[342] 562; Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514 (25; 929); | has a direct interest, or is under an obligation respecting the relief invoked. See the opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Justice Miller in United States v. San Jacinto Tin Company, 125 U. S. 273 [31: 747], decided this term of the If the heirs of Philbrook had a valid claim court. they might abandon it. House v. Talbot, 51 Tex. 467; Thornton v. Murray, 50 Tex. 161; Minter v. Crommelin, 59 U. S. 18 How. 87 (15: 279); MacKay v. Easton, 86 C. S. 19 Wall. 630 (22: 214); Fremont v. U. S. 58 U. S. 17 How. 542 (15: 241); French v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 172 (23: 813); Grignon v. Astor, 43 U. S. 2 How. 319 (11: 283). Even if it had not thus been authoritatively settled, it would have been difficult, upon principle, to reach any other conclusion. The public domain is held by the Government as part of its trust. The Government is charged with the duty and clothed with the power to protect it from trespass and unlawful appropriation, and, under certain circumstances, to invest the individual citizen with the sole possession of the title which had till then been common with Danley v. Rector, 10 Ark. 212; Shall v. Biscoe, all the people as the beneficiaries of the trust. 18 Ark. 165; Hornor v. Hanks, 22 Ark. 583; If a patent is wrongfully issued to one individChapman v. Chapman, 59 Pa. 214; Cumber-ual, which should have been issued to another, land Valley R. R. Co. v. McLanahan, Id. 23. or if two patents for the same land have been The claim is barred by the Statute of Limi-issued to two different individuals, it may proptations and this fact appears on the face of the bill. The heirs of Philbrook are estopped from setting up any claim to the land. Where this is the case the objection may be made by demurrer. Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391 (27: 219); Bradstreet v. Huntington, 30 U. S. 5 Pet. 446 (8: 186); Voorhees v. Bank of U. S. 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 473 (9: 499); Bryan v. Forsyth, 60 U. S. 19 How. 334 (15: 674); Cosby v. Buchanan, 90 U. S. 23 Wall. 453 (23: 142). In no courts have the Statutes of Limitation been more favorably construed than in those of the United States. Bell v. Morrison, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 360 (7: 178); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U. S. 3 Pet. 278 (7: 678); Hawkins v. Barney, 30 U. S. 5 Pet. 466 (8: 193); Wright v. Madison, 59 U. S. 18 How. 57 (15: 283). After such great laches, the suit will not lie. MacKay v. Easton, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 619 (22: 211); Cunningham v. Ashley, 55 U. S. 14 How. 379 (14: 463); U. S. v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 36 (24: 648); U. S. v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 66 (24: 66); U. S. v. Smith, Id. 217 (24: 115); The Siren, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 159 (19: 132); Briggs v. Light-boat, 11 Allen, 185; U. S. v. Buford, 28 U. S. 3 Pet. 12 (7: 585); Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 465 (26: 218); Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 210 (25: 434); Williams v. U. S. 92 U. S. 461 (23: 498). Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court: The points involved in the pleadings and made before the court below have been presented and urged with much earnestness, both in the brief and in the oral argument of counsel. First. As to the right of the attorney-general to bring this suit. The authority of the attorney-general, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to institute a suit in the name of the United States to set aside a patent alleged to have been obtained by fraud or other mistake, whenever denied by a specific pleading before this court, has been uniformly maintained. And it may now be accepted as settled that the United States can properly proceed by bill in equity to have a judicial decree of nullity and an order of cancellation of a patent issued in mistake or obtained by fraud, where the Government erly be left to the individuals.to settle, by personal litigation, the question of right in which they alone are interested. But if it should come to the knowledge of the Government that a patent has been fraudulently obtained, and that such fraudulent patent, if allowed to stand, would work prejudice to the interests or rights of the United States, or prevent the Government from fulfilling an obligation incurred by it, either to the public or to an individual, which personal litigation could not remedy, there would be an occasion which would make it the duty of the Government to institute judicial proceedings to vacate such patent. In the case before us the bill avers that the [343] patents whose cancellation is asked for were obtained by fraud and imposition on the part of the patentee, Beebe. It asserts that there exists, on the part of the United States, an obligation to issue patents to the rightful owners of the lands described in the bill; that they cannot perform this obligation until these fraudulent patents are annulled; and that they therefore bring this suit to annul these fraudulent instruments whose existence renders the United States incapable of fulfilling their said prior obligation. The court below held that, the bill in this case having been filed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, for the declared purpose of having the questions which were being pressed upon the Land Department, in connection with the claims of the Philbrook heirs against the Government, determined by the judicial department, which claims were unsettled and important, the appeal to the court was proper. In this we think the learned judge is in full accord with the principie laid down by Mr. Justice Miller in the San Jacinto Case, and within the following language of the court in Hughes v. United States, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 236 [18: 304], which was a suit brought in the name of the United States to set aside a patent for the benefit of a private citizen entitled to the land covered by said patent. Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion of the court, speaking of the patent to Hughes, said: "Whether regarded in that aspect or as a void instrument, issued without authority, it prima facie passed the title; and therefore it was the plain duty of the United States to seek to vacate and annul the instru [344] [345] ment, to the end that their previous engagement that both the State and the Attorney-General Next, as to the defense of the Statute of The grounds on which the court below sus- are only nominal actors in the proceeding. The In the case of United States v. Nashville, C. In the former case it was held that a suit in the name of a State for the benefit of parties interested is to be regarded as a suit in the name The principle that the United States are not of the party for whose benefit it is brought. bound by any Statute of Limitations, nor Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the barred by any laches of their officers, however court, said: "The name of the State is used gross, in a suit brought by them as a sovereign from necessity when a suit on the bond is prosGovernment to enforce a public right or to ecuted for the benefit of a person interested, assert a public interest, is established past all and in such cases the real controversy is becontroversy or doubt. U. S. v. Nashville, C. tween him and the obligors on the bond;" and & St. L. R. Co. 118 U. S. 125 [30: 83], and the case was decided upon a consideration of cases there cited. But this case stands upon a the merits as if the party interested was alone different footing, and presents a different ques- named as plaintiff. And he cited, approvingtion. The question is, Are these defenses avail-ly, the following language in McNutt v. Bland, able to the defendant in a case where the Gov-43 U. S. 2 How. 9 [11: 159]: "As the instruernment, although a nominal complainant par- ment of the state law, his (the Governor's) name ty, has no real interest in the litigation, but has is in the bond and to the suit upon it; but in allowed its name to be used therein for the sole no just view*** can he be considered a liti [346] benefit of a private person? gant party. Both look to things, not names; It has not been unusual for this court, for the to the actors in controversies and suits, not to purposes of justice, to determine the real par- the mere forms or inactive instruments used in ties to a suit by reference not merely to the conducting them in virtue of some positive law.” names in which it is brought, but to the facts In Miller v. State, the other case cited by Mr. of the case as they appear on the record. Justice Gray, the court said: "As laches is not Thus, in the case decided at this term, Re Ayers, to be imputed to the Government, the Statute 123 U. S. 492, 493 [31: 225], the court held of Limitations does not apply to the State unthat the State of Virginia, though not named less it be clear from the Act that it was intendas a party defendant, was the actual party ined to include the State. *** In our opinion, the controversy. Mr. Justice Matthews, who delivered the opinion, said: "It is, therefore, not conclusive of the principal question in this case that the State of Virginia is not named as a party defendant. Whether it is the actual party *** must be determined by a consideration of the nature of the case as presented on the whole record." So in the cases of New Hampshire v. Louisiana and New York v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 [27: 656], the court looked behind and through the nominal parties on the record to ascertain who were the real parties to the suit. Chief Justice Waite, in delivering the opinion of the court, used the following language: "No one can look at the pleadings and testimony in these cases without being satisfied, beyond all doubt, that they were in legal effect commenced, and are now prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and coupons. *** The bill, although signed by the attorney-general, is also signed, and was evidently drawn, by the same counsel who prosecuted the suits for the bondholders in Louisiana, and it is manifested in many ways the rule that the Statute of Limitations does not In Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 118, which [347] [348] Applying these principles to this case, an in- | years ago, the complainants in this bill could In his letter to the United States District At- We are of the opinion that when the Government is a mere formal complainant in a suit, v. PETER C. GAILLARD, Treasurer of (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 216-234) jurisdiction of this court. 