A Social-contract Theory of OrganizationsUniversity of Notre Dame Press, 1988 - 277 էջ |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 27–ի 1-ից 3-ը:
Էջ 125
... tional authorities can be set aside . And it is crossed when we presume that the really interesting problem of organizational design concerns the division of labor . Recognizing the difficulties of explicitly justifying ruling elites or ...
... tional authorities can be set aside . And it is crossed when we presume that the really interesting problem of organizational design concerns the division of labor . Recognizing the difficulties of explicitly justifying ruling elites or ...
Էջ 208
... tional value , it is essential to recognize that the ends of participants can vary and conflict . Theorists have tried to simplify the problem of evaluating social systems by assuming uniformity of ends or lack of conflict among ends ...
... tional value , it is essential to recognize that the ends of participants can vary and conflict . Theorists have tried to simplify the problem of evaluating social systems by assuming uniformity of ends or lack of conflict among ends ...
Էջ 223
... tional harm , indeed any criterion of organizational effectiveness , is hardly the sum and substance of virtue for individual persons.116 A ( 1979 ) . 112 ( 1973 ) . 113 ( 1980 ) . 114Blackburn ( 1980 ) ; Werhane ( 1985 ) . 115Shue ...
... tional harm , indeed any criterion of organizational effectiveness , is hardly the sum and substance of virtue for individual persons.116 A ( 1979 ) . 112 ( 1973 ) . 113 ( 1980 ) . 114Blackburn ( 1980 ) ; Werhane ( 1985 ) . 115Shue ...
Բովանդակություն
Organizational Analogs | 21 |
Rights | 58 |
Applications | 107 |
Հեղինակային իրավունք | |
3 այլ բաժինները չեն ցուցադրվում
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agreements American analogy approach argue bargaining behavior benefits choice cial claims coercion coercive collective goals common concepts concern conflict consequences consequentialist constitute contract contracts of adhesion corporate descriptive duties economic empirical employees ends entail ethical evaluation example exit fact freedom functional ganizations goal attainment goal models goal-based governmental groups human rights impartial imply individual rights industrial instance interactionist interests justice labor legislation Madison managerial managers ment Mintzberg moral rights natural persons natural rights negative freedom negotiation nizations nomic normative Nozick objective one's orga organiza organizational effectiveness organizational goals organizational participants organizational theory organizations outcomes Pareto efficiency persons perspective Pfeffer and Salancik policies political practices preferences Press principle problem production proposed question right-based role rules Selznick social systems social-contract society specific suggests theories of justice theorists tion tional tive unions vidual voluntary wages welfare well-being workers zations