VOL. IV. No. 22.] London, Saturday, 3d December, 1803. [ Price 10D: My Honourable Friend has proposed to limit the restriction [on paying in specie at the Bank] to "the 1st of May. My reason for proposing a more distant day, is, not that Parliament should put "it out of their power to take advantage of any circumstance, favourable to the discontinuance of the restriction, because there is a clause in the bill enabling Parliament to avail themselves of "any opportunity of that nature; but, though I think, that there is little probability, of their be. ing enabled so soon to gratify their wishes in that respect, 1 look forward to the commencement of the' "next session for that gratification.”——Mr. Addington's Speech, Feb. 11, 1803. 44 769] LETTER I. FROM A CONTINENTAL OBSERVER. Hamburgh, 23d Oct. 1803. SIR,--Your Political Register of the 23d of July last, fortunately falling into my bands, I read with great interest, and not without some surprise, INQUISITOR'S IVth Letter of the 16th. Whether the arguments of your correspondent have produced any active measures, I know not, but that they have given rise to much reflection I am certhin. It appears to me, that, at this moment, the situation of England requires active deLiberation and deliberate activity. Inquisitor is of the same opinion, and therefore pursues the shortest course to attain his object. This is, generally, the best mode; for when we are in the right way, we need not be afraid of proceeding with too much speed; and if we should chance to stray, our errors will not be of long continuance.Of the debates in Parliament, alluded to by your correspondent, I shall say nothing, because I regard them as mere family quarrels. Besides, in the opinion of a foreign observer, that which is past, is past, while the present is full of importance, and the future fall of dread. The proposition which Inquisitor has made, and in which you have participated, as a remedy for the evils of our circumstances is worthy of serious consideration. Whoever you are, it will not be adopted on your bare word; and Englishmen are too considerate to reject it without examination. You wish to change the uncertain object of the war; to substitute, the re-establishment of the ancient French monarchy, in the person of Louis XVIII. openly, honourably, and boldly avowed, instead of the paltry objects of contention, which, apparently, divide France and England. As an unbiased foreigner, I acw beg permission of you and of your correspondent to examine: I. Whether the success of such a measure would, really, be de. sirable for England?-II. Whether such a measure is feasible?-III. Whether, suppoging it to be both desirable and feasible, there reason to believe that England will adepi it?—And IV. Whether there is any is any [776' appearance that the powers of the Continent would aid or oppose it?--The first question presents itself to our notice under two points of view. It will not be denied that this great change will produce a total alteration in the relations between France andˆ England; and the latter, ceasing to bear towards the former those which she now bears, will bear others. Now, what are the present relations between the two powers? With an enormous and almost indefinite increase of power, and at a time when her conquests, and her affiliations of states under various forms, szemed to remove all bounds to her aggrandizement; France concluded the treaty of peace. England now complains that this treaty was only a veil, momentarily thrown over her projects of invasion, and over that spirit of malevolence which has always guided her conduct towards her. She complains that, at Amiens, instead of a real peace, she found a hostile peace: she is per suaded that, notwithstanding the necessity there was of her obtaining an effective, durable peace, a state of war, full of miseries as it was, was infinitely better for her than that, sort of peace with which she was cursed. This is now the general opinion, but many go still further, and doubt whether it was possible for her, even by the means of additional sacrifices, to have purchased any but an uncertain peace, or one which would only have been the pledge of greater sacrifices hereafter. And would such a peace have been better than the peace of Amiens? These reflections lead one to think, that, since the end of all war must, necessarily, be peace, the people of England, in some measure, losing sight of this uncertain and distant termination of the war, should, at present, direct all their attention to the means of conducting it. She has been most vehemently menaced with an attack on her own shores. Nay; her enemy has sworn the destruction of her government, and the subjugation of her people. No sacrifices, no risques, no dangers will delay the execution of the chastisement which is preparing for her. I am wil ling to admit that these threats are no more but no Mo with only five, and, now, the whole venom of the monster is concentrated under one. This must be the maximum of its power and of its malignity. If it be so, this terrible army and this destructive policy, this peace of Amiens and this war of Paris, these projects of invasion and this disguised animosity, together with all those open and secret operations which filled the short year of peace; 1 all these will serve as so many deadly instru- i ments for the disorganization of society, or as seeds which bid fair to yield a more abundant harvest of miseries for our posterity, a than that with which we are already cursed. In comparison with these, even the restoration of the ancient worship of the church, will be considered as a mere jacobinical manœuvre, or a profligate trick. The