curred, it was made an implied condition of the grant that the society should avow no doctrines inconsistent with these. But of what fundamental doctrine is the denominational name of 'United Brethren in Christ' expressive? If any, it determines the use to that extent. It helps nothing to inquire what are the distinctive doctrines of the denomination, or whether it has any. What concerns us is to ascertain what distinctive doctrines are expressed in the denominational name. Arminianism may be, and we are told is, one of the fundamental doctrines of the church, but it is not ascertainable from the denominational name. The name is not contradictory of extremest Calvanism. So, opposition to all secret associations may be a distinguishing characteristic, but the name does not so inform us.

If this name indicates anything as to doctrine, beyond the divinity of Christ, and the brotherhood of all believers in Him, we fail utterly to see it. As to these doctrines, the name furnishes us with an unerring guide, but its value stops right there.

“The cases all distinguish between a dedication of property to support particular tenets, and a dedication to support such tenets in subjection to a particular church government; and the rule is that when the cestui que trust is a congregation, indicated by its denominational name, the law will make it a condition of the grant that the congregation maintains the appropriate ecclesiastical connection, but when nothing appears in in the grant, except the church name, to indicate the form of belief, the law will make conditions only of those fundamental doctrines which the name clearly expresses. In Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 510, it is said: "There may be a support of tenets without subjection to any ecclesiastical power which upholds them; but it may be a condition of grant of property that a trust is to be maintained in subordination to a particular power, as, if a church be established in connection with a particular ecclesiastical body, a severance from that body would be a violation of the trust.' In our own state we have entire unanimity of decision on the general principles which govern in these cases; and, while we find no single one-where matters of faith were the disturbing cause-which turns upon a declaration of use so meager as this, yet they all accord with the authorities cited, and sustain the rule as we have stated it. The subordination to a particular church government may be made a fundamental condition, is the doctrine declared in Presbyterian Congregation v. Johnston, 1 Watts & S. 37. It is repeated and emphasized in Means v. Presbyterian Church, 3 Watts & S. 303. In App v. Lutheran Congregation, 6 Pa. St. 201, where the grant is almost identical with this, it is not only decided that it may be, but that it is, an essential condition; and in that case there is noth

ing from which such condition could be inferred but the denominational name. So, too, in Roshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 465, where the dedication was almost exactly similar, -'in trust for the use of the said German Reformed Church.' 'The principle which governs in all such cases,' says Mr. Justice Sharswood, 'is old and well established, and has frequently been asserted by this court. Whenever a church or religious society has been originally endowed in connection with, or in subordination to, some ecclesiastical organization and form of government, it can no more unite with some other organization, or become independent, than it can renounce its faith or doctrine, and adopt others.' McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. St. 14, and Schnorr's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 146, are to the same effect. These authorities all recognize this ecclesiastical connection, implying submission, as a fundamental condition, and several of them, as we have indicated, infer this condition from the use of the denominational name in the grant; and, however much any of them may seem to emphasize adherence to faith and doctrine as a condition, it will be found to be only in cases where there is an expressed condition to this effect, and even in such they limit it to doctrines which are distinctive and fundamental. In those of our state cases where the grant most resembles this one, the effort was to carry away the local church property, or at least to secede from the original organization. In Schnorr's Appeal, supra, one party, having declared themselves independent of all synods, and absolved from the government of the church of which they had been a part, claimed the local church property, notwithstanding the fact that it had been conveyed 'for the use of the congregation of the German Evangelical Reformed Church, and with the condition that no change shall be made in said congregation for any other denomination.' It was in this case, and with reference to this positive prohibition in the grant, that Justice Sharswood, in expressing his dissent from the language used in McGinnis v. Watson, supra, uses the emphatic language which is so much relied upon by the defendants. He says: 'Courts, which have the supervision and control of all corporations and unincorporated societies or associations, must be guided by surer and clearer principles than those to be derived from the nature of intellectual and spiritual life. The guaranty of religious freedom has nothing to do with the property. It does not guaranty freedom to steal churches. It secures to individuals the right of withdrawing, forming a new society, with such ends and government as they please, raising from their own means another fund, and building another house of worship, but it does not confer upon them the right of taking the property consecrated to other use by those who may now be sleeping in their graves.' What is

