years, and who was appointed to instruct an engineer on another engine in all the physical peculiarities of the road, that such engine is several inches wider than the one he had been accustomed to handle; and he cannot, therefore, recover for injuries sustained by his head coming in contact with the iron work of a bridge while leaning out of the cab window watching his train, though he could safely have done so in his old engine.-Bellows v. Pennsylvania & N. Y. Canal & R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 685. -Defective appliances. injuries to their employes.-McMullen v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1043. 9. In an action for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's husband, the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that defendant was negligent, where it showed that deceased was an assistant stillman in defendant's oil refinery; that he was required to remove manheads from the stills after the fires were drawn: that the manheads were too heavy to lift and remove without standing in front of the manhole; that he was fatally injured, when directly in front of an open manhole, by an explosion of gas in the still; that it was customary, in other oil refineries, either to introduce steam into the stills after the fires were drawn, for protection in removing the manheads, or to use a crane or hinge, by which the manhead could be removed without lifting it or standing in front of the manhole; that neither of these precautions was used by defendant; other stillmen had complained thereof.-Bannon v. Lutz, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 890. 10. In an action for injuries causing the death of an employe, it appeared that, while defendant's engineer was lowering into the mine a cage containing decedent and other workmen, a cotter pin broke, whereby the engineer lost control of the throttle. He then undertook to stop the engine by means of the reverse lever, but he accidentally pulled the lever too far, and reversed the engine, instead of stopping it. Deceased attempted to jump on a landing as the cage moved past it, and was killed. The other men remained in the cage, and were not injured. The cotter pin was of the kind in general use, and had been duly inspected, but no defect was discovered, similar pin on the same engine was without though it had been in use for seven years. defect at the time of the trial, after 11 years' use. Held, that the accident was not caused A by defective machinery. Sterrett, C. J., disSup.) 27 A. 400. senting.-Bradbury v. Kingston Coal Co., (Pa. personal injuries, it appears that plaintiff was 11. Where, in an action by an employe for injured while in the performance of his duty, and without fault on his part, by a defective appliance which defendant had ample opportunity to discover, but did not repair, it is not error to refuse to take the case from the jury. --Bennett v. Standard Plate-Glass Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 874. 12. The piling of coal refuse or culm on the surface of the mine in the manner usually followed in the coal region will not render the owners liable for injuries to employes caused by a break in the roof of the mine at a point far beneath the surface under rock and dirt, in the absence of any evidence that the weight of the accumulated culm pile caused the break. -Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 577. 13. The fact that the culm was piled over a gully, through which flowed a small stream in times of storm, will not warrant the inference that the water penetrated into the solid ground, and through a considerable depth of rock, and thus 'caused the break in the mine, rather than through the pile of loose culm lying on the surface.-Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 577: Pleading. personal injuries sustained by one of its em14. In an action against a corporation for ployes, an allegation that the corporation threw, or caused to be thrown, a box on plaintiff, is equivalent to an allegation that the corporation did the act by its servants or agents. 8. The rule that a railroad company is re--Di Marcho v. Builders' Iron Foundry, (R. I.) sponsible for injuries to its employes caused by 27 A. 328. defects in its cars, of which it was ignorant, as it is its duty to inspect its appliances, does not apply to companies or persons on whose sidings cars are delivered by a railroad company for the purpose of permitting them to load or unload them, so as to make them so liable for 15. An allegation that plaintiff was employed by defendant to assist in the work of carrying on its business, and that he was so employed when injured, sufficiently sets forth that plaintiff was engaged in the service of the corporation, when injured, to show that it was bound to the exercise of due care on its part not to expose him, unnecessarily, to injury.-Di Marcho v. Builders' Iron Foundry, (R. I.) 27 A. 328. 16. In an action against a corporation for personal injuries sustained by one of its employes, an allegation that the corporation threw, or caused to be thrown, a box on plaintiff, is bad, because it thus appears that the act which occasioned the injuries was the act of a fellow servant, for which the corporation. is, prima facie, not liable.-Di Marcho v. Builders' Iron Foundry, (R. I.) 27 A. 328. Fellow servants or vice principals. is liable for such injuries.-Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co., 27 A. 235, 63 Conn. 9. Concurrent negligence of master and fellow servant. 23. Where the negligence of an employer contributes to the injury he is liable therefor, though the negligence of a fellow servant was also contributory.-Morrisey v. Hughes, (Vt.) 27 A. 205. Incompetency of fellow servants. 