monster who had sworn the destruction of a religion, the very essence of which was universal benevolence, should, like Nero, have said, "I embrace "my rival, but it is that I may strangle "him." Horrors like these need not be imagined, they will soon be but too clearly unfolded and too generally experienced. Can it be supposed that England, although protected by the waves of the ocean, and the natural sentiment of her people, will long escape from the influence and the effects of the revolution? She is now the only bul wark against the enormous power of France, and the dreadful influence of that revolu tionary torrent, which may be used as a ter rible instrument in aid of French policy, although it be not directed by the French government. For, if that government be not, itself, the instrument of jacobinism, jacobinism is, at least, a formidable weapon in its hands, which it has never disdained, and which it most assuredly never will disdain to employ.- -But all the evils which I have alluded to, every kind of hostility with which Great Britain is menaced, disappear before the success of the plan which Inquisitor has proposed, and which, I doubt not, every reflecting Englishman would rejoice to see accomplished. In France, instead of an arbitrary, immoderate, precarious, and illegiti mate government, which is at all times fluctuating and transitory, and, more or less, re volutionary and corrupt; we should see a royal and paterual government, established on the most indisputable hereditary succes sion, more than ever interested in opposing revolutionary doctrines, too much occupied with its internal concerns to possess either the power or the inclination to disturb its than phantoms. but nothing is gained by neighbours, having every thing tyd, and ment whose great interest it would be to convince the world of its integrity in its negotiations, of its fidelity in its engagements, and, in fact, of all the differences which distinguish hereditary stability from revolutionary uncertainty. Whatever might be the Prince, thus restored to the throne of his ancestors, Great Britain would reap the greatest advantages frorn the measure: and as he is the true heir, this noble act of justice would unite every honourable man, both in and out of France, in her favour. A very long time must elapse before French incon stancy would efface a benefit like that from the hearts of the mass of the nation; and however ungrateful Sovereigns may generally be supposed, the Prince whom England would restore could never forget the hand, to which, under God, he was indebted for his throne. The Bourbons have generally been more disposed to forgive than to resent, and I do not recollect that ingratitude has been one of the faults for which they have been reproached, I have not the honour of a personal knowledge of Louis XVIII. but those who do know him, know that he possesses great capacity and an elevated soul. To these natural qualities he joins an advan❘ tage which nothing can compensate, and that is of having been, as it were, moulded, and prepared for the throne, by the most severe adversity, and the most instructive calamities. Nothing can be more beneficial than this terrible education; and whether as a master, or as a neighbour, nothing can be more fortunate than that the Monarch has passed through it. Accustomed to live in the atmosphere of a throne, and inured to sufferings, his heart must be insensible to flattery, and as rigid from principle as it is good by nature. Another inestimable advantage, in my opinion, is, that he knew ancient France, was acquainted with its excellencies and its defects, and that he will therefore unite the experience of all in his own person.--Thus, it appears to me, Sir, that with respect to the first question which I proposed to examine, there can be no doubt that the success of the measure proposed by your correspondent Inquisitor, would, really, be desirable for England. In that success she would establish her own safety; she would obtain real and solid peace; she would acquire new consideration in the eyes of the whole world, and a consideration, too, far superior to that which she now enjoys. It is thus that Providence, sometimes, permits an union of honour and interest for the benefit of mankind.--I am, Sir, &c. &c. LETTER II. Hamburgh, Oct. 29, 1803. SIR, Having in my letter of the 23d, endeavoured to prove that the re-establishment of the ancient French monarchy, in the person of Louis XVIII. would, really, be desirable for England; I will now proceed to the examination of the second question which I proposed: which is, "whether "the re-establishment is feasible?"-Great operations are not always the most difficult; and it is often more easy to effect a complete and entire change, than to produce a simple alteration. The whole secret consists in finding a proper lever, and in placing it where its power may be exercised. England presents this basis out of the Continent; and Archimedes required no more to move the globe. The war in which England is engaged is a struggle for existence. The consideration now, is not the number of vessels to be captured, or the number of provinces to be conquered. This is a war of destruction. The government of England, as well as her territory, is menaced with invasion. Its annihilation has been decreed; and is not the overthrow of the French Government a just and necessary act of reprisal? Viewing the contest in this light, let us inquire what is the equality between the parties. The ancient and legitimate government of England is dear to the hearts of her people, who attribute to its benign influence, not only the happiness which they enjoy, but