grace of novelty. Fourthly, that it necessarily and invariably discloses the whole design of the speaker, when his object often requires that he should bring his audience to conclusions unawares even to themselves. Fifthly, that it counteracts and interferes with all powerful appeals to the passions. As nothing can be more opposed to emotion than calculations, so a minute and scrupulous dissection of parts is utterly irreconcileable with those great, sudden, unexpected touches, which extort the suffrage of the hearer from his feelings. Sixthly, there are many arguments feeble in themselves, but which may derive strength from their numbers. These require accumulation, rather than division. And lastly, in the division of judicial causes there must be one point stronger than the rest; of course it makes them useless, and perhaps loses some of its strength by the incumbrance of their alliance. All these objections are fairly and fully stated by Quinctilian. When the archbishop of Cambray then affirms, that division is a modern invention, which came first from the schools, he must have reference only to the particular mode of divisions, usually practised in writing Both Quinctilian and Cicero however very explicitly give their opinions in favor of a

sermons.

partition; and, although it must be admitted that there is weight in some of the difficulties, which I have here stated, yet experience will soon convince every public speaker, that his own convenience and that of his auditory, nay in most cases I might say an absolute necessity prescribes the use of some regular partition. It is possible that an orator, after laying down his divisions, may forget to treat of some of them; but it is impossible that he should avoid forgetting many important ideas, if he has not arranged them in some regular order. If he suffers any material consideration to remain without the boundaries of his partition, so as thereby to lose its benefit, the fault is not in the general character of partition, but in the imperfection of that, which he has chosen. The appearance of premeditation it certainly has; but without premeditation to deliver a speech upon a long and complicated argument is not within the compass of human powers. The process of the human mind in the acquisition of ideas is successive, and not instantaneous; our reason is discursive, and not intuitive. In the regions of romance a magnificent palace may rise from the earth like an exhalation, with all its pillars and pilasters, architrave, frieze, and cornice. But such a fabric in

But

the real world of man is the work of an age, with incessant toil and hands innumerable. But it does not necessarily follow, that the orator, by marking a division of his subject, should disclose his whole purpose, or forestall the arguments, which may produce an impression by their novelty. If indeed the proposition, which the whole discourse is to urge, be of such a nature, that it cannot safely be made known to those, who are finally to act upon it, then the division must be concealed, not for itself, but as constituting the proposition. such cases can now very seldom if ever occur. When Cicero addressed the people of Rome to defeat the popular project of an Agrarian law, proposed by the tribune Rullus; when Mark Antony harrangued them over the dead body of Caesar, for the purpose of stirring them up to mutiny, a formal division would have been absurd; for the success of the speaker depended upon the concealment of his intention. But there can surely be no occasion for rhetorical instructions predicated upon the purpose of rousing a populace to insurrection; and, strongly as the feature of democracy predominates in all our political institutions, our people has wisely entrusted all the important powers of government to delegated bodies, and has re

served to itself the exercise of no great object of national concern. Our deliberative and judicial orations must generally be addressed to select assemblies; and the purpose of the speaker must be ap parent in the very form of discussion. It cannot

be denied, that the construction of a discourse with accurate partition implies composure and tranquillity of mind in the speaker, and that to follow him in his concerted train supposes a similar self-possession in his audience. Yet that it does not preclude the use of pathetic instruments, in the progress of his discourse, is obvious from the orations of Cicero, some of which are equally remarkable for preciseness of partition, and depth of pathos. The accumulation of arguments separately feeble will be rather facilitated, than prevented by a judicious division; and although one point of a pleader's argument may be stronger than the rest, it will not of course be always sufficient to command the decision of the cause. In the conflict of jurisprudence, as in the contests of nations, the strong may be as essentially benefited by the concurrence of the weak, as the weak by their recurrence to the strong.

So great are the advantages of a just partition in giving clearness and perspicuity to a discourse,

so much more easy does it render the treatment of any momentous subject to the speaker and to the understanding of the hearer, that I have deemed it indispensable thus far to attempt its vindication against the speculative objections, which have been at different times urged against it. I call them speculative objections, for, notwithstanding the earnestness and ingenuity, with which they are supported in Fenelon's dialogues, no eminent preacher since the time when he wrote has ever attempted to practise upon his precepts; and the usage of dividing sermons into heads still subsists, and will subsist so long, as sermons worth reading or even worth hearing shall be delivered.

In forming however his division the speaker will need the exercise of great skill, fruitfulness of invention, and solidity of judgment. The forms of division for judicial harangues, recommended by Cicero and Quinctilian, were of two kinds, which they denominate enumeration and segregation. The first consisted of a marked distinction, unfolded in precise terms, of all the heads, upon which the speaker was to discourse; and the second of a discrimination between those points, upon which the two parties to a cause were agreed, and those upon which their contest was to turn.