Exclusion of placemen ers from the House of literally true, for his acts are really the acts of his Ministers; and his Ministers are responsible to the House of Commons not merely as of old, for any breach of the law, but for the general course of their policy, which must accord with the opinions of the majority of that House, or else, in conformity with a Constitutional usage practically as binding as a legal enactment, the Ministers are bound to resign office. Instead of a revolution or a Parliamentary impeachment, a change of Ministry suffices to preserve harmony between the Crown and the people. The sixth clause of the Act of Settlement, by which all placemen and pension and pensioners were excluded from Parliament, was directly aimed, not at the Cabinet system, but at the dangerous influence which the Crown had acquired through the profuse distribution of offices and pensions among the members of the Legislature. This means of corrupting the representatives of the people had been extensively employed under the last two Stuarts; and William III.. amidst the difficulties with which he found himself surrounded, adopted and even extended this baneful expedient for controlling his Parliaments. To check this abuse the Commons, in 1693, passed a Bill to prohibit all members thereafter elected from accepting any office under the Crown. Rejected by a small majority of the Lords, the bill was re-introduced in the following year and passed both Houses; but William III. refused the Royal assent. A few years later, however, the principle of disqualification received a Legislative sanction by the express exclusion from the House of Commons of the newly-appointed . Commissioners of Stamps and Excise.1 The total exclusion of all servants of the Crown from the House of Commons, enacted by the Act of Settlement, was not only far too drastic a remedy for the special evil which it was intended to meet, but would also, if carried into practice, have brought the Ministers of the Crown into hopeless conflict with the House of Commons, and, by preventing the fusion of the Legislative and Executive powers, have effectually stopped the development of the system of Parliamentary or Cabinet government which we now enjoy. The clause was, however, as we have seen, repealed before it could come into operation, in the fourth year of Queen Anne's reign; and two years afterwards, by the 'Act for the Security of the Crown and Succession,'3 more reasonable provisions were enacted for the prevention of corrupt influence. (1) Every person holding any office or place of profit whatsoever under the 1 4 & 5 Will. & Mary, c. 21 (Stamps); 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 2, s. 50 (Excise). 2 4 Anne, c. 8, s. 25. 36 Anne, c. 7. Crown' created since the 25th of October, 1705, or in receipt of a pension during the pleasure of the Crown, was incapacitated from sitting in the House of Commons; and (2) every member of that House accepting any of the previously existing offices under the Crown (except a higher commission in the army) was obliged to vacate his seat, though still eligible for re-election. So long as the system of Ministerial government, with responsibility to the House of Commons, was not fully established, and while the House of Commons itself remained liable to corrupt influences, and, under a restricted franchise, failed to represent the people, such a provision as the latter, which compelled the acceptance of office by a representative to be submitted to the approval of his constituents, acted as a salutary check both upon the Crown and the leading members of the Commons. But now, with a reformed suffrage, and under a customary or unwritten Constitution in which one of the principal functions of the members of the Commons is, by an indirect process, to choose the Ministers of the Crown, the reasons for the enactment have ceased to exist. Although, however, several attempts have been made to modify the principle, they have been always unsuccessful, with the single exception contained in the Reform Act of 1867, dispensing with the requirement of 6 Anne, c. 7, in the case of the removal of a Minister from one office under the Crown to another. Bill' of 1742. The exception from the Act of 6 Anne, c. 7, of all offices existing on the 25th October, 1705, enabled the Crown still to exercise extensive corruption by means of places; and in 1741 no less than two hundred appointments were held by members of the House of Commons. In the following year, however, the Place Bill, which had been thrice The Place rejected by the Commons, and twice by the Lords, passed into an Act, excluding from the House a large number of officials, chiefly clerks and other subordinate officers of the public departments. In 1782 several other offices which had been generally held by members Lord Rockof Parliament were suppressed by Lord Rockingham's Civil List Act ; Civil List Act, 1782. and the policy of official disfranchisement has been since almost invariably followed whenever new officers have been appointed by Acts of Parliament. ingham's The incapacity imposed by the Act 6 Anne, c. 7, upon pensioners Secret of the Crown during pleasure, though extended at the commencement 16 Anne, c. 7. To check the increase of placemen, certain restrictions were also imposed on the multiplication of commissioners. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 52. 3 Lords' Protests, 1741. pensions. 4 15 Geo. II. c. 22. 3 22 Geo. III. c. 82. Exclusion of Judges from House of Commons. of the next reign to pensioners for terms of years,' was eluded by the grant of secret pensions out of the large sum annually voted to the Crown 'as secret service money,' and expended without any account; but by Lord Rockingham's Act already referred to, the power of granting pensions out of the King's Civil List was considerably limited, and secret pensions were abolished by a provision that in future all pensions should be paid at the public Exchequer. In the same year a stop was put to another form of Parliamentary corruption by an Act disqualifying contractors for the public service from sitting in the House. The Common Law Judges had always been disqualified from sitting in the House of Commons; and this exclusion was extended to the Scotch Judges under George II., and to the Irish Judges under George IV. The same rule was applied in 1840 to the Judge of the Court of Admiralty; and the holders of all newly-created Judicial posts have been disqualified by the Acts under which they were constituted. The Master of the Rolls-hitherto the sole Judge who had retained the capacity of sitting in the Commons-has been also at length disqualified by the clause of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, which declares that no Judge of the High Court of Justice or of the Court of Appeal shall be capable of being elected to or of sitting in that House." 