the state, within Act April 3, 1779, providing the relative rights of the parties beyond low- Risks of Employment. Rivers. sustain replevin.-Lawry v. Ellis, 27 A. 518, See "Waters and Water Courses." 85 Me. 500. Districts," 5, 6. in equity, see "Equity," 7-15. Of sale by seller, see "Sale," 6-17. RIPARIAN RIGHTS. Remedies of riparian owners, see "Nuisance," 2. Prescriptive rights. 1. The fact that a sluiceway formed on river flats between the piers of a bridge and sections of a causeway erected across such flats and river, by the filling in of such cause way and of other portions of the flats, has existed for over 15 years, does not confer riparian rights on owners of land across which such sluiceway extends. - Chamberlain v. Hemingway, 27 A. 239, 63 Conn. 1. Adjoining proprietors-Boundaries. 2. The judicial settlement of the divisional line between adjoining riparian proprietors, so far as the line runs from high to low water mark, is at least a prima facie settlement of Giving bond as tax collector, see "Towns," 2. Roads. See "Easements;" "Highways." Rule in Shelley's Case. See "Wills," 23. SALE. See, also, "Judicial Sales;" "Vendor and Purchaser." Bona fide purchasers, of corporate stock, see "Corporations," 11. Effect of collecting insurance on damages, see "Damages," 5. For taxes, see "Taxation," 23, 24. Validity of contract, see "Frauds, Statute of," 7. Entire or severable contract. 1. A contract for the sale of a lot of furniture, all to be of a certain quality, for a lump sum, is an entire contract, and the buyer is not obliged to receive it, part of it not being of such quality.-Sidney School Furniture Co. v. School Dist. of Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 856. Acceptance of subject of sale. 2. Where the goods are contracted for in writing, to be delivered at a place agreed upon by the parties, proof of delivery at such place raises a presumption of acceptance by the purchaser.-White v. Harvey, 27 A. 106, 85 Me. 212. Warranty. 3. In an action for breach of warranty of a horse, the question as to whether there was a warranty, or whether plaintiff bought on his own knowledge of the qualities of the horse, is for the jury.-Toner v. Zell, 27 A. 304, 149 Pa. St. 458. Election of remedies by seller. 4. Plaintiff on conversion, by first bringing the action in assumpsit, did not elect to affirm the contract of sale under which he alleged the goods were fraudulently obtained.-Bonaparte v. Clagett, (Md.) 27 A. 619. Rights of seller as against third per plaintiff.-Schofield v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 69. 7. Defendants having committed an act of bankruptcy 13 days after a sale of goods to them on credit, plaintiffs' agent, with his attorney, called on them, accused them of falsehood in statements made at time of sale, and demanded payment or security, which were refused. Held, that the agent's acts did not ratify the sale, and an instruction "that if plaintiffs asked for payment and an assignment of book accounts after they were aware of the fraud, they could not recover the goods," was much too favorable to defendants.-Boyd v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 60. 8. A sale effected through the false and fraudulent representations of the vendee may be rescinded by the vendor without the return of part payments made by the vendee, where it appears that the vendee, from the goods purchased, had sold more than enough to reimburse him for the payments made.-Sloane v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 67. 9. A seller may rescind a sale effected by the fraud of the purchaser, without returning the money received in part payment, where it appears that the portion of the goods undisposed of by the purchaser does not exceed in value the balance due the seller.-Schofield V. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 69. v. 10. Plaintiffs contracted with defendants for certain stone monuments for a sum fixed by one of defendants on information given him by their foreman, and on which he relied. The price was much below the value of the goods, through an error in computation of the foreman, as was known by plaintiffs. Held, that the contract was the result of a mistake, and plaintiffs could not recover thereon. - Everson v. International Granite Co., (Vt.) 27 A. 320. 11. Where part of the price of goods is paid in cash, and the purchaser gives his notes for he balance, it is the duty of the seller, on attempting to rescind the sale for fraudulent representations of the purchaser as to his solvency, to return, not only the notes, but also the cash received, though at the time of the attempted rescission the goods are in the custody of the sheriff, who has seized them under execution against the purchaser.-Schwartz v. McCloskey, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 300. 12. Where a sale is rescinded by the seller, and he brings an action to reclaim the goods, a tender by him before verdict of notes given by the purchaser is sufficient.-Schofield v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 69. 