fought to arm in their caufe, the refidue of the world, and deemed it criminal to acknowledge the fovereignty of the Republic. The nations of Europe, even those who had not entered into the conteft, were either themselves unwilling to acknowledge this fovereignty, or were detered by fear from doing fo. Had the partialities of America been againft France, this example would have been followed. According to the rules of ordinary calculation, the measure would have been fafe, and confequently a government, feeling the attachments now fo unjustly attributed to that of the United States, would have indicated those attachments by its adoption. Far from purfuing fuch a fyftem the United States, unawed by the ftrength of the coalition, received with open arms the minister of this Republic, acknowledged with enthusiasm the government which had deputed him, overlooked his extraordinary attacks on their fovereignty, and manifested a cordial friendthip for his nation and a fincere with for its fuccefs.

Scarcely were the first ceremonies of his reception over, when Mr. Genet difplayed a difpofition to ufurp and exercife within the United States, the choiceft and most important duties and powers of fovereignty. He claimed the privileges of arming and embodying the citizens of America within their own territory, to carry on from thence expeditions against nations with whom they were at peace, of fitting out and equipping, within their limits, privateers, to cruize on a commerce deftined for their ports; of erecting within their jurisdiction, an independent judiciary, and of arraign. ing their government at tl:e bar of the people. The underfigned will not afk in what manner France would have treated any foreign minifter, who fhould have dared fo to conduct himself towards this republic? But in what manner would the American government have treated such a minister, if the reprefentative of a nation it viewed with coldness, or even indifference? In what manner would it have treated him, had he been the reprefentative of any other nation than France? No man acquainted with that government can doubt how these enquiries ought to be answered. From the minifter of France alone could this extraordinary conduct be borne with temper. To have continued to bear it, without perceiving and feeling its extreme impropriety, would have been to have merited the contempt as well of France as of the other powers of the earth. The government of the United States did feel it; but far from transferring to his nation that refentment, which fuch conduct could not fail to excite, it diftinguished strongly between the government and its minifter, and the reprefentations it made were in the language of a friend afflicted, but not irritated, by the injuries it complained of. The recall of that minifter was received with univerfal joy, as a confirmation that his whole fyftem of conduct was attributable only to himself; and not even the publication of his private inftructions could perfuade the American government to ascribe any part of it to this Republic.

At the fame time the exertions of the United States to pay up the arrearages of their debt to France, which had been unavoidably permitted to accumulate, their difinterested and liberal advances to the fufferers of St. Domingo, thrown fuddenly upon them, without provifions or money, whofe recommendation was, that they were Frenchmen and unfortunate; the perfeverance with which they appologized for and ascribed any occafional injuries they fuftained to the force of circumftances; the interest which they continued openly to take in all the fortunes of this Republic, manifefted partialities of a very different fort from those which have been so unjuftly attributed to them."

At this period too, a great principle was brought into difcuffion, the difpaffionate confideration of which is effential to the fair eftimate of the charges made by France against the government of the United States. The property of French citizens was taken by British cruizers and ships of war, out of American bottoms, and the American government fubmitted to

the practice. The propriety of fubmitting to it, depends entirely on the naked right of the captors, under the exifting circumftances of the cafe, to exercise fuch a power. The circumftances were these: In the treaty of commerce made between France and the United States in February 1778, it was ftipulated in substance, that neither party should take out of the veffels of the other, the goods of its enemy, but the character of the bottom fhould be imparted to its cargo. With England the United States had made no ftipulation on the fubject.

It follows then that the rights of England, being neither diminished or encreased by compact, remained precifely in their natural state, and were to be ascertained by fome pre-existing acknowledged principle.

This principle is to be fearched for in the law of nations. That law forms, independent of compact, a rule of action by which the fovereignties of the civilized world confent to be governed. It prefcribes what one nation may do without giving juft caufe of war, and what, of confequence, another may and ought to permit, without being confidered as having facrificed its honor, its dignity or its independence.

