quickened and enhanced. I do not say this in depreciation of Christian dogma. But we are still a Christian people' ('Gleanings,' vii, 150). Consequently, after the recovery from his first disillusionment, he remained steadfast to the resolve to fight every inch of ground in defence of the alliance of Church and State, because of its beneficent effects on English social life.

'It is' (he says) 'by a practical rather than a theoretic test that our Establishments of religion should be tried. . . . An Establishment that does its work in much, and has the likelihood of doing it in more; an Establishment that has a broad and living way open to it, into the hearts of the people; an Establishment that can command the services of the present by the recollections and traditions of a far-reaching past . . such an Establishment should surely be maintained' (ib.).

It should specially be noticed that Mr Gladstone shows no mercy to a disestablishment policy, somewhat in favour to-day, which rests on the assumption that alliance with the State must inevitably impair the witness of the Church. He attacks it vigorously in his first essay, and recurs to the subject in his 'Chapter of Autobiography.' He points out that the familiar quotation from Dante's 'Inferno' about Constantine, so often applied, among others by Mr Gladstone's biographer, to the alliance of Church and State, refers not to this but to the supposed donation of temporal sovereignty; and contends that, by the combined evidence of friends and foes, the alliance proved a powerful influence in extending the truth of religion. He insists further that, if Christ died for the whole race, it is better to have a somewhat lower average tone over a large area than for Christianity to be restricted to a private society. We may add that it is always possible, even for an Established Church, to maintain an intensity of heat and light at the centre of the system, even if it only nominally embraces the greater part of a community; and we may well doubt whether, if the Church does not do so under an Establishment, it would do so in any other circumstances.

Art. 11.-THE NAVAL CRISIS.

1. The Navy League Annual. Edited by Alan H. Burgoyne. London: Murray, 1909.

2. The Naval Annual. Edited by T. A. Brassey. Portsmouth Griffin, 1910.

3. Fighting Ships, 1910. Edited by Fred T. Jane. London: Sampson Low, 1910.

4. The Campaign of Trafalgar. By Julian S. Corbett. London: Longmans, 1910.

5. The Naval Operations of the War between Great Britain and the United States, 1812-15. By Theodore Roosevelt. London: Sampson Low, 1910.

THE naval supremacy of Great Britain is in grave peril. It is already apparent that a determined effort will be made, before the Navy Estimates for next year are laid before Parliament, to convert the Cabinet-if conversion is necessary to a policy of ruinous economy on the British fleet in face of immense expenditure on foreign fleets, and to subvert the judgment of the predominant element in the electorate, the working classes, for whom the Navy means work and food. The leader of the new anti-navy campaign is not a free-lance politician, speaking from a public platform, but a responsible Minister of the Crown, speaking from the Treasury Bench. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out on the new crusade with the support of the Home Secretary and other members of the Cabinet. The line of attack was indicated in his Budget speech. Mr Lloyd George did not attempt to show that our fleet is larger than the situation demands; he did not indulge in such platitudinous laments over its cost as Chancellors in the past have frequently made; but he suggested that a rivalry exists between adequate measures for national defence by sea, and measures for improving the lot of the working classes at home. Turning to the Radical and Labour benches, he stated that

'if the taxes fulfil their promise, and come up to the Government's expectations next year, and if we return to the normal naval expenditure in the following year, we can see our way to start next year on a great national scheme of insurance

against unemployment and invalidity, a scheme on a contributory basis with a liberal State subsidy-a State subsidy twice as liberal as that given by Germany for the same purpose, which will insure 2,500,000 workmen employed in precarious trades against the evils of unemployment, and 13,000,000 of working men and working women against the distress that comes from sickness and the premature breakdown of the breadwinner, and will provide for the setting up of sanatoria for the cure of illness.'

In this passage a rivalry was suggested between national security and social amelioration. The section of the Press which echoes the Chancellor's views was not slow to drive home this statement of policy. The working classes have been repeatedly reminded that, if the expenditure on the Navy is reduced, the sooner will blessings flow from the Treasury Bench. The masses are being urged to oppose reasonable precautions against aggression, not because precautions are unnecessary, but because by limiting expenditure on the Navy they may obtain advantages for their particular class. Was ever a more insidious campaign initiated? What section of the community will feel as soon and as acutely the privations of war as that which works for a weekly wage? Yet it is on these lines that a conspiracy against our naval supremacy is being organised, with a view to coercing the Admiralty into the acceptance of estimates insufficient for the due maintenance of the fleet.