24. In an action by an employe for personal injuries there was evidence that the injury resulted from the incapacity and inexperience of a man employed to operate a powerful machine recently introduced into the workshop. This man had no previous instruction as to operating the machine, though, as several witnesses testified, it was dangerous for one without instruction or experience to attempt to do so. Defendant's engineer testified that he spoke of the man's incompetency to the superintendent, but that the latter took no action in the matter. Held, that there was evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff.-Lebbering v. Struthers, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 720. 25. The fact that the person acting as min18. The mining boss required by the act of ing foreman made a remark, several months be1885 (P. L. p. 239) to be employed by mine fore the breaking in of the roof of a mine, that owners, with prescribed duties, relative to the the roof was bad, and that more timber should care and inspection of mines, is a fellow serv-be put in, is not sufficient to render the comant with the miners at work in the mine; and, if the owners have exercised reasonable care in the selection of a mining boss, they are not liable for injuries to workmen resulting from his negligence.-Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 577. 19. Rule 24, art. 12, of the mining boss act of 1885, which requires employes in mines to give notice of apprehended danger to the mining boss, does not make the mining boss the representative of the owners, so as to charge them with constructive notice of information given to him by the workmen; since his duty is the same with or without the provision,-to give immediate actual notice of the apprehended danger to the owners, and take all proper measures to prevent its occurrence.-Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 577. Negligence of vice principal. pany liable for the death of its workmen killed by the cave-in, where it appears that the place spoken of was not the place of the accident, and that another person was foreman at the time of the accident, and it does not appear whether any timbers were put in.-Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 577. 26. The length of time during which the mining boss, a fellow servant with the workmen in the mine, had notice of the apprehended danger of a cave-in in the mine, does not affect the master's liability; since, if the defects warned against are serious, and the mining boss does not correct them, it is the duty of workmen having knowledge to notify the master, and, if they do not do so, they continue work at their own risk.-Lineoski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 577. Assumption of risks. 20. In an action against a city by a laborer 27. An employe who engages in new work, in a sewer for injuries caused by defendant's and who is not acquainted with the latent dannegligence in employing an incompetent engineer gers incident to it, is not presumed to know who operated a steam hoisting apparatus, by whether his employer has furnished appliances means of which plaintiff was lowered into the which are reasonably safe and in ordinary use, sewer, it appeared that such engineer, the day and is not chargeable with an assumption of he began running the engine, and the day be- the risks involved in the failure to provide them. fore the accident, let the elevator cage fall two-Bannon v. Lutz, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 890. or three times. Held that, though such cage fell because of the engineer's negligence, it constituted no proof that he was incompetent, nor that defendant was negligent in employing him. -City of Baltimore v. War, (Md.) 27 A. 85. 21. In an action against a city by a laborer in a sewer for injuries caused by defendant's negligence in employing an incompetent engineer, there was evidence that the officer having superintendence of the work and authority to employ men, on the recommendation of a citizen and of a member of the city council, an experienced locomotive engineer, employed the engineer instead of another person whom he had selected for the place. Held, that there was no evidence that such officer was negligent, in the absence of evidence also that a prudent man would not have acted on such recommendations.-City of Baltimore v. War, (Md.) 27 A. 85. 22. Where an employe of a corporation is injured by the starting of machinery by reason of the absence of the superintendent and manager from the place where the rules of the company, which were known to the employes, required him to be, and because he failed to notify the engineer, as it was his duty to do, of the dangerous position of the injured employe, which was known to him, the company v.27A.-74 28. In an action against a railroad company for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's husband, it appeared that deceased was an engineer on defendant's road, which was blocked by snow; that a train was sent out, which consisted of four engines and two tool cars, and carried two hundred laborers with appliances for clearing tracks; that an engineer, a conductor, and deceased's fireman each had been notified to go out "to open the road," "to clear snow," or "with the snow train;" that the men in charge of the train consulted as to the order of the engines; and that deceased was killed by his engine being thrown from the track on running into a drifted cut. Held, that deceased assumed the risks of the employment, as the equipment and manning of the train was notice of the purpose for which it was sent out and of the nature of the work to be done, and it was not necessary for the company to notify the trainmen where drifts were.