A Social-contract Theory of Organizations

agreements American analogy approach argue bargaining behavior benefits choice cial claims coercion coercive collective goals common concepts concern conflict consequences consequentialist constitute contract contracts of adhesion corporate descriptive duties economic empirical employees ends entail ethical evaluation example exit fact freedom functional ganizations goal attainment goal models goal-based governmental groups human rights impartial imply individual rights industrial instance interactionist interests justice labor legislation Madison managerial managers ment Mintzberg moral rights natural persons natural rights negative freedom negotiation nizations nomic normative Nozick objective one's orga organiza organizational effectiveness organizational goals organizational participants organizational theory organizations outcomes Pareto efficiency persons perspective Pfeffer and Salancik policies political practices preferences Press principle problem production proposed question right-based role rules Selznick social systems social-contract society specific suggests theories of justice theorists tion tional tive unions vidual voluntary wages welfare well-being workers zations