and employee. Section 10 of this act makes it a misdemeanor for the carrier to require the employee to agree "not to become or remain a member of any labor corporation" or organization as a condition of employment, or to threaten loss of employment, or to discriminate, because of membership in any labor corporation or organization; or who, having discharged an employee shall "attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent such employee from obtaining employment."

It is declared by section 8 of this (1898) statute that every national trade union must embody in its articles of incorporation "and in the constitution, rules and by-laws," a provision that a member "shall cease to be such by participating or by instigating force or violence against persons or property during strikes, lockouts, or boycotts, or by seeking to prevent others from working, through violence, threats or intimidation." The section declares that members "shall not be personally liable for the acts, debts, or obligations of the corporations, nor shall such corporations be liable for the acts of members or others in violation of law."

54b. Injunction of Proceedings in State Court When Forbidden. Congress, in order to secure the orderly administration of proceedings pending in State courts, as to matters concerning which the Federal courts have no jurisdiction, has forbidden the latter to issue an injunction to stay proceedings in the State courts, unless proceedings in bankruptcy are involved. The Federal statute in this regard is as follows:

Injunction as to State Courts. The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States, to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy. U. S. Rev. Stat., § 720.

This provision of the United States revised statutes was construed and commented upon, in regard to proceedings in the State courts of Kentucky, which were stayed by the Federal court, in the case of Oman v. Bedford-Bowling Green Stone Co., 134 Fed. R. 64.

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IX. STATE ANTI-TRUST LAWS-COMMON-LAW TRUSTS. § 55. State Anti-Trust Laws.- Congress can legislate only as to interstate commerce. The power conferred by the Constitution authorizes it to regulate commerce among the several States. It has no power to legislate with regard to commerce conducted wholly within the borders of a State. Power to forbid trusts, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade within State lines resides in the State Legislature. Since the passage of the Sherman Act, approved July 2, 1890, known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, which prohibits every contract, combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, Legislatures of various States of the Union have, from time to time, enacted similar laws prohibiting conspiracies in restraint of trade within the borders of the respective States. Many of these State laws have been sustained and declared valid by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In a number of States, however, no anti-trust laws have been enacted, and the question constantly arising is, how far monopolies or criminal conspiracies to enhance the price of necessaries of life, can be punished criminally in those States where the common law prevails, and in which no statutes have been enacted to punish unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce.

§ 56. Federal Courts Cannot Punish Common-Law Trusts. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789 (U. S. Rev. Stat., § 711), supra (§ 40), the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over "crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States." The Constitution authorizes Congress to punish three classes of crimes: (1.) Counterfeiting. (2.) Piracies and felonies on the high seas. (3.) Treason. The Federal courts, however, although courts of general jurisdiction, are also courts of limited jurisdiction in the sense that they cannot punish crimes, except such as are defined by Congress, which must designate the crime and fix the punishment because they

possess no common-law jurisdiction over crimes. (United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 32; United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How.. 518.)

The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not establish a Penal Code. That legislation is contained in the Crimes Act of April 30, 1790, U. S. Rev. Stat., Title LXX. That act contains no provision making monopolies and criminal conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce crimes. No Federal statute on that subject was passed until Congress enacted the Sherman Act, approved July 2, 1890.

While there is no Federal common law with respect to crimes, the common law in so far as it relates to civil actions, both at law and in equity, will be administered in the Federal courts. They will enforce the common law as they find it in the respective States as adopted and modified by the State in which the Federal court is sitting, unless the rule has been superseded by an act of Congress upon the subject. (U. S. v. Lancaster, 2 McLean, 431; U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 18; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; U. S. v. Burr, 2 Rob. 481; U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384.)

The settled rule is, therefore, that the common law in criminal cases cannot be administered in the Federal courts, and their jurisdiction does not extend to offenses unless they are made crimes by an act of Congress.

This rule as to the enforcement of the common law in civil cases, rests upon the principle that in so far as the common law has been adopted by a State, it becomes part of the local law and of the jurisprudence of that State, and in justice to its citizens, and to enforce their civil rights, Congress has expressly commanded that the Federal courts shall enforce the laws of the several States unless in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States. The statute (U. S. Rev. Stat., § 721), provides as follows:

Laws of the States in Federal Courts.- The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the

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United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded, as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. (U. S. Rev. Stat., § 721.)

Congress by this statute, subject to the qualifications of the act, has adopted the common law which has been adopted in the respective States, and has conferred upon the Federal courts authority to apply such common law in the States where it is invoked in civil actions. The Federal courts, however, are not bound to follow the construction put upon i the law by the State courts, but have a right to construe it according to their judgment as to its meaning and interpretation. If a right is claimed in a Federal court based upon principles of the common law, reference must be made to the common law of the State where the Federal court is sitting in which the controversy arose. Whether such common-law rule relied upon exists, and the extent or limitation of the rules, must be determined by the judicial decisions, statutes, if any, and the usages and customs thereof. If the common-law rule exists as claimed, and is applicable to the case, and is not abrogated or superseded by the Constitution, or a law or treaty of the United States, it will be the duty of the Federal court to regard it as a rule of decision in the Federal court.

An illustration of this principle is shown in United States v. Garlinghouse, 4 Ben. 194. Mrs. Garlinghouse, a married woman, was engaged in business as a distiller in the State of New York. She executed a bond to the United States in the penal sum of $20,000, conditioned upon her compliance with the warehouse and internal revenue laws. In a suit upon the bond in 1870, defendant pleaded her coverture as a defense, and claimed that, being a married woman, she had no legal capacity to execute the bond. She argued that at common law the bond was void. The answer was that under the laws of the State of New York defendant, though a married woman, was authorized to engage in business as a distiller on her own account, for her own benefit, and was competent to execute the bond under the New York statute. The court, therefore, held the bond to be valid.

under the lex loci contractus. That the common-law rule was binding on the Federal court only in so far as it existed or had been modified or abrogated by the State of New York where the contract arose, and where the action was tried. That the common-law rule as to married women had been so far modified in that State as to remove the disability of a married woman as to her separate business, and authorized her to engage in business on her own account, and that under the statutes of New York defendant was not disqualified to execute a bond in connection with her own business.

The courts of the United States have never adopted the common law as a whole, by any general rule of court, and have no power to do so. "And yet," says Mr. SPEAR, in his work on the Federal Judiciary, "in the disposal of civil cases relating to legal rights and their remedies, these courts have, from the commencement of the government, looked to the common law as a repository of doctrines and principles to which they might refer for the purpose of understanding the meaning of statutes and constitutional provisions, and which, in the absence of statutes directing them, or otherwise requiring, they might adopt, and apply, as containing pertinent and proper rules for their guidance in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by express law, and in determining questions relating to the rights of the parties in the cases pending before them."

§ 57. Common Law, as to Trusts and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade.-The Federal courts have no jurisdiction over crimes and offenses, other than those cognizable under the laws of the United States. Congress has no power to legislate with respect to trade or commerce carried on wholly within. the borders of a State. In the absence of a State Anti-Trust Law, therefore, the only redress is the common law, under which a conspiracy to control the price of necessaries of life is an indictable offense. Sir William BLACKSTONE, the most distinguished commentator on the common law of England, says that criminal conspiracies in restraint of trade and