this but saying that the will and intentions of the donor alone determine the limitations and conditions of the trust, and that, when these are clearly expressed, the law of the land, which is superior to any supposed law of intellectual and spiritual life,' in its operation on property rights, at least, will enforce them? In App's Case, supra, the bequest was claimed by a congregation which did not belong to the old Lutheran Church, was attached to a new synod, and not under the same ecclesiastical government that ruled when the bequest was made. Ginnis v. Watson, supra, was a case of secession. In Presbyterian Congregation v. Johnston, supra, there was no ecclesiastical connection prescribed. And so we might distinguish all the cases from the one we are now considering. None of these suggest anything inconsistent with the rule of the interpretation as we have stated it, while in several, as we have shown, it has been applied in a most conclusive way.

Mc

"Confining our search, then, for the intentions of these donors, to the words of the conveyance from Dome, can we discover any intention to impose other conditions than that the beneficiary must be a congregation in connection with the Church of the United Brethren in Christ? that it must be distinctively Christian in faith, and accept the doctrine of the brotherhood of all believers in Christ? If more was intended, could it not have been easily expressed? As was said in Princeton v. Adams, 10 Cush. 129, it is perfectly easy for persons giving their own private property to a religious use to limit that use, and devote the property to a particular faith; and as was said in the Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 510, 'they need no professional assistance or technical learning to supply them with a peculiar phraseology. Any intelligible language will answer the purpose. They can have no difficulty in saying, in some comprehensible form, that they intend the dissemination of the thirty-nine articles of the English Church, or the Westminster Catechism; the doctrines of Luther, or Loyola; of Edmonds, or Channing, or Jefferson; the tenets held by some sect at a certain time, or such as it may hold from time to time in the course of its existence in a changing world. If they intend a theological limitation, they will express it; and then the court may be called upon to decide, by legal rules settled by the wisdom of ages, not what the faith is, but what limitation is expressed by the words used.' If, by our interpretation, we have confined this trust within limits too narrow, to what extent are they to be opened up? Can it be maintained for a moment that they are to include, as an essential condition, the entire confession of faith which was recognized by the denomination when the trust was created? If so, it must be by necessary intendment from the single fact that there was such a confession in existence. Any such view not only imputes to the donors what

they did not express, and which could have been readily expressed, if intended, but it ignores what we have tried to show was the paramount purpose, because it is expressed, to wit, to place the subject of the trust in a congregation in subjection to the general order and government of the church at large. The United Brethren in Christ were an organized body long before the trust was creat ed. So, too, the Greencastle congregation had an earlier existence, and was in ecclesiastical connection with the general body, and subject to its authority and legislation, when the property was dedicated to its use. This much the donors knew, and are presumed to have had in contemplation. Is it reasonable to suppose, under such circumstances, that they intended a use inconsistent with the submission of the congregation to established authority? We think it evident that the paramount purpose was to secure the property to the local society, in subordination to the higher authority of the church, whereby the regular connection and relation of the parts to the whole would be secured; and surely, if this be correct, such a qualified use as is here contended for would be inconsistent with this purpose, except upon the theory that it is beyond the power of the church to change its creed,-an assumption which we cannot allow. Why cannot the church change its creed? It made it; and why cannot the same power which made, unmake? It can change its name, its order of worship, its discipline, its government. Then, why not its creed? To deny it this right is to deny its existence as an organized society, or else deny it the freedom of conscience which is guarantied to the individual. The power to make implies the power to change. It is inherent and inextinguishable as well in churches as in individuals. We are not denying that certain legal consequences affecting property rights may result from a change of creed. What we are saying is that the power to change the creed is implied in the very existence of the church, and that this power inhered in the church before, and at the time when, this particular property was dedicated to a local congregation in connection with the church. This the donors are supposed to have known, and to have indicated the use accordingly. With this knowledge, either actual or imputed, of the inherent power of the church over its creed, is it not, and ought it not to be, a controlling circumstance in the case, that no condition whatever in regard to faith or doctrine, beyond what is expressed in the denominational name, can be found in the letter of the grant? We certainly so regard it, and in this view we are largely supported by the case of Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. Mon. 481, which stands out with the prominence of a guidepost. It is no answer to say that it was in the belief that the church would adhere to its confession of faith, as then written, for all time to come, that the dedication of the property was made