What then is the doctrine of the law of nations on this fubject? Do neutral bottoms, of right and independent of particular compact, protect hoftile goods? The question is to be confidered on its mere right, uninfluenced by the wishes or the interefts of a neutral or belligerent power.

It is a general rule, that war gives to a belligerent power a right to feize and confifcate the goods of his enemy. However humanity may deplore the application of this principle, there is perhaps no one to which man has more univerfally affented, or to which jurifts have more uniformly agreed. Its theory and its practice have unhappily been maintained in all ages. This right then may be exercised on the goods of an enemy wherever found, unless opposed by fome fuperior right. It yields by common confent to the fuperior right of a neutral nation to protect, by virtue of its fovereignty, the goods of either of the belligerent powers, found within its jurisdiction. But can this right of protection, admitted to be poffeffed by every government within its own limits, in virtue of its abfolute fovereignty, be communicated to a veffel navigating the high feas?

It is fuppofed that it cannot be fo communicated; becaufe the ocean being common to all nations, no abfolute fovereignty can be acquired in it: the rights of all are equal, and muft neceffarily check, limit and restrain each other. The fuperior right therefore of abfolute fovereignty, to protect all property within its own territory, ceafes to be fuperior, when the property is no longer within its own territory, and may be encountered by the oppofing acknowledged right of a belligerent power, to feize and confiscate the goods of his enemy. If the belligerent permits the neutral to attempt without hazard to himself, thus to ferve and aid his enemy, yet he does not relinquish the right of defeating that attempt whenever it fhall be in his power to defeat it. Thus it is admitted that an armed veffel may stop and search at sea a neutral bottom, and may take out goods, which are contraband of war, without giving cause of offence, or being fuppofed in any degree to infringe neutral rights. But this practice could not be permitted within the rivers, harbours or other places of a neutral, where its fovereignty was complete. It follows then that the full right of affording protection to all property whatever, within its own territory, which is inherent in every government, is not transferred to a veffel navigating the high feas. The right of a belligerent over the goods of his enemy within his reach, is as complete, as his right over contraband of war; and it feems a position not eafily to be refuted, that a fituation that will not protect the one, will not protect the other. A neutral bottom then does not of right, in cases where no compact exifts, protect from his enemy the goods of a belligerent power. To this reafoning, the practice of nations has conformed, and the common understanding of mankind feems to have affented. Vattel, B. 3. Sect.

115, fays pofitively, "that effects belonging to an enemy, found on board a neutral ship are seizable by the rights of war."

Vattel is believed to be fupported by the most approved writers on the fame fubject. It is deemed unneceffary to multiply citations to this point; becaufe France herself is fuppofed to have decided it. In her maritime ordonnance of the year 1744, which is considered as having been in force in 1778, enemy goods in neutral bottoms, generally, are declared liable to feizure and confifcation. From the operation of this rule are excepted the veffels of Denmark, and the United Provinces, to whom special treaties fecured the exception. In the ordonnance too of the 26th July, 1778, the first article of which is confidered as forbidding the cruizers of France to stop and bring into port neutral veffels, having on board the goods of an enemy, a power is referved to revoke the privilege granted to neutrals by that article, if the enemy fhould not grant the fame privilege within fix months from the publication of that regulation. This clearly indicates a conviction, that the exemption from the capture of the goods of an enemy, which fhould be found on board the veffel of a neutral power, not having ftipulated fuch exemption by treaty, was a privilege granted by the ordonnance, and that the mere revocation of the ordonnance would abolifh the privilege, and restore the ancient rule. It will not be contended that France has continued in a long course of practice and of legislation oppofed to her own opinion of the law of nations. It must then be confidered as the opinion of France, that under that law neutral bottoms afford no protection to the goods of an enemy. This principle, thus admitted to have been established, is fuppofed by fome to have been changed by the armed neutrality. A new law of nations, it is contended, was introduced, by that confederation. But who were the parties to that federation, and what was its object? The northern maritime powers of Europe united to protect by force, in their own bottoms, during the then exifting war, the goods of either and of all the belligerent powers. The compact in its own nature was confined with respect to its objects and its duration. It did not purport to change nor could it change permanently and univerfally the rights of nations not becoming parties to it. It did indeed hold forth the promife of future more permanent and more general engagements for the fame object, but fuch engagements were never formed. How then can this temporary and partial convention be confidered as altering, radically and generally, principles which have been univerfally adopted, and in the modification of which all have an intereft? Would France herself admit that a combination, fuch as that which conftituted the armed neutrality, may rightfully change the law of nations, and establish a new code of univerfal obligation? It is believed that no nation on earth would more perfeveringly oppofe fuch an invasion of its fovereignty.

