[509] The original patent contained the following claim, the words here printed in brackets being those omitted in the reissue: "In a corn-planter having the rear main frame mounted on supporting wheels, the front runner-frame hinged or pivoted to the main frame, [and operated by an elevating and depressing lever pivoted to the main frame, having its front end slotted, and connected to the runner-frame by a bolt passing through said slot, in combination with the shaft d and the lifting hand-lever D, rigidly attached to said shaft, for elevating, depressing and controlling the runner-frame, substantially as herein set forth.]" For this claim the reissue substituted the following four claims, the new words in which are here printed in italics: "1. In a corn-planter having the rear main frame mounted on supporting wheels, and the front runner-frame hinged or pivoted to the main frame, the combination of a foot-treadle and a hand-lover adapted to be used, in conjunction or independently, for the purpose of elevating or depressing the runners, substantially as herein set forth. "2. In a corn-planter having the rear main frame mounted on supporting wheels, and the front runner-frame hinged or pivoted to the main frame, a foot-treadle for elevating or depressing the runner frame, in combination with a hand lock-lever, the foot-treadle and hand-lever adapted to be used in conjunction for forcing and locking the runners into the ground or lifting and locking them out of the ground, substantially as herein set forth. "3. In a corn-planter having the rear main frame mounted on supporting wheels, and the front runner-frame hinged or pivoted to the main frame, a foot-treadle for elevating or depressing the runner-frame, in combination with a hand-lever rigidly connected therewith, that either hand-lever or treadle may be used for forcing the runners into the ground or lifting them out of the ground, substantially as herein set forth. 4. The combination, in a corn-planter havthe rear main frame mounted on supporting wheels, and a front runner-frame hinged or pivoted to the main frame, of a foot-treadle for elevating the runner-frame, and a hand-lever for elevating or depressing the same, both arranged to move simultaneously when either is acted upon by an operator." It thus appears that while the claims, both of the original patent and of the reissue, relate to a corn-planter having the rear main frame mounted on supporting wheels, and the front runner-frame hinged or pivoted to the main frame, the difference between them is this: The claim in the original patent is limited to a lever having its front end slotted, and connected with the runner-frame by a bolt passing through the slot, in combination with a shaft journaled at one end to the main frame and at the other to the seat-standard, and with a lifting hand-lever rigidly attached to that shaft, for elevating, depressing and controlling the runner-frame. pressing the runners; the second claim differs only in being restricted to a hand lock-lever used in connection with the foot-lever; and the third claim, in requiring the two levers to be rigidly connected. In the Kelly machine, patented September 14, 1875, and in public use before the plaintiff's invention, a foot-lever and hand-lever had been used in combination, rigidly connected together (certainly quite as much so as in the defendant's machine), and with a lock on the hand-lever. The only feature of the plaintiff's machine which can possibly be considered as new is a slotted lever connected with the runner-frame by a bolt, and the hand-lever mounted upon a shaft journaled at one end to the main frame and at the other end to the seat-standard, thereby facilitating the depressing of the runners by a single movement. The claim in the original patent is limited to a mechanism containing that feature, which is not found in the defendant's machine. The enlargement of the claims in the reissue, so as to embrace machines not containing that feature, is void, under the rules established by recent decisions of this court, too numerous and familiar to require citation. Decree affirmed. HARRIET A. PURDY, Admrx. of WILLIAM A. PURDY, Plff. in Err., v. THE TOWN OF LANSING. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 557-559.) Town bonds, when invalid. Town bonds, issued under the New York Act of Railroad Company, without any previous action of 1871 in regard to the New York and Oswego Midland the company designating all the counties through which would pass the road authorized by such Act ity of law, and cannot be the foundation of a judgof 1871 to be constructed, are issued without authorment against the town. [No. 96.] Argued Nov. 23, 26, 1888. Decided Dec. 10, 1888. