the Central Railroad, as to the traffic of the iron works, which it could not theretofore have been required to assume. We can not believe that any such result was accomplished. The rights and duties of the Central Railroad respecting the iron works could not thus be altered. If its obligations as a common carrier were fully discharged and its tariff rate earned by delivering cars to and taking them from the exchange tracks before the iron works parted with its railroad, its rights and duties respecting that concern were neither increased nor diminished by the creation of the Crane Railroad. The services rendered to the iron works continuing to be precisely the same in point of fact, this railroad continued to be utilized as the facility of the iron works' plant in the same way after as before incorporation.

Nor do we perceive any serious objection to regarding a given agency as a plant facility of a particular shipper, although a common carrier as to other shippers. Whether considered from the standpoint of law or of practical administration, it seems reasonable to hold, as the Commission virtually held in this case, that a railroad of the kind in question may have this dual character and perform services for one concern which are not the services of a common carrier, but which that concern is bound to provide for itself, notwithstanding it occupies the relation of a common carrier to other concerns and the public generally. Concededly, the work which the Crane Railroad does in moving cars between different points in the iron works' plant has none of the inci

dents of common carriage, and why may not the same thing be affirmed of the work it does in switching cars for the iron works to and from the exchange track with the Central Railroad, even if the work it does for the other industries makes it as to them or the shippers of Catasauqua a common carrier?

It is unnecessary to discuss the charge of discrimination except to say that the Commission has found, upon evidence which is clearly substantial, that the refusal of the Central Railroad to pay switching charges on traffic handled for the Iron Works, while at the same time paying switching charges on traffic handled for the other industries, is not an undue prejudice to the one or an undue preference to the others.

In the concluding paragraph of the report upon which the dismissal order is based the Commission summarizes the situation as follows:

"The complaint attacks certain rates as unreasonable and asks for the establishment of certain joint rates between definite points. The complainant [petitioner] does not contend that these rates are unreasonable except by the amount of this switching charge, nor does it ask for the establishment of joint rates except for the purpose of compelling the defendant [Central Railroad] to pay the Crane Railroad for the performance of this switching service. Since we hold that the delivery by the defendant [Central Railroad] is completed when cars are placed upon the interchange track and that defendant [Central Railroad] owes no duty to the complainant [petitioner] to receive loaded cars from it until they are put upon that track, there is no occasion to examine in detail the rates referred to."

Upon the whole case we are of opinion that no error of law was committed by the Commission in denying the petitioner's application. It follows that the motions to dismiss the petition should be granted, and it will be so ordered.

United States Commerce Court.

No. 57-FEBRUARY SESSION, 1912.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. STONY FORK COAL CO. ET AL., PETITIONERS, UNITED STATES, INTERVENER,

V.

LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO. ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

ON PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Mr. T. G. Anderson for petitioners.

Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, for the United States, intervener, in support of the jurisdiction of the court.

Mr. Albert S. Brandeis and Mr. William A. Northcutt for the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.

Mr. Alfred P. Thom and Mr. John K. Graves for the Southern Railway Co.

Before KNAPP, Presiding Judge, and ARCHBALD, HUNT, CARLAND, and MACK, Judges.

CARLAND, Judge:

[March 20, 1912.]

November 15th, 1911, petitioners filed their petition in this court, praying for a writ or writs of mandamus directed to the respondents, commanding

them and each of them to perform their duties as common carriers in the matter of the transportation of coal. Upon the filing of the petition an alternative writ of mandamus was ordered to issue by the court. The alternative writ, however, was not issued, but in place thereof a copy of the order allowing the same was served on the respondents, together with an order to show cause, returnable December 5th, 1911. Each respondent answered the petition filed, and the case was subsequently heard upon the petition and the answers of respondents.

At the hearing, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company moved to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction. Petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings. The following material facts appear therefrom:

The Stony Fork Coal Company, Ralston Coal Company, Monarch Coal & Coke Company, and Hignite Coal Mining Company own and operate coal mines in Bell County, Kentucky. The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the Southern Railway Company are common carriers engaged in the transportation of freight, including coal, from coal fields and coal mines on their lines of railroad in the State of Kentucky to stations and points in the States of Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, which said lastmentioned States are known for the purposes of transportation as southeastern territory.

Middlesborough is a town in Bell County, Kentucky, in what is known as the Middlesborough district of