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ditions into the interior, and isolate the western portion of the Confederacy. This was found to be a difficult matter, if not impossible, and a different strategy was soon devised that of flanking and forcing the evacuation of these river fortresses by operations in the interior at their rear. In this plan the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers played an important part, and the great features of the railway system of the southern Valley east of the Mississippi entered into it as a large factor. It played an important part in the years that followed, to the great advantage of the North and damage of the South. The lower part of the railroad system was of great importance to the Confederacy for the rapid concentration and transfer of forces, and transport of supplies to Virginia and the border.

From Paducah, on the Ohio, below Louisville, a continuous line of railway ran nearly due south to Mobile and New Orleans. From Memphis, at the southwest corner of Tennessee and on the Mississippi, a line skirted the northern border of the States of Mississippi and Alabama, to Chattanooga, in East Tennessee, and thence northeast between the parallel ranges of the Alleghanies to the tidewaters of the Atlantic, in Virginia. This line was intersected at Decatur, Ala., and Stevenson, Ga., from the north by a road from Louisville, which passed through Bowling Green, Ky., where a branch connected with Memphis. Chattanooga was connected by railway through Atlanta, Ga., with the Atlantic seaboard at Charleston, S. C., and Savannah, Ga., and with the Gulf at Pensacola, Florida. Vicksburg, a strong fortification on the east bank of the Mississippi, midway between Memphis and New Orleans, was ultimately connected by railway with Montgomery, Ala., and Atlanta.

The Confederate lines at Bowling Green were joined with the force at Columbus by the intermediate fortifications of Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. Paducah lies at the mouth of the Tennessee on the Ohio. Forts Henry and Donelson formed the center of

the Confederate line, which, being broken there, would expose both Bowling Green and Columbus to an attack in the rear, or their communications with the Confederacy could be easily severed.

This plan was adopted by the Federal commanders with success. While a Federal army confronted the Confederate forces at Bowling Green, another, supported by a fleet of gunboats, ascended the Tennessee from Paducah and captured Fort Henry; the boats returned to the Ohio and ascended the Cumberland to Fort Donelson, the army crossed the short distance between the two rivers to the same point, and Donelson also fell. The Confederate forces at Columbus and Bowling Green were obliged, by this disaster, to withdraw without a struggle; Middle and East Tennessee were opened to Federal occupation, and the Confederate lines were reformed south of the Tennessee River on the northern border of Mississippi. The disadvantage to the South of having so large territory to defend with inferior forces and warlike material was apparent; it was, in fact, decisive of the whole struggle. It gave too much advantage to their opponents in mental warfare, or strategy. In a smaller field, as in Virginia, where defensive strategy could be employed to make up for inferiority of numbers, they were more successful.

The Federal armies pressed forward against the new Confederate line. Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen in February, 1862. By April the antagonists confronted each other on the south bank of the Tennessee at Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing. Before the two Federal armies had concentrated the Confederates attacked the one nearest, at Shiloh, and one of the most desperate and characteristic battles of the war occurred. It was of extreme importance to the Confederacy to hold this line, for the Memphis and Chattanooga Railroad lay but a few miles to the south, and this was the most important, shortest, and, at that time, the only line of communication between the eastern and western parts of their territory. The

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loss of it might be fatal to them. The Southern army, about 40,000 strong, was confronted by the Federal force under General Grant with 33,000 men. General Buell, commanding the Federal army that had lain between Bowling Green and Louisville, was advancing to form a junction with Grant.

This would give the Union army a great superiority of numbers. The Confederate army, therefore, made a furious attack which was with the utmost difficulty withstood by troops, in large part, recently recruited and undisciplined. But the shades of night found them still in arms and resolutely refusing to acknowledge defeat, although nearly half their number had been disabled or killed. In the evening the army of General Buell began to arrive and another day was fought through with a great increase of force on the Federal side. The Confederate army was almost annihilated, but withdrew so bravely that its shattered and helpless condition. was not suspected, and it remained a long time intrenched within a few miles, its defiant attitude conveying an impression of strength which it did not possess.