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, to review a judgment in favor of the town, in an action upon town bonds. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. James R. Cox, for plaintiff in error: Whether the statutory prerequisites had all been complied with, the railroad commissioners were charged with the duty of deciding; and their issuing these bonds was, to the purchaser, the strongest possible affirmation of compliance with all the statutory requirements, and the purchaser had the right to rely upon it. Dodge Co. v. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205 (24: 625); San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 314 (24: 817); Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 427 (24: 206); Marshall Co. v. Schenck, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 772 (18:556); San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405; Henry Co. v. Nicolay, 95 U. S. 619 (24:394). The town is not at liberty to deny it, as against a good faith purchaser. In the reissue, on the contrary, the first and [510] [557] U. S. 1 Wall. 83 (17: 548); Venice v. Murdock, 92 | 507; Rexford v. Knight, 15 Barb. 642; 1 Kent, U. S. 494 (23: 583); Davenport v. U. S., Lord, 76 Com. 433; Ailesbury v. Pattison, 1 Doug. 27. U. S. 9 Wall. 414 (19: 707); Merchants Nat. Bank Why, then, should we look for such a conv. State Nat. Bank, 77 Ú. S. 10 Wall. 644 (19: dition precedent in the vague expression "may 1018). be located." Whether or not any of the conditions preceIdent of fact were complied with, he was not bound to inquire. Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 642 (23: 750). The bonds and the indorsement represent compliance with all precedent conditions and preliminary requirements of the statutes. Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 75 (30: 325); Roberts v. Bolles, 101 U. S. 119 (25: 880); Calhoun Co. v. Galbraith, 99 U. S. 214 (25: 410); Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499 (25: 330); Warren Co. v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 (24: 977); Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86 (25: 363); Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484 (23: 579); Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 95 (28:364). If the previous location of the railroad through or near the Town of Lansing is to be regarded as one of these conditions precedent, the purchaser had the right to presume that it was done. Marion Co. v. Clark, 94 U. S. 287 (24: 62). The proposing purchaser of the bonds cannot be charged with any knowledge of errors of assessors, their affidavit being full and correct. Ontario v. Hill, 99 N. Y. 329; Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 62 U. S. 21 How. 539 (16: 208); Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 65 U. S. 24 How. 299 (16: 671); Moran v. Miami Co. 67 U. S. 2 Black, 722 (17: 342); Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 203 (17: 524); Lynde v. Winnebago Co. 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 6 (21: 272); Kenicott v. Wayne Co. 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 452 (21: 319). The locating of this branch railroad through or near this town, and also 140 miles beyond it to Buffalo, was not, by the Act of April 5, 1871, intended to be a condition precedent to subscribing for the stock, or issuing the bonds. James v. Milwaukee, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 160 (21: 267); Phelps v. Lewiston, 15 Blatchf. 148; Smith v. Yates, 15 Blatchf. 92; Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93 U. S. 574 (23: 913). A condition precedent must be always plain and explicit, and is not to be extracted from vague and doubtful words. 8 Coke, 90; Shep. Touch. 134; Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co. 45 N. Y. 464; Woods v. Lawrence Co. 66 U. S. 1 Black, 386 (17: 122); Addison, Cont. 136; Pars. Cont. 526; 1 Story, Cont. §§ 40 50. The varied forms of expression in the many different town bonding Acts, contemplating proposed use of projected railroads, all mean the same thing, viz.: "Along the route;" Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 U. Š. 196 (25:803); Enfield . Jordan. 119 U. S. 695 (30: 529); "Situated along the route;" Phelps v. Lewiston, 15 Blatchf. 134; "Any part of the route of said railroad may be," Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93 U. S. 567 (23: 911); "Through which the railroad may pass;" Woods v. Lawrence Co. 66 U. S. 1 Black, 886 (17:122); Callaway Co. v. Foster, supra; U. S. v. Collier, 3 Blatchf. 325. In the construction of a statute, the court will look to other statutes in pari materia. Dwar. Stat. 189; Re Rochester Water Comrs. 66 N. Y. 413; Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 744; Mc Cartee v. Orphan Asylum Society, 9 Cow. Smith v. Yates, 15 Blatchf. 