There feems then to be no folid ground for maintaining, that the general law of nations has been at all varied by the armed neutrality.

It remains to enquire whether the treaties, between France and the Uni-* ed States, pledge either nation to affert and establish the principle, that free bottoms make free goods.

The treaty of amity and commerce, concluded the 6th February 1778, ftipulates reciprocally for the right of trading with and protecting the goods of the enemy of either party in the veffels of the other, and in turn furrenders its own goods found in the veffels of an enemy, but it contains no clause impofing on either party the duty of extending the principle, or of fupporting its application to other nations. The ftipulations of that treaty are negative as well as affirmative. They fpecify as well the difabi. lities intended to be created and the duties to be impofed, as the privileges defigned to be granted. Had it been intended that either nation fhould have been bound to maintain this principle in its intercourfe with others, or fhould have been in any degree incapaciated from profecuting freely that

intercourse, without the previous admiffion of the principle, a ftipulation to that effect would have been made. No fuch ftipulation having been made, the parties cannot be prefumed to have intended it. Indeed it would have been madness in the United States, under their actual circumftances, to have formed fuch an agreement. There being no exprefs ftipulation to this effect, it cannot be fuppofed to have been implied. Nations forming a folemn compact which ought to regulate their conduct towards each other which is to be reforted to as the ftandard for adjusting their differences, do not leave to implication fuch delicate and important points. Indeed if a great principle not mentioned is permitted to be implied, the object of a written agreement, which is itself to evidence all the obligation it creates, is totally defeated. But who is to make the implication, and to what extent is implication to be allowed? It is very eafy to perceive, that the doctrine of implying in contracts ftipulations never formed, would destroy all certainty, of construction, and open a boundless field of controversy to the contracting parties.

It refults from the very nature of a contract which affects the rights of the parties, but not of others, and from the admiffion of a general rule of action, binding independent of compact, which may be changed by confent, but is only changed fo far as that confent is actually given, that a treaty between any two nations must leave to all others thofe rights which the law of nations acknowledges; and must leave each of the contracting parties fubject to the operation of fuch rights. For the truth of this pofition, believed to be fo clear in itself, and which it is fuppofed the hiftory of all Europe will illuftrate, the ordonnance of 1744, already quoted, is confidered as furnishing an unequivocal authority. By that ordonnance the law of nations is ap-' plied to all thofe neutrals with whom France had not ftipulated, that the quality of their bottoms fhould be imparted to their cargoes, while thofe with whom fuch stipulations had been made are exempted from the application of the law.

The defire of eftablishing univerfally the principle that neutral bottoms fhall make neutral goods, is perhaps felt by no nation on earth, more strongly, than by the United States. Perhaps no nation is more deeply interested in its establishment. It is an object they keep in view, and which, if not forced by violence to abandon it, they will purfue in fuch manner as their own judgment may dictate as being beft calculated to attain it; but the wish to eftablish a principle is effentially different from a determination that it is already established. The interefts of the United States could not fail to produce the with their duty forbid them to indulge it, when deciding on a mere right. However folicitous America might be to purfue all proper means, tending to obtain for this principle the affent of all or any of the maritime powers of Europe, the never conceived the idea of obtaining that confent by force.