11 Geo. I. c. 36. 22 Geo. III. c. 45. The Irish Parliament, in 1793, applied the principle of the English Act of Anne to its own members by diqualifying all holders of offices under the Crown or Lord Lieutenant created after that time. This disqualification was extended, at the Union, to the Parliament of the United Kingdom; and at the same time several new disqualifications in respect of Irish offices were added (41 Geo. III. c. 52). In the first Parliament of Geo. I. there were 271 members holding offices, pensions, and sinccures. In the first Parliament of George II., 257; in the first Parliament of George IV. but 89, exclusive of officers in the Army and Navy; and in 1833 there were only 60 members holding civil offices and pensions, and 83 holding naval and military commissions. On Places and Pensions in the House of Commons, see May, Const. Hist. i. pp. 369-375. 3 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 9. [The general position of affairs in regard to Constitutional questions since the Revolution is thus tersely summed up by M. Glasson, Hist. du Dr. et des Inst. Pol. de l'Angl. v. 404-5. La révolution de 1688 inaugure définitivement le régime parlementaire en Angleterre. La royauté est plus que jamais limitée dans sa prérogative. L'habile prince d'Orange s'attacha à user l'un contre l'autre les deux grands partis qui se disputaient le pouvoir dans le Parlement. . . . La reine Anne, douce, comme son père, d'un esprit étroit et borné, ne parvint à exercer aucune influence sur le Parlement. George Ier était, en tous points, un prince allemand du dix-huitième siècle... infatué de son importance princière, incapable de prononcer un mot d'Anglais, ignorant l'esprit du peuple sur lequel il devait régner. Il eut cependant l'habileté de comprendre combien sa situation était délicate. . . George II. se trouva au commencement de son règne dans une situation pire encore que celle de son père. C'est seulement sous George III. ་ que la royauté se relève sérieusement. Interesting particulars throwing light on modern views of Ministerial government may be found in the Edinburgh Review, for Jan., 1890, Art. Life of Lord John Russell, and in Mr. Spencer Walpole's Life, of which it is a criticism, as well as in Mr. Walpole's History of Europe since 1815. Lond. 1878-86. The fact of the growth a genuine Legislative Authority in this country, in opposition to the Executive, still represented by the monarch,' was emphasised by the late Prof. Sheldon Amos, in his Science of Politics, Lond. 1883, p. 91, as 'a world-wide phenomenon simply made more conspicuous in England by the slow, steady, and uninterrupted manifestation of every one of the links in the chain of development. In other countries the process has only been accomplished after hundreds of years of political stagnation, or after periods of anarchy or after the social chaos produced by religious corruption. '—C.] With the Reformation, the Revolution, the Restoration, and the expulsion of the Stuarts, the limits of the executive power were in England defined, and the political constitution was formally established.'—Gneist, Hist. Eng. Const., who refers among general and political histories to the following; viz.: Hallam, Const. Hist. of England: Lord Mahon, Hist. from the Peace of Utrecht; and W. Massey, Hist. of Engl. under George III. —ED.] 572 1. Kingship since the Revolution. Legal prero- Revolution, Convocation. CHAPTER XVII. PROGRESS OF THE CONSTITUTION SINCE THE REVOLUTION (CONTINUED). IN the preceding chapter we have discussed the Act of Settlement and the various topics arising out of its provisions, including that most important topic of all-the growth and present working of the Cabinet system. Much more remains to be said on the progress of the Constitution since the Revolution; and with a view as well to clearness of exposition as to conciseness of statement the chief remaining Constitutional facts may be conveniently grouped under the five heads of the Kingship, 2) the House of Lords. (3 the House of Commons, (4) Religious Liberty, and 5) the Liberty of the Press. I. Kingship since the Revolution. The legal prerogatives of the Crown were untouched by the Revolution settlement. It was only the recent innovations which were swept away, leaving to the Kingship the legal character which it had possessed prior to the usurpations of the Tudors and Stuarts. By the written Constitution the King still retains the supreme Executive and co-ordinate Legislative power. He calls Parliament together, prorogues or dissolves it at pleasure, and may refuse the Royal assent to any Bills. He is the 'Fountain of Justice,' and as such dispenses Royal justice through Judges appointed to preside, in his name, over the various Courts of Judicature. As supreme Magistrate and conservator of the peace he nominally prosecutes criminals, and may pardon them after conviction. As supreme Military commander, he has the sole power of raising, regulating, and disbanding armies and fleets. As the 'Fountain of Honour,' he alone can create Peers (a power of the highest Constitutional importance) and confer titles, dignities and offices of all kinds. He is the legal head and supreme governor of the National Church, and in that capacity convenes, prorogues, regulates, and dissolves all Ecclesiastical Synods or Convocations. As the representative of the majesty of the 1 On the early history of Convocation and its relations to the King and Parliament something has been said (supra, pp. 209, 210, notes 2 and 3). From the passing of the Act 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19(supra, p. 355, and n. 1), Convocation had ceased to possess any independent Legislative power, Church and State being alike subjected to the |