13. Where a vendor seeks to rescind a contract of sale for fraud of the vendee, and is subsequently made plaintiff in an interpleader issue to determine the ownership of the goods sold, a tender by him at the trial of the issue of notes given by the vendee in payment will be treated as if made at the date of rescission. -Sloane v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 67. 14. Plaintiffs, on receipt of defendants' order for goods on credit, asked them for a statement and references to others with whom they had dealt. Defendants grossly misstated their assets and liabilities, and gave some references. Plaintiffs consulted one of these, who gave them, without comment, a statement made him lately by defendants, similar, in substance, to that given to plaintiffs. The active partner of plaintiffs' firm swore positively that they sought corroboration of the statement from said dealer, but sold their goods solely on the credit of the statement made to them. Held, as to plaintiffs' right to rescind the sale, that the question whether they relied on the statement, or on their own judgment after inquiry, was for the jury.-Boyd v. Shiffer, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 60. 15. The fact that an intending purchaser, though knowing that his liabilities exceed his resources. asserted his ability to pay for the goods, does not constitute such a fraud as will authorize a rescission of the sale after delivery of the goods, when the statement was made under the belief that the larger part of the claims against him were in the hands of per sons who would not press them so as to interfere with the conduct of his business.-Wessels v. Weiss, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 535. Rescission by seller-As against third persons. 16. A sale of goods cannot be rescinded by the sellers, the sellers, as having been induced by the fraudulent representations of the purchasers as to solvency, after such goods have been seized by the sheriff on an execution against the purchasers under a judgment for a debt_incurred after the sale, since creditors whose debts are contracted subsequent to the possession by the purchaser of goods under a voidable title are treated as bona fide purchasers.-Schwartz v. McCloskey, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 300. 17. The suppression of a judgment note given by the debtors in statements of assets and liabilities made by them to creditors who furnished them goods on the faith of such representations does not estop the holder of the note, to whom it had been theretofore transferred, from asserting the same as a valid claim against the purchasers.-Reese v. Reese, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 703; Appeal of Hart, Id. Action for price. sale of coal is terminated by the buyer, the sell18. Where an executory contract for the er's right of action at once accrues, not only for the breach of contract, but for the price of all the coal delivered before bringing the action.-Hocking v. Hamilton, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 836. 19. In an action by a seller for the contract price of the goods, though defendant relies on a rescission of the contract before the goods were shipped, he may also show that they were not of the quality stipulated for in the contract.Sidney School Furniture Co. v. School Dist. of Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 856. Buyer's rights and remedies. 20. Where the purchaser of corporate stock, under a contract to return it and have the money paid for it refunded, tenders the stock in rescission, and the seller refuses to accept it, the purchaser has the right to do any acts in regard to the stock reasonably necessary to protect his interests, and at the same time to maintain his claim to rescind.-Jessop v. Ivory, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 840. 21. Where such purchaser subsequently directs the sale of the stock, gives a proxy to cast his vote, and personally attends and participates in the business of a stockholders' meeting, such acts are prima facie acts of ownership inconsistent with the demand for rescission, and a jury is at liberty to infer from them an acquiescence in the seller's refusal and a waiver of the demand.-Jessop v. Ivory, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 843. 22. Where a contract for the sale and delivery of lumber fails to specify the time for delivery, it is a question for the jury what is a reasonable time.-Bagby v. Walker, (Md.) 27 A. 1033. 23. An instruction that notwithstanding the provision in a contract by which plaintiff was to deliver lumber to defendant within a certain time, if the jury should find that defendant waived the requirement, and accepted and hauled lumber from plaintiff's wharf thereafter, defendant could not have damages for the failure to deliver within the specified time, does not treat the mere acceptance as a waiver.-Bagby v. Walker, (Md.) 27 A. 1033. Bona fide purchasers. 24. One who receives chattels in payment of a pre-existing debt is not a bona fide purchaser for value, as against one from whom the property was obtained by fraud.-Hurd v. Bickford, 27 A. 107, 85 Me. 217. 25. One who, having agreed to receive certain shares of stock in payment of notes held by him, learns of equities affecting such stock before he delivers up the notes or in any way carries out the agreement, is not a bona fide | his seal, and no other is necessary.