That is assuming a fact, in support of which there is no evidence at all. But grant it to be a fact. What have we to do, in determining this question, with the belief and inducements which operated on the minds of the donors, when they have expressed in the grant itself the use they intend? If the grant were doubtful or uncertain,-which it is not, -we could resort to extrinsic circumstances, and consider, perhaps, the belief and motives of the grantors as aids, but not otherwise. This grant cannot be regarded as requiring extrinsic evidence to construe it, simply because it may be thought by some, from the circumstances under which it was made, and its brevity, that more was intended than is expressed. Any such rule would open the way for extrinsic evidence to disturb, if not destroy, any trust in existence. And when a church, in the exercise of its undoubted right, in a legal and sufficient way, changes its creed, what property rights are affected thereby? It unquestionably forfeits its right to all property, the use of which was conditioned by the donor, in his grant, on an unchangeable creed, but nothing beyond. We have argued to show that the conditions in the present case are that the property be used by a Christian congregation in connection with a particular denomination, holding to the doctrine of the brotherhood of all believers in Christ. Any connection with a different denomination, or the avowal of a faith inconsistent with the doctrines of the Christian religion, or the brotherhood of believers in Christ, would be a perversion of this trust, such as the law would forbid and correct; but, until such radical and fundamental perversion as this is attempted, those whom we have found to compose the true and real congregation at Greencastle, and here represented by the plaintiffs, are entitled to the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of the church property.

"In the view we have taken of this case, any further examination into the changes made in the confession of faith is unnecessary. It remains distinctively and unequivocally Christian in its character. So much is conceded, and it is all that concerns us to know. We may, however, be permitted to add that, in comparing the new with the old, we fail to see how any one professing his belief in either could be denied membership or fellowship in the society which professes belief in the other. Literally, they are not the same; but if inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other, with respect to any doctrine which has ever been made the basis of separate denominational existence, such fact has not been brought to our notice. The schoolmen may have made some of the points of difference the subject of their violent polemics, and it may interest the student of history or science to know just how they were regarded by these men who were so wasteful of their learning and zeal; but, in modern Christian thought, they are not con

sidered of sufficient importance to disturb the unity of the faith. Since, then, the Liberal congregation at Greencastle, here represented by the plaintiffs in the original bill, is in connection with, and subordinate to, the authority of the legitimate Church of the United Brethren in Christ, and since none of the conditions of the grant under which it holds the property now in dispute have been violated, it follows that these plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for, and that the defendants' cross bill must be dismissed."

O. C. Bowers, for appellants. Rowe, Gillan & Stewart, for appellees.

WILLIAMS, J. The right to the decree asked for in this case depends on a question of ecclesiastical identity. The question is, which of the parties, and organizations represented by them, is the church and society known as the "United Brethren in Christ?" The society was a unit prior to 1889. It had a system of polity and a creed which were accepted throughout the whole church. They had taken form gradually, with the growth of the church, from a small beginning a hundred years or more ago, until they were reduced to form by the general conference. This was done, so far as the confession of faith is concerned, in 1815. The constitution was formulated and adopted in 1841. The confession of faith remained without any considerable change for three-quarters of a century. The constitution had been recognized and accepted as the fundamental law of the society for a half century. The system of polity provided for the grouping of individuals into local congregations or churches. An indefinite number of churches were grouped to form a circuit. Circuits were united to make a district, and these, held together by the denominational bond, made up the church. The ecclesiastical power of the society was distributed through a succession of courts or tribunals. The church officers exercised this power in the individual congregation. In the circuit, it was exercised by the quarterly conference; in the district, by the annual conference; and, for the whole society, the general quadrennial conference was the supreme legislative and judicial body. Its confession of faith was brief, and in its outlines was what may be described as "Christological." Under these simple fundamental rules of polity and articles of faith, the society had grown until in 1889 its membership numbered over 200,000, distributed over many states. It had become one of the influential Protestant organizations, and was the owner of much valuable church property. The local church at Greencastle was organized and officered prior to 1889 under the authority of this united and prosperous society, and was in full connection with it. The officers of this local church are the plaintiffs in this case, and they insist that since 1889, as truly as before, they have

the right to the possession of the house of worship, and the lands appurtenant, belonging to the church at Greencastle.