-Derr v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1002. Contributory negligence 29. Plaintiff, with other employes of defendant, was ordered to unload iron from a car onto a platform 16 inches from the bed of the car. It was so dark that it could not be seen whether there was a footboard across this space of 16 inches or not, but plaintiff, supposing that there was one, without examination, stepped into the car, and, on returning with an armful of iron, fell through the space, and was injured. There was a footboard near at hand, and also a lamp, which plaintiff and his coemployes could have used. Held, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.-Piper v. Cambria Iron Co., (Md.) 27 A. 939. Material Men. See "Mechanics' Liens." Measure of Damages. See "Damages." MECHANICS' LIENS. ified in the contract between the owner and the contractor.-Linden Steel Co. v. Rough Run Manuf'g Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 895. Proceedings to perfect. cottage in question, continued in defendant 7. Plaintiff, after ceasing to labor at the contractor's employment at his shop. Defendant's foreman, in doing some work on the cottage not in the contract, went to the shop, and borrowed plaintiff's tools for a few minutes. Plaintiff also rendered the trifling service of receiving from the foreman's hand a board, which might otherwise have been allowed to fall without danger of injury. Held, that these were not acts of labor on the cottage that would prolong plaintiff's time for filing a lien thereon.-Cole v. Clark, 27 A. 186, 85 Me. 336. 8. Under Pub. Laws 1887-88, c. 696, § 4, providing that, to procure a lien for materials, the person furnishing them shall give notice Rights of subcontractors on construction of within 60 days after the materials are placed on railroad, see "Railroad Companies," 2. Consent of owner to improvements. 1 Under Rev. St. c. 91, requiring the lien claimant to prove that he furnished the labor or material by contract with the owner, or by the owner's consent, such consent may be inferred from the existence of a contract for the construction between the owner and a building contractor.-Norton v. Clark, 27 A. 252, 85 Me. 357. 2. A covenant that the contractor will not suffer any lien by any person to be put on the building, and that any such lien, till it is removed, shall preclude any claim for payment under the contract, and that the last installment shall not be payable till a release of all claims and liens for work and material is furnished by the contractor, does not indicate that the parties meant to prevent absolutely the filing of any lien, and it will not therefore prevent a material man having a lien.-Samuel J. Cresswell Iron Works v. O'Brien, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 131. 3. Stipulations in a contract that no liens shall be claimed for labor or materials furnished by the contractor, or others by him employed, will not bar the lien of a laborer and material man who has not assented to it, though he introduces the contract in evidence to prove the owner's consent.-Norton v. Clark, 27 A. 252, 85 Me. 357. For what obtained. the land, a notice given on the 6th of January is sufficient to support a lien for materials furPaterson v. St. Thomas' Church, (R. I.) 27 A. nished on the previous 7th of November.- 449. 9. Where a mechanic's lien describes the land sought to be subjected, names each building thereon, and refers to, and makes a part of the lien, a map of the premises, it is sufficient.-Linden Steel Co. v. Rough Run Manuf'g Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 895. Effect of destruction of building before filing lien. 10. Where a lien for materials is filed against a manufacturing establishment consisting of a group of buildings, the fact that the particular building in which the materials were used was destroyed before the lien was filed does not defeat the lien.-Linden Steel Co. v. Rough Run Manuf'g Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 895. Rights of material men Contract against liens. 11. The right of a material man to a mechanic's lien cannot be released by a stipulation in the contract between the owner of the premises and the contractor, but only by a sufficient covenant. Benedict v. Hood, 19 A. 635, 134 Pa. St. 289, distinguished.-Samuel J. Cresswell Iron Works v. O'Brien, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 131. Meeting. Merger. 4. Where the interior of a building was torn out by the tenant, and materially changed, See "Towns," 4. and the front altered to some extent, but the tenant continued to occupy the building throughout the work, it constituted repairs of an old building, and not a new structure, entitling the See "Judgment," 3. contractor therefor to a lien. De Wald v. Woog, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 1088. Nature of improvement new erection. - Mesne Process. Addition or See "Ejectment," 4. 5. On the side of, and attached to, a twostory building 60x22 was erected a two-story building 80x28. The partitions in the upper story of the old part were taken out, its roof and the upper story of the wall next the new part were taken off, the studdings of the old part were raised to be on a level with those of the new part, and all was inclosed under one roof, the upper floor of both parts being used as a single hall. Held, that a mechanic's lien should be filed as for an addition or alteration, and not for a new erection.-Smyers v. Beam, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 884; Appeal of Seifert, Id. MINES AND MINING. Mining for oil, see "Partnership." 1, 2. oil and gas leases, see "Landlord and Tenant," 8-10. Conveyances. 