1. Who may sue under a state statute, and when, and under what circumstances, are questions for the exclusive determination of the state tribunals, whose judgment thereon is not subject to review by this court, unless the statute denies or injuriously affects a right claimed by a party under the Constitution or laws of the United States. not for the purpose of asserting any public Review of state judgment—federal question— These principles, so far as they relate to general Statutes of Limitation, the laches of a party, and the lapse of time, have been rendered familiar to the legal mind by the oft-repeated enunciation and enforcement of them in the decisions of this court. According to these decisions, courts of equity in general recognize and give effect to the Statute of Limitations as a defense to an equitable right, when at law it would have been properly pleaded as a bar to a legal right. They refuse to interfere to give relief when there has been gross negligence in prosecuting a claim, or where the lapse of time has been so long as to afford a clear presumption that the witnesses to the original transaction are dead, and the other means of proof have disappeared. We think the court below justly and wisely applied the principle to the case under consideration in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill. The rights of the Philbrook heirs, the real parties to this case, which are set up in this bill, originated in 1815. The acts of Beebe perpetrating the alleged fraud were prior to 1838. The alleged illegal action of the Land Department occurred in 1839. More than 45 2. Where the state court based its judgment, not 3. To give this court jurisdiction to review a state Argued April 4, 1888. Decided April 30, 1888. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State Reported below in 21 S. C. 560. Statement by Mr. Justice Matthews: The complaint in this case, filed in the Court of Common Pleas in the County of Charleston, South Carolina, alleged that the plaintiff [217] was the owner and holder of three bonds of the State of South Carolina, two, designated by the numbers 850 and 851, for $500 each, and one, by the number 2290, for $1,000; that thereby the State of South Carolina promised to pay to the bearers the sums therein named on the 1st day of July, 1893, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, on the 1st day of January or July of each year, on the presentation of the proper coupons, thereto annexed, bearing the collected and ought to be refunded, and that a The answer of the defendant sets forth the The complaint further alleges that the de[218] fendant is the County Treasurer for Charleston County, whose duty it is to collect and receive the taxes due to the State of South Carolina upon the property situate in that county; that the plaintiff is the owner of property in said County upon which taxes were levied under the provisions of the Act to raise supplies for the fiscal year commencing November 1, 1881, in the sum of $153.86, of which sum $29.34 were levied by the said Act for the public schools; that on the 18th day of December, 1882, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant, as county treasurer, in payment of said taxes, $131.97 in cash, and the remainder, viz., $60, in the coupons of the said consolidated bonds Nos. 850, 851 and 2290, which matured on the 1st day of January, 1882; that the defendant wrongfully and illegally refused to receive the said coupons, and assigned as a reason therefor that he was forbidden so to do by the provisions of the said Act; whereupon the plaintiff paid to the defendant, under protest, the sum of $191.97 in legal tender notes of the United States, in pursuance of the provisions of an Act of the General Assembly of said State, approved the 24th of December, 1878, entitled "An Act to Facilitate the Collection of Taxes." Plaintiff therefore demands judgment "that it be adjudged that the amount of sixty dollars in United States currency, paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on the eighteenth day of December, 1882, was wrongfully and illegally "Defendant, further answering, alleges that, subsequent to the passage of said Act, the General Assembly of the said State, by a Joint Resolution to Raise a Commission to Investigate the Indebtedness of the State,' approved June 8, 1877, provided a commission to make a complete and thorough investigation of the entire amount of consolidated bonds and certificates of stock which had been issued under the "Consolidation Act' aforesaid, and of the bonds, coupons and certificates of stock which had been surrendered to the state treasurer in exchange for the consolidated bonds and certificates of stock issued under said Act, and to report to the General Assembly any illegality or nonconformity to law in the issue of consolidated bonds and certificates of stock, and the grounds of the same, which commission is "That the said commission made a report to the General Assembly of the result of the investigation made by them under the joint resolution aforesaid, with schedules annexed showing the different classes of bonds and certificates of stock which had been surrendered in exchange for consolidated bonds and certificates of stock, schedule 6 showing the consolidated bonds and certificates of stock which, in the judgment of the said commission, were not issued in accordance with law and were not authorized to be consolidated under the Consolidation Act.' "And thereupon the General Assembly, by a Joint Resolution Providing a Mode of Ascertaining the Debt of the State and of Liquidating the Same,' approved March 22, 1878, created a special court, known as the Court of Claims,' to hear and determine any case or cases made up or brought to test the validity of any of the consolidated bonds or certificates of stock, or of any of the various classes of bonds or certificates of stock mentioned in the said report of the bond commission' as not issued in accordance with law. "It was further provided by the joint resolution aforesaid that there should be the same right of appeal from the said 'court of claims' to the Supreme Court of South Carolina as from the circuit courts of the said State, and with a right of appeal, by writ of error or otherwise as provided by law, to the Supreme Court of the United States. "That said special court should have the same right to enter judgment, issue execution, punish for contempt, and enforce its mandates as was then possessed by the Circuit Courts of the State of South Carolina. "That the State should be represented in said special court by the attorney-general and two associate