notice that on May 17, 1911, it likewise would apply for a preliminary injunction. The Federal Sugar Refining Company intervened. The United States filed a motion to dismiss, and the commission and the Federal Sugar Refining Co. likewise filed motions to dismiss. The three motions to dismiss were argued together May 17, 1911, and submitted on briefs. May 22, 1911, the Commerce Court entered an order granting the motion for a temporary injunction. On the same day it entered a separate order overruling the motions to dismiss the petition, allowing twenty days within which to file answers. Important questions of both law and fact are involved in the contention that Arbuckle Bros. are receiving preferences and discriminations at the hands of railroad companies as against other independent refiners and shippers of sugar. June 12, 1911, the Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal Sugar Refining Co. took a joint appeal to the Supreme Court. June 16, 1911, the United States followed with a separate appeal. January 9, 1912, the cause was argued in the Supreme Court. June 10, 1912, the Supreme Court announced its opinion, holding the preliminary injunction was issued in the discretion of the Commerce Court and that in view of the importance of the case and the fact that the commission was divided, it would affirm the order of the Commerce Court and, without passing on the merits of the case, it remanded the case with instructions to proceed to a final hearing. June 9, 1911, the United States filed its answer in the Commerce Court, as did also Federal Sugar Refining

Co. The United States is ready to and will at once proceed with the taking of evidence for the final hearing early in the autumn.

No. 39. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company et al. v. United States, commonly known as the "Restricted coal rate case."

February 24, 1911, the Interstate Commerce Commission directed certain railroad companies to cease and desist from giving preferences in rates on interstate shipments of coal for particular consignees, for particular uses, which rates were restricted to certain shippers and were not open to all shippers alike. Numerous railroad companies filed a petition before the Commerce Court, seeking to enjoin and annul the order of the commission and asked for a preliminary injunction. The motion was argued and submitted. May 29, 1911, the Commerce Court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the order of the commission and issued its writ of injunction. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from the interlocutory order or decree of the Commerce Court and an answer was filed by the United States to the petition. Important questions are involved in the contention that railroad companies have been making preferential and discriminatory rates among themselves applicable to coal consumed in the locomotives. January 9, 1912, the case was argued in the Supreme Court. June 7, 1912, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Commerce Court, holding that railroad companies as shippers and consumers of coal were on the

basis of all other shippers and consumers of coal, that the preliminary injunction was improvident, and directed a dismissal of the petition.

No. 40. Norfolk & Western Railway Company et al. v. United States.

June 7, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission reduced the local class rates from Roanoke, Va., to Winston-Salem, N. C., and from Lynchburg, Va., to Durham, N. C. It also reduced certain other class rates from Cincinnati, Ohio, to the North Carolina destinations. On May 1, 1911, the carriers filed a petition before the Commerce Court, supported by affidavits, seeking to set aside that order, and moved for a preliminary injunction. The motion was argued and submitted. May 25, 1911, the motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. The evidence was taken, and on February 16, 1912, the cause came on for final hearing. The basis of the attack on the order of the commission was that the railroad companies were not given a full hearing before the commission; that their interests were not sufficiently considered; that the rates as reduced were confiscatory; that the commission misapprehended the facts; and that the rates as reduced would conflict with the longand-short-haul clause; also that heavy losses would result. April 9, 1912, the opinion of the Commerce Court was filed, holding that the various contentions. turned purely on questions of fact which were foreclosed by the findings of the commission, and directing a dismissal of the petition. No appeal was taken.

No. 41. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company et al. v. United States, commonly known as the "pre-cooling and pre-icing citrus fruits case." Prior to January 14, 1911, it had been the practice of the railroad companies to permit the shippers of citrus fruits in California to pre-cool and pre-ice the cars prior to shipment, with directions to the carriers not to re-ice in transit. The services of the carriers consisted only of setting the cars preliminarily to precooling and loading and after the cars had been precooled and loaded by the shipper to transport them to destination. For this privilege the carriers have levied a charge of $30 per car. On complaint to the commission, the latter found, January 14, 1911, that the charge of $30 was unreasonable and reduced it to $7.50 per car, which was sufficient to pay for the repairing of the bunkers. May 4, 1911, the carriers filed a bill, supported by affidavits, and moved for a preliminary injunction, on the ground that the commission had acted beyond its power; that the allowance of $7.50 per car did not pay for the cost of the service; that they were not obliged to permit precooling and pre-icing; that their property would be confiscated and that they would sustain enormous losses. After argument, on May 29, 1911, the motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, the court holding that it did not construe the order of the commission as requiring the carriers to continue this privilege, but while the privilege was accorded the charge prescribed by the commission should be sustained. Thereupon the carriers filed new tariffs, to

become effective July 1, 1911, seeking to withdraw their tariffs permitting the pre-cooling and pre-icing. These new tariffs were suspended by the commission, and the case went to a second hearing before that body. April 8, 1912, the commission filed its report and entered its order finding that the shippers had the right to pre-cool and pre-ice their cars and ordered a permanent suspension of the proposed tariffs which sought to take away that right.

May 15, 1912, the carriers filed a supplemental petition, further alleging that the commission was without power to suspend the tariffs and erred as a matter of law in so doing; that pre-cooling and preicing constitute a part of the refrigeration and that the carriers were entitled to provide and perform all refrigeration services and make reasonable charges therefor and that $7.50 was not sufficient to pay the cost. A second motion for a preliminary injunction was made before Judge Carland, which, May 17, 1912, was also denied; and the order of the commission is still in full force and effect. From the report of the commission it appears that by this order the shippers of California are saving $600,000 per annum. The case will not come to a final hearing before the autumn.

No. 42. The Arkansas Fertilizer Company v. United States.

The Interstate Commerce Commission had held, in Blinn Lumber Co. v. Southern Pacific Co. (18 I. C. C. R., 430), that complaints for reparation should be filed with the commission within two years from