Looking at the position of the defendants, we find that on the church records, as far back as 1865, there is evidence to show a growing difference of opinion in regard to three points of polity. These were the admission of lay representation, the rates of representation, and the attitude of the church towards secret societies. The constitution of 1841 (article 2, § 7) contained this provision: "There shall be no connection with secret combinations." This declaration was indefinite. It was susceptible of an interpretation so broad as to prohibit membership in the various social, charitable, and mutual aid societies that have grown so rapidly in number and in favor in recent years. It might with equal, if not better, reason, be construed as having reference to unlawful secret combinations, and not intended to interfere with lawful organizations, whose advantages were restricted to their own membership. The attitude of those who held to the first of these positions was regarded by many as imposing an unnecessarily hard restriction upon the freedom of action of the individual members of the church. The sentiment in favor of increased liberality towards the laity, in admitting them to participate in the government of the society, and removing unnecessary restrictions upon their individual action, grew steadily. Finally, in 1885, it had become so strong that a decided majority of the members of the general conference took action upon the subject. In a carefully-worded resolution, they expressed their belief that both the creed and constitution could be improved in clearness and fullness of statement, and by this means brought more thoroughly into harmony with the views and wishes of the church. This was a mild form of revision, and the conference entered very deliberately upon it. The first thing done was to raise a committee of 13 members to consider the subject, and report. After considerable deliberation, 11 members of the committee united in a report setting forth: "It is the sense and belief of your committee that the constitution, as it now stands, is not in harmony with the present wishes of our people, as has been indicated in discussion, petitions, and elections during the past year," and recommending that a commission, to consist of 27 members, including all the bishops of the church, should be appointed to "consider our present confession of faith and constitution, and prepare such a form of belief, and such amended fundamental rules for the government of this church in the future, as will be best adapted, in their judgment, to secure its growth and efficiency in the work of evangelizing the world." This commission was made up so as to distribute its members among the several districts composing the society, and was subjected to the following lines of limitation,

viz.: "To preserve unchanged, in substance, the present confession of faith, so far as it is clear; * to retain the present itiner

ant plan; * to keep sacred the general usages and distinctive principles of the church on all great moral reforms." When the commission should complete its work of revision along these narrow and conservative lines, it was instructed to submit it to the membership of the society for approval or disapproval, in such manner as to secure general attention to it, and place it in the power of every member who would do so to express his or her opinion. This action was in no sense revolutionary. It did not propose to cut loose from any distinctive theological doctrine, or from the general system of polity, theretofore held by the society. The commission entered upon its work, and revised both the confession of faith and the constitution, with a view to greater clearness and fullness of statement upon certain doctrines, and greater liberality towards the membership in their individual action upon the subject of secret societies. Both documents were put in a more connected and logical form; and were relieved from the indefiniteness and ambiguity of expression out of which the differences of interpretation had arisen. The revised documents were then submitted to the society for an expression for or against their adoption in lieu of the constitution and confession then in use. Nearly three years were given for discussion and examination. At the end of this time a vote was taken throughout the society. The returns showed a very large majority of the votes to be in favor of the substitution of the revised forms for the old. At the general conference of 1889 the commission reported its work, the submission of it to the society, the votes given for and against its adoption, and submitted the whole to the consideration of that body. In this report 25 of its members concurred. One bishop and one other person dissented, and submitted a minority report. The general conference then referred the majority report to a special committee, charged to examine and report whether the commission had followed the instruc tions given to it, kept within the prescribed limits, and submitted its plan of revision to the society in a proper manner. All but two of this committee joined in a report affirming that the commission had acted with fidelity, had observed the limitations imposed upon their action, and had submitted their work to the membership, by whom it had been approved. They therefore recommended that the bishops should issue a proclamation announcing the adoption of the revised documents, and declaring them to be the confession of faith and the constitution of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ. This report was adopted by the very decisive vote of 110 yeas to 20 nays. The proclamation was accordingly made, and the revised forms became thereupon, and thereaft