89, 92. In Kirkbride v. Lafayette Co. 108 U. S. 208 (27: 705), the construction put upon the statute at the time the bonds were voted and issued, by those interested in executing its provisions, was clearly recognized by this court. See also Green Co. v. Conness, 109 U. S. 105 (27:872); Douglass v. Pike Co. 101 U. S. 687 (25: 971). As to newly discovered construction of statutes, see: Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 94 (17: 549); Bourbon Co. v. Block, 99 U S. 699 (25: 495); Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 497 (23:583); Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806 (26: 612); Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513. Messrs. Francis Kernan and H. V. How. land, for defendant in error: The towns had no power to aid in the construction of any railroad, unless expressly empowered to do so by a statute of the State; and the burden of proving its existence rests upon the party claiming by virtue of its exercise. 1 R. S. N. Y. 6th ed. 820, §§ 1, 2; McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429 (24: 129); E. Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255, 258 (24: 125, 126); S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 261, 262 (24: 155); Wells v. Pontotoc Co. 102 U.S. 625, 630 (26: 122, 124). No power was conferred by this Law of 1871 upon the Town of Lansing to issue bonds in the aid of the construction of this extension, unless and until the board of directors of the company had fixed the termini of the extension and located the same between such termini. Mellen v. Lansing, 19 Blatchf. 512; S. C. 20 Blatchf. 278; Thomas v. Lansing, 21 Blatchf. 119; People v. Morgan, 55 N. Y. 587, 591. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover on any theory that he was a bona fide holder of bonds. Where a municipality issues its bonds without any authority to do so they are void in the hands of a bona fide holder for value parted with; the authority to contract must exist before any protection to an innocent purchaser can be successfully claimed. Marsh v. Fulton Co. 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 676, 682 (19:1040, 1042); E. Oakland v. Skinner, S. Ottawa v. Perkins, McClure v. Oxford, and Wells v. Pontotoc Co. supra; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 UJ. S. 120–126 (29:81-83). The town was not estopped from alleging want of power to issue the bonds by anything recited in the bonds, or by the payment by the town officers and commissioners of two or three semi-annual installments of interest. Where the town has no legal power to issue obligations, its officers cannot, by their acts, render them valia. Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 (28: 360). Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion [558] of the court: This is an action upon certain bonds, with interest coupons attached, issued in the name of the Town of Lansing, in the County of Tompkins, New York, to the New York and | cited, and, as they are entirely satisfactory, no The correctness of that judgment depends upon the construction to be given to the Act of the Legislature of New York, approved April, 5, 1871, entitled "An Act to Authorize the New York and Oswego Midland Railroad Company to Extend its Road, and to Facilitate the Construction Thereof. Laws of N. Y. 1871, Vol. 1, p. 586, chap. 298. By the first section of good purpose would be subserved by enlarging that Act it is provided: "The New York and TRUSTEES OF DUBLIN TOWNSHIP, Oswego Midland Railroad Company are here- v. INSTITUTION. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 510-514.) Certificate of division of opinion-what ques- construct their railroad from the City of Au- THE MILFORD FIVE CENT SAVINGS York and Oswego Midland Railroad and its branches and extensions, by the issue and sale of its bonds in the manner provided for in the Act entitled 'An Act to Facilitate the Construction of the New York and Oswego Midland Railroad, and to Authorize Towns to Subscribe to the Capital Stock Thereof,' passed April fifth, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and the Acts amendatory of and supplementary thereto." In Mellen v. Lansing, 20 Blatchf. 