the great part which Providence has permitted them to act on the theatre of the world. The dangers and the storms which threaten it have already united the most opposite parties, and reconciled the most adverse spirits. The national spirit is roused; every Englishman of importance is agreed upon the grand object of the contest, and the only question among them is upon the most effectual means of attack and of defence. These are the general sentiments of the people; and with such support, though she may commit some errors, England has little to dread from invasion, and may defy every attempt to subvert her government. It may generally be regarded as a maxim, that a nation does not really fall until the people are prepared for the change.France is exactly the reverse. On her coasts we see a great and formidable army; and from one end to the other, the whole face of the country presents nothing to our view, but crowds of soldiers, and unfortunate young men who are ready to augment the number, either from choice or compulsion, and who are frequently dragged to glory as others are dragged to the scaffold. Experience has taught us that the French fight well, even in spite of them. selves; and, that however great may be their losses, they cannot exceed the remedies which they are always able to apply. What then can be more politic or more easy for France, than to make war? Witnesses of the great and rapid successes of the last war, almost without commerce; harassed and desolated in the interior; the victims of taxes and conscriptions equally oppressive, and of the rigours of the public treasury and of a consuming luxury; driven to the armies like negroes to the market, they will gladly embrace the meteor of glory and pillage. The magic of discipline, example, and necessity will soon perfect them in the virtues. and the vices of their state. Though these armies might be powerless in England, they are terrible on the Continent, and are like the giant Antæus, who could never be thrown while he touched the earth. While the government of France is protected by such a force, it may bid defiance to every attack. But is France, really, content with her condition? I will not say that I doubt it, but I assert that it is impossible. She bows her head under the yoke which oppresses her. Since the commencement of the Revolution she has done little more than suffer; oppression has succeeded oppression, and each successive change has increased her miseries. Every motive aids in preparing her for the change which she ardently, but secretly desires. She has had a woeful experience of the inutility of all the revolutions which she has undergone, and of the calamities which follow in their train, and she is persuaded that foreign powers seek rather to injure than to relieve her. It is in this miserable state that she suffers, having no hope of relief but from her own exertions, not daring to oppose a government so suspicious, so active, and so arbitrary, and seeing no arm upon which she can rely for aid. Such, in my opinion, Sir, is the disposition of France.By effectually removing all those doubts which France entertains of the reality and good faith of the intentions of Great Britain, relative to the restoration of the ancient French monarchy, in the person of her lawful sovereign, Inquisitor's plan removes two great obstacles to the measure. In the first place, it will convince all France that there is no intention whatever to deceive them by any dishonourable trick, but to render them the most effectual service by putting an end to their changes and their revolutions: in the 18P/C second place, it will demonstrate, in the clearest manner, that the only means of ac complishing that object, is by undertaking to replace, on the throne of France, he only Prince whose right is indisputable, and whose true and legitimate splendour would soon overcome those false and feeble lights by which they have been deluded. I will abstain from all parallel: when contrasts are odious they disgust; and there is no Frenchman who does not feel that which exists. Be they more or less censurable, can it be supposed, that they will still dety the just vengeance of ar: offended monarch? They well know that their lawful master is no chief of a faction; and they can recol lect that Louis XII who merited the appel lation of father of his people, and whom Louis XVIII. appears to have taken for 4 model, refused to avenge the injuries of the Duke of Orleans.By associating her powerful efforts with the legitimacy, I had almost said with the sanctity of the right of Louis XVIII. Great Britain, who during the present war has only appeared as a country which France wished to oppress, and which was making great efforts for its own de fence, will ennoble her cause in the eyes of all Europe, and of the whole world, and will strengthen it by a new interest, without the smallest interruption to the measures which she is pursuing for her own defence. Her first and principal ally will be that of her own choice, I may say, indeed, of her own creation, and, can it be supposed that she will have any occasion to dread lest she should betray or desert her while engaged in such noble pursuits? For my part, I doubt not, that louis XVIII. animated by a sense of his own interest, and of the interest of all France, which is still dearer to him, and by the experience of more than fourteen years of suffering and observation, would direct the whole measure in the most effectual and desirable manner; and that this prince emerging from the degrading obscurity in which he has been so long buried, would soon convince all Europe, that it is owing to no fault of his, that he has