counsel to be selected by the joint vote of the General Assembly. [219] [220] [221] "3. Such as were issued in exchange for those conversion bonds which were issued in exchange for either of the bonds or coupons of the two classes mentioned. "That the attorney-general and his associates, | 26, 1868,' or the coupons of such bonds; the "The said joint resolution further provided for the levy for the current year of a tax sufficient to pay the coupons and interest orders maturing on the outstanding consolidated bonds and certificates of stock during the said fiscal year, the interest on the consolidated bonds and certificates of stock mentioned in schedule 5 of the report of the bond commission' as subject to no valid objection to be paid,-and the payment of the interest on the several classes of consolidated bonds and certificates of stock mentioned in schedule 6 of said report, whenever there should be a final adjudication as to the validity of the several classes of bonds and stocks in the manner therein provided, and none other. "That, in pursuance of the provisions of the said joint resolution, actions in which the State of South Carolina was the defendant were, with the consent of the attorney-general and his associates, brought in the said 'court of claims' on coupons of the bonds of the various classes mentioned in schedule 6 of the report of the 'bond commission.' "That, after trial and hearing of the said causes, the said court of claims' rendered judgment in favor of the State. From the judgments of the 'court of claims,' in these several cases, appeals were taken to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina, as provided in the joint resolution establishing the said court of claims.' "That upon the hearing of the said appeals the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina, at the April Term, 1879, in the cases entitled Walker v. South Carolina, 12 S. C. 200, and Pelzer v. South Carolina, Id., decreed and adjudged: "First. That all the bonds issued under the 'Consolidation Act' are valid obligations of the State of South Carolina, except as follows "1. Such as were issued in exchange for bonds issued under the Act entitled 'An Act to Authorize a Loan for the Relief of the Treasury,' approved February 17, 1869, or for the coupons of such bonds; the said Act being repugnant to section 7, article IX, of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, in that it purports to create a debt which was not 'for the purpose of defraying extraordinary expenditures,' and the debt sought to be created not being for some single object,' and such object not being distinctly specified therein,' as required by the said section and article of the Constitution. "2. Such as were issued in exchange for the second issue of bonds under an Act entitled 'An Act to Authorize a State Loan to Pay Interest on the Public Debt,' and which were indorsed Issued under Act approved August "Second. That if any consolidated bond rests wholly upon any of the three objectionable classes of bonds therein mentioned, then it is wholly void; but if it rests only in part upon such objectionable bonds and coupons, then it is void only to the extent which it does rest upon such objectionable bonds or coupons, and for the balance it is a valid obligation of the State. "Third. That the burden of proof is upon the State to show that any particular bond which may be brought into question does rest either in whole or in part upon such objectionable bonds and coupons; and if in part only, then the State must show what part is so affected. "III. Defendant further alleges that by an Act entitled 'An Act to Provide for the Settlement of the Consolidated Debt of the State in Accordance with the Decision of the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina,' approved December 23, 1879, after reciting the legislation and the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina in relation to the consolidated debt of the State, herein before set forth, and that it is to the interest of the State and her creditors that the principles established in the said decision of the supreme court should be accepted as final, and forthwith applied in the elimination from the consolidated debt of the State of all invalid material,a special commissioner was appointed to ascer tain and establish the exact percentage and amount of the invalidity of each and every consolidated bond and certificate of stock of the state consolidated debt, and of the interest thereon, in accordance with the principles laid down in the said decision of the Supreme Court of the State. "And it was therein further provided that the said special commissioner should, at least once in each month during the period of said ascertainment, make a detailed report to the state treasurer, setting forth therein by their numbers the consolidated bonds, coupons, certificates of stock, and interest orders investigated by him during the previous month; also, whether the same, under the decision of the supreme court aforesaid, be wholly valid or only partially valid, and, where only partially valid, in each case he should also set forth the exact percentage, amount, and character of the invalidity; that he should continue to make such detailed reports to the state treasurer until he should have investigated and reported upon the entire consolidated debt of the State. "It was further therein provided that every holder of any consolidated bond or certificate of stock, or of the interest thereon reported by said special commissioner as partially invalid, shall have the right to surrender to the state treasurer for cancellation such bonds, certificates of stock, and interest; and upon such surrender and cancellation he shall be entitled to receive from the state treasurer, who is au [222] [223] |