templates the invitation of all interested States to join in the protectorate of the canal, in other words the neutralization of the canal. By the adoption of this plan, the United States would gain all the advantages which a canal would offer, and without the necessity of keeping on foot an enormous navy, or of entering generally upon a career of militarism, which is at this moment the calamity and the danger in European nations. As Dr. Wharton pointed out: "Such an international agreement, entered into by all the great powers, would not be in conflict with the Monroe Doctrine. For an agreement that no powers whatever should be permitted to invade the neutrality of an isthmus route, but that it should be absolutely neutralized so as to protect it from all foreign assaults by which its freedom should be imperilled, is an application, not a contravention, of the Monroe Doctrine. Such an agreement is not an approval of, but an exclusion of foreign interposition." 1

There would probably be no objection on the part of European States to the United States taking a leading part in the management of the canal; that would be a natural consequence of our position.

The argument of Mr. Blaine as to England's control of the Suez Canal has, of course, no longer any force since, by the joint action of the European powers, on the 29th of October, 1888, that canal has been neutralized.

On the other hand, if we set aside the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and attempt an exclusive control of the canal, we shall encounter many difficulties. More than half the world is interested, politically or commercially in the isthmian canal; and it is more than probable that all the maritime States of Europe and America would combine to oppose our exclusive control of it. In the case of the Panama route, moreover the sole basis of our claim is the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of 1846 with Colombia, which may be abrogated at any time by a twelvemonths' notice on the part of Colombia, and thus leave us without the semblance of a legal right to a protectorate over that route. In regard to the Nicaragua route, it is said that we should be able to control it by annexing Mexico and a part of Central America. Herein lies the real danger of such a policy;

1 1 Digest of International Law, II. 243

and the warning of Mr. Sarmiento applies to it. To take into our Union twelve millions of people, of a race totally different from ours in temperament, in traditions and laws, in capacity for self-government, and in their habits and religion, would introduce an element of discord and perpetual trouble, which it would be the part of wisdom to avoid.

As to the question of annexation of territory in general, there is serious danger to our system of government in introducing into it territories which are occupied by any races essentially different from our own. The history and the present political condition of those States, composed of peoples of different nationalities, should be a warning to us not to repeat that fundamental mistake.

THE FISHERIES QUESTION.

It is said there are two sides to every question: and we may add, that the fisheries question forms no exception to the rule. In the dispute about the fisheries between the United States and England, which has been going on for more than a century, each party has apparently come to believe that the other is wholly in the wrong. The truth would seem to be somewhere between these two extremes. The real issue has been so befogged by a mass of doubtful claims and abstruse reasoning that the average man despairs of reaching a definite conclusion in the matter.

Besides the old claim of the United States to a natural right in the British fisheries in America, there have arisen questions of international law, such as the nature of the jurisdiction over the ocean, within the three-mile limit, the question of headlands, the interpretation of treaties, and the rights of vessels under the laws of navigation and commerce.

The subject may be conveniently divided into the following heads, to be discussed as nearly as possible in their historical order :

1. Did the United States have a right to the inshore fisheries of the British provinces independent of the treaty of 1783?

2. Was the article of that treaty granting the liberty to fish in British waters abrogated by the war of 1812?

3. Has the article relating to the fisheries of the convention of 1818 been modified by subsequent statutes of the two countries relating to navigation and commerce?

4. What is the rule of international law as to jurisdiction over the three-mile limit? And is this limit to be measured from headland to headland in the case of bays more than six miles wide, or is it to follow the sinuosities of the shore?

5. The Reciprocity treaties of 1854 and 1871.

6. The controversy in recent years.

In any discussion of the history of the controversies about the fisheries between the United States and England, the fact must be recognized that the relative importance of the fisheries as an industry and commercially was very much greater during the colonnial period and for some time subsequently than it is at the present time. In the New England colonies the fisheries not only were the chief source of food at times, but they furnished the first articles of export, and laid the foundation of their commerce and navigation. It was not without reason, therefore, that Lord North's bill, of 1775, depriving Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island of the fishery on the Banks of Newfoundland and other places, was expected to "starve them into submission."