Policy does determine armaments, but not the policy of the British Government only; indeed, the more peaceful the outspoken intentions of the British Government, the more bellicose frequently becomes the attitude of rival Powers. The important factor in determining the extent of British armaments is not British policy, but the policy of other countries. Now the scale of our armaments, as of those of the United States, France, and even, in a great degree, of Japan, is dictated by Germany. The official relations between the British and German Governments are friendly; and no one would designedly utter one word which would tend to hinder an understanding being reached between the two peoples. But we cannot ignore the operation of the German Navy Law, under which, a fleet 'greater than any now in existence' (to quote Sir Edward Grey) is being created and trained within

three or four hundred miles of our shores. This fleet is rapidly becoming the dominating factor in international politics. It is not our business to object to the scale on which Germany chooses to organise her naval forces, but it is our business to watch this development in the light of Germany's past policy, and to take such measures as may be necessary.

We need hardly remind our readers of the salient facts in the recent history of that country, or of the methods which have been employed in the aggrandisement of Prussia. We have no evidence that these methods have been abandoned. Year by year, we watch the growth of the German fleet, the creation of a series of menacing fortifications facing the North Sea, the assiduous care taken to perfect the efficiency and inflame the military spirit of the greatest army in the world; and we, whose highest interest is peace, wonder what such measures mean. Russia is exhausted by foreign and internal conflicts; France is thrifty and lethargic, and was never less desirous of war; Italy, with embarrassed finances, seeks no adventures; England, with an army of insignificant proportions, was never less inclined for hostilities than to-day. Where is the cloud that hangs over the German Empire, allied to the huge armaments of Austria-Hungary? What is there to explain the feverish haste with which Navy and Army are being marshalled on a scale, and at a cost, unequalled by any of the great Empires of the past? We have one arm only for our protection, for safeguarding our oversea dominions, for protecting our commerce and our foodsupplies; and, however innocent Germany may be of hostile intentions against ourselves or others, we cannot forget that our present and our future lies on the sea, and that by the sea we live. It is in face of this rapid growth of armaments abroad that a conspiracy is being organised, in our midst and by men of our blood, against the maintenance of British naval forces in sufficiency and efficiency.

We are faced by a naval crisis, a crisis at once serious and imminent. The salient facts of the situation are no longer in doubt; they are not disputed even by members of the Government. We need not recapitulate the grave admissions made by the Prime Minister and

the Foreign Secretary in the spring of 1909, admissions to which we called attention in these pages last autumn. In July last, when Mr Asquith next dealt with the naval situation, he distinctly affirmed that nothing had occurred in the interval to cause the Government to retract a single one of these earlier statements; and he proceeded to make a specific admission of the relative strength of the British and German fleets which, in the light of new facts, has hitherto failed to attract that measure of attention which it merited. Mr Asquith told us that in April of this year the German Government had placed orders for four more ships of the largest armoured type, asserting that he obtained this intelligence from the official records of the German Government. In the light of this further acceleration, the Prime Minister indicated the relative strength of the two navies in capital ships at specified dates in the future.*

The First Lord of the Admiralty went into rather more detail than the Prime Minister, in order to justify in the eyes of the naval economists in the House of Commons the programme of construction put forward by the Government. Commenting upon the implied suggestion that it was unnecessary to lay down the five ships for which the Admiralty asked, Mr McKenna said:

'If I do not give an order for these five, under the German law-I name Germany because it has been so often mentioned -the Germans are entitled merely on the procedure of this year to give an order for another four large armoured ships next April. I cannot get permission from Parliament until next April to lay down any more. They would have seven on the slips against our four, and four more on order. Does my hon. friend' [Mr John Dillon, who moved the reduction of the vote and was supported by 69 members] think that in these circumstances I should be doing my duty in not asking power from Parliament to build an additional five? Surely he would not say to me that was an adequate number-ten built against five built; six launched against five launched

*This tabulated statement was published in the Liberal Magazine' o August 1910 (p. 399), in a summary of Mr Asquith's speech.