against such railroad company for an injury re such injured servant or employé has himself plaintiff in error that the Act of 1874 of Kan- This law denies to no person affected by it "equal protection of the laws." Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Daviess County, 3 S. W. Rep. 364; Ohio & M. R. R. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 140. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of [206] the court: [207] To this charge the defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $12,000, upon which judgment was entered. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the judgment was affirmed; and to review the latter judgment the case is brought here. At the trial, and in the Supreme Court of the State, it was contended by the defendant, and the contention is renewed here, that the Law of Kansas of 1874 is in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives the Company of its property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws. In support of the first position the Company "At the common law a master or employé could not be held liable for an injury sustained by one servant by reason of the mere negligence of a fellow servant engaged in the same common employment, the negligence of the fellow servant not being deemed in such case the negligence of the master; and such was the law of this State up to 1874, but at that time this rule of the common law was abrogated, so far as it related to railroad companies and their employés in this State, by a statute which reads as follows: "Every railroad company organized or doing business in this State shall be liable for all damages done to any employé of such company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers or other employés, to any person sustaining such damage.' "This enactment so far modifies and changes the common law that a servant or employé of a railroad company may maintain an action Amendment. The plain answer to this con- [208] [209] [210] ries to passengers. Whatever care and pre- | meets a particular necessity, and all railroad MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. LOUIS RAIL [210] v. FRED. C. HERRICK. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 210-212.) Iowa law as to master and servant. 1. The law of Iowa imposing liabilities upon railroad companies for injuries to employés in its service, though caused by the negligence or incompetency of a fellow servant, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 2. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, ante, 107, followed. 1888. State of Minnesota, to review a judgment in [N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the favor of plaintiff, for injuries sustained by him through the negligence of defendant's engineer. Affirmed. Reported below, 31 Minn. 11. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. The objection that the Law of 1874 deprives | Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (25:676); Tiernan v. Rinkor, 102 U. S. 123 (26:103); Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865; Stockton Laundry Case, 26 Fed. Rep. 611; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (25:667); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 385; 8. C. 118 U. S. 396 (30:118); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Id. 356 (30:220); Pearson v. Portland, 69 Me. 278; San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Carland, 5 Mont. 146. When the natural and reasonable effect of a Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 92 U. S. 259 U. 8. Bank v. Deveaux, 9 U. S. 5 Cranch, 61, Before the adoption of this statute the common-law rule was of general application inIowa, that the principal is not liable for damage sus [211] tained by an employé by the negligence of a co- | employés of the corporation, and in consequence employé. Sullivan v. Mississippi & M. R. R. Co. 11 Iowa, 421. This common-law rule is still in force in Iowa, except as provided by the statute in question. Peterson v. Whitebreast Coal & Min. Co. 50 Iowa, 673. This statute is not an exercise of the police power. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (30:220); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (28:923); Soon Hing v. Crowley, supra; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (29:483). Mr. Edward J. Hill, for defendant in error: The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment were not intended to apply to cases like the one at bar. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 36 (21:394); U. S. v. Dewitt, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 41 (19:593) and cases cited; New York v. Miln, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 102 (9:648); License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 471 (18:500); Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. 498; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542-545 (23:588). There is nothing in this statute repugnant to such amendment. McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338; Deppe v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 36 Iowa, 52; Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I. &. P. R. Co. 41 Iowa, 344; Potter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 46 Iowa, 399; Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. 489; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. R. Co. 27 Vt. 149; Laws Wisconsin, 1875, chap. 173; Ditberner v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 47 Wis. 138; Laws Minn. 1887, chap. 13; Code Ga. 1873, $2083; Georgia R. R. & Bkg. Co. v. Goldwire, 56 Ga. 196; Marsh v. South Carolina R. R. Co. Id. 274; Georgia R. R. & Bkg. Co. v. Rhodes, Id. 645; Rev. Stat. Mo. 1855, p. 647, Schultz v. Pacific R. R. Co. 36 Mo. 13. The whole doctrine of exemption is an exception to the ancient general rule or maxim of the common law, Respondeat superior." Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302; English Factory Acts, and English Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1872, cited in 2 Thomp. Neg. 1007. Statutes imposing duties and liabilities on railroad companies and other corporations are to be found on the statute books of almost every State, and, if general in their application to all such corporations, they are valid. Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 29 Minn. 429; Blake v. Winona & St. P. R. R. Co. 19 Minn. 418; S. C. 94 U. S. 180 (24:99); Munn v. Illinois, Id. 113 (24:77); Chicago, B. & 2. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, Id. 155 (24:94); Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. Id. 164 (24:97). of the willful wrongs, whether of commission or omission, of such agents, engineers, or other employés, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of any railway on or about which they shall be employed; and no contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding." On the 6th of December, 1881, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a brakeman on one of its cars, and on that day, in Webster, in Iowa, it became his duty to make a coupling of an engine and a freight car. The engine was in charge of one of its employés, an engi neer, and, whilst the plaintiff was making the coupling, the engine was, by the negligence and mismanagement of the engineer, driven against the car, causing severe and permanent injuries to the plaintiff. To recover damages for the injuries thus sustained, he brought this action in a District Court of Minnesota, relying upon the law of Iowa quoted above. The defend ant in its answer alleged, and on the trial contended, that this law was abrogated by that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which declares that no State shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The district court held the law to be in full force, and that under it the Railroad Company was responsible to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained by him through the negligence of the engineer. The plaintiff accordingly recovered a verdict for $2,000, upon which judgment was entered. Upon appeal to the State Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed, and to review that judgment the case is brought here. We have just decided the case of Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey [ante, 107], where similar objections were raised to a law of Kansas, [212] which on the point here involved is not essentially different from the law of Iowa, namely, in imposing liabilities upon railroad companies for injuries to employés in its service, though caused by the negligence or incompetency of a follow servant; and we held that the law was not in conflict with the clauses referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment. On the authority of that case the judgment in the present one must be affirmed; and it is so ordered. PEORIA AND PEKIN UNION RAIL [200] WAY COMPANY, Appt., v. CHICAGO, PEKIN AND SOUTHWESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 200-205.) Receiver's liability for rent of railroad. In proceedings to compel a receiver in a foreclosure action to pay rent for use of tracks and terminal facilities, where the amount of rent was left ties which was oppressive in its terms was not a test uncertain,-Held that a contract between other parof the amount of rent which the receiver should pay; and that there being no evidence that the sum erty was worth, the decision of the court below to paid by defendant was not all that the use of propdismiss the proceedings was correct. [201] [No. 210.] Argued April 6, 1888. Decided April 23, 1888. APPEAL from a of trict of Illinois, dismissing a petition to compei There was an implied contract to pay rent. The rent demanded is reasonable. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. R. Co. 29 Fed. Rep. 559. Mr. Thomas S. McClelland, for appellee: A receiver has no power to make any important contract touching the management of the property, except by the order of the court. Hooper v. Winston, 24 Ill. 353; Atty.-Gen. v. Vigor, 11 Ves. Jr. 563; Waters v. Taylor, 15 Ves. Jr. 25; Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 2 Paige, 452; Re Van Allen, 37 Barb. 225; Re Globe Ins. Co. 6 Paige, 102; Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Central R. R. Co. 35 N. J. Eq. 426; Yeager v. Wallace, 44 Pa.296; Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179. ary 1, 1881, the petitioner, having obtained a lease of the Peoria and Springfield Railroad, and acquired by purchase the Peoria, Pekin and and Jacksonville Railroad, and having improved Peoria, entered into a contract in writing with the four companies aforesaid, by which it leased to them for fifty years the tracks between Pekin and Peoria, with the use of its terminal accommodations and facilities at Peoria; and each of the four companies agreed to pay a yearly rent of $22,500, and a proportionate share of the expenses of maintaining the terminal accommodations at Peoria, and of terminal services, according to the business done by each; and it was further agreed as follows: "Eighth. Any other railroad company, whose road shall now or hereafter run into said City of Peoria, or that shall desire to procure an entrance into said city, shall be allowed to acquire the same rights and privileges as the said several lessees, but no other, and upon no lessrental, upon entering into a like contract hereto with the party of the first part, except as to representation in the board of directors of the party of the first part and ownership in its capital stock." Before February 1, 1881, the trains of the defendant company had been run over the road of the Peoria and Springfield Railroad Company, at a rate of compensation fixed by agreement between the receivers of those two com The compensation due the appellant for the use of its tracks, etc., was the sum theretofore paid, as a holding over, with consent of owner. Clapp v. Noble, 84 Ill. 62; Golloway v. Kerly, 9 Bradw. 501; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 lll. 96; Mc-panies. Kinney v. Peck, 28 Ill. 174; Otto v. Jackson, 35 Ill. 349. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: Pending a suit in equity by the Farmers Loan and Trust Company against the Chicago, Pekin and Southwestern Railroad Company, to forclose a mortgage of its road, the Peoria and Pekin Union Railway Company filed this intervening petition to compel the receiver of the defendant company, appointed in that suit, to pay to the petitioner the sum of $16,231.55 for rent of tracks and terminal facilities at Peoria from February 1, 1881, to March 1, 1882. From the documents in the record, and the very argumentative and somewhat conflicting affidavits of Cour, the vice-president and general counsel of the petitioner, and of Hinckley, formerly the president and now the receiver of the defendant, the material facts appear to be as follows: Peoria and Pekin are ten miles apart, on opposite sides of the Illinois River, and connected by two lines of railway tracks, that of the Peoria and Springfield Railroad Company on [202] the east side of the river, and that of the Peoria, Pekin and Jacksonville Railroad Company on the west side of the river, and each crossing the river on a bridge. Connecting with these at Peoria or at Pekin are the lines of four other railroad companies: the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company; the Indiana, Bloom ington and Western Railway Company; the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Railway Company; and the Peoria and Jacksonville Railroad Company. On February 1, 1881, Cohr, in behalf of the petitioner, demanded of Reed, then the receiver of the defendant company, that he should enter into a contract to pay, during his receivership, the same rent and other charges as the four companies; and insisted that he had no authority to allow the use of the petitioner's tracks on any other terms. Reed objected that the terms demanded were exorbitant and oppressive, and that he had no authority to assent to them without an order of the court; and it was thereupon agreed that the defendant company should enjoy the use of the tracks and the terminal facilities, and should pay the like terminal charges as the four companies, and should also pay such rent from February 1, 1881, as should be determined by Judge Drummond, upon an application to be forthwith made by Reed, and that, until such determination, the defendant company should pay at the same rate as formerly paid to the receiver of the Peoria and Springfield Railroad Company, and should pay the residue, if any, when the judge should so determine. Pursuant to this agreement, Reed made an application in writing to Judge Drummond, who, as Cohr testifies, in December, 1881, or early in 1882, informed him that he declined to decide upon it, and that, unless the defendant settled with the petitioner by March 1, 1852, the petitioner might shut out the defendant from its tracks. Upon notice to that effect, Reed declined to pay, and on March 1, 1882, ceased to use the tracks of the petitioner. The defendant paid the petitioner for the use of its tracks and terminal facilities from February 1, 1881, to March 1, 1882, at the same The petitioner was organized in 1880, its rate as previously paid to the receiver of the whole capital stock being owned by these four Peoria and Springfield Railroad Company, companies, one quarter by each. On Febru-l amounting to $17,537.83. The petitioner [203] claimed for the same period the sum of $9,394.- | of the property, to exclude the defendant from The master, to whom the petition was referred, reported that there was nothing before him which enabled him "to report the amount of compensation which the petitioner should have, except as the result of the conditions upon which the receiver continued to use the property after the attempted making of a contract between the parties resulting in the notice referred to;" but found "from their relations, and the implied understanding upon the part of the receiver arising from them," that the sum claimed was due from the defendant to the petitioner. The circuit court sustained exceptions taken by the defendant to the master's report, and dismissed the petition. Its opinion, which is not made part of the record, is reported in 18 Fed. Rep. 484. The petitioner appealed to this court. The only matter in dispute is whether the defendant is liable to the petitioner, by way of rent, from February 1, 1881, to March 1, 1882, for anything more than has already been paid. There is no more ground for implying an assent by the defendant to the claim of the petitioner, than for implying an assent of the petitioner to the position of the defendant. When the petitioner demanded of the receiver of the defendant the like rent, as well as the like rate for terminal expenses, as was to be paid by the four companies, the receiver of the defendant declined to assent to the demand without an order of the court whose officer he There is no evidence tending to show that the RICHARD H. PORTER, Appt., v. STEPHEN V. WHITE. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 235-245). Appeal, effect of-lien of attorney on fund. 1. An appellant in this court who has appealed from a decree of the General Term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is only entitled to relief in regard to that portion of the decree which was appealed from the special term to the general term. 2. A power of attorney to prosecute a claim for By the terms of that agreement, then, the amount of rent to be paid by the defendant was left uncertain, and dependent upon the award of the judge. The affidavit of the pe compel an assignment to himself of a part of the APPEAL from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in General Term reversing a decree of the Special Term that defendant pay certain moueys to plaintiff and assign to plaintiff, by such form of conveyance as will be recognized by the State Department, a portion of the payments due upon a Mexican award. Affirmed. Reported below, 5 Mackey, 180, 4 Cent. Rep. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. titioner's own witness shows that the judge, af- Mr. Stephen V. White, appellee, in person. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin This is a bill in equity, filed in the Supreme [235] |