-Loraw_v. purchaser of the stock.-Hayden v. Charter Oak Nissley, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 242; Appeal of EvDriving Park, 27 A. 232, 63 Conn. 142. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DIS- Location of schoolhouse. 1. The discretion of a board of school di ans, Id. Searches and Seizures. Seaworthiness. rectors as to the location of schoolhouses is See "Shipping," 1. Secondary Evidence. Failure of board to organize-Appoint- See "Evidence," 4. ment of new board. 2. Where six persons elected as members of a school board divide into two equal fac 41. Separate Estate. SET-OFF AND COUNTER CLAIM. tions, and each faction attempts an organiza- See "Husband and Wife," 8-13. Legacy to debtor, right of set-off, see "Wills," Contracts. 3. A parol contract of a school district may be proven though the minutes of the school board contain no reference to it.-Sidney School Furniture Co. v. School Dist. of Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 856. With teacher. 4. Section 44 of the school law (Revision, p. 1077) provides that, in every contract between a school teacher and the board of trustees, a school month shall be construed to be 20 school days, or 4 weeks of 5 school days each, and any contract made in violation of this section shall have no effect as against the teacher. Held, in an action by a teacher who had been paid by the calendar month, that he could not recover an alleged balance of salary without proof as to how many "school months" there actually were during his service.-Steinson v. Trustees of School Dist. No. 8, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 923. -Rescission by school board. 1. Though Rev. St. c. 82, § 130, allows the assignee of an account to sue thereon in his own name, one summoned as trustee cannot deduct by way of set-off from the sum owing by him to the principal defendant an account which another person has assigned to him against such defendant, unless after such assignment the principal defendant was notified of the assignment and agreed to pay the account to him.-Soule v. Kennebec Maine Ice Co., 27 A. 92, 85 Me. 166. Pleading set-off in reply. 2. Plaintiff in assumpsit cannot, in a replication to a plea of set-off, set off other claims against defendant, which should properly_have been set up in the declaration.-Heath v. Doyle, (R. I.) 27 A. 333. Severable Contracts. 5. To show rescission by a school district of a written contract in pursuance of a contemporaneous parol contract, a resolution of the See "Contracts," 4; "Sale," 1. school board, on which notice of rescission was given, is admissible, it being no objection thereto that the other party to the contract was not present at the passing of the resolution.-Sidney Rule in, see "Wills," 23. School Furniture Co. v. School Dist. of Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 856. 6. The school board having passed a resolution for rescission of the contract, the president of the board did not need a special authorization to notify the other party thereof.-Sidney School Furniture Co. v. School Dist. of Warsaw Tp., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 856. Shelley's Case. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES. 1. Purd. Dig. p. 322, pl. 38, provides that no action shall lie against a constable for anything done in obedience to any warrant issued by a justice until demand has been made, or left at his usual place of abode, for a perusal and copy of such warrant, duly certified under his hand, and the same has been neglected for six days thereafter. Held that, where a levy and sale are made by a constable under execution issued by one authorized to issue such writs, failure by defendant in execution to make such a demand is a bar to a recovery from such constable and his surety of damages from such levy and execution.-Commonwealth | ing lots; these not showing clearly an absence v. Warfel, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 763. of redress at law.-Gove v. City of Biddeford, 27 A. 264, 85 Me. 393. Contracts enforceable. 2. Where, after service of a writ, the officer delivers it to plaintiff's attorney without making formal return, the officer may, in an action by plaintiff against him for damages, show by oral testimony that he complied with the directions of plaintiff's attorney as to service Morgan v. Joyce, (N. H.) 27 A. 225. 3. A peremptory order to a sheriff, without notice of a hearing thereon, to pay the proceeds from a sale under execution into court, will be set aside.-Dewoody v. Dewoody, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 667; Appeal of Ray, Id. SHIPPING. See, also, "Marine Insurance." 1. In an action involving the seaworthiness 2. In an action on a general average bond. where the issue is as to the seaworthiness of the vessel when she started on her voyage, and the testimony is conflicting, it is proper to refuse to charge that though there may be a prima facie presumption of unseaworthiness, and the burden on defendant to prove the contrary, yet, "where it appears from the undisputed evidence in the case that the vessel sprung a leak or became damaged under cirsprung a leak or became damaged under circumstances which would not cause such results to an ordinary seaworthy vessel," the burden of proof is placed on the vessel 'owners to den of proof is placed on the vessel owners to show that she was seaworthy.