278, 286, [559] involving substantially the same questions as are here presented, and in which case it became necessary to interpret the above statute, it was said: "Moreover, there is an inherent defect, in the fact that the company never, by any action of its directors, or otherwise, designated all the counties through which the road was to pass. Under the Act of 1871, the whole extension or branch must be located before the bonds of any town can be issued. It is not enough that a location be made through a particular county. So that even though the maps filed could be regarded as a location of so much of the western extension as was to pass through Tompkins County, there would be no authority for issuing the bonds until the whole extension or branch should be located. The board of directors must, in some way, adopt an entire route as feasible and favorable before the town bonds can be issued. This seems to have been the view of the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Morgan, 55 N. Y. 587." These views were in accordance with the previous decision by the same court in Mellen v. Lansing, 19 Blatchf. 512, and were reaffirmed in Thomas v. Lansing, 21 Blatchf. 119. We are of opinion that this construction of the statute is the proper one. The reasons therefor are fully stated in the cases above This court cannot take jurisdiction of a case, Submitted Nov. 19, 1888. Decided Dec. 10, 1888. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: The original action was brought by the Milford Five Cent Savings Institution, a New Hampshire Corporation, against the Trustees of Dublin Township, Mercer County, Ohio, upon coupons attached to bonds issued by the defendants to aid in the construction of a railroad, under the Statute of Ohio of April 10, 1880. 77 Ohio Laws, 165. Each count of the petition set forth at length provisions of that statute, and the facts relied on as constituting the cause of action, and alleged that the statute was not in conflict with the Constitution of Ohio, as had been determined by the supreme court of the State in Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14. The answer, occupying six closely printed pages of the record, set up seven defenses to the action, the nature of four of which, constituting the greater part of the answer, is indicated by the following abstract: The third defense asserted that the statute was in conflict with the Constitution of the State, set forth at length a number of facts and reasons supposed to bear upon that point, alleged that the Supreme Court of Ohio, by a uniform series of decisions, had held this and similar statutes to be in violation of the Constitution of the State and void, and denied that this case was similar to that of Walker v. Cincinnati, mentioned in the petition. The fourth defense was that one Counter [510] [511] man and one Keith, two, in behalf of all, tax- negotiation of the bonds alleged in the petition, "Third. Whether the former suits, actions The fifth defense was that the present plaint-right to recover herein." The defendants sued out a writ of error, Messrs. Oliver J. Bailey, James H. Sedgwick, S. E. Brown and J. C. Lee, for defendant in error, in support of motion to dismiss: To pass upon the propositions presented is to Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426 (31: 190); The whole case cannot be broken up into Weeth v. New Eng. S. Mortg. Co. 106 U. S. 605 (27: 99); U. S. v. Bailey, 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 267 (9: 124); Nesmith v. Sheldon, 47 U. S. 6 How. 41 (12: 335). This court will refuse jurisdiction when it is obvious that the case was certified pro forma. Webster v. Cooper, 51 U. S. 10 How. 54 (13: 325); Colo. Cent. R. Co. v. White, 101 U. S. 98 (25: 860). The seventh defense, reiterating and re- Upon argument before the Circuit Judge and "First. Whether the said answer showed that the law under which the bonds sued upon were issued was in conflict with the Constitution of the State of Ohio and therefore void. Second. Whether, if said legislation is in conflict with the Constitution of the State of Ohio, there had been such decision of the state courts prior to its passage and to the sale or Mr. John H. Doyle, for plaintiffs in error, Even if any of these questions are bad, if one State Bank v. St. Louis Rail Fastening Co. 122 U. S. 21-23 (30: 1121); Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680 (30: 523); U. S. v. Northway, 120 U. S. 327 (30: 664). Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: By the rules often laid down in former cases and restated at the last term in Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426 [31: 190], and at the present term in Fire Ins. A880. v. Wickham, ante, 503, this court cannot take jurisdiction of this case because, besides the manifest attempt to refer to this court for decision substantially the whole case, by the device of splitting it up into several questions, neither of the questions certified presents a distinct point or proposition of law clearly and precisely stated, but each requires this court to find out for itself the point intended to be presented, by searching through the allegations of the answer and the provisions of the statute relied on by the plaintiff, and by also examining either the whole [514] Constitution of the State, or else reports or records of decisions of its courts, referred to in the answer and made part thereof. The certificate is even more irregular and [598] insufficient than one undertaking to present the question, arising on demurrer or otherwise, whether an indictment or a count therein sets forth any offense which this court has constantly held not to be a proper subject of a certificate of division of opinion. U. S. v. Briggs, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Stanage, 6 Fed. Rep. 279; Singer Mfg. Co v. Riley, 11 Fed. Rep. 706; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 15; Brill v. Singer Mfg. Co. 41 Ohio St. 127; Fairbanks v, Jacobus, 14 Blatchf. 