England had claimed, as France had done before her, the exclusive right of fishing over a very extensive area of sea-including the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Newfoundland Banks. When the last of the French territory in this part of America (with the exception of the islands of Miquelon and St. Pierre) was transferred to England by the treaty of 1763, French fishermen were excluded from the fisheries within three leagues of the British coast in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and fifteen leagues from the island of Cape Breton.1 By the same treaty Spain formally renounced all her claims to territory and rights in that part of America. It is important to remember that the rule of the "freedom of the seas" and the "three-mile limit" had not then attained a fixed determination.

Under these circumstances, the statesmen of the Continental Congress expected that England would, in negotiating a peace, attempt to exclude the United States from the fisheries of the Newfoundland banks and the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

1 See extracts from the treaties of 1713 and 1763, supra, pp. 1

But, as important as the fisheries were to them, the members of Congress did not make the right to the fisheries an ultimatum, in the instructions to John Adams, August 14, 1779, to negotiate a treaty of peace.1 In instructions of the same date for the negotiation of a treaty of commerce, however, the fishing rights are made an important part.2 What they insisted on here was the right to fish on the "banks of Newfoundland and other fisheries in the American seas anywhere, excepting within the distance of three leagues of the shores of the territories remaining to Great Britain at the close of the war, if a nearer distance cannot be obtained by negotiation." And Mr. Adams was to endeavor to obtain a "nearer distance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence" and "along the shores of Nova Scotia," and even an occasional use of the shores. There is no intimation in these instructions of any claim to a right in the British shorefisheries. And indeed, on the 12th of July, 1781, the commission and instructions for the negotiation of a treaty of commerce were revoked, thus leaving no instructions or ultimatum to insist on even a right to the bank or deep-sea fisheries.

On the 27th of October, 1781, the Massachusetts legislature, by resolution, instructed the delegates from that State in Congress to insist on the right to the fisheries; and the resolution having been referred to a committee, the committee reported on the 16th of August, 1782. An extract from this very able report is given above (p. 57), and it will be seen therein that no claim is made to a right to the shore-fisheries of British territory; it is an argument drawn from history and practice to prove that the open sea is not subject to appropriation by any State. The Newfoundland banks, therefore, "the nearest point of which is thirty-five leagues distant from Cape Race, are too far advanced in the Atlantick to be a dependence of the shores."

It appears not to have occurred to the statesmen of the revolutionary period to put forward a claim of right to the shore-fisheries of the territories remaining to Great Britain; indeed they anticipated a hard fight to establish their right to the deep-sea fisheries on the banks. This being the case, how did it happen that by the treaty of peace, the United States obtained the privilege of both the bank and shore-fisheries?

1 Supra, p. 54.

2

Supra, p. 55.

8 Supra, p. 57.

The fact seems to be that John Adams was determined to get the use of these fisheries regardless of instructions; and gave the British commissioners to understand that this was an ultimatum on the part of the United States.

In the meantime Congress had added to the commission Benjamin Franklin, John Jay and Henry Laurens. On the part of England was Mr. Oswald, as commissioner, assisted by Mr. Strachey and Mr. Fitzherbert.

In one of their discussions which had continued the whole day, says Mr. Adams: "I proposed a new article concerning the fishery; it was discussed and turned in every light, and multitudes of amendments proposed on each side; and at last the article drawn as it was finally agreed to.

"The other English gentlemen being withdrawn upon some occasion, I asked Mr. Oswald if he could consent to leave out the limitation of three leagues from all their shores, and the fifteen from those of Louisburg. He said, in his own opinion, he was for it; but his instructions were such that he could not do it."

From this and from other incidents the American commissioners now appeared to have strongly suspected that Mr. Oswald's instructions did not make the fisheries an ultimatum, that a certain discretion was permitted to him, and Mr. Adams, at least, determined to make a bold strike for the complete right to the whole fishery. He continues:

"Upon the return of the other gentlemen, Mr. Strachey proposed to leave out the word 'right' of fishing, and make it liberty (for the entire fishery). Mr. Fitzherbert said that the word 'right' was an obnoxious expression. Upon this, I rose up and said, 'Gentlemen, is there or can there be a clearer right? In former treaties,-that of Utrecht and that of Paris, -France and England have claimed the right, and used the word. When God Almighty made the banks of Newfoundland at three hundred leagues distance from the people of America, and at six hundred leagues distance from those of France and England, did he not give as good a right to the former as to the latter? If Heaven in the creation gave a right, it is ours at least as much as yours. If occupation, use, and possession give a right, we have it as clearly as you. If war, and blood, and treasure give a right, ours is as good as yours.' It must