This disaster might, perhaps, have been repaired had not other parts of the field diverted so much of the attention of the Confederate Government. The fortifications on the Mississippi below Columbus were soon taken. Commodore Farragut captured New Orleans and the lower defences of the river, and the Federal army, under McClellan, was threatening Richmond, Va., the Confederate capital. The Federal forces also gained a foothold on the coast of North and South Carolina, and secured Pensacola. Only Vicksburg and Port Hudson held the two parts of the Confederacy together.

Under such a cloud of misfortunes the South might well have despaired. It did not, however. McClellan was repulsed from the Peninsula and the tide of war again rolled up toward Washington, and even crossed the Potomac into Maryland for a time. A vigorous effort was made throughout the South; fresh armies were organized, and a bold push northward was

made from East Tennessee as well as from Richmond. General Buel was proceeding with his army from the neighborhood of Corinth to Chattanooga, when General Bragg, Confederate commander, suddenly transferred his army ahead of him across Alabama to Chattanooga, and pushed forward into the fairest part of Kentucky, and toward Louisville, which required Buell to repair to that point for its protection. After gathering vast and various supplies, which were much needed in the South, General Bragg succeeded in conveying them away in safety and in withdrawing his army without a great battle. Although disappointed in its hope of holding Kentucky and carrying the war into the North, the South was inspired with new energy by such successes after so many great reverses, and tenaciously held on its way.

Corinth and Memphis had fallen in June, principally by retreat after resistance became hopeless, and the most important line of railway joining the east and west of the Confederacy, between Memphis and Chattanooga, had passed mostly into Federal hands or been destroyed. The strong fortifications of Vicksburg, and the east and west railway line of which it was the terminus, became the mainstay and hope of the South. The Yazoo River and unfavorable ground protected the stronghold in the rear, and for more than a year it resisted the most desperate efforts of the Federal generals. By the invasion of Kentucky after having lost both that State and most of Tennessee, the South barely failed of recovering nearly all it had lost, which gave it a glimpse of the possibilities of war from which its sturdy courage and unbending will took all the encouragement it wished.

The winter found it still in possession of East Tennessee and the railway connections, so important to the Confederacy, at Chattanooga, and triumphantly holding Vicksburg. A long series of strategic movements and battles, covering much of Kentucky, Tennessee and parts of Alabama and Mississippi, had occupied the summer and fall. Arkansas had been the

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theatre of incessant conflict, but the bulk of the forces had been withdrawn by both sides to support the more critical operations in the eastern Valley. The bravery of the Southern armies had covered them with glory and required an equal valor and far greater resources on the Federal side to make head against them. The Confederate soldier was often in want of almost everything but the most indispensable means of fighting and keeping life in his worn, overworked and underfed body; while the invasion of a hostile country, the vast masses of men required and the abundant means of the North, made the question of supplies one of leading importance in the strategy and operations of the Federal generals. Compared with the Confederate, the Federal soldier may almost be said to have fought at his ease and in comfort.

By December 1, 1862, more than 1,300,000 men had been put in the field by the North, while, it is affirmed, the South had never half that number at once in arms. The entire number of different men in the Southern armies during the whole war is stated at about one third the whole number of its antagonists. The sacrifices of the North were immense and seemed inconceivable, but the devotion of the South to a constantly failing cause was not less honorable to its spirit. It is true that there were many, both North and South, who did not scruple to improve the opportunities offered, during the confusion of war, to enrich themselves at the expense of their government; and many, in the South, sought to avoid a personal share of the fighting after having exerted their influence to promote the desperate collision; yet, as a whole, the Southern people were disposed to sacrifice everything to independence, and the Northern citizens were ready to assume all the burdens required to preserve the Union.

The South displayed much energy, after the loss of the upper and lower Mississippi, of the central Valley and of most of its seaports, by the advances in force into Maryland and Kentucky. The North thought that there was reason enough