337; Gally v. Colt's Pat. Fire-Arms Mfg. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 46 U. S. 5 How. 208 [12: 119]; U. S. v. North-118; Lorillard v. Pride, 28 Fed. Rep. 434; Del. Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction. [No. 49.] Argued Oct. 30, 31, 1888. Decided Dec. 10, 1888. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, perpetually enjoining defendants from using the name of Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company, or the name of Goodyear Rubber Company, or any abbreviation thereof, in their business. Reversed. Reported below, 22 Blatchf. 421. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Frederic H. Betts, Samuel R. Betts and J. E. Hindon Hyde, for appellants: The name Goodyear Rubber Company is not a trademark. Schneider v. Williams, 44 Off. Gaz. 1400. In a trademark suit, relief is granted against conduct which satisfies the court that a defendant has represented to the public that he is the plaintiff and that his goods are those of plaintiff. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (24: 828); | Avery v. Meikle, 27 Off. Gaz. 1027; Sawyer v. Horn, 1 Fed. Rep. 24; Sawyer Crystal Blue Co. v. Hubbard, 32 Fed. Rep. 388; Moxie Nerve Food Co. v Baumbach, Id. 205. Mere general allegations of fraud amount to nothing. Stearns v. Page, 48 U. S. 7 How. 819 (12:928); Beaubien v. Beaubien, 64 U. S. 23 How. 190 (16: 484). The name Goodyear Rubber Company is a purely descriptive name, and as such is incapable of exclusive appropriation. The defendant and not the complainant is entitled to any relief that can be given. Clement v. Maddick, 5 Jur. N. S. 592; Matsell v. Flanagan, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 459; American Grocer Pub. Asso. v. Grocer Pub. Co. 25 Hun, 398. A corporation may be shown by several names. Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co. 12 Barb. 27; Abbott, Dig. Law of Corporations, 538; All Saints Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall, 191; Dutchess Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 238; Dutch West India Co. v. Van Moses, 1 Str. 614; Knight V. Mayor of Wells, 1 Ld. Raym. 80; Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. 441; South School Dist. v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227. The circuit court had no jurisdiction of this case. Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 275 (29:899); Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187 (28: 693); Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U. S. 631 (30: 1020.) Mr. W. W. Mac Farland, for appellee: The title to the name Goodyear Rubber Company, and the exclusive right to its use, belongs to the complainant. Newman v. Alvord, 51 N. Y. 189. Upon the facts the decree should be affirmed. Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223; Ainsworth v. Walmsley, L. R. 1 Eq. 524; Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 97; State y. Hutchinson, 3 Ry. & Corp. Jour. 2012; Col. ton v. Thomas, 2 Brewst. 308; Merchant Bkg. The court should decline to listen to the point that the cause was not removable after the long lapse of time. French v. Hay, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 238 (22: 854). If there was federal jurisdiction, it is enough. Canal &C. Sts. R. Co. v. Hart, 114 U. S. 654 (29:226). A formal party against whom no relief is asked does not affect the jurisdiction. Hatch v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 6 Blatchf. 105; McHenry v. New York, P. & O. R. Co. 25 Fed. Rep. 65; Wood v. Davis, 59 U. S. 18 How. 467 (15: 460); Harter Twp. v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (26: 411); Bacon v. Rives, 106 U. S. 99 (27: 69); Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457 (25: 593). Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of [599] the court: This was a suit in equity, brought by the Goodyear Rubber Company, a corporation created under the laws of New York, to restrain Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company, a corporation created under the laws of Connecticut, and others, defendants |