The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised EditionBasic Books, 29 ապր, 2009 թ. - 304 էջ A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics. |
Բովանդակություն
The Problem of Cooperation | 3 |
The Emergence of Cooperation | 25 |
The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments | 27 |
The Chronology of Cooperation | 55 |
Cooperation Without Friendship or Foresight | 71 |
The LiveandLetLive System in Trench Warfare in World War I | 73 |
The Evolution of Cooperation in Biological Systems with William D Hamilton | 88 |
Advice for Participants and Reformers | 107 |
Conclusions | 143 |
The Social Structure of Cooperation | 145 |
The Robustness of Reciprocity | 169 |
TOURNAMENT RESULTS | 192 |
PROOFS OF THE THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS | 206 |
NOTES | 216 |
| 223 | |
| 231 | |
Այլ խմբագրություններ - View all
Common terms and phrases
actually altruism analysis Anatol Rapoport average score based on reciprocity behavior best strategy better biological chapter choice collectively stable strategy Computer Chess Computer Tournament conflict coop cooperation based decision rule developed discount parameter E. O. Wilson effective emergence of cooperation entries environment eration evolution of cooperation evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary example exploit forgiving future game theorists Gordon Tullock hypothetical tournaments important incentive interaction invade TIT iterated Prisoner's Dilemma JOSS less live-and-let-live system Maynard Smith meanies ment mutant mutual cooperation mutual defection neighbors never cooperate newcomer nice rules nice strategy NYDEGGER once other's outcome pattern payoff matrix player cooperates player defects points population possible previous move Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament problem programs promote cooperation proposition provocable punishment random reputation response restraint retaliation robust second round side situation submitted successful rules TAT players territorial system theory tion TIT FOR TAT tive tournament results tournament score trench warfare