1. A deed of bargain and sale with words of inheritance granted certain lots, all gas from certain wells, and the perpetual right to mine and carry away coal from all the veins under certain land, the grantee to pay a royalty on all coal mined, there being, however, no condition or covenant requiring him to mine. Held, that an exclusive right to mine and carry away coal was not granted. Jennings Bros. & Co. v. Beale, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 948. Mining leases. 2. A lease of a coal mine excepted from its operation the upper vein, and stipulated for a minimum yearly rental of $500. Subsequent ly the lessees assigned the lease to a corpora- | Deed absolute in form. 3. Where the parties to a coal-mining lease stipulating for a specified royalty per ton, "miners' weight," have for years interpreted the term "miners' weight" as meaning a ton of prepared coal, after eliminating therefrom all bone, slate, and material not marketable as coal, it is too late for the lessors to demand an accounting based on the weight of the material as brought out of the mines.-Drake v. Lacoe, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 538. Negligent mining-Injury to owner of surface. 4. In an action for injury to plaintiff's land, resulting from a subsidence of the surface, caused by the negligent working of a coal mine beneath it, it appeared that defendant, who owned the mine, had leased it to others, who paid him a royalty on the coal taken out, but that he gave frequent and explicit directions as to taking coal from the pillars and supports, saying that too much coal had been left. The manager of the mine testified that, under defendant's directions, he continued to take out coal till the mine "shut in." Held, that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's liability for the injury to go to the jury.-Kistler v. Thompson, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 874. Minor. 1. About the time that the firm of J. B. & Sons failed, members of it conveyed to S., for cash considerations, real estate used by the firm, and lands held by the partners, and the homestead of J., one of the partners, all subject to prior mortgages. J. also conveyed an firm, in a partnership with S. and S.'s brother. interest held in his name, apparently for the B., the other surviving member of J. B. & Sons, swore that J., who made the deal with S., told him that S. was advancing them the money, and would carry the realty for them, and that the conveyances were made with that idea. J. and S. swore that the sale was absolute. S. was not a creditor of the firm, nor a land speculator. He lived in another state, and had a large business of his own to manage. J. and B. used the realty pretty much as they had before; paid insurance and interest on the mortgages. The lands were put in a broker's hands for sale under J.'s directions. J. lived in his house without paying S. rent, and later S. resold it and an interest in the partnership with himself, to J., for what looked like grossly inadequate prices, allowing J. profits accrued on his former interest in said partnership. Held, that the conveyances to S. constituted a mortgage.-Pidcock v. Swift, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 470. Debts secured. 2. In an action to foreclose a mortgage executed as security for all sums then due or thereafter to be due, the mortgagee is entitled to be allowed, as part of the sum due, certain moneys received by the mortgagor from the sale of the machinery of a sawmill, formerly the property of the mortgagor, but at the time of the sale owned by the mortgagee, as purchaser from an execution creditor of the mortgagor.-Gleason v. Kinney's Adm'r, (Vt.) 27 A. 208. Parol evidence. 3. Parol evidence is competent to show that a mortgage securing "all other legal claims due said A. and B." was meant to include the individual debts due A., as well as the joint debts due A. and B.-Snow V. Pressey, 27 A. 272, 85 Me. 408. See "Guardian and Ward;" "Infancy;" "Par- Lien-Extinguishment. ent and Child." Misappropriation. By trustee, see "Trusts," 16. Misrepresentation. See "Vendor and Purchaser," 6. Mistake. As to boundaries, adverse possession, see "Boundaries," 4, 5. In executing release, see "Release and Discharge," 2. Rescission or reformation of contracts, see "Equity," 4. Modification. Of contracts, see "Contracts," 10-13. MORTGAGES. See, also, "Chattel Mortgages;" "Fraudulent Rights of purchaser at foreclosure sale, see Subrogation to rights of mortgagee, see "Subrogation," 3. 4. Parties to a note secured by mortgage may substitute a new note for the original without impairing the security, though the terms of the two notes are not the same.-Buck v. Wood, 27 A. 103, 85 Me. 204. Rights of mortgagor. 5. A mortgagor in possession, and before foreclosure, has such interest in the premises as will enable him to sue for damages for flowage, under the mill act. Nor is it any defense that the land has been sold for taxes, or levied on in execution, so long as the owner's right to redeem continues.-Atwood v. Moose Head Paper & Pulp Co., 27 A. 259, 85 Me. 379. Liabilities of mortgagor. 6. A mortgagor is not liable for insurance premiums paid by a mortgagee, where the insurance is not procured, or the premiums paid, at the request or for the benefit of the mortgagor.-Snow v. Pressey, 27 A. 272, 85 Me. 408. Payment and release. 7. Plaintiff, at the request of defendant's solicitor, discharged of record a mortgage held by it on land of W., to whom defendant was about to make a loan to be secured by a mortgage on the same land, relying on the solicitor's representations that settlement would be had after the discharge. Held, that the acceptance by plaintiff of the solicitor's personal check was not a substitution of the solicitor's personal liability for that of defendant, and |