been so long kept at so great a distance from his true station. To his own talents and wisdom, and to those of his few faithful adherents, will be joined all the talents and all the wisdom of England; for the counsels of a benefactor, which are at all time good, cannot fail of effect in an enter prize of which he is the very soul-If I may believe reports which are hardly to be doubted, the French army bears but a slen der attachment to the present government, by which it is said to be negligently paidį LALL and so great is the distrust, that all those generals, who signalized themselves during the late war, are studiously kept from employment, whilst new and unknown creatures dick every review, and haughty, inaccessible stangers form the confidential guard. If, on the one hand, internal dissatisfaction and Gacontent are favourable to the cause, and only wait for lawful and certain support to race France from the lethargy in which she is sunk, and to awaken in the descendents of the subjects of Henry IV. that fervent loyalty which animated their fathers after the cafortunate war of the league; I need not Hesitate in supposing that the armies, which, above all others, ought to be the refuge of honour, would not be insensible to that of, at last, seeing Louis de Bourbon at their and. A white standard, and three fluersd-lys, with the inscription of Enfans, venez Votre Roi, would form a talisman of incalclable influence over a French army. Here, a repenting and reforming general will dissiminate among his troops this virtuous sentiment of duty, which is inseparable from that tree and solid glory that admits of no dispute: and there, an army delighted with their king, will drag on their wavering general to honourable duty; and will be folloved by the whole five hundred thousand soldiers. I may be told, perhaps, that all this is very easily said; bt that I offer no prof of the certainly of success; and even that the experience of the past and of the present is by no means of a nature to encouIge hope. To this cinjection, which is, wh me, of but little weight, the following my reply,I confess that the success of a rast enterprize, to which there are many totaules, cannot be demonstrated with as h certainty as a problem of Euclid. This is the case with all military and politial measures. If the thing had been possihe, I have no doubt that your correspontar, Inquisitor, who, perhaps, reserves to Armse'f the manœuvres by which his plan is Ho be directed, and who can therefore speak of them better than I can, would have been ager to demonstrate plainly to you, that he proposed a sure game to his countrymen; for war, as well as politics, is a game in which custom authorises artifice. I con. fess that the success of the enterprize does hot appear to me to be so clearly demonstrated, as the advantage which Engand would delive from it. Nevertheless, in my opinion, there is, undoubtedly, a rich greater probability of success, than generally deemed necessary, before other mportant enterprizes are undertaken. The proof of the certainty of success is in Α proportion to this probability. The experience of the past proves nothing against it; or rather, if it proves any thing, it is in favour of the future. The circumstances are, evidently, wholly different Without entering into the detail of the various mears which were employed in the early stages of the revolution, to instil the poison of disafsection and finally to prevail upon the great body of France to participate, by their inac-. tivity, at least, in the rebellion against the unfortunate Louis XVI. we all know that the first acts of sedition were garnished with the annunciation of an excessive freedom, the dangerous idea of which has seduced so many in a country that has not the most correct or profound political notions of the means by which nations are governed. The attraction of novelty, so alluring to all men, and more particularly to Frenchmen, contributed greatly towards attaching partizans to the Revolution. Indeed I think, that, at first, it was almost the only motive which actuated a very great number of the 'republicans; but, by this time they have suffered sufficiently for their novelty in France. very great majority of the people are, for ever, disgusted with the bitterness of the cup of unrestrained liberty; and this disgust has induced them to support, even from its birth, the arbitrary power of the present government. The partizans of liberty, by whatever names they are called, are infinitely less numerous, but more discontented; and are, certainly, by no means disposed to bear the weight of the consular chains with patience. Formerly all might fatter themselves with some hope favourable to their respective views. They thought, in the most gloomy times, that they were only temporary, and that, like the brightening of the heavens after a storm, more favourable days would succeed. Now, however, the times are settled; and settled into a despotism, in the plenitude of its operation. I cannot suppose that the French would besitate for a moment in their choice between this despotism and their ancient, mild, and legitimate government; and I think this the moment to offer them, with success, the salutary vigour of a monarchy to protect them at once from the overwhelming billows of anarchy and the yawning gulf of despotism. The epoch will be still more favourable where the strange fortune of the present chief of the republic shall split upon the shores of Great-Britain. We ought undoubtedly to prepare to encounter many and great obstacles; but I declare, that I should not be at all surprised, if, to the utter astonishment of every cbserver, we should meet |