-Broadnax v. Cheraw & S. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 412, 3. In an action on a general average bond, where the issue is as to the seaworthiness of the vessel when she started on her voyage, while the burden of proving unseaworthiness at the commencement of the vessel's voyage is on defendants, who assert it as a defense, yet if it is shown that, shortly after the commencement of the voyage, the vessel, without encountering any stress of weather or any unusual perils of the sea, became so leaky as to be obliged to put into a port of refuge for repairs, the presumption then is that she was unseaworthy when she sailed, and the burden of proving the contrary is then on plaintiffs. - Broadnax v. - V. Cheraw & S. R. Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 412. Slander. See "Libel and Slander." Societies. See "Benevolent Societies;" "Religious Societies." See "Judge." 2. Where a husband agrees to exchange land belonging to his wife for land of defendant, and the title to the land which the husband agreed to convey is still in the wife when the husband sues for specific performance, no decree can be made in his favor, since there is a lack of mutuality of obligation and remedy.— Ten Eyck v. Manning, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 900. 3. An agreement for the sale of a "lot adjoining Pavonia Yacht Club, on Bay View avenue," is sufficiently definite to be enforced, if it is shown that the vendor owned only one lot answering to such description.-Champion v. Genin, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 817. 4. When a son renting a farm from his father has been induced by the father's promise to convey or devise him the farm to make expensive and permanent improvements on it, such as a mere tenant would not make by way of repairs, the father having full knowledge of said improvements, specific performance can be enforced by the son's widow and daughter against the father's devisees.-Young v. Young, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 627. 5. Defendant, who owned a patent for a cooking utensil, together with complainants, R. facture of household furnishings, and assigned and S., organized a company for the manuthe company his patent, each of them subThe company became insolvent, and a reorscribing for a certain amount of capital stock. ganization was had, under which S. paid out $55,000 in liquidation of debts, relieving defendant and R. of all personal liability therefor, and S. thereby became owner of all the capital stock, one-fourth of which he transferred to defendant. S. testified that defendant agreed to develop as many specialties as possible, and to assign to the company all patents therefor. R. testified that, on the first organization, defendant agreed that any patents utensils should "go to the company." Defendwhich he might invent in the line of kitchen ant testified that the original agreement contemplated only the patent originally assigned; that a subsequent patent he assigned the company was assigned only because it was a modification of the first. Held insufficient evidence to warrant a decree compelling defendant to assign the company other patents granted him subsequent to the organization of the company.-Eustis Manuf'g Co. v. Eustis, (N. J. Ch.) 27 A. 439. Performance by complainant. 6. Where certain persons contract to sell land to another, who agrees to take it, and pay the consideration on the delivery of a proper deed, and he demands a conveyance of more land than in equity he is entitled to, and refuses to pay the consideration unless his demand is complied with, and after such refusal the land is conveyed to another, who has full knowledge of the facts, the party making the "Corporations;" demand cannot thereafter claim specific per"Corporations;"formance of the contract, but will be left to his remedy at law.-Pyatt v. Lyons, (N. J. Err. & App.) 27 A. 934. Special Judge. Special Laws. See "Constitutional Law," 6, 7. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Adequate remedy at law. 1. A city's contract with the landowner to extend or construct a sewer through his land cannot be specifically enforced on mere allegations that the land is damaged, and that plaintiff is prevented from using it for build Spirituous Liquors. See "Intoxicating Liquors." STARE DECISIS. Taxation of corporations. The question as to the constitutionality of Act June 1, 1889, (P. L. p. 429,) relating to taxation of corporations, which makes the capital stock of corporations a distinct class of investments for the purpose of taxation, and exempts corporations organized exclusively for manufacturing purposes from taxation on their capital stock, is stare decisis.-Commonwealth | money raised for such tax, but paid by the v. National Oil Co., (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 374; Same v. Mill Creek Coal Co., Id. 375. STATE LEGISLATURE. Controversy as to election of members of legis- county treasurer to the state, with direction that it be applied on an account for which the County was not liable, and in fact so applied. is held by the state as trustee for the county, cannot be considered, as it raises an independent cause of action against the state.