The United States will only arm to defend their own rights: neither their policy nor their interefts permit them to arm, in order to compel a furrender of the rights of others. Thefe and other confiderations, which have been fubmitted to the government of France, produced on the part of the. United States a decifion, that their bottoms could not of right protect the goods of a belligerent power from an enemy not bound to refpect the principle. This decifion was founded on the most perfect conviction, that it was enjoined by the law of nations; and that good faith, refpect for truth, and for the duties of an upright and honeft judgment, rendered it indifpenfible. This conviction remains unfhaken. If those articles, which still appear conclufive to the American government, have not the fame operation on the judgment of France, they muft at least be fufficient to evince the fincerity with which that government has acted, and to prove that its conduct, in this refpect, was produced by a fenfe of duty, and not by any partiality for a nation against which it was, at that time, confiderably irritated by other

causes.

The undersigned, citizen minifter, rely too implicitly on your candoar and difcernment, to apprehend, that you will eftimate improperly, the motives which on this effential point have influenced and guided the United States.

1

The early decifion of the American government on this fubject was immediately avowed, openly and amply fupported by Mr. Jefferson, the then Secretary of State, in his letter to Mr. Genet, dated the 24th July, 1793; and in his letter to Mr. Morris, dated 16th August in the fame year. The arguments, which thofe letters contain, were fuppofed to have fatisfied the government of France, fince its minifters in the United States no longer controverted the principle they fupported. Indeed those arguments appeared too conclufive to permit a doubt concerning the fuccefs which would attend

them.

In August 1794, when Mr. Monroe, the then minifter of the United States to this Republic, was received into the bofom of the convention, France obviously did not confider the acknowledgement of this established principle of the law of nations, as indicating a partiality towards her enemy. The language ufed on the occafion could only have been used to the minifter of a nation, whofe friendship was valued, and whofe conduct had evinced the fincerity of its profeffions. It was then declared "that the fweetest, the frankeft fraternity united in effect the two Republics," and that "their union would be forever indiffoluble." Thefe declarations, made long after America had avowed its neutrality, and had avowed its acquiefcence under the principle, that a belligerent power, unrestrained by particular treaty, may of right take out of the bottoms of a neutral, the goods of its enemy, demonftrate that neither that neutrality nor that acquiefcence induced the want of a proper regard for France. The government of the United States ftill cherishes the hope, that this true and fair eftimate, then made of its conduct, may be foon refumed by a nation whofe friendship it has affiduoufly and unremittingly cultivated, by all those means which good faith and juftice could permit it to use.

After the difcuffion of this interesting question was fuppofed to have been clofed, and France was believed to have been entirely content with that system in which the United States found themselves bound to persevere, fome complaints were made, not against the principles adopted by the government, but against the application of thofe principles to particular cafes fuppofed not to come within them. The neutrality of the United States could not permit prize to be made of veffels belonging to nations with whom they were at peace, within their jurifdiction; or by Privateers fitted out in their own ports. Regulations to this effect were necessarily made; and to enforce the obfervance of thofe regulations, was a duty not to be difpenfed with. The right of one of the belligerent powers, to obtain the release of a veffel captured under fuch circumftances, was as facred as the right of the captor to a veffel taken on the high feas and which according to the ufages of war was lawful prize. The United States were bound to refpect the rights of both. To do fo, it was neceffary to examine the facts; for which purpose, a Tribunal, in which both parties might be fairly heard, was unavoidable. Some complaints were made of particular vexations, and each complaint has heretofore been particularly attended to. It is believed to be unneceffary to review these several cafes, because the underfigned are entirely perfuaded that explanations, already given, must have been completely fatisfactory. Should any one of them be ftill confidered as furnishing fubject for complaint, the undersigned will proceed to its investigation, with the most fincere desire to attain truth, and to redress the wrong, if any has been committed.

During this period, the caufes of complaint against France, on the part of the United States, were by no means inconsiderable. Their commerce was not exempt from depredations, believed to be entirely unwarrantable, made upon it by the Cruizers of this Republic.