-Commonwealth v. Philadelphia County, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 546. Statute of Frauds. jurisdiction of courts. see "Mandamus," 1. Filling vacancies, see "Elections and Voters," See "Frauds, Statute of." 1, 2. Submission of questions to courts by governor or legislature, see "Courts," 1, 2. Statute of Limitations. Failure to elect members - Filling va- See "Limitation of Actions." cancy. 1. Under Const. art. 8, § 1, providing that senators and representatives shall hold office "until others are legally chosen and duly qualified to fill their places," a failure to elect within seven days from the first town meeting, as required by section 5, does not, when there is an incumbent to continue to hold the office, create a vacancy, within the meaning of Pub. St. c. 10, § 27, providing that when, in case of a failure to elect, the office shall become vacant, the town clerk shall issue his warrant for an election to fill such vacancy.-State v. Perry, (R. I.) 27 A. 606. Power of adjournment. 2. Under Const. art. 4, § 9, providing that neither house shall, during a session, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than two days, nor to any other place, and the clause requiring the two houses at the May session to meet in grand committee, and count the votes cast for general officers at the April election, the senate has the power to adjourn for more than two days, and to another place, on the same ground on which it has refused to join the house in grand committee, viz. that the house "has unseated certain of its members, and seated a person not elected, in violation of law, and in defiance of the constitution," since the constitution entitles each town to full representation.-In re Legislative Adjournment, (R. I.) 27 A. 324. By governor. 3. Under Const. art. 7, § 6, providing that, in case of disagreement between the two houses certified to him by either, the governor may adjourn them to such time and place as he may think proper, the question whether an adjournment of one house, before meeting in grand committee to canvass the votes for the general officers, not acted on in the other house, and certified by the former as a disagreement, warrants the governor in adjourning the assembly, is for the governor alone to decide, and the judges of the supreme court cannot review his decision. In re Legislative Adjournment, (R. I.) 27 A. 324. STATES AND STATE OFFI- Adjournment of legislature by governor, see Jurisdiction to grant pardon, see "Pardon." In an action on the account of the state against a county for taxes on personal property, settled by the auditor general, under authority of Act March 30, 1811, a claim that STATUTES. Retrospective effect of constitutional amend Enactment and approval. 1. The court will not go behind a law to see whether Const. art. 3, § 8, requiring notice of proposed legislation to be published 30 days before introduction of the bill, was complied with, but will presume such compliance.-Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 356. Amendment. 2. Act May 18, 1887, (P. L. 118,) relating to the liens of mechanics and others on buildings, purports to amend, so as to require notice of lien to be given to the owner, and extend to the entire commonwealth, the provisions of Act May 1, 1861, which limits to certain counties the provisions of Act June 16, 1836, relating to the same subject. In the body of the act the title of the act of 1836 is quoted, and so much of the act of 1861 as is intended to be amended and extended is republished, but the act of 1861 is only referred to by reference to Act 1836, "and the several supplements to the said act." Held, that the act is valid, as its enactment is in substantial compliance with Const. art. 3, § 6, requiring that so much of a law as is "revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length."-Purvis v. Ross, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 882. Titles of acts-Plurality of subjects. 3. Under Const. art. 3, § 3, providing that no act shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, the provision of Act May 24, 1893, entitled "An act to abolish the commissioners of public buildings and to place all public buildings heretofore under the control of such commissioners under the control of the department of public works in cities of the first class,' providing for the repeal of Act Aug. 5. 1870, cannot stand. McCollum, Mitchell, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting.-Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, (Pa. Sup.) 27 A. 356. Repeal. 99 4. Act approved April 2, 1891, entitled "An act for the formation and government of boroughs," does not repeal by implication act approved April 5, 1878, entitled "An act for the formation of borough governments," and the supplements thereto, since the act of 1878 is evidently designed for a more permanent community, of larger area, and larger permanent population, while the act of 1891 applies, by its very terms, to a population of an itinerant and fluctuating character.-State v. Clarke, (N. J. Sup.) 27 A. 924. |